

PARTIES
PROBLEMS
AND
LEADERS
OF
'96






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THE "WHITE HOUSE," WASHINGTON, D. C.

Parties

Problems and Leaders

— of 1896

AN IMPARTIAL PRESENTATION OF LIVING
NATIONAL QUESTIONS,

EMBRACING:

The Campaign Outlook—President Making—Status of Parties
Principles of Free-Trade and Protection—Gold and
Silver Issues—Tariff Legislation—American
Reciprocity—The Monroe Doctrine—
Our Cuban Relations.

—WITH—

PORTRAITS AND BIOGRAPHIES

—OF—

DISTINGUISHED PARTY LEADERS;

—ALSO—

Lives of the Candidates for
President and Vice-President, Convention Proceedings and Full
Text of National Platforms.

—BY—

JAMES P. BOYD, A. M.

Author of "Men and Issues of '92," "Vital Questions," Etc.

PUBLISHERS' UNION

1896

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INTRODUCTORY.

THE national will finds expression for the twenty-eighth time in the presidential election of 1896. The last event is no less momentous than the first, or any intermediate one. Considered as a spectacle it is the most imposing of all, for everything that enters into it is on a stupendous scale. An empire of forty-five states, breasting the two great oceans of the globe, chooses by common consent its executive guardian for four years. Thirteen million voters meet in national tribunal to determine their quadrennial policy. Never before has earth yielded areas of such magnitude to popular government. History nowhere records the voluntary, peaceful judgment of so many freemen, spoken at an agreed upon time, and, as it were, with a single breath.

But the recurrence of a national election in this great republic is far other than a mere spectacle. It is preëminently suggestive of the inner meaning of popular empire, and eloquently expressive of the underlying forces that make empire possible and permanent. It is the opened mouth of sovereignty, whose voice is heard on hill-top and in valley, by river and lake, and whose speech is, for the time, the irresistible edict.

And what a meaning the word sovereignty has in a republic like ours, as compared with other forms of empire! It was never a part of any feudal government to

recognize sovereignty as in the people. Yet it is doubtful if there was ever a time in the history of any nation when the people did not feel that sovereignty was in themselves. Many learned writers who recognize organic sovereignty as in the people, call it sovereignty only when it takes the tangible shape of government or law. But in the United States sovereignty is the undoubted birthright of the individual. He gives it majesty and moving, visible effect when he unites it with the same right in others, acting along the same plane of thought and desire. As it takes many soldiers to make an army, so individual sovereignty assumes imposing and effective force when it bubbles forth from a set of men, a society, a community, a people, a nation, and embodies an aggregate or joint will, the election providing the opportunity for, and the ballot being the medium of, expression. In the individual it may be as a still small voice in a wilderness of men, but joined with other voices, in the same key of affirmation or protest, it becomes as Jove's voice thundering a verdict from Olympian heights. It is then that it speaks into existence legislators, laws, governors, presidents, policies, constitutions, states, empires. And, in hours of great public grievance, incendiary thought or violent partisan outburst, it may mean defiance of all law, official dethronement, smashing of constitutions, upheaval of states, crashing of empires.

So then the inner, vital, inspiring force of republican empire which makes so omnipotently for weal, if rightly directed, may make equally for woe, if wrongly directed. The responsibility of proper direction is at the source of the force—in the individual voter. In the lower forms of government, individual instinct, that is, nature's education, is a sufficient directive energy. In higher forms of

government intelligence must supplement instinct. In the highest form of government, as in our own republic, where there is scarcely a gap between the source of the governing force and its outward expression or even active application, intelligence ought to be the supreme qualification. Therein alone lies national stability and safety ; therein only exists hope for the benefit of healthy, pure, responsive government, and for the glory of free institutions.

Therefore the awful responsibility of a vote is commensurate with the mighty right to vote. Both are exalted with the magnitude, importance or complexity of the problems seeking solution. Public questions do not grow fewer with the years, nor become less momentous. On the contrary they by right expand in number and importance just as territory grows, industries increase, commerce multiplies, and all social and economic interests amplify. Even should there come exceptional times when issues are narrow in number and complexity, it will be found that like finer metals they weigh all the more, and involve quite as much, as when they are many or less simple. The situation of this very hour may not be, comparatively speaking, complicated as to national issues, but who has ever seen the time in our political history when they concerned so intimately the pocket, food, raiment, shelter, health and happiness of the toiling masses, or were regarded so nervously by the farmer, manufacturer, merchant, banker and creditor?

However careless the American voter may have hitherto been about preparation to cast a satisfactory ballot, or however much he may have striven to exercise an intelligent will at the polls, it cannot at this juncture escape him that it is incumbent on him to do all in his power to make his exercise of personal sovereignty as clear

and decisive as possible. This work has been prepared with a view to helping him. If it should be accepted as his preparatory hand-book, he can readily prime himself for the election occasion and form a judgment which he can defend in the forum of conscience and before the world. One thing he can be sure of to start with, and that is that he will be unhampered by any attempt on the part of the author to sway his feelings or influence his inclinations. As partisanship is not a proper part of free education, and as every fountain of knowledge should be of unadulterated liquid, so the information offered in this volume is neither speculative nor biased, but only such as the historic verities warrant.

The problems of the times are most serious, the issues broad. Voters are in no humor to "go it blind" for the sake of party. The spirit of this work meets their spirit. It presents the living questions, the issues that burn for solution, not as seen by partisan or party, not in any narrow, controversial view, but as the intelligent, independent voter would have them, and had best have them, so that he can see them from all sides and form for himself an estimate of their worth.

The constant aim of the author has been to steer clear of the narrowness, selfishness, partisanship and perishability of the ordinary campaign book, and to present the problems involved in the national election in all their phases, so that both, or all, sides may be studied, and so that their study may not be for to-day only, but for all the time the problems may be uppermost. In no other form could a work touching on political questions, and issued during a period of political controversy, prove as high a compliment to the intelligence and independence of the reader. In no other form could it deserve or find

so permanent a place in the library and great school of the home.

The problems amplified are those of President Making, Parties, Free Trade, Protection, Silver and Gold, Tariff Legislation, Reciprocity, Monroe Doctrine, Cuban Relations—all vital and urgent. They are introduced with a horoscope of the campaign, interspersed with frequent portraits of eminent statesmen and political leaders of all parties, together with their biographies, and supplemented with lives of the presidential candidates.

The publishers have greatly helped the purpose of the author to provide a plain, impartial educational work of a political kind for legislators, public speakers and voters, by gracing it with so many beautiful illustrations, so clear and readable a type and such unsurpassed excellence and beauty of paper and binding.

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HON. JAMES McMILLAN.

Born at Hamilton, Ont., May 12, 1838; prepared for College, but entered business in Detroit, 1855; established Michigan Car Company, 1863; member and chairman of Republican State Central Committee, 1876, 1886, 1890; President of Detroit Park Commission and Board of Estimates; Republican Presidential Elector, 1884; elected to United States Senate, as Republican, for term beginning March 4, 1889, and re-elected in 1895; an industrious, practical member, whose opinions command respect; Chairman of Committee on District of Columbia and member of Committees on Commerce, Naval Affairs and Corporations in D. C.



HON. GEORGE GRAHAM VEST.

Born at Frankfort, Ky., December 6, 1830; graduated at Centre College, Ky., 1848, and at Law Department of Transylvania University, 1853; same year moved to Missouri and began practice of law; Presidential Elector on Democratic ticket, 1860; member of Missouri Legislature, 1860-61; served for two years as member of Confederate Congress, and one year in Confederate Senate; elected to U. S. Senate, as a Democrat, 1879; re-elected 1885 and 1890; member of Committees on Finance, Commerce, Public Buildings and Grounds, and Epidemic Diseases.

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POLITICAL LINES OF 1896.

THE campaign of 1896 has much in common with preceding ones, yet is so different in vital respects as to be of an exceptional kind in American political history.

The turmoil incident to a national election, the blight of uncertainty that settles on enterprise, the suspension of industrial and mercantile energies in the midst of excitement, have, too often, contributed to the feeling that such an election was more of a visitation than a welcome event.

Happily for the one now pending, it is eagerly looked to by all parties, and even by all classes of men, as an event which is to dispose of questions that more nearly concern their business efforts, mechanical skill and economic welfare, than their partisan prejudices. Never heretofore have the masses been in so subdued and thoughtful a mood, and never before have the issues in their hands for disposal reached down closer to their homes, pockets, prosperity and happiness. Therefore the campaign is more than ever a period of serious consideration rather than noisy excitement, and the election a welcome opportunity rather than a simple and recurrent political event.

One feature not hitherto uncommon to national campaigns, and which, while fascinating, has been least productive of satisfactory results, is the outside place at pres-

ent accorded to the politician pure and simple. This feature has been prominent ever since the beginning of the presidential year. In all those preliminary stages of the campaign, when ground was being broken for the national conventions, and when political leaders expected to find rich soil in which to cultivate their crops of selfish pipe-laying and sordid patronage manipulation, they were, as a rule, relegated to the rear, or thwarted in their most cunning designs, by a majestic and irresistible flow of general sentiment. This was so marked in the Republican organization as to place both a unanimous party policy and a prospective candidate far beyond reach of ambitious coteries or scheming juntas; and in the Democratic organization, as to amount to a proclamation, "hands off till the hour of final counsel."

And as the contentions took the glow and gleam of heated campaign, as the stump became radiant with controversy and redolent with eloquence, as the grand surges of political thought swept onward toward the goal of the ballot, more than ever was the politician lost sight of as either an animating or directing energy. He became as a mere piece of drift in a resistless current. There was no toleration of his presence or plans, no time nor opportunity for him to intrigue, flatter or control.

In the two or three preceding presidential campaigns the presence of a cold-blooded, calculating element, capable of dark, designing work which might have the effect of entrapping candidates, modifying vital party measures, securing dangerous selfish concessions, or entirely controlling the problems of defeat and victory, served to cloud and chill the situations, to provoke doubts and asperities, and to degrade all the functions of open, honorable canvass. Good men grew ashamed, earnest men lost

heart, candid men became puzzled, convinced men wavered, those who sought conviction at the shrines of leaders came away in a shroud of doubt, or oftener, and what was worse, filled with false notions of duty to self, party and country. Such an element has been eliminated from this campaign by force of its very earliest conditions—a determination on the part of voters to think, speak and act more largely and independently for themselves.

The highest educative political forces, the most teachable object lessons, of many years past, have so wrought upon individual welfares, have entered so minutely every sphere of activity, have so punctured every mind susceptible to impression, that independency has come to be looked upon as a salvation. What was once holy allegiance to party creed is now the application of experience—often hard and bitter experience—to the more immediate conditions of existence. The party shibboleth is as nothing compared with the ultimate principle, the overspreading, all pervading law, whose practical application means the mental and moral lifting up, the social and industrial betterment, of those whose destinies are in their own keeping. It is likely that the radical political revolutions of the last few years have done more to call the attention of voters to themselves, to their personal and home needs, to the effect of tried principles upon the nation, its institutions, its industries, its prosperity, than any other events could possibly have done. These revolutions have taught voters their power, yet at the same time that simple impulses should never be mistaken for judgments, and that where the latter strike so deeply as to reach the workshop and the hearthstone, they ought to be the most seriously considered of all judgments. They have still further taught that in the application of great economic laws and

broad business principles to human situations, mutation, even when it assumes the brilliant and fascinating hues of revolution, may prove to be means of devastation rather than help. Says that exquisite pundit, James Russell Lowell;—

“Change jes for change is like them big hotels,
Where they change plates and let you live on smells.”

But independency on the part of voters is often inseparable from a species of turbulency most distracting to exact campaign methods. However it may gratify personal sentiment or conviction, whatever the effect may be on individual or general welfare, there is, for the time being, party disconcert, amounting to even the fracture of old established lines, to the enunciation of fresh principles, to the establishment of new parties, to the multiplication of candidatures. The time has been when these have gone so far as to entirely befog real situations and to lead to results quite contrary to what was desired by anyone. The present situation may not, in all respects, exactly repeat that above alluded to, but if not, it is because the average voter sought a landing place before he took his leap. He has not allowed broken party allegiance to run wild, but has anchored it quickly and spontaneously on a previously chosen bottom. In changing boats he has not become a waif, to be tossed helplessly on waves of tumultuous sentiment. Hence the very discords that have characterized former analogous situations and often thwarted their aims, are not now either dangerous or undesirable. Even supposing the disconcert to become most distracting, and the tumult most discordant, the life lines of very peculiar circumstances are out in plentitude, and voters can, if they choose, land themselves

safely on friendly shores. Even supposing candidatures to be inordinately multiplied, the room for wise choice can hardly be said to be so curtailed as to provoke lengthy doubt or impel to disastrous mistake.

And this is particularly true because in all the outcrops of the present campaign thus far, the matter of mere men has been subordinated to the matter of measures. Considering the earnestness of all, the magnitude of measures, the solemnity of the political situation, what we as a people of workers and business are to escape, what to remedy, what to confront, there is no good reason to suppose that campaign beginnings do not exactly reflect their endings, and that the final verdict will be the proclamation of a much needed and desirable result.

This displacement of leaders, especially the candidates, by the measures they represent, happily leaves little provocation for vulgar, personal politics. All must remember with humiliation the indecent opening of the campaign of 1884. For weeks, and even months, it was a game of personal sharpshooting, an occasion of revilement, a fiery furnace of character attacks and defences, most degrading to party honor and despicable in the eyes of individuals whatever their political predilections. Such an exhibition cannot be repeated now, if ever. Candidates are not standing for more than measures. In this, as very likely in all the political battles of the near future, it is hardly probable that voters will permit an overthrow of their deliberative mood, and an eclipse of issues at stake, by halting to indulge in the vile tactics of personalism.

Honorable partisanship is the making of a campaign. As issues broaden and deepen, their very solemnity smoothes the rough and acerb edges of partisanship, gives it healthy tone, adapts it to the high and noble work of

clear, fair, truthful statement, and calm, deliberative, forceful defence. The true partisan becomes the best of political school-teachers. He may be the statesman of the hour, the leader of the future. This campaign is prolific of opportunities for that class of partisans who have honest convictions, fearless natures, clear judgments, fair spirits and gifted expression. The partisan of only heated words, loud expletives, false assertions, specious logic and idle promises, will find himself without a mission, or ought to so find himself, at a time when dispassionate discussions should rule the hour and when all bitterness and falsehood should be at lowest discount. The orator of this grandest of all political occasions, a presidential election, will have before him such an audience as he never before addressed. It will be a large audience, for the masses are in motion; a critical audience, for the masses are inquiring; a studious audience, for the masses are thinking; a subdued audience, for the masses are not in jubilee humor, but in grimly defiant mood. A forcible fact is going to avail far more than a pyrotechnic spurt. Vituperative thunder is going to addle very few brains. Sophistical balloons will find themselves punctured ere they reach a floating medium. There may be localities in which all this will prove an exception, but they will be few and wide apart. There may be men foolish enough, or ignorant enough, to rely for argument and effort on sarcasm, bitterness, vituperation and deceit, but they will certainly look in vain for spirited applause or sincere converts.

The activities and energies of the campaign can hardly fail to prove variegated and interesting. What will be lacking in the spectacular will be made up in that asiduity of speech and competitive vigor of work which the political situation demands. The crisis warrants a

“campaign of education” in the highest and most diversified sense. The issues seek enlargement, require emphasis. Campaign agency must prove vigorous and untiring, energy, restless and persevering, devotion, sincere and uncompromising.

National questions were never more national. So the popular verdict should be all the more dispassionate. This campaign and election should emphasize the era which notes the final departure of all dishonorable means for securing political victories.

This campaign, as it surges along, makes rapid headway toward the two only issues that the past few years have rendered logical and inevitable. The sweep of events has been so magnificent and irresistible as to crush out of sight party questions of minor moment, and to subordinate all lesser political differences to those of supreme magnitude. Ever since 1887, there existed a determination on the part of those who passed as tariff reformers to wage relentless war upon the existing economic system of the country. In the national battle of 1888 they suffered signal defeat. Not daunted, however, they reopened the war more vigorously than ever, and in the national engagement of 1892 they scored a significant triumph, which they speedily put to use by overthrowing the tariff system of 1890, and introducing that quite opposite system of 1894.

For reasons of whose accuracy everyone must be left to judge for himself, the country was dissatisfied with a regime so opposite to that which had been overthrown, and so full of melancholy contrasts with it. This dissatisfaction was made manifest in the State elections of 1893. In the Congressional elections of 1894, it assumed the proportions of emphatic protest, and the political

situation was entirely reversed. In 1895 the verdicts of disapproval were still stronger. Democracy lost in its very strongest holds.

Here, then, was a full three year trend toward a culmination which was unavoidable in 1896. No matter what politicians, economists and parties thought, as to the propriety of a battle royal, in 1896, over the tariff issue, the voters themselves had seemingly determined in advance that the time was opportune for them to recast their judgment of 1892. Thus there was no escape in 1896, from the issue that had not been allowed to rest for three years. There must be another trial of strength over a question so vital to national welfare and so intimately woven with individual prosperity. In all the preliminaries of the campaign of 1896, throughout all its earliest stages, the parties looked to such a trial as inevitable and braced themselves for it. But the tariff was not to be an issue merely ; it was to be the main issue. Nothing could eclipse it in importance. It meant meat, clothing and shelter for toilers. It meant revived industry, living wages, an era of restored prosperity and happiness, where all was idleness, poverty and discontent. This on the one hand ; on the other hand it meant for those who saw in the tariff of 1894 the culmination of anti-protectionism an opportunity to confirm the wisdom of the doctrine they had carried to triumph in 1892, and had so fully and energetically incorporated into our economic system. They could not but be eager to repeat that triumph, for then the tariff policy of the country would be fixed in their favor for a generation at least.

But while the parties with their banners were thus lining up for the tariff fray, there came upon them a

diversion which quite transfixed them for a time at least. It could not be said to have come suddenly nor unexpectedly, but its fervor manner and force were so overwhelming as to carry with it a sense of shock, if not dismay. The question of free silver coinage was an old one, and one which had been made familiar by its especial champion, Mr. Bland. It had been made a cardinal doctrine by the People's, or Populist, party in their platform of 1892, and had been stoutly advocated on the stump wherever that party exercised its campaign energies. With the spread of Populism in the West and South, it became more and more a party tenet, and its advocates in both Democratic and Republican ranks made it stronger with themselves than their party allegiance. They used it in the Fifty-fourth Congress as a foil to the legislation which the House had passed, the condition being that no legislation of moment should be completed by the Senate unless it bore the free silver coinage stamp.

Statesmen and publicists of both the leading parties felt that a grave political error had been committed in 1892 by Mr. Cleveland's party managers in seeking alliances with the Populists in the Western States. They were warned by the most astute minds in the Democratic party that such alliances would prove troublesome, if not fatal. But they adhered to their purpose, feeling that all was fair in politics, that the Republicans could receive no harder blow, and trusting to Mr. Cleveland's power to hold all that would be gained to strict party allegiance, and mould all to the dominant party will.

It took but little time to ascertain that these alliances had given an impetus to the free silver coinage sentiment, which threaten to sweep Democracy from its

ancient moorings. What it had sown was not the true seed, but dragons' teeth; what it had admitted into its citadel was not a helpful engine, but a Trojan horse. It became a rule at Democratic conventions in the West and South, and especially in those conventions whose main object was to elect delegates to the Chicago Convention, to declare in favor of the free coinage of silver at the ratio of 16 to 1, which was one of the planks in the Populist platform of 1892, inserted at the Omaha Convention.

In order to stem this rapidly rising silver tide, and to correct as far as possible the error of 1892, the administration entered into contests in several States, notably in Kentucky, but with little avail. Its every advice and appeal either passed unheeded, or served to stir opposition to deeper, depth and bitterer proportions. The tide daily grew higher and swept along more irresistibly. It took on more and more the lines of sturdy purpose and intelligent direction. Direct antagonism to the administration was courted rather than feared, and defiance became a test of faith in the free silver doctrine.

Meanwhile circumstances all contributed to a possible coherence of the silver strength. The Prohibitionists met in National Convention at Pittsburgh in May, only to find that a large contingent of their strength was so infected with free silver coinage as to make its acceptance a condition of support of the old cardinal principles of the party. Being defeated, this "broad guage" contingent bolted the convention and nominated a ticket on a free silver coinage platform.

In June, the Republicans met in National Convention at St. Louis. There also a free silver contingent was on

hand, and in earnest demand for a free silver coinage plank in the platform of the party. Their request was denied, and they too bolted the convention to cast their political fortunes in with the other exponents of their doctrine. These bolts affected the respective parties more or less seriously. While they were deprecated, they served, perhaps, to clarify party situations; at least they served to encourage the free silver coinage sentiment, and to render it brave for the work of closer amalgamation and final coherence.

At length, the opportunity that had long been desired for a show of coherent strength and aggressive initial came with the Democratic Convention at Chicago, in July. A single test of strength showed that free silver coinage had captured the Democratic citadel, and that, as to aggressiveness, it was fully endowed with the old Democratic martial spirit. It would hear no concession or compromise, but enthroned itself as an only rightful master, determined that its cardinal doctrines which were many, novel, striking, and, as some say, dangerous, should henceforth bear the full Democratic stamp and possess the clear Democratic ring.

This signal triumph gave new metes and bounds to the political situation. As to Democracy, it was a right-about-face of the oldest political organization in the country. It at once put the hitherto unorganized free silver element in possession of a party name and party machinery. It afforded them a nucleus around which every other free silver party, or element, by whatever name called, could rally. It imparted the prestige of generations of conflict to the newly pledged captors of a time-honored political army. The standard of Jefferson, the gonfalon of Jackson, the ancient spirit of

battled-scarred Democracy, were all theirs by virtue of bravery and numbers, and for inspiration in fresh wars for newly engrafted principals. What matter if the dissaffected should bolt? Better that than divided counsels, or traitorous priests within the holy-of-holies. What matter if the unruly and untrue should set up counter tickets or go off into the wilderness of despair to worship strange gods? Every vacancy would be filled by new recruits. Thus hopefully did the enthusiastic victors of Chicago reason, thus they presumed on the strength and character of their conquest. Their position had all the radiance of newly achieved glory, all the promise of a broad popular victory at the polls.

Discomfitted and mourning Democrats likened the situation to that of 1860, when the party was rent into two irreconcilable factions over the question of slavery. They saw in the new departure of the majority of their party a step toward repudiation and anarchy, and they naturally likened it to a time when patriotism was preferred to party allegiance. The problem was how best to cope with a situation they deemed revolutionary and dangerous. Should they cope with it by holding to the party name and making another nomination for President? Should they quietly acknowledge the will of the majority and enter secret protest at the polls? Never had dilemma two such formidable horns. Both were charged with a voltage that rendered their touch hazardous. A second ticket would divert strength that ought to go to the defeat of the first, and which might, in the end, only show the weakness of the minority. To let matters drift might, in the end, be accepted as acquiescence in what they regarded as absurd politics and as an attack on national credit and


institutions. Time alone could bring about an intelligent decision. The new frontage of Democracy not only bore the seeds of disintegration on the winds of alarm, but it presented a strategic problem to the Republicans who were fully committed to the dual doctrines of sound money and protective tariff. They had even dug their trenches and stretched their tents on an alignment by means of which they could most successfully resist a free trade onslaught. Should they shift position and re-arrange for a currency attack by flank and front? And if so, what was to become of the issue upon which they staked their most ardent hopes of success, which had for them involved a life or death principle throughout all the years of their existence? The Democratic dilemma became the Republican quandary.

The judgment was eventually reached that the Republican lines as first laid down were ample, with a little shifting so as to anticipate the free silver artillery charge, and a little strengthening in places, so as to provide against unexpected developments of strength by the enemy. It would still be an industrial battle as well as one of finance, but with the former as a reserve to the latter wherever the character of the fray determined it wise. Thus the sudden and alarming diversion at Chicago would not necessarily prove fatal, however disturbing it might be to political calculations for a time.


It is almost unnecessary to speak of the influence of the Chicago outcome upon the fortunes of the triumphant majority of the Democratic party there, or rather upon the Democratic party as it existed after that triumph. Its platform called for much of a radical and impracticable nature, but on nothing so

loudly, squarely and honestly as the free coinage of silver at a ratio of 16 to 1. This was the momentous and absorbing tenet. In this it was to be original, in this wholly at variance with ancient party traditions. On this it was to go before the country as an independent pleader for suffrage. It would scarcely have another battle cry. Around this standard it expected to rally the disaffected of all parties. With this inspiration it confidently counted on a campaign as triumphant in the end as that which had placed a venerable Democracy within its control. If nothing occurred to thwart its plans or depress its hopes, the country would certainly witness one of the grandest of marches of sentiment toward a coveted destination. No political calculation could for a time compass this novel, persistent, dauntless and enthusiastic force. It certainly had a right to the confidence its capture of Democracy inspired. It also had a right to pose as the central planet about which all other silver planets should revolve. Upon it would rest the responsibility of every initiative in the pending battle, and with it would abide all the glories of victory or disgraces of defeat. Hence its boundless energy and restless determination ; hence also its right to expect, or even command, the adhesion of all sentiment that looked toward free silver coinage as a relief from existing ills.


At no stage of the campaign were party lines ever so tightly drawn as to exclude free intercourse between the pickets or free leaps over the parapets. This was essential. The educative work was stupendous — far more so than if tariff alone had been an only, or the prime, issue, for the average voter had made himself familiar with the objects and effects of a tariff. To




GEORGE WASHINGTON.




JOHN ADAMS.



THOMAS JEFFERSON.



JAMES MADISON.




JAMES MONROE.



JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.




ANDREW JACKSON




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
WILLIAM H. HARRISON.



JOHN TYLER.



JAMES K. POLK



ZACHARY TAYLOR.

speaking more accurately, the tariff had lost its mystery as an economical problem, and had become one of those every-day questions, comprehensive to everyone who had heads to shelter, mouths to feed, and backs to clothe.

But it was not so with the financial question. The averment was that low prices, hard times, and every cognate ill, was due to the demonitization of silver, and would flee away under the spell of free and unlimited coinage of silver at the ratio of 16 to 1. But who arose to prove all this? It never at any time passed beyond the stage of vehement and plausible averment. And who understood all this? Certainly not the average voter to whom it was first introduced. Demonitization to him was the veriest Greek, and 16 to 1 was a Chinese puzzle. Ratios were as nothing compared with bread and butter.

On the other hand the averment was that free silver coinage meant the repudiation of debts, the scaling of prices and wages, the introduction of panic, the destruction of credits, universal bankruptcy and demoralization. Admitting it all, still men would ask, how then comes it that so many advocates of disaster are found in the country? How could these calamity seekers walk into a great conservative and patriotic convention and walk away with it bodily? How could they make so many and such easy converts in so short a time? Surely there must be some misrepresentation of a situation which proves so alluring and potential as to attract and hold as this one does! It cannot be that the multitude are so filled with the Gadarene spirit as to wish to rush over the precipice into the sea!

All along in the campaign it has been the wish of

every man of patriotic instincts, and the expectation of parties, that the leading issues, as already foreshadowed, should never be lost sight of, but should be persistently fought to a finish. As the country has seen, dalliance with a great economic and industrial problem, like the tariff, is destructive of energies and hopes, subversive of investment and enterprise, and quite as costly in the end as actual war.

The same can be truthfully said of agitation respecting the country's currency and finances, especially when such agitation is suddenly sprung by those who oppose the established usages of credit and exchange, and who favor radical departures in the interest of debtor and against creditor. If they are right, the quicker they establish the fact the better. The individual creditor, the savings bank, the building association, the bank of deposit, the stock-and-bond-owing corporation, the pensioner, the day laborer, are all in suspense, 'till they know whether what they are entitled to is above or below par. If they are wrong, let the verdict be emphatic, so that they will not soon return to vex the country with sophistries, distract it with contentions, threaten it with sectional division, or endanger it with internal convulsion. Let the campaign be hard and earnest; let the lines be clear and strong; let the result be an explosion forever of wrong thought and dangerous principle, and the permanent establishment of right doctrine and righteous aspiration, no matter what the standard upon which they are inscribed.

PRESIDENT MAKING SINCE 1788.

ELECTORAL VOTE FOR PRESIDENT, 1892.

States.	Basis of 173,901.	Votes.	Republican. Harrison.	Democrat. Cleveland.	Populist, Weaver.
Alabama.....	9	11		11	
Arkansas.....	6	8		8	
California.....	7	9	1	8	
Colorado.....	2	4			4
Connecticut.....	4	6		6	
Delaware.....	1	3		3	
Florida.....	2	4		4	
Georgia.....	11	13		13	
Idaho.....	1	3			3
Illinois.....	22	24		24	
Indiana.....	13	15		15	
Iowa.....	11	13	13		
Kansas.....	8	10			10
Kentucky.....	11	13		13	
Louisiana.....	6	8		8	
Maine.....	4	6	6		
Maryland.....	6	8		8	
Massachusetts.....	13	15	15		
Michigan.....	12	14	9	5	
Minnesota.....	7	9	9		
Mississippi.....	7	9		9	
Missouri.....	15	17		17	
Montana.....	1	3	3		
Nebraska.....	6	8	8		
Nevada.....	1	3			3
New Hampshire.....	2	4	4		
New Jersey.....	8	10		10	
New York.....	34	36		36	
North Carolina.....	9	11		11	
North Dakota.....	1	3			3
Ohio.....	21	23	22	1	
Oregon.....	2	4	3	1	
Pennsylvania.....	30	32	32		
Rhode Island.....	2	4	4		
South Carolina.....	7	9		9	
South Dakota.....	2	4	4		
Tennessee.....	10	12		12	
Texas.....	13	15		15	
Vermont.....	2	4	4		
Virginia.....	10	12		12	
Washington.....	2	4	4		
West Virginia.....	4	6		6	
Wisconsin.....	10	12		12	
Wyoming.....	1	3	3		
Totals.....	356	444	144	277	23

The popular vote was—Cleveland, Democrat, 5,545,227; Harrison, Republican, 5,126,478; Weaver, Populist, 1,125,842; Bidwell, Prohibitionist, 262,386.

ELECTORAL VOTE OF 1888.

States.	Basis of 154,325.	Votes.	Republican.		Democrat.	
			Benj. Harrison, Ind.	Levi P. Morton, N. Y.	Grover Cleveland, N. Y.	Allen G. Thurman, Ohio.
Alabama.....	8	10	..	..	10	10
Arkansas.....	5	7	..	..	7	7
California.....	6	8	8	8		
Colorado.....	1	3	3	3		
Connecticut....	4	6	..	..	6	6
Delaware.....	1	3	..	..	3	3
Florida.....	2	4	..	..	4	4
Georgia.....	10	12	..	..	12	12
Illinois.....	20	22	22	22		
Indiana.....	13	15	15	15		
Iowa.....	11	13	13	13		
Kansas.....	7	9	9	9		
Kentucky.....	11	13	..	..	13	13
Louisiana.....	6	8	..	..	8	8
Maine.....	4	6	6	6		
Maryland.....	6	8	..	..	8	8
Massachusetts..	12	14	14	14		
Michigan.....	11	13	13	13		
Minnesota.....	5	7	7	7		
Mississippi.....	7	9	..	..	9	9
Missouri.....	14	16	..	..	16	16
Nebraska.....	3	5	5	5		
Nevada.....	1	3	3	3		
New Hampshire..	2	4	4	4		
New Jersey....	7	9	..	..	9	9
New York.....	34	36	36	36		
North Carolina..	9	11	..	..	11	11
Ohio.....	21	23	23	23		
Oregon.....	1	3	3	3		
Pennsylvania...	28	30	30	30		
Rhode Island...	2	4	4	4		
South Carolina..	7	9	..	..	9	9
Tennessee.....	10	12	..	..	12	12
Texas.....	11	13	..	..	13	13
Vermont.....	2	4	4	4		
Virginia.....	10	12	..	..	12	12
West Virginia..	4	6	..	..	6	6
Wisconsin.....	9	11	11	11		
Totals....	325	401	233	233	168	168

THE POPULAR VOTE.—Harrison, 5,438,157—20 States; Cleveland, 5,535,626—18 States; Prohibition, 250,157; Labor, 150,624.

ELECTORAL VOTE OF 1884.

States.	Basis of 154,325	Votes.	Democrat.		Republican.	
			Grover Cleveland, N. Y.	Thos. A. Hendricks, Ind.	James G. Blaine, Maine.	John A. Logan, Ill.
Alabama	8	10	10	10		
Arkansas	5	7	7	7		
California	6	8	..	..	8	8
Colorado	1	3	..	..	3	3
Connecticut....	4	6	6	6		
Delaware	1	3	3	3		
Florida	2	4	4	4		
Georgia.....	10	12	12	12		
Illinois.....	20	22	..	..	22	22
Indiana	13	15	15	15		
Iowa	11	13	..	..	13	13
Kansas.....	7	9	..	..	9	9
Kentucky.....	11	13	13	13		
Louisiana	6	8	8	8		
Maine.....	4	6	..	..	6	6
Maryland.....	6	8	8	8		
Massachusetts..	12	14	..	..	14	14
Michigan	11	13	..	..	13	13
Minnesota	5	7	..	..	7	7
Mississippi.....	7	9	9	9		
Missouri.....	14	16	16	16		
Nebraska	3	5	..	..	5	5
Nevada.....	1	3	..	..	3	3
New Hampshire	2	4	..	..	4	4
New Jersey....	7	9	9	9		
New York.....	34	36	36	36		
North Carolina.	9	11	11	11		
Ohio.....	21	23	..	..	23	23
Oregon	1	3	..	..	3	3
Pennsylvania...	28	30	..	..	30	30
Rhode Island ..	2	4	..	..	4	4
South Carolina.	7	9	9	9		
Tennessee	10	12	12	12		
Texas	11	13	13	13		
Vermont	2	4	..	..	4	4
Virginia.....	10	12	12	12		
West Virginia..	4	6	6	6		
Wisconsin.....	9	11	..	..	11	11
Totals.....	325	401	219	219	182	182

POPULAR VOTE.—Cleveland, 4,911,017—States, 20; Blaine, 4,848,334—States, 18; Butler, Greenback-Labor, 133,825; St. John, Prohibition, 151,809; Scattering, 11,362.

PREVIOUS ELECTORAL VOTES.

<i>Republican.</i>	1880.	<i>Democrat.</i>
James A. Garfield, O., 214		Winfield S. Hancock, N. Y., 155
Chester A. Arthur, N. Y., 214		Wm. H. English, Ind., 155

Total electoral vote, 369; 38 States.

POPULAR VOTE.—Garfield, 4,449,053—19 States; Hancock, 4,442,035—19 States; Weaver, Greenback, 308,578; Prohibition, 10,305; American, 707; Scattering, 989.

<i>Republican.</i>	1876.	<i>Democrat.</i>
R. B. Hayes, Ohio, 185		S. J. Tilden, N. Y., 184
W. A. Wheeler, N. Y., 185		T. A. Hendricks, Ind., 182

Total electoral vote, 369; 38 States.

POPULAR VOTE.—Hayes, 4,033,950—21 States; Tilden, 4,284,885—19 States; Cooper, Greenback, 81,740; Smith, Prohibition, 9,522; American, 539; Scattering, 14,715.

<i>Republican.</i>	1872.	<i>Democrat.</i>
Ulysses S. Grant, Ill., 286		Horace Greeley
Henry Wilson, Mass., 286		B. Gratz Brown

Total electoral vote, 366; 37 States.

POPULAR VOTE.—The death of Mr. Greeley before the electoral count caused the scattering of his 66 votes among various candidates. The votes of Louisiana and Arkansas were not counted on account of fraudulent returns. Grant, 3,597,071—31 States; Greeley, 2,834,079—6 States; O'Connor, Labor, 29,408; Black, Prohibition, 5,608.

<i>Republican.</i>	1868.	<i>Democrat.</i>
Ulysses S. Grant, Ill., 214		Horatio Seymour, N. Y., 80
Schuyler Colfax, Ind., 214		Francis P. Blair, Mo., 80

Total electoral vote, 317; 34 States; Mississippi, Texas and Virginia still in rebellion, and not voting.

POPULAR VOTE.—Grant, 3,015,071—26 States; Seymour, 2,709,613—8 States.

<i>Republican.</i>	1864.	<i>Democrat.</i>
Abraham Lincoln, Ill., 212		Geo. B. McClellan, N. J., 21
Andrew Johnson, Tenn., 212		Geo. H. Pendleton, Ohio, 21

Total electoral vote, 314; not voting, 11 States in rebellion.

POPULAR VOTE.—Lincoln, 2,216,067—22 States; McClellan, 1,808,725—3 States.

<i>Republican.</i>	1860.	<i>Democrat.</i>
Abraham Lincoln, Ill., 180		Stephen A. Douglas, Ill., 12
Hannibal Hamlin Me., 180		H. V. Johnson, Ga., 12
		Jno. C. Breckinridge, Ky., 72
		J. Lane, Oregon, 72

Constitutional Union.

John Bell, Tenn.,	39
Edward Everett, Mass.,	39

Total electoral vote, 303; 33 States.

POPULAR VOTE.—Lincoln, 1,866,352—17 States, N. J. divided; Douglas, 1,375,157—1 State, N. J., divided; Breckinridge, 845,763—11 States; Bell, 589,581—3 States.

<i>Democrat.</i>	1856.	<i>Republican.</i>
James Buchanan, Pa., 174		Jno. C. Fremont, Cal., 114
Jno. C. Breckinridge, Ky., 174		William L. Dayton, N. Y., 114

American.

Millard Fillmore, N. Y.,	8
A. J. Donelson, Tenn.,	8

Total electoral vote, 296; 31 States.

POPULAR VOTE.—Buchanan, 1,838,169—19 States; Fremont, 1,341,264—11 States; Fillmore, 874,534—1 State.

<i>Democrat.</i>	1852.	<i>Whig.</i>
Franklin Pearce, N. H., 254		Winfield Scott, Va., 42
William R. King, Ala., 254		Wm. A. Graham, N. C., 42

Total electoral vote, 296; 31 States.

POPULAR VOTE.—Pierce, 1,601,474—27 States; Scott, 1,386,578—4 States; Hale, 156,149.

<i>Whig.</i>	1848.	<i>Democrat.</i>
Zachary Taylor, La., 163		Lewis Cass, Mich., 127
Millard Fillmore, N. Y., 163		Wm. O. Butler, Ky., 127

Total electoral vote, 290; 30 States.

POPULAR VOTE. — Taylor, 1,360,101—15 States; Cass, 1,220,544—15 States; Van Buren, N. Y., Free-soil Dem., 291,263.

<i>Democrat.</i>	1844.	<i>Whig.</i>
James K. Polk, Tenn., 170		Henry Clay, Ky., 105
George M. Dallas, Pa., 170		Theo. Frelinghuysen, N. J., 105

Total electoral vote, 275; 26 States.

POPULAR VOTE.—Polk, 1,337,243—15 States; Clay, 1,299,068—11 States; Birney, 62,300.

<i>Whig.</i>	1840.	<i>Democrat.</i>
William Henry Harrison, Ohio,	234	Martin Van Buren, N. Y., 60
John Tyler, Va.,	234	R. M. Johnson, Ky., 48
Total electoral vote, 294; 26 States.		
POPULAR VOTE.—Harrison, 1,275,017—19 States; Van Buren, 1,128,702—7 States; Birney, 7,059.		

<i>Democrat.</i>	1836.	<i>Whig.</i>
Martin Van Buren, N. Y., 170		Wm. H. Harrison, O., 73
R. M. Johnson, Ky., 147		F. Granger, N. Y., 77
Total electoral vote, 294; 26 States.		
POPULAR VOTE.—Van Buren, 761,549—15 States; Harrison, 7 States; White, 2 States; Webster, 1 State; Mangum, 1 State—236,656 votes.		

<i>Democrat.</i>	1832.	<i>Nat. Republican.</i>
Andrew Jackson, Tenn., 219		Henry Clay, Ky., 49
Martin Van Buren, N. Y., 189		J. Sergeant, Pa., 49
<i>Anti-Mason.</i>		
William Wirt, Va., 7		
Amos Ellmaker, Pa., 7		

Total electoral vote, 288.

POPULAR VOTE.—Andrew Jackson, 687,502; Henry Clay, 530,189; William Wirt, 33,108.

<i>Democrat.</i>	1828.	<i>Nat. Republican.</i>
Andrew Jackson, Tenn., 178		Jno. Q. Adams, Mass., 83
Jno. C. Calhoun, S. C., 171		Richard Rush, Pa., 83
Total electoral vote, 261.		

From the time of the disputed election, which resulted in the choice of John Adams, the popular vote began to be regarded as of importance.

POPULAR VOTE.—Jackson, 647,231—States, 15; Adams, 509,097—States, 9

	<i>Republican.</i>	
1824.	Andrew Jackson, Tenn., 99	} <i>For President.</i>
	John Q. Adams, Mass., 84	
	W. H. Crawford, Ga., 41	
	Henry Clay, Ky., 37	
	Jno. C. Calhoun, S. C., 182	} <i>For V.-President.</i>
	N. Sanford, N. Y., 30	
Total electoral vote, 261.		

There being no choice for President under the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution, which requires that a candidate shall have a majority of all the electoral votes, the election was thrown into the House. In the contest in the House, Clay, who was out of the fight, threw his strength, or as much of it as he could control, to Adams, which gave him 13 States, as against 7 for Jackson and 4 for Crawford. Though the election of Adams was perfectly regular and constitutional, it forced the liberal and strict schools of interpreters wide apart, and the latter, carrying their fight to the country in the shape of a rebuke to those Representatives who had slaughtered Jackson, soon had the vantage ground.

Republican.

1820 James Monroe, Va., 231
 Daniel D. Tompkins, N. Y., 218

Total electoral vote, 235. The Missouri vote was disputed; and New Hampshire gave one vote to J. Q. Adams.

Republican.

1816.

Federal.

James Monroe, Va., 183
 Daniel D. Tompkins, N. Y., 183
 Total electoral vote, 221.

Rufus King, N. Y., 34
 No nom. for V.-P.

Republican.

1812.

Fed. or Clinton Dem.

James Madison, Va., 128
 Elbridge Gerry, Mass., 131
 Total electoral vote, 218.

De Witt Clinton, N. Y., 89
 Jared Ingersoll, Pa., 86

Republican.

1808.

Federal.

James Madison, Va., 122
 George Clinton, N. Y., 113
 Total electoral vote, 176.

C. C. Pinckney, S. C., 47
 Rufus King, N. Y., 47

Republican.

1804.

Federal.

Thomas Jefferson, Va., 162
 George Clinton, N. Y., 162
 Total electoral vote, 176.

C. C. Pinckney, S. C., 14
 Rufus King, N. Y., 14

This was the first National election which distinguished between nominees for President and Vice-President, under Twelfth Amendment to Federal Constitution.

<i>Republican.</i>	1800.	<i>Federal.</i>
Thomas Jefferson, Va., 73		John Adams, Mass., 65
Aaron Burr, N. Y., 73		C. C. Pinckney, S. C., 64

As there was, up till this time, no distinction between nominees for President and Vice-President—the one having the highest number of votes being the President—and Jefferson and Burr having each 73 votes, the election went to the House, where a prolonged and bitter struggle ensued, resulting in the choice of Jefferson. This dispute led to the adoption of the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution.

<i>Federal.</i>	1796.	<i>Republican.</i>
John Adams, Mass., 71		Thomas Jefferson, Va., 68
Thos. Pinckney, Md., 59		Aaron Burr, N. Y., 30
Total electoral vote, 138.		

<i>Federal.</i>	1792.	<i>Republican.</i>
George Washington, Va., 132		Geo. Clinton, N. Y., 50
John Adams, Mass., 77		
Total electoral vote, 135.		

1788.

George Washington was nominated by a caucus of the Continental Congress. The State Legislatures chose electors for President and Vice-President on the first Wednesday of January, 1789. These electors voted on the first Wednesday in February, casting 69 votes for Washington as President, and 34 for John Adams as Vice-President. Washington was sworn into office by Chancellor Livingstone on April 29, 1789.

PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT.

POLITICAL parties are inseparable from republican institutions. They are the birth of free thought and expression. If at all times they are the birth of high and noble sentiment and have for a purpose something definite and useful, they are both a necessity and blessing. If, on the contrary, they find birth in ignorance, fanaticism or sheer arbitrariness, and in their exercise of power use only low and brutish forces, they become elements of danger, and are not to be classed as among the welcome political energies.

Happily for our free institutions, volcanic parties, those of quick rise and fierce outburst, those that bear on their foreheads their own danger signal, are of short life. This is so for two great reasons. First, a high state of effervescence soon exhausts itself, and a high state of explosiveness generally leads to a speedy bursting of the bands of organization. Second, the sober intelligence of the country, the property instinct, the solid business interests, the peace and order sentiment, will not, for any long time, tolerate threats of danger or intolerable disturbance.

There are therefore philosophers who look upon parties of any and every kind as essential. Their argument is that no matter what may be the aim of a party, nor how narrow and fanatical, or even dangerous, it may be, it is better that it should find the rebuke and correction which

an outlet affords, than smoulder and consume like some internal fire, and thus prolong apprehension of irruption. This argument shows a high appreciation of the corrective forces in society, and a strong reliance on the conservatism of our institutions. And it has the historic fact to support it, that as yet excessive partyism has somewhat resembled violent disease, and run a swift course without detriment to a resolute constitution. Washington's opinion of political parties was this: "From the natural tendency of governments of a popular character, it is certain there will always be enough of party spirit for salutary purposes. And there being constant danger of excess, the effort ought to be, by force of public opinion, to mitigate and assuage it. A fire not to be quenched, it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into flame, lest, instead of warming, it should consume."

NAMES AND DRIFT OF PARTIES.

Party names are frequently misnomers, in so far as they reflect the principles and objects of parties. Some have been assumed hastily, by force of outward circumstances, and without reference to preconceived purposes. Others have been forced upon new political organizations in a spirit of the ludicrous, or as a likeness of something familiar, or as an expression of intense enmity. Thus "Whig" came into use in America, as a distinctive and honorable party name, for no other reason than because it was familiar and suited an existing fancy. In its colonial sense it was a convenient set-off to the title "Tory," but in its truly national sense, and as the designation of the successor to the National Republican party, or as descriptive of one who favored internal improvements, a protective tariff, and a strong central government, or as the op-

posite of "Democrat," it had no significance whatever. "Whig" was originally the word "Whiggamore," a member of a body of insurgents, carters and others, who marched from the southwest of Scotland upon Edinburgh, in 1648, in opposition to the compromise with Charles I. Their cry of *Whiggam*, used in driving their horses, gave them the title of "Whiggamore raiders." The name, in the contracted form of *Whig*, passed, in a spirit of derision to the Presbyterian rebels of the west of Scotland. After the restoration, 1660, it was applied to the Roundheads or Parliamentarians, as opposed to the Cavaliers. Still a nickname, and opposed to that other nickname, "tory," it came to designate the liberal, or country, party of England, a use that was continued till the title "Tory" was lost in that of "Conservative," after 1832.

"Tory" itself was an English party nickname for a hundred and fifty years, and while it covered those who sustained the court and the divine right of kings, its original use by the Whigs was to confuse all Tories with the *tories* or outlaws, inhabiting the Irish bogs. So the word "locofoco" as a designation of Democrat, and hence of the party, sprang into popular use, after 1835, through the incident of re-lighting the extinguished gas in Tammany Hall by means of friction matches, then a new device, and called "locofocos." The title "Know Nothing," was meaningless as to the principles of the American party, and only indirectly perpetuates the fact that it grew out of a set of secret societies.

But a greater anomaly as to political parties is that where they exist for any great length of time they frequently cross their principles, and sometimes drift entirely away from the intentions of their founders. In such instances, where original principles are lost sight of,

the party name becomes a mere shibboleth, and blind partyism usurps intelligent adherence to principles. A party in such a strait is more of an obstruction and menace than a purifying, progressive and exalting agency, and it may well be questioned whether it is any longer entitled to the use of an ancient and honorable name.

EARLY PARTIES.

The Colonial period could develop no national parties as we now know them, for the colonies were disjointed. But as they began to adhere over the question of taxation without representation, two orders of thought arose, one of which favored the right of the British parliament to tax America, and the other opposed it. These same orders of thought existed in England, the former being designated by Tory and the latter by Whig, and these names were readily transferred to America. The Tory remained the fast friend of English sovereignty on our soil. The Whig, at first only an opponent of parliamentary claims, drifted into a Colonial unionist without separation from the mother country, and finally into a unionist with separation.

The Declaration of Independence and the Revolutionary war brought the Tory party under odium and left it without a mission on American soil. Its members became enemies of the country, and even traitors. As a party it met a speedy and deserved death. The principles of the Whig party became overwhelming, but its name grew to be traditional, through the almost universal use, according to locality or fancy, of such equivalents as "Popular Party," "Party of Independence," "American Party," "Liberty Party," "Patriots," etc.

The Whig idea both brought about the Confederation


and forced its abandonment. It equally substituted the Constitution for the Articles, and Union for Confederacy. The Tory title being a thing of the past, there was little use for its antithesis, Whig. The dominant idea under the new constitution was how to unite the states more firmly, and how to provide for peace and war. This was federalism, or whigism under changed auspices, and in a new political rôle. Whigs lost their name entirely in the title Federalists. The Federal party became the national party, and in a certain sense the nation, for as yet Anti-Federalism had not become coherent, had accepted even what it opposed, so as not to jeopardize the experiment of Union. Thus Federalism, which was responsible for the new government, naturally sought its strength and perpetuity, by throwing all doubtful constructions of the Constitutions in favor of the central authority; that is, it interpreted the Constitution openly and liberally, saw in it a spirit as well as a letter, looked upon government under it as a creation with powers and functions to be questioned only by the people at large.

Now that the experiment of popular government had been fully launched, and the fact of a Union was no longer in danger, the Anti-Federal spirit of the day began to take shape. It assumed the negative of the proposition of government as laid down by Federalism, and inclined to such a construction of the Constitution as would throw all doubt in favor of the States; that is, it interpreted the instrument closely, regarding it as an inelastic code, and government under it as simply an aggregate of powers with which the States had parted, and which they alone in their sovereign capacity were at liberty to question, or, if need be, recall.


These may be regarded rather as schools of thought

than as active and antagonistic political parties, yet they laid the foundation of subsequent parties, coherent in organization and with contra-distinguishing titles. While both schools were united as to the policy of a protective tariff, the propriety of honoring Washington with a second term of office, and in general a scheme of funding the national debt, there was an unconscious drift apart upon the question of open or close construction of the Constitution, the trend of the liberal interpreters, or Federalists, being more and more toward a fuller exercise of powers on the part of the national government, and of the close interpreters toward the doctrine of State rights.

The adoption of the first ten amendments to the Constitution, which were regarded as in the nature of a declarative bill of rights, so disarmed all Anti-Federal opposition to the instrument, as to render the title "Anti-Federal" a party misnomer. Jefferson felt that it was a perpetual reminder of opposition to the *fact* of government, and that if ever the varying, and often discordant, sentiments it represented were to be crystalized, some new and more appropriate name must be adopted. His opportunity soon came. Aglow with the spirit of the French Revolution and the fires of the French Republic, his admiration, on his return to this country, became infectious, even assuming the fantastic form of dress and manner. The Federalists, fearing the introduction of the ungovernable, leveling and communistic spirit of France, opposed such threatened innovations, and became more coherent than ever as a party. In proportion, Jefferson and his admirers grew warmer, more united, more aggressive. Only a name and banner were needed to complete a formidable organization. These the genius of Jefferson supplied. His party should, first



MILLARD FILLMORE.



FRANKLIN PIERCE.



JAMES BUCHANAN.



ABRAHAM LINCOLN.




ANDREW JOHNSON.



ULYSSES S. GRANT.



RUTHERFORD B. HAYES.



JAMES A. GARFIELD.



CHESTER A. ARTHUR.



GROVER CLEVELAND.



BENJAMIN HARRISON.

of all, be "Republican." That would set it off sharply against Federalism. In order to group all elements within it, it should be "Democratic." What therefore so comprehensive, popular and imposing as "Democratic—Republican," for that because the new party name, symbol of all opposition to Federal, crystalization of everything Anti-Federal.

Then began partyism as we have known it ever since. The Federals denounced Democratic-Republicans as Jacobins, held their pretensions up to contempt, and so ridiculed their compound title as to force abandonment of its first part, leaving only the word "Republican" as the distinctive and popular name. Nor was abuse wholly on the side of the Federals. The Republicans countered bitterly, denouncing their opponents as aristocrats and monarchists, and stirring all the fires of partisan animosity in the bosom of the masses. Such was the antagonism that Washington openly complained of it as a substitution of unjust suspicion and personal antipathy for the old spirit of friendly compromise.

As already intimated this alignment of parties did not affect Washington's second election, though it brought the wrath of the Republicans on him and all Federals for their policy of neutrality between England and France. Jefferson left Washington's cabinet, and retired to his Virginia plantation to further develop, by writing and plan, the new Republican party of which he was the acknowledged founder. His master hand became visible in promoting attacks on the administration. The Republicans opposed indirect taxes with direct taxes, the liability of state to suit with the eleventh amendment to the Constitution, the Jay treaty with denunciation of Washington as an embezzler and usurper.

The expiration of Washington's second term brought the two parties into square contentions for that national supremacy indicated by the choice of a presidential candidate.

FEDERAL AND REPUBLICAN PARTIES.

In the national convention of 1796, the Federals, with John Adams as candidate, and with no platform, except the claim to represent Washington's policy of peace, neutrality, finance, progress and safety, won a victory over the Republicans, with Thomas Jefferson as candidate, and with no platform except the claim to economy, enlarged liberty, rights of man and rights of states. But this victory was rendered incomplete and partially barren by the choice of a Republican Vice President in the person of Thomas Jefferson, the election at that time being held through the state legislatures, and the candidate receiving next to the highest number of votes becoming the Vice President.

During Adams' administration the Republicans gained ground by their opposition to the Alien and Sedition laws. But their most substantial gain was that indirect one which grew out of division in the Federal ranks. Adams had estranged such advisors as Hamilton, and had ignored his entire cabinet in his change of policy toward France. Though nominated for the Presidency by the Federals in 1800, the Republicans won a victory with Jefferson and Burr, the contest between these two being settled in the House of Representatives.

The Republican victory was nothing in its bearing on party lines as compared with the permanent breach in the Federal ranks. The strength and glory of Federalism seemed to have expended itself in placing the government

on a firm basis, in giving it such power as would make it respected at home and abroad, in restraining French Republican influence and in establishing a permanent policy of neutrality. The unanimity and boldness which had been equal to the solution of most intricate financial problems, to the provision of ample revenue, and to the building up of an enduring national credit, were in strange contrast with its divisions and weaknesses at the time the Republicans won their first national victory.

Jefferson was supported by Republican majorities in both Houses of Congress. He mapped a vigorous policy for his party, and in his choice of officials, showed little mercy for the Federals. The act repealing the establishment of circuit courts drove the Federals from their last hold on the government, and they never recovered their lost ground. Though they largely typed the wealth, intellect and culture of the country, there seemed to be no escape from the blow of 1800. In 1804 they were vanquished in every state except Connecticut, Delaware and part of Maryland. Jefferson adroitly turned every new situation to popular account, and as he had the entire confidence of the masses, he kept his party on a happy vantage ground with a vigor that was well-nigh autocratic. He gave to Republicanism a decided affirmative in action, and kept the Federals on a distractive defensive but little removed from the sharp agony that presaged a not distant death.

The unpopular Embargo Act of 1807 proved to be a Republican boomerang, by which the Federals profited to the extent of greatly reducing Republican majorities for Madison as President and in the House. But threats of war with England, and finally the war of 1812, served to render Madison's reelection sure. Just here a notable

change came over the spirit of the Republican party. The ordeal of war had taught it the necessity of doing many things for the safety of the country it had before repudiated as Federal measures. If Federalism was dying, Republicanism was honoring it by occupying its ground on most of the questions relating to national preservation. While dire emergency was the excuse, the same excuse had not been accepted as good Federal logic. But more than this, a new school of thought had sprung up within Republican ranks. It was critical, independent, largely Federal in that it found in the preservation of our commerce grounds for opposition to the war, progressive, in that it favored internal improvement, liberal in that it objected to the Republican idea of strict construction. It did not dread the title Jacobin, and was rather pleased with the title Democrat. Indeed, as Clintonian Democrats, it made its presence and strength felt in the national election of 1812, when it nominated De Witt Clinton for the presidency, which nomination was accepted by the Federals as the best that then offered.

President Madison felt that the peace of 1814, meaning less though it was, was a narrow escape for him and the Republican party. The war, unpopular though it was, had proven another nail in the Federal coffin. Inflamed partisanship formed in the Hartford convention a weapon both keen for cutting and blunt for beating. The Federal decay was thenceforth rapid. The party nominated Rufus King for the presidency in 1816, but carried only Massachusetts, Connecticut and Delaware.

Upon the election of Monroe, in 1816, came what was called "The era of good feeling." Organized Federal opposition had nearly ceased. The Republican House organized by the unanimous election of Henry Clay as

Speaker. He was one of the liberal and advanced Republicans, able to carry his party with him as to protection, internal improvement, and even the establishment of a national bank, all favorite Federal measures. Calhoun belonged to his school of thought. President Monroe favored it. The old, or strict construction, school of Republicans looked with alarm on the daily growing strength, number and boldness of the new element in their ranks. The movement, so ably led, so aggressive, so fully supported by Federal aid as to absorb the remains of that party and stamp its extinction as complete, proved to be the germ of a new party, whose growth was hastened by the slavery discussions over the entry of Missouri as a State in 1818-20, and by the distinct affirmation of the protective doctrine in the same years. The latter doctrine fairly divided the Republican ranks.

There were really no political parties in 1820, Monroe being chosen President without opposition, and without even a nomination by the Republicans. In the 16th Congress, Nov. 1820, Clay resigned the Speakership of the House. The election of his successor showed that the new and liberal wing of the Republican party was now the stronger, for Taylor of New York, the successful candidate, was equally, if not further, advanced than Clay in his advocacy of a protective tariff and internal improvements, and in his opposition to the extension of slavery in the territories.

During Monroe's second term, 1821-25, the contention between the old school element of the Republican party and the new, or liberal, school, grew bitter, and the breach rapidly widened. Monroe broke with the liberals, and opposed internal improvement. The contention reached down to the masses. The election of Clay as Speaker of

the House in 1823, was heralded as a significant victory of the Liberal Republican wing, which now took the affirmative of all national questions. Clay had already foreshadowed the "Monroe Doctrine," and Monroe swung back sufficiently to the liberal side to favor, in his message of 1823, the tariff act of 1824, and a plan of internal improvement, thus emphasizing what became known as "The American System."

In the national election of 1824, known as the "Scrub race," the two Republican wings ran separate presidential candidates, the Liberals supporting Clay and Adams, and the strict-constructionists Crawford and Jackson. The election went to the House, and John Adams was chosen. This result practically disrupted the Republican party and sounded its death knell. It was now to find a grave with its deceased antagonist, the Federal party, which it had outlived for but a few years. They both died of the same disease, inanition due to violent disruption.

WHIG AND DEMOCRATIC PARTIES.

The political movement which, as we have just seen, had ripened within the Republican ranks, and had broken them in twain, was now ready for separate identity under a national name. But a proper title was not easy to be found at first. The right name must be evolved by the ferment of the situation. Adams, as was to be expected, entered on his administration with the Crawford adherents dead against him. These belonged to the "straightest sect" of strict constructionists. It was but reasonable for Adams to expect the support of Jackson and his followers, for all these had mostly inclined to the old Federal ideas of protection and internal improvement, and in this respect had

coöperated with Clay in bringing about revolution in the Republican ranks.

But Jackson was embittered by his defeat by Adams, and he and his forces joined those of Crawford in opposition to Adams' administration. Adams had made Clay his Secretary of State. This opened the way for charges of collusion between Adams and Clay, and much crimination and recrimination followed, serving to unite more closely the followers of Crawford and Jackson, as well as those of Adams and Clay.

President Adams, in both his inaugural and first message to Congress, mapped a set of principles which, as to protection, internal improvement and liberal construction of the Constitution, answered as a permanent bond of agreement between his own followers and those of Clay. Thus solidified, the party, now virtually a separate one, with distinctive principles, and with John Adams as its candidate for President in 1828, adopted for its name that of "National Republican," though it passed through that campaign under the general designation of "Adams Men." The title "National Republican" was comprehensive and excellently chosen, for it not only showed that the new party had germinated within the old Republican ranks, but that it had assumed independent being as a liberal, or national interpreter of the Constitution. But accurate and full of meaning as the title was, it was bound, by that strange fatality which sometimes attends party names, to be of short duration, for in a few years it was pushed aside to make room for the meaningless title of "Whig."

The Crawford and Jackson followers were united only in their opposition to the National Republicans. No doubt they would have perpetuated the title of Republican in the campaign of 1828, but for the fact that Crawford was

sick, and it required the tremendous personalism of Jackson to hold the two opposing wings of the party together. This he did by becoming a candidate for the Presidency against Adams, and by dropping the title Republican altogether, his followers becoming known as "Jackson Men," in contradistinction to "Adams Men."

But as the title "Adams Men" only temporarily usurped that of "National Republican," so when it became necessary to get rid of the personalism of Jackson, the title "Jackson Men" began to give away to something else. Men like Calhoun and others, who never cared for the name Republican, preferred to be spoken of as "Democrats." The title "Democrat" could not, however, be at once projected on the party, for Jackson's personalism was yet too strong, and if his own name was to be lost as a party shibboleth, he preferred that it should be swamped by a revival of the old Republican name, rather than by the new name of Democrat, especially since the latter had been proposed by the ultra wing of strict-constructionists.

The time when "Democrat" began to have meaning in a party sense, and as comprehensive of "Jackson Men," or of Republican, and as expressive of definite principles, was in 1831, preparatory to the presidential election of 1832. Yet even in that election, the transition to "Democrat" was not complete, for the Jackson, or Republican, ticket was thus headed "*Democrat-Republican ticket for President in 1832, Andrew Jackson.*" While this compromise title showed the elimination of Jackson's personalism to a certain extent, it showed also that the time was not yet ripe for the entire dropping of the old word "Republican" and the complete substitution of the new word "Democrat." This substitution was not completed until 1832-33.

In 1832, the ticket of the National Republican party was headed, "*National Republican Candidate for President in 1832, Henry Clay*," thus showing that the title had come into full recognition prior to that time.

In the national campaign of 1832, the National Republicans, with Clay as their nominee, defined their principles as tariff, internal improvement, question of removing the Cherokee Indians, renewal of United States Bank Charter. The Democrat-Republican published no declaration of principles, they being agitated within either by the grave question of nullification, or by serious divisions respecting the tariff. In the former, Jackson scored a signal triumph, after his election. Respecting the latter, Clay effected one of his disastrous compromises, by accepting the ten year scaling tariff of 1832-42.

Jackson's financial policy, especially that relating to the destruction of the United States Bank, together with dissatisfaction respecting the workings of the sliding-scale tariff, intensified opposition to his second administration, and to his party, which had by this time adopted the single term "Democrat." Party antagonism was heightened by the bursting on the country of the panic of 1837. During the latter part of Jackson's administration, the title "Whig" had come into general use as a substitute for that of National Republican, and as a party designation it was complete in the National campaign of 1836.

In order to head off the strict State-rights Democrats of the South, who had early nominated H. L. White, of Tennessee, for the Presidency, the forces of Martin Van Buren, whom Jackson desired should be his successor, met in popular convention in Baltimore in May, 1835, nominated Van Buren for President, and set forth a platform,

the most important plank in which was adherence to gold and silver as a circulating medium.

The members of this convention were not designated as Democrats, but as "Locofocos," a term which had sprung into popular use the year before, and which grew out of an incident at Tammany Hall, New York, in which the lights were put out during a Democratic meeting, and relit by means of locofoco matches, then a new invention.

Thus "Locofoco" and "Whig," coming into popular use at nearly the same time, were fair set-offs to each, other, and one was as meaningless as the other.

In this campaign of 1836, the Whigs, Anti-Masons, and some other opponents of Van Buren nominated William Henry Harrison, of Ohio, for president. Van Buren was elected. During the closing days of Jackson's second administration a new and hitherto silent force, known as the National Anti-Slavery Society, incorporated in 1833, began to make itself felt in a political way. By means of lectures and literature it had given offence to the South, and a strenuous effort was made to deny it the use of the United States mails. But Congress was not yet found ripe for so hazardous an experiment.

Van Buren felt himself to be the executor of Jackson's financial policy, but the crisis of 1837, and a violent faction of his own party, calling themselves "Conservatives," caused the 25th Congress to defeat some of his pet schemes of finance. This Congress, too, was the scene of long debates over the question of Federal control of slavery, a question that entered nearly every subsequent congress till 1863.

In 1840 the Whigs nominated William Henry Harrison for president, without a platform. The Democrats renominated Martin Van Buren, with a lengthy platform, which

is curious as serving to shape Democratic policy for a long time, if not even to the present day. Its gist was (1) The Federal Government is one of limited powers. (2) The Constitution does not confer on the Government the right to carry on a system of internal improvement. (3) Nor to assume the debts of the States contracted for internal improvement. (4) Justice and sound policy forbids the Government to foster one branch of industry to the detriment of another, or one section to the injury of another. (5) Economy urged. (6) Congress has no power to charter a United States Bank. (7) No power to interfere with the domestic institutions of the States. (8) Government money must be separated from banking institutions. (9) This country is an asylum for the oppressed of all nations.

THE LIBERTY PARTY.

During this campaign, the Abolition or Liberty party first openly appeared in the political arena, with James G. Birney, as its candidate for President, and with a platform favoring the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, and in the Territories; stoppage of the interstate slave trade; and opposition to slavery to the fullest extent of all Constitutional powers.

General Harrison was elected, but died April 4, 1841, leaving Tyler as his successor. Then came an era of antagonism between the President and the Whig majority in Congress, pending which Tyler was excommunicated by his party. The Whigs were greatly demoralized by Tyler's defection, and it was only with the greatest difficulty, and after repeated modifications, that they secured Presidential sanction of their favorite measure, the tariff act of 1842. Clay became so disgusted with attacks upon

him, and with public life in general, that he resigned from the Senate. This was a terrible blow to the Whigs, for in Clay's action they had lost their recognized leader. They lost the Congressional elections of 1842, and were further demoralized by divisions over a policy suited to the questions of slavery and Texas annexation.

In the campaign of 1844, the three existing political parties were in the field. The Liberty party nominated for president, James G. Birney, of Michigan, and adopted a platform which was explicit in its denunciation of slavery and the slave trade.

The Whigs nominated Henry Clay for president, on a platform declaring for well regulated currency; tariff for revenue, but discriminating in favor of domestic labor; distribution of proceeds of sales of public lands; single term for the presidency; reform of executive usurpation.

The Democrats tried to nominate Van Buren, but his defeat was accomplished by the adoption of the two-thirds rule for securing a nomination, a practice that has held ever since in Democratic national conventions. The nominee became James K. Polk, of Tennessee, on a platform affirming that of 1840, with the addition that Oregon and Texas ought to be annexed.

The Whigs fought the battle on the lines of protection. It was a close battle, and would have been won for Clay, but for the fact that he unwisely undertook to conciliate southern Democrats by a letter favoring postponed action on the question of Texas annexation. Polk was elected, and with him a Democratic Congress.

The leading party measures of Polk's administration were the Mexican war, which the Whigs could not, in a spirit of patriotism, bitterly oppose; the settlement of the Oregon boundary, in which the Whigs came to the rescue

of a Democratic minority, the disappointing tariff act of 1846, passed in defiance of Democratic campaign promises not to disturb the tariff of 1842; and the historic "Wilmot Proviso," whose introduction marked the beginning of a wide split in the Democratic party.

FREE SOIL DEMOCRATS.

In 1848, the Democrats nominated for president, Lewis Cass, of Michigan, on a platform affirming that of 1844, and adding congratulations over the results of the Mexican war; denouncing a tariff, except for revenue; hailing the tariff of 1846 as a substitute for that of 1842.

The Whigs nominated General Zachary Taylor, of Louisiana, without a platform, but with a subsequent series of ratification resolutions endorsing the then well-known Whig principles of protection, etc.

And now appeared the new political force foreshadowed by the introduction in Congress of the Wilmot Proviso. The Democratic position on the slavery question had for some time been too ultra and threatening to suit the views of a strong minority of the party. This minority could not brook the doctrine that the Government had no power to regulate slavery in the Territories. This doctrine was put to a test on the floor of the Convention that nominated Cass for president, and the rabid pro-slavery sentiment prevailed. Thereupon, the Democrats who favored Government interference with slavery in the Territories, or in other words, those who opposed the extension of slavery to the Territories, resolved to meet in Convention and nominate a ticket of their own. They so met at Buffalo, in August, 1848, and nominated Martin Van Buren, of New York, for president, and Charles Francis Adams, of Massachusetts, for vice president. They called them-

selves "Free Soil Democrats," and they embraced two factions, one locally known as "Barnburners," opposed to the extension of slavery in the Territories, the other simply opposed to further agitation of slavery, and locally known as "Hunkers." They adopted a lengthy platform, seeking free soil for a free people; announcing that Congress had no more authority to make a slave than to make a king; affirming the ordinance of 1787 and the Jeffersonian doctrine that after 1800 no slavery should exist in the Territories; favoring internal improvements, proclaiming the watchword, "Free Soil, Free Speech, Free Labor, Free Men."

In the campaign, the old Liberty party united with the Free Soil Democrats, while many of the rabid southern Democrats preferred to trust Taylor, a southern man, to Cass, a northern man, on the slavery question. New York was the pivotal state, and as the Liberty party, by dividing the Whigs in 1844, had given it to the Democrats, so now the Free Soil Democrats by dividing the regular Democrats, gave it to the Whigs, and Taylor was elected.

The question of introducing slavery into the vast Territories acquired by the Mexican conquest, and of protecting it there, and, of course, everywhere, by Government interference, was at its height during Taylor's administration. Calhoun, the recognized pro-slavery leader, pushed the question by proposing to extend the Missouri Compromise line of 1820 clear through to the Pacific. Taylor's position was that California, then ready for statehood, should be admitted without slavery, as her constitution provided, and that the other Territories should be erected without reference to slavery, leaving them to settle that question for themselves when they came to be admitted as states. At this juncture, Clay offered his compromise measure of

1850, it being virtually the plan proposed by president Taylor, except that it embraced a more vigorous fugitive slave law. The Whigs and Free Soilers regarded this compromise as weak, and as an unnecessary surrender of free soil principles. The pro-slavery Democrats were but little better pleased with it, for opposite reasons. California came in as a free state September 9, 1850, and on September 15, 1850, slavery was abolished in the District of Columbia. Taylor died, July 9, 1850.

After Taylor's death the political situation became complex, and boded disaster to the Whigs, who in their national convention had failed to commit themselves to the doctrine of the Wilmot Proviso, thereby estranging the Liberty party, which it might have readily attracted, and what was worse, driving out many of their leaders into the ranks of the Free Soil Democrats, who were now more bitter opponents of slavery extension than the Whigs themselves.

A large part of the Whig strength lay in the South. Therefore it was hardly to be expected that the party could escape the slavery maelstrom. Calhoun's failure to force the slave line of $36^{\circ} 30'$ through to the Pacific, thus confirming a free and slave section of the Union, led to a hardening of the pro-slavery lines, to the broad denial of the Government's right to interfere with slavery at all, to threats of disunion and to talk of the necessity of setting up a new set of institutions whose object should be the protection of slavery. These discussions drew over the pro-slavery Whigs to the Democrats, but they carried along with them into the Democratic ranks the doctrine that had been broached, but voted down in the Democratic National Convention of 1848, to wit, that the people of each Territory should be left free to treat the slavery question as they pleased. Coming from such a source and in such


a way, the Democrats could not escape the force of this doctrine before the country. It was the doctrine that afterwards became known as "Popular" or "Squatter Sovereignty," which figured so prominently in the Kansas affair, and which served to draw such men as Douglas, Geary and Reeder outside of the Democratic lines. The California miners had applied it in their own state. While the doctrine, or its opposite, had forced the Whig party asunder, it was now about to do the same thing for the Democratic party.

DECLINE OF THE WHIG PARTY.

In 1852, the Democrats nominated Franklin Pierce, of New Hampshire, for the Presidency. Their platform affirmed that of 1848, and added an endorsement of the compromise measures of 1850, emphatic opposition to the interference of Congress with State affairs, adhesion to the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions of 1798, no monopoly for the few at the expense of the many, and the Union as it is and should be.

The Whigs nominated General Winfield Scott, of Virginia, for President, on a platform favoring tariff, internal improvement, a Government sufficiently strong to make it operative, the compromise measures of 1850. This last plank was also in the Democratic platform, but the Whigs fell into the trap set by the extreme pro-slavery leaders, and foolishly added to the plank the words "including the fugitive slave law." The plank was a bold stroke on the part of the pro-slavery people to commit both parties to the extension of slavery, but the attempt reacted with thrice the effect on the Whig party that it did on the Democrats.

The Free Soil Democrats nominated John P. Hale, of New Hampshire, for President, on a platform denouncing



HON. NELSON W. ALDRICH.

Born at Foster, R. I., November 6, 1841. Academically educated; engaged in mercantile pursuits; President of Providence Common Council, 1871-73; member of State Assembly, 1875-76; Speaker of House of Representatives in 1876; elected to Congress for 46th and 47th Congresses; elected, as Republican, to United States Senate, 1880; re-elected, 1886 and 1893; rose to prominence as advocate of Protection; authority in party and Senate on matters pertaining to Tariff Legislation; conspicuous in preparation and adoption of Tariff act of 1890; Chairman of Committee on Rules and member of Committees on Finance and Transportation.



HON. FRED. T. DUBOIS.

Born in Crawford co., Ill., May 29, 1851; graduated at Yale, 1872. Secretary of Board of Railway and Warehouse Commissioners of Illinois, 1875-76; moved to Idaho and entered business, 1880; United States Marshal of Idaho, 1882-86; elected Delegate to 50th and 51st Congresses; elected, as Republican, to United States Senate, December 18, 1890; one of the youngest members of Senate; Chairman of Committee on Public Lands, and member of Committees on Civil Service, Enrolled Bills, Naval Affairs and National Banks.

the fugitive slave law, the compromise measures of 1850, and slavery extension.

The result of the election was most disastrous to the Whigs. They carried but four States. But this was by no means their worst blow. They stood appalled at the discovery that their endorsement of the compromise measures of 1850 and of the fugitive slave law had proved to be a logical commitment of the party to further slavery agitation, if not to actual slavery extension. They could not advance except by going directly into the Democratic ranks. They could not retreat except with shame and demoralization. They could not stand still, for the Free Soil Democrats had swept the ground from under their feet. They never recovered from their shock, lost their organization, never ran another President. As was piquantly said, the Whig party died of too much compromise, of a "vain attempt to swallow the fugitive slave law."

President Pierce moulded his administration wholly in the interest of the pro-slavery Democrats. This party was now in position to force its construction of the slavery issue, for it had large majorities in both House and Senate. The construction forced was that the compromise measures of 1850 repealed those of 1820, and therefore the slavery question was again open as to all the territory of the United States. The gage of battle was thrown down in the celebrated Kansas-Nebraska contest which served to solidify the pro-slavery Democrats and Whigs, to divide the Northern Democrats into two equal factions and to divide the Northern Whigs into two parties, one of which coalesced with the Free Soil Democrats, the other to soon lose its name and identity entirely, for a time under the title of anti-Nebraska men, and afterwards in that of the modern Republican party.

NATIVE AMERICAN PARTY.

The Native American idea is almost as old as the country. It cropped out in 1790 in connection with the passage of a naturalization law, and again in 1795, 1798, and again in 1802. The legislation of the latter date was designed to secure to the old Republican party the preponderance of foreign votes in the cities. To correct this, an organized movement was begun in New York as early as 1835, and in 1844 the Native Americans carried the city. The movement spread to other cities, and was signalized by great excitement and riots.

In 1852, it reappeared in politics as a secret organization, known officially as the American party, but popularly as the Know Nothing party, from the reticence of its members. Its cardinal principle was "Americans must rule America." Its rise was rapid, and its existence being at a time when the Whig party was disintegrating, and when much dissatisfaction existed in all political organizations, it was greatly encouraged to exist by its ability to hold the balance of power in many cities and even States. In 1855 it carried no less than nine State elections.

In the national campaign of 1856, it entered the race for the Presidency, by nominating Millard Fillmore, of New York, on a platform of distinct Americanism and naturalization, only after a residence of twenty-one years, with denunciation of existing parties as sectional. It succeeded in carrying the state of Maryland. In the 34th Congress it had a strong contingent of members, forty-three in all in the House and five in the Senate. In the 35th Congress it had only five members in the House.

In the vicissitude of parties between 1856 and 1860, its titles became merged into that of "Constitutional Union,"

and in the latter year it placed John Bell, of Tennessee, in nomination for the President, who succeeded in securing twelve electoral votes. It did not again appear in a presidential race.

THE REPUBLICAN PARTY.

It is not worth while here to go through the history of the Kansas-Nebraska act of 1854, with its subsequent bloody contentions for political supremacy on the soil of these Territories. Suffice it to say that all efforts to fasten slavery on these Territories by Government intervention were met by a determined opposition sentiment, which was temporarily crystalized under the title of anti-Nebraska sentiment. Its exponents became known as anti-Nebraska men. They embraced men of all parties who opposed the pro-slavery methods of making slave States out of the Territories. These anti-Nebraska men controlled the House in the 34th Congress, and participated in one of the stormiest sessions of its history.

It was seen by political leaders, of anti-Nebraska sentiment, that of the elements which composed such sentiment could be organized, a new national party would logically result. The title "Republican" was said to have been suggested by Governor Seward, of New York, in the latter part of 1855 or early part of 1856, as a substitute for anti-Nebraska men, who were as a rule opposed to slavery and slavery extension. The former title would nationalize the latter, and raise a standard around which could rally the old Liberty party, the Free Soil Democrats, the anti-slavery Whigs, and all who doubted the propriety of following further the Democratic party in its now rapid strides toward absolute State-rights and slavery extension.

The name "Republican" served the purpose intended,

though it was for a time stigmatized as "Black Republican" by its enemies, on account of its sympathy with the colored race.

By June 17, 1856, the title was sufficiently indicative of a national principle, and had served to cohere so large a number of leaders, that it ventured on a National Convention at Philadelphia, at which John C. Fremont, of California, was nominated for President. The platform declared that the Constitution, the rights of States and the union of States shall be preserved; that life, liberty and property shall be preserved by due process of law; that Congress had no right to legislate slavery into a Territory; that the administration had no right to defy the will of the people of the Territories; that the Government should extend aid to a Pacific railroad and to internal improvements.

In this campaign of 1856, the Know Nothing party was first in the field, as we have just seen. It was followed by the Democratic party at Cincinnati, which nominated James Buchanan, of Pennsylvania, on a platform affirming preceding ones, and adding an endorsement of the Kansas-Nebraska bill, and of the Squatter Sovereignty method of leaving slavery in the Territories to be settled by the people therein.

What was left of the old Whig party met at Baltimore, where it joined with the Know Nothings in denouncing the Democratic and Republican parties as sectional, and in supporting Millard Fillmore for President. This was the last appearance of Whig on the party lists.

The result of the campaign of 1856, was the election of Buchanan, the Democratic nominee, with a Democratic Congress, though the new Republican party had ninety-two members. The popular vote showed the possibilities of the

new party, and the popular vote of the entire country was largely against the Democrats.

The pro-slavery Democrats, though they had Buchanan's administration with them, soon repented of their platform endorsement of Squatter Sovereignty, for they saw that they could not colonize the Territories as rapidly and effectually as the North could. They therefore drifted more and more toward other means of extending slavery, even if the last desperate means of secession had to be resorted to. Their drift bore the administration with it, and the way was illuminated by the Dred Scott Decision which in effect wiped out the compromises of 1820 and 1850, crushed the principle of Squatter or Popular Sovereignty, opened the Territories, and even States, to slavery, despite their local laws, and nationalized the institution.

This decision extinguished the last hope of Douglas and his now important Democratic following for a settlement of the vexatious and dangerous slavery question on the basis of Popular Sovereignty, and they began to drift away from the regular organization. When the question of admitting Kansas as a State under the famous Lecompton Constitution was before the 35th Congress, 1857-58, the Douglas wing of the Democratic party, under the name of Anti-Lecompton Democrats, voted with the Republicans against the measure.

In the Congressional elections of 1858 the tide of national sentiment ran strongly in favor of the new Republican party, and the number of their members in the House rose to one hundred and nine, or more than any other party, though not a majority of all. The slavery question was still on in all its bitterness, and in 1859 it

was intensified by the John Brown affair at Harper's Ferry.

The campaign of 1860 opened with the Democratic Convention at Charleston, S. C., April 23, 1860. It proved to be a battle ground for supremacy between the southern, or extreme pro-slavery, Democrats and the Douglas Democrats. The latter won, so far as the platform went. Many pro-slavery Democrats withdrew, but enough remained to prevent Douglas' nomination. The Convention at length adjourned to meet in Baltimore, June 18th. Here Douglas was nominated for president. But a portion of the Baltimore Convention now seceded and met the seceders from the Charleston Convention, first at Charleston, then at Richmond and finally at Baltimore, where John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky, was nominated for president, on a pro-slavery platform.

The Republicans met in National Convention at Chicago, May 16, 1860, and nominated Abraham Lincoln, of Illinois, for president, on a platform announcing the necessity for a Republican party; denouncing all schemes of disunion, and the Kansas policy of the Buchanan administration; declaring in favor of protection, a Homestead law, internal improvements, and aid for a Pacific railroad. The American party made its last appearance in the national arena, under the name of the Constitutional Union party, at Baltimore, and nominated John Bell, of Tennessee, for president.

The Republican party elected Mr. Lincoln president. This election resulted also in a Republican House and Senate. The pro-slavery wing of the Democratic party regarded this result as a cause for secession of the slave States from the Union. They setup the southern Con-

federacy and inaugurated war by firing on Fort Sumter, April 13, 1861. This was the great American Rebellion, or Civil War in the United States, which was to last for over four years, and to end with the extinction of the Confederacy and a restored Union of States.

Pending this war, the Republican party held possession of all branches of the Government. In 1863 the vexatious question of slavery was forever settled by its entire abolition in the United States. The measures of Lincoln's first administration were chiefly those of war and finance. In 1861, a tariff bill was passed in accordance with the Republican doctrine of protection. Though the Democrats of the northern States coöperated largely with the Republicans in measures looking to the direct suppression of the Rebellion, they still held to their party organization sufficiently to put all strictly party questions to severe test, and as the time for the national election of 1864 drew near they were encouraged to meet in National Convention at Chicago, and nominated General George B. McLellan for president. This Convention was dominated by the reactionary or peace wing of the party, called "Copperheads," by their opponents. The platform announced adherence to the Union under the Constitution; demanded a cessation of hostilities and a peace Convention, after four years of failure to restore the Union by war; opposed military interference with elections; set forth the objects of the party as a restoration of the Union with the rights of the States unimpaired; denounced war measures in general; expressed sympathy for soldiers and sailors.

The Republican National Convention of 1860, at Baltimore, re-nominated Abraham Lincoln for president on a platform pledging the party to suppression of the Rebellion; to peace on the unconditional surrender of all rebels;

to an amendment to the Constitution prohibiting slavery; extending thanks to soldiers and sailors; approving Lincoln's administration; pledging the national faith to the redemption of the public debt; approving the Monroe Doctrine.

These two conventions were supplemented by one at Cleveland, Ohio, held under the auspices of "Radical Men," a Republican faction opposed to Lincoln on account of his tardiness respecting matters appertaining to slavery. It nominated John C. Fremont for president, but the movement collapsed, and afterwards became a part of the regular Republicans party.

The issue of war failure and of peace by compromise presented by the Democrats in 1864, was met squarely by the Republicans, and the result was an overwhelming victory for the latter, both as to the Presidency and the Congress. The war practically ended with Lee's surrender, April 9, 1865. On April 14, President Lincoln was assassinated. He was succeeded by Vice President Johnson, who was to play toward the Republicans the part of Tyler toward the Whigs, through the trying period of reconstruction of the seceded States. Though baffled at every turn by the President, the Republican majorities in both Houses of Congress were such as to enable the party to carry through most of its terms of reconstruction, and to amend the Constitution so as to secure civil rights and the right of suffrage to American citizens.

This stormy period of reconstruction served to unite in a measure the Northern and Southern wings of the Democratic party. The disturbing question of slavery eliminated, they could once more make common cause against the Republicans, which they did in the campaign of 1868, with Horatio Seymour, of New York as their candidate

for president, and with a platform recognizing the question of secession and slavery as settled; demanding the immediate restoration of the Southern States and the settlement of the question of suffrage by the States themselves; amnesty for all offenses, payment of the public debt in lawful money, where coin is not called for; equal taxation and one currency; economy, and abolition of the Freedmen's Bureau; tariff for revenue with incidental protection; general arraignment of the Republican party; gratitude to Johnson for resisting the aggressions of Congress.

The Republicans met in national convention at Chicago, May 20, 1868, and nominated General U. S. Grant for President. Their platform embodied the following: (1) Congratulation over the success of the reconstruction policy of Congress. (2) Equal suffrage to all loyal men. (3) No repudiation of national promises to pay. (4) Equalization and reduction of taxation. (5) Reduction of interest on public debt and gradual payment of same. (6) Improvement of National credit. (7) Johnson's treachery denounced. (8) Honor to soldiers. (9) Encouragement of immigration. (10) Commendation of all loyal men in the South.

The main issues of the campaign were the reconstruction measures of Congress and equal suffrage, the latter a new question rising out of the condition of the freedmen. The popular verdict was strongly in favor of the Republicans, both as to President and Congress. Grant's first administration was full of vexations, on account of a new force in the South which, under the various names of "Unreconstructed," "Irreconcilables," "Ku-Klux Klan," etc., rose up in opposition to Federal authority, and especially to the newly formed State governments, which were

denounced as "Carpet-Bag Governments." This force applied the doctrine of "a white man's government" with such effect as to terrorize all organized opposition, and eventually gain its point. But while the administration was thus struggling with ever-recurring vexations, the Supreme Court came to its rescue with a decision that Congress had the power to establish the relations of rebellious States to the Union. An equally important decision declared the Legal Tender Act of 1862 to be constitutional, thus bringing the "Greenback" into great popularity and laying the foundation of a new but ephemeral party. By July 15, 1870, the last seceded State was back in the Union, and the clouds of the reconstruction period had well-nigh vanished.

LIBERAL REPUBLICANS.

Both the Republican and Democratic parties were now to be shaken up by the question of "amnesty to rebels." Many leaders in both parties thought the time had come when general amnesty should be extended to all who had engaged in the Rebellion, on the part of the South. The Republicans who thus thought met in convention at Cincinnati, May 1, 1872, and nominated Horace Greeley, of New York, for president, on a platform pledging the party to Union, emancipation, enfranchisement; opposition to the reopening of any question settled by the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the Constitution; immediate removal of all political disabilities; local self-government with impartial suffrage; civil service reform; modest Government revenue. But the remarkable part of the platform, considering that Mr. Greeley, a lifelong protectionist, was the nominee of the party, was the tariff

plank, which simply relegated the question of the tariff to the congressional districts for discussion.

The Liberal Republican idea gained rapid headway in several States. It split the Republican party in twain in Missouri, and the Democratic party in Ohio. Accretions were so numerous from both parties, and the general amnesty doctrine was so strong with Democrats, that the Liberal Republican Convention felt it could, by early and discreet action, capture the entire Democratic organization.

In this it counted correctly, for when the Democratic Convention met in Baltimore, July 9, 1872, it accepted the platform and nominees of the Liberal Republicans, with the hope of thus widening the schism in the Republican ranks and crushing the party forever.

But not all Democrats fell thus to the Liberal Republican movement. A straight out Democratic Convention was held at Louisville, September 3, 1872, which nominated Charles O'Connor, of New York, for president, on a platform containing a plea for State-rights, and repudiation of the Baltimore convention as a betrayal of the Democratic party into a false creed and false leadership.

The Republicans met in National Convention in Philadelphia, June 5, 1872, and renominated U. S. Grant for president on a platform whose leading planks favored enforcement of the new constitutional amendments, civil service reform, and maintenance of the public credit.

THE PROHIBITION PARTY.

Up until 1865, what may be designated political temperance depended on the use of parties as they were found to exist in the States. This localized the temperance issue, and subjected it to the whim of opponents. The time had come for the nationalization of the cause. In

1868, the Grand Lodge of Good Templars moved for "the organization of a national political party whose principles should be prohibition of the manufacture, importation and sale of intoxicating liquors to be used as a beverage." This sentiment was closely reflected by the Sixth National Temperance Convention at Cleveland, July 29, 1868. The next year, during a session of the Grand Lodge of Good Templars at Oswego, N. Y., a call was made for a Convention to organize a "National Prohibition party."

This Convention met in Chicago, September 1, 1869, with five hundred delegates from twenty states, and launched the new party. The party held its first National Convention at Columbus, Ohio, February 22, 1872, and nominated James Black, of Pennsylvania for president, on a platform declaring that as all existing political parties had proved unwilling to adopt an adequate policy respecting traffic in intoxicating drinks, therefore the Prohibition party pledged itself to maintain the principles of its Declaration and Constitution; that effective state as well as National prohibition is the only means of suppressing traffic in intoxicants; that existing party competition for the liquor vote is a peril to the nation; dissuasion from the use of intoxicants; competency, honesty and sobriety as qualifications for office; no removals from office for political opinions; economy; direct vote for president; sound national currency; labor reform; suffrage without regard to sex; fostering of common schools.

All parties were now ready for the campaign of 1872—a campaign peculiar in every respect. Its burdens were chiefly borne by the Liberal Republicans. The result was their overwhelming defeat. They had not captured the Democratic party, for what they gained from it was far more than offset by desertions to the Republicans. Nor

had they widened perceptibly the schism in the Republican ranks. As was wittily said at the time, "fusion had resulted in confusion."

THE GREENBACK PARTY.

In 1873 the Country passed through a panic. Cautious financial legislation became necessary. President Grant vetoed a measure increasing the national currency to the extent of \$400,000,000, because it tended to inflation at a time when the country was looking toward the resumption of specie payments. A strenuous effort was made by a strong minority of both parties to pass the bill over the veto. The effort failed, but here we have the germs of the "Greenback party."

The rise of this party was encouraged by the stringency of the times, and by the propensity to hold the dominant party responsible for industrial and financial ills. It at first took form and name as "The Independent party," that being best suited for a grouping of all the elements of discontent. But it could not escape the more suggestive name of "Greenback party," since its object was to relieve financial stringency and business depression by using the credit of the Government in the shape of greenbacks, and insisting on a sufficient issue of them to answer the purposes intended. The greenback was then popular and was ere long to be redeemed in gold.

But while the inception of the party was in 1873, it received its real impetus in the passage of the specie Resumption act of 1875, by the Republicans. The Democrat party, contrary to its traditions, had arrayed itself against the passage of this act, and was therefore in a position to ally itself with the Greenbackers. This alliance was effected in many States, and it proved to be a very strong alliance in

industrial districts where the thought of unlimited money was a pleasing delusion.

CAMPAIGN OF 1876.

This party was the first to enter the campaign of 1876. It met in National Convention at Indianapolis, May 17, 1876 and nominated Peter Cooper, of New York, for president, on a platform arraigning both Republican and Democratic parties for refusing to foster financial reform and industrial emancipation; demanding repeal of the Specie Resumption act of 1875; insisting upon the United States note (greenback) as a circulating medium and legal tender, and upon the Jeffersonian theory that "bank paper must be suppressed, and the circulation restored to the nation to whom it belongs; declaring that the Government shall legislate for the full development of all legitimate business; opposing further issue of gold bonds; no further sale of bonds with which to purchase silver as a substitute for fractional currency.

This was a most remarkable platform in view of the strenuous opposition of the Democrats to the passage of the original Greenback act, of the traditions of the party in favor of hard money, and of the historic opposition of Democracy to Government legislation in favor of our industries.

Another party which had already entered the campaign of 1876, was the American National party, which met in mass meeting at Pittsburg, June 9, 1875, and nominated James B. Walker, of Illinois, for president. It favored a Sabbath, and prohibition, the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, arbitration, Bible in schools, return to specie payments, direct vote of the people for president, and opposed Secret Societies. The Prohibition party,

under the name of "Prohibition Reform party," met in National Convention at Cleveland, May 17, 1876, and nominated Green C. Smith, of Kentucky, for president, on the usual platform of principles.

The Republican party met in Convention at Cincinnati and nominated Rutherford B. Hayes, of Ohio, for president. This Convention broke the usual party practice of voting the States as units. It declared in its platform that the United States was a nation not a league; that Republican work was not done till the Declaration was acknowledged in every State; for protection of all citizens; for redemption of United States notes in coin; for improved civil service; rigid responsibility in office; against sectarian control of schools; for sufficient revenue with protection; against land-grants to corporations; in favor of pensions to soldiers.

The regular Democratic party met in convention at St. Louis. June 28, 1876, and nominated Samuel J. Tilden, of New York, for president, on a platform of general condemnation of the Republican party and policy; the language as to the existing tariff being that it is, "a masterpiece of injustice, inequality and false pretence."

This campaign led to the unfortunate result of a disputed return of electors from three of the Southern States and from Oregon—a result upon which the victory hung. The matter was carried before a special tribunal, called the "Electoral Commission." Its decision was that R. B. Hayes, the Republican nominee for president, had received one hundred and eighty-five electoral votes, and Samuel J. Tilden, the Democratic nominee, one hundred and eighty-four votes. A remarkable feature of this contest was that Republicans and Democrats had reversed their

ground as to open and strict construction of the Constitution.

The forty-fifth Congress, the first to meet under Hayes' administration was Democratic in the House and Republican in Senate. Strictly partisan legislation was therefore blocked. This Congress witnessed the introduction of the silver question into politics, in the shape of the Bland bill remonetizing silver and authorizing the coinage of \$2,000,000 Bland dollars, a month. In the forty sixth Congress the Republicans made a determined effort to repeal the Bland silver act but failed.

CAMPAIGN OF 1880.

In the campaign of 1880, the Republicans were first in the field. They met at Chicago, June 5, 1880, and nominated James A. Garfield, of Ohio, for president. The platform recited the achievements of the Republican party from the suppression of the Rebellion to the resumption of gold payments, and extended the usual pledges in favor of protection, pensions, internal improvements, etc.

The Convention of the National Greenback party was held at Chicago, June 9, 1880. It nominated James B. Weaver, of Iowa, for president upon a platform adhering to a large legal tender currency; opposition to refunding of the national debt; favoring abolition of national banks, an unlimited coinage of gold and silver and a graduated income tax.

The Prohibition Reform party met at Cleveland, June 17, 1880, and nominated Neal Dow, of Maine, for president on the usual platform.

The Democratic party met at Cincinnati, June 22, 1880, and nominated General Winfield S. Hancock, of New York,



HON. LEVI P. MORTON.

Born at Shoreham, Vt., May 16, 1824; educated in common schools; entered mercantile business at Concord, N. H.; at twenty-five, member of firm of Morton & Co., Boston; member of firm of Morton & Grinnell, New York, 1854; a banker in 1863; Morton, Bliss & Co., in 1868; elected to Congress in Twelfth New York District in 1878; an authority in matters of finance; declined Vice-Presidential nomination, 1880; furnished fourth of cargo to Irish sufferers; declined Secretaryship of Navy under Garfield; Minister to France under Garfield; urged for U. S. Senator, 1885; elected Vice-President, 1888; elected Governor of New York by a large majority in 1894; noted for financial knowledge, charitable disposition, and nobility of character; prominent candidate for Presidential nominee on Republican ticket in 1896.



HON. WILLIAM ALFRED PEPPER.

Born in Cumberland co., Pa., September 10, 1831; educated in common schools; engaged in teaching and farming; moved to Indiana, 1853, and engaged in farming; moved to Missouri, 1859, and to Illinois, 1861; enlisted in Union army and served in Department of Nashville; studied law and began practice in Clarksville, Tenn., 1865; moved to Kansas, 1870, to practice law and edit; elected to State Senate, 1874; Republican elector in 1880; editor of *Kansas Farmer*, 1881; elected to United States Senate, as a People's Party candidate, for term beginning March 4, 1891; an exponent of the ideas advocated by the Farmers' Alliance and other new parties; Chairman of Committee on Civil Service, and member of Committees on Immigration, Pensions, Irrigation and Woman's Suffrage.

for president, on a platform pledging the party to Democratic traditions, and tariff for revenue only.

The result of the campaign was the election of Garfield, with a Republican majority in the House and a tie in the Senate. On July 2, 1881, President Garfield was mortally shot, and was succeeded by Vice President Arthur. The forty-seventh Congress enacted the important tariff bill of 1883, lowering duties. It also enacted the Civil Service Reform Bill, introduced into the Senate by Geo. H. Pendleton, Democrat of Ohio. The elections of 1882 had proven disastrous to the Republicans, and in the forty-eighth Congress there was a large preponderance of Democrats in the House, but no legislation of political moment was effected. Both parties preferred to stand as nearly still as possible, preparatory to the campaign of 1884.

CAMPAIGN OF 1884.

The eighth National Convention on the history of the Republican party met at Chicago, June 3, 1884. James G. Blaine, of Maine, was nominated for president, on a platform which commended the party for its achievements; lamented the death of Garfield; endorsed Arthur's administration; favored a tariff for the protection of American industry; denounced Democratic measures in Congress; urged international standard of gold and silver; suggested the regulation of interstate commerce; favored international arbitration; denounced the importation of contract labor; favored civil service reform, liberal pensions, extension of the navy; insisted on a free ballot and full count in southern States; passed a pledge to secure to all persons full political rights.

The Democrats met at Chicago, July 8, 1884, and nominated Grover Cleveland, of New York, for president,

much against the wishes of Tammany Hall. The platform announced "the preservation of personal rights, equality of citizens before the law, reserved rights of States, supremacy of Federal Government within Constitutional provisions;" that a change of parties was demanded; that the will of the people was defeated by fraud in 1876; that the Republican party was extravagant, and had not kept its pledges to workingmen soldiers, and in favor of American manufactures; that the Democratic party pledged itself to reform the existing tariff and internal revenue laws, and denounced the existing tariff; that the Government should secure equal rights to all citizens; that there should be no sumptuary laws; that the party favored Civil Service Reform, separation of church and state, legislation tending to advance labor, an American policy for restoration of American commerce.

The Prohibition National Convention met in Pittsburg, July 21, 1884, and nominated Ex-Governor John P. St. John, of Kansas, for president, on the usual Prohibition platform.

As a prelude to the National Convention of the Greenback party, a Convention of Anti-monopolists met at Chicago, May 14, 1884, which nominated Benjamin F. Butler, of Massachusetts, for president. When the Greenback party met in Chicago, May 28, 1884, it also nominated Butler for president, on a platform demanding the issue of legal tender notes in quantities sufficient to supply actual demands of trade and commerce in accordance with increase of population.

The campaign opened with great personal bitterness, and was conducted with an acerb spirit to the end. Mr. Blaine threw into it all his intense personalism, but the result was his defeat by the narrowest of all margins. At

the same time the House was carried by the Democrats. At this time there were two wings to the Democratic party, one favoring a tariff for revenue with incidental protection, the other standing squarely against the protective idea.

The new president elect, Mr Cleveland, at first favored the former wing led by Mr. Randall, but he turned, and in his message of 1887, announced his tariff reform, or free trade, sentiments, which became the party doctrine for future campaigns. With their majority in the forty-ninth Congress, the Democrats achieved but little party legislation. In the fiftieth Congress the House still had a Democratic majority, while there was a Republican majority of one in the Senate. The former passed the Mills Tariff Bill by a slender majority. It was defeated in the Senate. Nothing seriously affected the status of the two leading parties during Mr. Cleveland's first term of office.

CAMPAIGN OF 1888.

The Democrats entered the lists first with their national Convention at St. Louis, at which President Cleveland was re-nominated by acclamation, on a platform reaffirming that of 1884, and inveighing against the Republican policy of accumulating a surplus in the treasury.

The Republicans met in National Convention at Chicago, June 19, 1888, and nominated Benjamin Harrison of Indiana, for president, on a platform strongly favoring the protective idea and accepting the issue of free trade as presented by the Democrats.

The Prohibition party met at Indianapolis and nominated Clinton B. Fick, of New Jersey, for president, on a distinctive party platform.

The United Labor party placed R. H. Cowdrey in the

field as its candidate for president. The Greenbackers, now figuring faintly in political affairs, united with the Labor Reformers, and nominated Alson J. Streeter for president. The American party nominated James L. Curtis for president. The Equal Rights party, nominated Belva A. Lockwood for president.

The campaign was one largely of discussion, the leading issue being that of Tariff *vs.* Free Trade. The result was the election of Harrison the Republican nominee, together with a Republican House of Representatives. The revolution of 1884 was now reversed. The Harrison administration was signalized by the passage of the McKinley tariff bill of 1890, involving the principle of reciprocity, the Administrative Customs' Act and the Sherman Silver Bill changing the actual coinage of silver, as provided for in the Bland Bill, to the purchase of 54,000,000 ounces of silver in a year—the amount of the American product—and the issuing of silver certificates against the bullion deposited.

The Democrats were not daunted by the defeat of Tariff Reform in 1888, but pressed the issue before the country with sufficient success in the elections of 1890, to win a large majority in the fifty-second Congress. This majority proved to be too large, unsophisticated and unwieldy. Such imposing questions as those appertaining to Samoa, the murder of Italians in New Orleans, the Chilian Imbrolio, overshadowed everything narrower. The Congress achieved nothing outside of routine and such few passing things as would contribute to success in the approaching campaign of 1892. The "pop-gun" method of doing away with the Tariff act of 1890, proved unsatisfactory to even its advocates.

But there was one question that would not down in

this Congress. That was the free coinage of silver. It bobbed up at every turn to annoy the Democratic majority. The failure of silver producers to realize their expectations under the Sherman act of 1890, the growing desire on the part of the dissatisfied to change industrial and trade conditions in the South and West, had given the silver question a new and decidedly party turn. Democratic State Conventions had almost unanimously declared in favor of "free and unlimited coinage of silver." This was but an echo of the Greenback doctrine, now on its wane. Mr. Bland, recognized leader of the silver agitation, formulated his "Free Silver Coinage Bill" and urged it with his tremendous ability. The belief that it could fail in a Democratic House was not to be entertained. But what was his surprise to find that the eastern Democrats had turned in with the Republicans, and that the vote on his bill was a tie. Though the Speaker, Mr. Crisp, broke the tie in favor of the bill, it was afterwards defeated by dilatory motions.

In comparison with the fifty-first Congress the fifty-second passed into history as the "do-nothing Congress." It was frequently driven to protest against itself for filibustering tactics. Owing its existence largely to "The Billion Dollar" extravagance of its predecessor, it exceeded that extravagance by a total of \$44,000,000.

CAMPAIGN OF 1892.

The Republican party held its National Convention at Minneapolis, June 7, 1892, and renominated President Harrison on a platform favoring American Protection, bimetallism with legislative restrictions, free ballot and honest count, extension of foreign commerce, enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, separations of church and state :

efficient protection to railroad employees, reduced postage and extension of free mail delivery, Civil Service, Nicaragua canal, admissions of Territories as States, the World's Fair, pensions; and opposing southern outrages, pauper immigration, trusts, and intemperance.

The Democrats met at Chicago, June 21, 1892, and re-nominated Grover Cleveland on a platform pledging the party to the principles of Jefferson, to opposition to the "Force Bill;" denouncing protection as a fraud and unconstitutional; the McKinley act as the "culminating atrocity of class legislation;" reciprocity as a fraud; declaring opposition to trusts; to giving away of public lands to railroads; to the coinage act of 1890; to State banks; to Republican foreign policy; to pauper immigration; to Harrison's administration; favoring Mississippi improvements, Nicaragua canal, popular education, admission of new States, protection of railway employees, abolition of the "sweating system."

The Prohibitionists met in National Convention at Cincinnati, June 30, 1892, and nominated General John Bidwell, for president, on an elaborate platform expressive of the party's views.

THE PEOPLE'S OR POPULIST PARTY.

A new party had been for some time in process of quiet growth, formed of those who thought that the Government had not been sufficiently mindful of the welfare of the industrial classes. It had formulated its doctrines at a meeting at Ocala, Fla., and was sufficiently advanced to take its place in the campaign of 1892. This it did in National Convention at Omaha on July 4, 1892, by the nomination of General James B. Weaver, of Iowa, for president. The party was recruited from both the lead-

ing parties, and gave as reasons for its existence, those found in the preamble to its platform, to wit;—that corruption dominates the ballot box, the legislatures, the Congress, and touches even the ermine of the bench. The people are demoralized, newspapers largely subsidized or muzzled, public opinion silenced, business prostrated, homes mortgaged, labor impoverished, lands concentrated in the hands of capitalists, workmen denied right of organization, imported pauperized labor beating down wages, the fruits of toil stolen to build up colossal fortunes, the national power to create money appropriated to enrich bond holders, a vast public debt funded into gold-bearing bonds, silver demonetized, the currency abridged to fatten usurers, bankrupt enterprise and enslave industry.

The preamble further charged both political parties with grievous wrongs and inability to right them, with engaging in sham political battles over tariffs for the sake of plunder, and with proposing to sacrifice homes, lives and children on the altar of Mammon. The platform which followed contained a belief that a union of the labor forces of the country was necessary to its salvation, that wealth belonged to him who created it, and that the time had come when the Government should own and operate the railroads, telegraphs and telephones. On the question of finance the demand was for a safe, sound and flexible legal tender currency, for free and unlimited coinage of silver at a ratio of sixteen to one, for a graduated income tax, for limitation of State and National revenues, for postal savings banks, for an eight hour law, for civil service regulations.

These plain charges and broad demands sufficed to touch deeply an immense contingent of both parties in the far western States, and one of the curiosities of the campaign

of 1892 was a coalition of Democrats and Populists in many States with a view to securing Democratic electors. The growth of this new party in the Southern States was phenomenal. In more than one of these States it swept away old regimes and installed itself in the Governor's chairs and legislatures.

The result of the national campaign of 1892 was a surprise to both the leading parties. There had been but little excitement, and nothing more than a quiet confidence manifested. But it was found that the labor vote had revolted against its employers, and that the Populist strength had proved enormous beyond all calculation, having swept several Republican states of the northwest from their political moorings. Ex-president Cleveland was elected, and with him a large majority of Democrats in the fifty-third Congress, the strength of parties being two hundred and twenty-one Democrats, one hundred and twenty-five Republicans, ten Populists. The Senate was also Democratic, the party strength being forty-three Democrats, thirty-seven Republicans, and five Populists.

This was really a greater political revolution than that of 1884 had been. The Democratic party found itself in possession of all branches of the Government for the first time in thirty-two years, and it could apply its principles at will. But though a triumphant, it was to be by no means a happy, party. Its alliances with Populists encouraged the free silver sentiment in its ranks, and out of fusion was to come confusion, as so often happens in party history.

A feeling of discontent rested heavily on the country and a sense of danger haunted commercial centres. Gold went abroad rapidly. The Treasury reserve became depleted. Exports fell off. Expenditures exceeded receipts.

The Secretary of the Treasury intimated the probability of redeeming silver certificates in silver. At once solid dread fell on the banks and capitalists. Credits shrivelled, banks closed, corporations and firms went to the wall, business demoralization became well-nigh universal, mills closed, labor went idle. The period was one of panic, or rather of that awful suspension of faith and credit which is usually worse than panic, because it is less treatable by remedies and of longer duration. It was to rest like an incubus on the entire second administration of Mr. Cleveland.

It was thought that the Sherman Silver Act of 1890 had something to do with the disastrous times. Congress was called in special session, August 7, 1893, and the purchasing clause of the bill was repealed, but not without strenuous opposition by the free silver coinage men. Credit was somewhat fortified, but the industrial panic still prevailed and even assumed more disastrous forms. It was evident that the cause had not been rightly guessed.

Amid this gloom the fifty-third Congress met in regular session, December 4, 1893. Its meeting was rendered more sombre by the fact that a counter political revolution had set in, in 1893, less diffused but more emphatic than that of 1892 had been. Democratic States, like New York, were swept by the Republicans, by large majorities. It was evident that the country was in violent reaction. Still the Congress went actively about the work of substituting a new Tariff act for that of 1890. The bill, which became known as the "Wilson Bill," was framed very far along the approaches to free trade, so much so indeed that the Democrats in the Senate forced into it many material amendments so as to make it secure more

revenue. It was passed, but never received the Presidents' signature. It became a law not only without the President's endorsement, but with his expressed disapprobation. The Democrats had now applied to the situation one of their most heroic remedies, had placed the country on a new economic plain. They had even incorporated in the Tariff the Populist doctrine of an income tax. This the Supreme Court decided to be unconstitutional.

All the while the Treasury condition was growing worse. The Gold reserve could not be preserved, and the deficit was growing daily. In order to meet expenses and preserve the National credit, a resort was had to borrowing. \$50,000,000 bonds were sold in order to replenish the Treasury. This did not last long, and another, and still a third issue, became necessary, making a total of \$262,000,000, in a little over a year. This use of bonds in order to keep the Treasury in funds was highly exasperating to free silver coinage sentiment in the Democratic party, while the country at large felt great disappointment over the fact that the Wilson tariff was falling so far below the expectations and promises of its projectors in providing revenue sufficient for the needs of Government in time of peace. Added to this, Mr. Cleveland had been unfortunate in his foreign policy, and had antagonized the patriotic spirit of the people. It was hardly surprising therefore, that the political reaction which began in 1893 should assume fuller proportions in 1894. The large Democratic majority in the House was overturned by an equally large Republican majority in the fifty-fourth Congress. It was therefore to a hostile body that President Cleveland made his plea for financial relief, in his message to the fifty-fourth Congress. The House came to his rescue with a provisional tariff bill designed

to increase the Custom's revenue sufficiently to meet the needs of the Treasury. But this could not be passed in the Senate, owing to the attitude of parties there, the free silver coinage sentiment holding a balance of power, and being determined to fix a recognition of its principles on all the legislation it could.

CAMPAIGN OF 1896.

The shapings of the campaign of 1896, proved to be most interesting. The free silver coinage sentiment which, as we have seen, the Populists formulated in their platform of 1892, but which had been a prolific source of agitation long before, had well-nigh taken possession of the Democratic party in the Western and Southern States, and had come to the front in the Republican party of the mining States sufficiently to threaten their allegiance. So conspicuous and pervading had the sentiment become that the name "Populist" was almost lost in that of "Free Silverite" as a party cognomen.

While the free silver coinage sentiment was thus affecting both the Republican and Democratic parties in kind, it was not doing so in degree, for its invasion of the Democratic ranks was where they had been strongest, while it penetrated but little into the strong Republican States. The Democrats stood in awe of it, for the reason that they had coquetted with and encouraged it in 1892, and for the additional reason that the administration had directly and bitterly antagonized it by seeking to make all that constituted its opposite a part of administrative policy. The Republicans had less fear of it, for the reason that however rabid the sentiment might become in the States that were most affected by it, the more important principle of protection would be there to modify or thwart it.

The first party to open the campaign was the Prohibition party which met at Pittsburg, May 27, and nominated Joshua Levering, of Maryland, for president on a single plank platform setting forth the principles of the party. This Convention witnessed a bolt led by the free silver coinage men, on account of their failure to secure the insertion of a free silver plank in the platform. The bolters set up a new party and a separate ticket.

The second National Convention was that of the Republican party, which met at St. Louis, June 16, 1896, and nominated William McKinley for president. The platform declared for an ample protective tariff and for the maintainance of the existing gold standard of money. The failure of the radical free silver coinage men to secure a plank in the platform pledging the party to free silver coinage at the ratio of sixteen to one, led to a bolt which portended the loss of several of the States interested in silver mining.

The preliminary battle for ascendancy in the Democratic Convention called to meet in Chicago on July 6, 1896, was the fiercest in the annals of the party. The free silver coinage men were actively, boldly and bitterly aggressive from the very inception of the campaign, and were constantly encouraged by the local elections in the states.

As time wore on their confidence was increased, and that of the gold, or the sound money, wing fell. Even the heroic effort of President Cleveland, by open letter, to stay the free silver coinage tide passed without effect, and it was conceded, some time before the meeting of the Convention, that the mastery of the free silver coinage wing of the party would be complete. The first test vote showed 556 for free silver to 349 against.

PRINCIPLES OF FREE-TRADE.

FREE-TRADE exists only in theory. There is no actual free-trade in all the world.

Those who ground their arguments on the abstract doctrine of free-trade are free-traders.

Those who admit the necessity or propriety of a tariff for revenue only are free-traders. All the political economists of the free-trade school—Adam Smith, Mill, Ricardo, Say, List, Laveleye, Wells, Wayland—say that a government has a right to levy a tax for its support, and that the tariff is the least onerous and easiest collected tax.

A tariff for revenue with incidental protection begins to draw the line between the free-trader and the protectionist.

A "Tariff Reformer" is either an outright free-trader, or a believer in a revenue tariff with incidental protection. He may be none the less a protectionist.

Politics confuse these terms. American politics are especially loose respecting them. We change both theories and terms with the rapidity of a new and enterprising country.

In England "free-trade" and "free-trader" carry no reproach. The meaning of the terms is understood, as well as the doctrine.

In political economy there is no doubt about terms. The free-trader and protectionist are what they profess to be.

The early economic writers were mostly free-traders. Protection, which all nations practiced, did not seem to admit of theories or encourage a literature.

It is well to understand that the astounding revelations in connection with the development of the United States have

shaken all the old theories respecting free-trade and protection, and made a new political economy possible, if not necessary.

A primary law of political economy is that an increase of the productiveness of the country implies an increase of its capital. No law can create capital.

A second law is that productiveness depends on the number of laborers. Legislation cannot create men.

A third law is that productiveness depends on the stimulus to labor. Protection changes only the mode of labor. If it attracts manufacturers, it repels agriculturalists, and, *vice versa*. What it pays as a stimulus to one industry it subtracts from another. Hence there is no gain to labor as a whole.

Protection increases the price of an article. As price increases, demand diminishes. The less an article is wanted, the less it will be produced. The demand for labor diminishes. The price of labor diminishes. The stimulus to labor is decreased.

The watchword of free-traders, or freedom of exchange, is *Laissez faire ; laissez passer* : "leave it alone." This is nature. Allow every one to buy and sell where he can do so most advantageously, whether in or out of his own country.

Revenue from customs on foreign goods may be permitted by the doctrine of *laissez faire*, but it is a tax, and a bad one.

To establish duties under the pretext of protecting national industries is an iniquitous measure fatal to the general interests.

By forcing a consumer to buy at a higher price than he would have otherwise, or elsewhere, to pay, is to perpetrate the injustice of taxing one class for the benefit of another.

Political economy draws no distinction between classes. So, if it be said that protection by means of tariff duties has for its purpose the favor of labor, it favors a class, none the less.

True industrial economy aims not to increase but diminish labor. If, with what I can earn in one day, I can buy a yard of cloth from a foreigner, why force me to spend two days' labor for the same?

An injury is done to humanity by a system which forces men into manufactories. The custom house snatches men, women and children from open air tasks, and chains them in gloomy workshops for twelve to fourteen hours out of twenty-four.

Free-trade applies to whole peoples the principle of the division of labor, assures them all that such principle can bestow, and thereby enhances their welfare.

When each is employed at what he can do best, the individual shares are greatest.

When each is compelled by legislation to do what he must, and what he may not have aptitude for, the aggregate of labor will not be so great, and the individual will be worse off.

So when each country or nation fails to devote its energies to what nature most favors, it will not bring to market the maximum obtained by the minimum of toil, but the results of a diminished productivity.

No man can be so self-sufficient as to confine himself to the manufacture of his food, clothing, furniture, books, etc. The nation is no better off than the man.

Protection obliges me to grow wheat, without reference to soil. But in nature my soil may be sandy, and I could better afford to raise something else in exchange for wheat, which grows better on my neighbor's clay soil.

Commerce is always an exchange of produce against produce. So much exported, so much imported. Therefore the foreigner cannot inundate us with goods. The different countries cannot sell more than they buy.

Industrial progress begets competition. Don't limit it at the confines of a state or nation. The widest competition is the most universal profit. Monopoly means sloth; protection, routine. The manufacturer who is forced to keep hold of the home market will conquer the world.

A railroad uniting two countries facilitates exchanges; customs dues impede them.

Free-trade has for its object the diminution of labor. Machinery has the same object. Protection, therefore, should demand the abolition of machinery, in order to be consistent.

Capital turns spontaneously to the most lucrative employment. Protection turns it to the less lucrative, and seeks to make up the difference by a tax on consumers.

The argument that a country should be independent of foreigners in time of war is of no avail in this era of easy and ready transportation. Neutral ships may transport the goods of belligerents. The blockade of a nation is impossible.

The doctrine of free-trade, like that of protection, is oftentimes best sustained by attacking and exploding the theories of the adversary.

Modern politics, especially the politics of a free country like that of the United States, are prolific of arguments and phrases which greatly affect the stereotyped theories of free-trade and protection.

Hence, having passed from the ascertained laws of free-trade, as found in the books, and as built on the experience of foreign countries, on monarchical conditions, and on a



BENJAMIN R. TILLMAN.

Born in Edgefield co., S. C., Aug. 11, 1847; joined Confederate Army, 1864; a farmer till 1886; engaged in agitation which led to establishment of Clemson Agricultural and Mechanical College at Fort Hill; farmers' candidate for Governor in 1890; elected in Nov.; re-elected in 1892; term signalized by passage of dispensary law and founding of another college, the Winthrop Normal and Industrial College for Women, at Rock Hill; entered the race for candidate against Senator Butler, and the two canvassed the State together; elected to U. S. Senate in 1895; member of Committees on Mines and Mining, Naval Affairs, Public Lands, Canada Relations, and Forest Preservation.



HON. CHARLES F. CRISP.

Born in Sheffield, England, January 29, 1845, of American parents, educated in common schools of Savannah and Macon, Ga.; entered Confederate army, May, 1861; a prisoner of war, 1864-65; studied law in Americus, Ga., and admitted to bar, 1866; practiced in Ellaville; appointed Solicitor-general in 1872 and again in 1873; moved to Americus in 1873; appointed Judge of Superior Court, 1876, and elected to same, 1878; re-elected Judge, 1880; elected to 48th, 49th, 50th, 51st, 52d, 53d and 54th Congresses; elected Speaker of House in 52d and 53d Congresses; member of the Committees on Ways and Means and Rules.

geography, climatology and sociology different from our own, there is opportunity for new laws founded on different natural and commercial conditions. This also gives free play to the doctrines respecting protection.

Bearing this in mind, we are prepared for opinions and assertions which have weight in free discussion, but which are somewhat removed from the seriousness and weight of fortified laws.

These are none the less worthy of consideration, for even if there is no economic law back of them, they may foreshadow truths which experience will ripen into economic axiom. As other nations, less expansive than ours, less liberally endowed by nature, and altogether less advanced in industrial and commercial knowledge and opportunity, have formulated economic laws, which are quoted with favor and accepted as final, so this nation may well assume to ascertain what is best for itself, and to give its conclusions the form of economic axiom.

In this point of view the American political economist becomes an impressive and invaluable economist, and the passionate wisdom of the partisan something which is crude quartz to the view, yet with crystals of gold inside.

As instances, the protectionist is challenged for reply by the declaration that the system of protection is sustained by the co-operation of its beneficiaries, and that they are held together by the "cohesive power of public plunder."

Similarly, by the declaration that the tariff is a tax upon the consumer, and that, especially, when imposed on raw materials. Ten cents a pound upon wool means that the consumer will have to pay that much more for the cloth made of that pound.

So, when a tariff is declared to be vicious in principle

that seeks to perpetuate high rates. Hamilton is quoted, in 1791 :

“The continuance of bounties on manufactures long established must always be of questionable policy ; because a presumption would arise in every such case that there were natural and inherent impediments to success.”

Clay is quoted, in 1833 :

“The theory of protection supposes, too, that after a certain time the protected arts will have acquired such strength and perfection as will enable them, subsequently, unaided to stand against foreign competition.”

The theory that a tariff protects labor by furnishing it employment is the old theory of “the maximum of toil and the minimum of profit,” whereas the true economic theory is “the minimum of toil and the maximum of profit.”

A tariff favors a class and tends to monopolies and the formation of trusts, with power to regulate prices and burden consumers.

A protective tariff and protective policy is not such a public policy as needs to be supported by the people at large. The principle and fact are denied that protection of an article by levying a duty on it tends to cheapen the price of the article, after its manufacture has been established.

To defend protection is to justify the taking of one man's money and putting it in another's pocket.

The tariff that looks to the protection of labor really injures labor when it leads to the production of articles in this country cheaper than abroad.

Gladstone defends free-trade on moral grounds—the commercial doing as you would wish to be done by.

Patrick Henry said :

“Commerce should be as free as the winds of heaven ; a restricted commerce is like a man in chains, crippled in all

his movements and bowed to the earth; but let him twist the fetters from his legs and he stands erect."

Protection has invoked many wars and rebellions. The head-spring of the American Revolution was the Navigation Act, an English system of protection which sacrificed to English monopoly the natural rights of her colonies.

In keeping with the Navigation Act were other English laws suppressing important manufactures as well as internal trade in the colonies. In the land of the beaver no man could be a hatter unless he had served seven years as an apprentice at the trade. No American hat could be sent out of one province into another. Steel furnaces, plating forges and slitting mills were prohibited as nuisances. Lord Chatham said that in a certain contingency he would prohibit the manufacture in the American Colonies of even so much as a horseshoe or a hobnail. Lord Sheffield declared that the only use England had for the American Colonies was "the monopoly of their consumption and the carriage of their produce." These violations of natural law worked their own overthrow, and the mother country lost the brightest jewel in her crown. This event led England to re-examine her commercial system and to adopt the policy of free-trade.

Adam Smith completed his great work, "Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations," the very year America declared her independence, 1776.

In 1817, when Parliament repealed the duty on salt, the agents of the salt monopolies plead for a prohibitory duty on it. "Thus fell," says Thomas H. Benton, "an odious, impious and criminal tax."

"The leaven of free-trade principles continued to work in England under the wise and skilful supervision of Rich-

ard Cobden, and reached its culminating triumph in the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846."—*Richard Hawley*.

In 1842 England exported goods to the amount of \$570,000,000, and in 1865 to the amount of \$1,815,000,000. In the same time her imports rose from \$326,000,000 to \$909,000,000. In 1842 the number of articles subject to duty was 1,150; in 1870 only 43 articles were subject to duty, and the duty was not protective. Yet her revenue from customs was about the same in 1870 as in 1842. She now levies duty only on about a dozen articles, such as tea, coffee, tobacco, spirits, wines, etc.

Hon. David A. Wells makes an argument for free-trade, or free exchange, thus:—"Population in the United States increased from 1860 to 1870, 22.2 per cent. The products of our manufactures increased in the same period 52 per cent. This tendency of manufacturing products to increase faster than population gluts our home markets and shows the necessity for larger and freer commerce."

"There is no nation," says he, "or country, or community, nor probably any one man, that is not, by reason of differences in soil, climate, physical or mental capacities, at advantage or disadvantage as respects some other nation, country, community or men in producing or doing something useful. It is only a brute, furthermore, as economists have long recognized, that can find a full satisfaction for its desires in its immediate surroundings; while poor indeed must be the man of civilization that does not lay every quarter of the globe under contribution every morning for his breakfast. Hence—springing out of this diversity in the powers of production, and of wants in respect to locations and individuals—the origin of trade. Hence its necessity and advantage; and the man who has not sufficient education to read the letters of any printed book perceives by

instinct, more clearly, as a general rule, than the man of civilization, that if he can trade freely, he can better his condition and increase the sum of his happiness; for the first thing the savage, when brought in contact with civilized man, wants to do, is to exchange; and the first effort of every new settlement in any new country, after providing temporary food and shelter, is to open a road or other means of communication to some other settlement, in order that they may trade or exchange the commodities which they can produce to advantage, for the products which some others can produce to greater advantage. And, obeying this same natural instinct, the heart of every man, that has not been filled with prejudice of race or country, or perverted by talk about the necessity of tariffs and custom-houses, experiences a pleasurable emotion when it learns that a new road has been opened, a new railroad constructed, or that the time of crossing the seas has been greatly shortened; and if to-day it could be announced that the problem of aerial navigation had been solved, and that hereafter everybody could go everywhere, with all their goods and chattels, for one-tenth of the cost and in one-tenth of the time that is now required, one universal shout of jubilation would arise spontaneously from the whole civilized world. And why? Simply because everybody would feel that there would be forthwith a multitude of new wants, an equal multitude of new satisfactions, an increase of business in putting wants and satisfactions into the relations of equations in which one side would balance the other, and an increase of comfort and happiness everywhere."

"All trade," he says, "is at the bottom a matter of barter; product being given for product and service for service; that in order to sell we must buy, and in order to buy we must sell; and that he who won't buy can't sell, and he who won't

sell can't buy. . . . The United States, for now a long series of years, has, in its fiscal policy, denied or ignored the truth of the above economic, axiomatic principles. It has not, indeed, in so many distinct words said to the American producers and laborers, You shall not sell your products and your labor to the people of other countries; but it has emphatically said to the producers and laborers of other countries, We do not think it desirable that you should sell your products or your labor in this country; and, as far as we can interpose legal obstructions, we don't intend that you shall! But in shutting others out, we have at the same time, and necessarily, shut ourselves in. And herein is *trouble No. 1*. The house is too small, measured by the power of producing, for those that live in it. And *remedy No. 1* is to be found in withdrawing the bolts, taking off the locks, opening the doors, and getting out and clear of all restrictions on production and the disposal of products."

Mr. Wells illustrates his theory by the failure of the United States to compete with England for the trade of Chili, Argentine and other countries. For though we could place our cotton manufactures in those countries as cheaply as England could, we refused to take their products freely in turn, or except by first imposing a duty on them. The position assumed by Mr. Wells that "all trade is at the bottom a matter of barter," ignores, in part, the function of money in the making of exchanges. He was answered thus by a "Protection" writer:

"The function of money, or its representatives, is that of enabling indirect exchanges to be made. The shoemaker buys his cabbages from one man and sells his shoes to another. Trade, in place of being a right line between two points, becomes, so to speak, triangular and polygonal.

"This applies pre-eminently to nations, which are aggre-

gations of individuals, each of whom acts according to his individual interest, in place of being, as Mr. Wells assumes, units actuated by a common purpose, and asking, before they buy a yard of calico, whether a half-pound of copper regulus will be taken in barter. If a Chilian merchant can buy a salable bale of Fall River cloths cheaper than a similar bale from Manchester, he will not reject it because the Fall River mill cannot buy Chilian copper. He knows that the copper will be sold to Swansea, and that the resulting bill of exchange on London will settle his debt at Fall River as readily as at Manchester. He knows, moreover, that if he patriotically refuses to buy the Fall River goods, his competitor across the street will do so and will undersell him. All this is the A B C of trade, and no pathetic groaning over the 55,000,000 yards of cotton supplied by England, in comparison with the 5,000,000 yards supplied by the United States in 1874, will get rid of it."

Again, Mr. Wells' attention was called to the fact that the removal of restrictions on trade, which restrictions are occasioned by the imposition of duties, did not in fact tend to make countries buy of the United States, even though the United States was their best customer. Thus, in 1876, as an instance, the United States bought of Brazil coffee and India rubber, on which no duties were levied, to the amount of \$44,000,000, and sent in turn only \$7,500,000 of her own products. This state of affairs Mr. Wells ascribes to the absence of shipping facilities on the part of the United States, which absence he accounts for by reason of the same mistaken fiscal and commercial policy he had been speaking against.

Free-traders deny that protection tends to keep up the price of labor. Germany and France demand high duties in order to protect their ill-paid laborers from competition

with the better paid labor of England. Therefore, low wages do not enable a country to compete with another country. As to this country, such are the advantages of combined capital and labor that the workmen are capable of a larger output than in other countries, and this enables the employer to afford them better wages. The general high rate of wages with us is due to the productiveness of labor, or, in other words, to the energy and efficiency of our laborers, the extended use of machinery and our great natural resources.

Prof. Taussig lays down the doctrine that it is wrong to limit duties to articles which can be produced in this country. Many of such articles, such as wool, iron and silks, are in the nature of raw material and enter into the manufacture of other articles. Tea, coffee and sugar are entered free of duty. A duty on these would have no such effect as a duty on iron, namely, that of turning the industry of the country into unproductive channels. If revenue must be raised by duties on imports, those duties should fall on articles not produced in this country, just as the internal taxes fall on tobacco and spirits.

During the thirty years that the English corn laws were in existence the prosperity of the farmer continually declined. Farm labor suffered in proportion. Artisans and laborers in manufactories were reduced to penury. The peace of the country, and even the existence of the government, were threatened.

Sir Robert Peel, who had changed from Protection to Free-trade and had championed the repeal of the Corn Laws, said on retiring from power: "I shall surrender power severely censured by those who, from no interested motives, adhere to Protection, considering it essential to the welfare and interests of the country. I shall leave a

name execrated by every monopolist who, from less honorable motives, clamors for Protection, because it conduces to his own individual benefit. But, it may be, that I shall leave a name sometimes remembered with expressions of good will in the abodes of those whose lot is to labor, and to earn their bread by the sweat of their brows, when they shall recruit their strength with abundant and untaxed food, the sweeter because it is no longer leavened with a sense of injustice."

The entire doctrine of Free-trade was confirmed by resolution in the British House of Commons in 1852, and the Protectionists gave up the battle.

In the United States, from 1824 to 1833, the demands of Protectionists threatened the peace of the nation, just as their demands did in England.

At the time of the adoption of the compromise tariff of 1833, President Jackson said in his message of that year: "Those who take an enlarged view of the condition of our country must be satisfied that the policy of Protection must be ultimately limited to those articles of domestic manufacture which are indispensable to our safety in time of war. Within this scope, on a reasonable scale, it is recommended by every consideration of patriotism and duty, which will always, doubtless, secure for it a liberal support; but beyond this object we have already seen the operation of the system productive of discontent. In some sections of the Union its influence is deprecated as tending to concentrate wealth in few hands and as creating those germs of dependence and vice which in other countries have characterized the existence of monopolies and proved so destructive of liberty and the public good. A large proportion of the public in one section of the Union declares it not only inexpedient on these grounds, but as disturbing the equal

relations of capital by legislation and therefore unconstitutional and unjust."

Said Senator Rowan, of Kentucky, in 1828: "It is in vain that Protection is called the 'American System.' Names do not alter things. There is but one American system, and that is delineated in the State and Federal Constitutions. It is the system of equal rights secured by the Constitution—a system which instead of subjecting the labor of some to taxation with a view to enrich others, secures to all the proceeds of their labor, exempt from taxation except for the support of the protecting powers of the government."

As chairman of the "Committee on Manufactures" in 1832, John Quincy Adams said:—"The doctrine that duties of import seem to cheapen the price of the article on which they are levied, seems to conflict with the first dictates of common sense. The duty constitutes a part of the price of the whole mass of the article in the market. It is substantially paid upon the article of domestic manufacture, as well as upon that of foreign production. Upon one it is a bounty, upon the other a burden, and the repeal of the tax must operate as an equivalent reduction of the price of the article whether foreign or domestic We say so long as the importation continues, the duty must be paid by the purchaser of the article."

In 1846 George M. Dallas said:—"This exercise of the taxing (tariff) power was originally intended to be temporary. The design was to foster feeble infant manufactures, especially such as were essential for the defence of the country in time of war. In this design the people have persevered until these saplings have taken root, become vigorous, expanded and powerful, and are prepared to enter with confidence the field of fair, free and universal competition."

Protection is responsible for the evils resulting from a violation of law known as smuggling. This practice, or crime, is as baneful and disastrous to the honest tradesmen as the competition of free-trade is healthful and beneficial.

Taking the two decades, 1840 to 1850, and 1850 to 1860, and regarding the first as a period which was most affected by the high tariff of 1842, and the last as most affected by the free-trade tariff of 1846, the contrast is in favor of the last decade. During the non-protective period cotton manufactures increased 130 per cent., woollen manufactures increased 62 per cent., and mostly between 1857 and 1860, when the cheaper grades of wool were admitted free. The year 1860 saw the manufacture of 913,000 tons of pig-iron at good prices, or 100,000 tons more than any previous year. In 1860 the aggregate of our exports showed an increase of 200 per cent. in ten years. The decade between 1850 and 1860 showed an increase of agricultural productions of 100 per cent. over the previous decade. In 1860 our total exports were \$400,000,000, or \$43,500,000 more than any previous year; and our imports were \$362,000,000, a much larger amount than any previous year. We consumed far more sugar, tea and coffee, per capita, during the free-trade tariff decade than the previous one, and also more than between the years of 1860 and 1868, years of protection. Farms increased in value 103 per cent. between 1850 and 1860. Farm products increased from 75 to 100 per cent. The products of all our manufactures was \$553,000,000 in 1850; in 1860, it was \$1,009,000,000. From 1840. to 1850 the real and personal property in the United States increased 80 per cent.; between 1850 and 1860 it increased 126 per cent. At no time prior to 1850-1860 had the capital of the nation increased so fast, and nothing demonstrates so forcibly the success of free-trade principles in the United

States. In 1850 there were 872 banks; in 1860, 1562; while banking capital increased from \$227,500,000 to \$422,000,000. Vast sums were expended in railroad building during the decade—21,613 miles being built, as against 904 miles between 1842 and 1846.

Protective duties on wool depress the price of domestic wool and injure wool-growers. The reason is that when the supply of wool-growing countries is shut out of our market, it floods Europe at so low a figure as to enable European manufacturers to make the finer class of goods and sell them to us, duty paid, at a lower figure than we can afford to make them. The price of American wool has not risen with higher tariffs.

By the time Protection pays the penalty of over-production, it makes it too costly as an experiment. James Buchanan said in 1846:—"Our Domestic Manufactures have been saved by the election of James K. Polk from being overwhelmed by the immense capital which would have rushed into them for investment, and from an expansion of the currency which would have nullified any protection short of prohibition."

So Hon. James Lloyd, of Massachusetts, said in the Senate in 1820:—"I am interested in manufactures. I own stock in one of the cotton-mills running in my State. It regularly pays good dividends and is likely to do so continually if the tariff is let alone. But if you pass the bill, hundreds of such factories will be erected, till the market is glutted with their fabrics, when prices must fall and our concern very possibly be broken down."

Of the year 1860, the end of the free-trade era, General James A. Garfield said:—"I suppose it will be admitted on all hands that 1860 was a year of unusual business prosperity in the United States. It was at a time when the bounties of

Providence were scattered with a liberal hand over the face of the Republic; it was at a time when all classes of our community were well and profitably employed; it was a time of peace, the apprehension of our great war had not yet seized the minds of our people; great crops, north and south—great general prosperity—marked the era.”

Hon. Caleb B. Smith, President Lincoln’s Secretary of the Interior, says in his report:—“Without any special stimulus to growth—depressed indeed, during the years 1857 and 1858, in common with other public interests by the general embarrassments of those years, and with a powerful competition in the amazing growth of manufactures in Great Britain and nearly every other nation in Europe—the manufactories of the United States had nevertheless augmented, diversified and perfected in nearly every branch and uniformly throughout the Union. Domestic materials, whether animal, vegetable or mineral, found ready sales at remunerative prices and were increased in amount with the demand, while commerce and internal trade were invigorated by the distribution of both raw and manufactured products. Invention was stimulated and rewarded. Labor and capital found ample and profitable employment, and new and unexpected fields were opened to each. Agriculture furnished food and materials at moderate cost, and the skill of our artisans cheapened and multiplied all artificial instruments of comfort and happiness for the people. Even the more purely agricultural States of the South were rapidly creating manufactories for the improvement of their great staples and their abundant natural resources. The nation seemed speedily approaching a period of complete independence in respect to the products of skilled labor, and national security and happiness seemed about to be insured by the harmonious development of all the great interests of the people.”

The principle of free trade has never been applied absolutely in the United States. No political party has been brave enough to dare the trial. Yet the arguments in favor of free trade are all invoked when the protective system is attacked, and even when the design is to lay down tariff laws embodying only the doctrine of tariff for revenue. This has been strikingly exemplified in the history of tariff discussion subsequent to 1887, which was the date of Mr. Cleveland's celebrated message announcing the necessity for "Tariff Reform." His main argument was an elaboration of the idea that tariffs were a source of burdensome and unnecessary taxes, bearing as directly on the people as any other taxes, and so to be gotten rid of as speedily as possible.

So also, in these later discussions over tariff reform, the free trade doctrine that tariffs fostered trusts was given unusual importance. Perhaps this argument was never used so effectively before, for it was given strength by the fact that trusts had grown in number and extent out of all proportion to the legitimate needs of corporate or partnership enterprise. Whether free trade, or even tariff reform, would prove a panacea for the evil of trusts, was not argued in an historic or even economic sense, for it was taken for granted that since their presence in a time of protection was due to protection, therefore absence of protection would work their destruction.

Again, the argument that free trade meant for this and all countries an open and, therefore, more profitable market, was given especial significance in that economic revolution which came about through the passage of the Wilson tariff bill. It will be remembered that that bill as originally drafted went as far as its supporters dare go in the application of free trade principles, without trenching

on the revenues of the government. It might be mentioned that, as the sequel proved, they went further than they intended to go, for in its practical workings the Wilson act failed to produce its share of public revenue. But the point in this connection was that it was to open the markets of this country to other countries, and, by parity of reasoning, the markets of other countries to this one. As this argument never before had such opportunity for direct and able support and for full and free application, economists as well as the interests affected will await with anxiety its practical results. And this anxiety will be intensified, and economic study greatly advanced, by coupling with those results the fact that in the application of the argument of open markets to the Wilson tariff bill, a part of the aim, and an aim wholly accomplished, was the destruction of the principle of reciprocity as found incorporated in the McKinley Act of 1890. This principle, at the time of its incorporation into the above act, was said to be a step in the direction of free trade. The arguments in its favor were certainly analagous for a certain distance, to those used by free traders in favor of open markets, and in principle the two aims to be accomplished are nearly identical.

PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION.

THE doctrine of protection starts without a doubt as to nomenclature. As a principle, it admits of no exception in the first chapters of the history of every commercial nation.

The commercial nation never existed that did not, at first, protect itself. So astute, refined and far-reaching has commerce become, that no nation which refuses to protect itself can ever hope to test its fitness for commercial supremacy, or independence, much less obtain it.

The same is true of industrial and manufacturing independence, both of which imply commercial independence, the moment transit is acknowledged as a subject of protection.

Nature supplemented by art made American transit supreme, or nearly so, when ships were of wood. Art combined with nature made English ships supreme, when ships came to be of iron. But nature is still on our side as to iron. Add the art of England to American nature, and transit will have its old supremacy. Art is protection and protection art.

A protective tariff provides revenue for the government in a better way than any other kind of a tariff. England levies duties for revenue only. They fall on two classes of articles; first, luxuries; second, on articles that cannot be raised or produced profitably at home and cannot come into competition with home productions. It so happens that the latter class of articles embraces tea, coffee and many things which rank as necessities among the common people.

Protection omits duties, when not required for simple



HON. WILLIAM B. ALLISON.

Born at Perry, Ohio, March 2, 1829; educated at Western Reserve College; admitted to bar in Ohio, moved to Iowa, 1857; served on Governor's staff during war, elected as Republican to 38th, 39th, 40th and 41st Congresses; elected to United States Senate, 1872; re-elected, 1878, 1884 and 1890; one of the oldest, ablest and most respected Senators; Chairman of Committee on Appropriations; Member of Committees on Engrossed Bills, Finance, Census, Extension of Library, and Geological Survey; prominent candidate for Presidential nominee on the Republican ticket in 1896.



HON. WILLIAM E. CHANDLER.

Born at Concord, New Hampshire, December 28, 1835; graduated at Harvard Law School and admitted to bar, 1855; reporter of Supreme Court, 1859; member of New Hampshire Legislature, 1862-63 64; Speaker of House, 1863-64; Solicitor and Judge Advocate-General of Navy Department, 1865; First Assistant Secretary of Treasury, June 17, 1865-November 30, 1867; member of the New Hampshire Constitutional Convention, 1876; elected to New Hampshire Legislature, 1881; appointed Solicitor-General by President Garfield, 1881, and rejected by Senate; appointed Secretary of Navy by President Arthur, April 12, 1882, and served till March 7, 1885; elected as Republican to United States Senate, June 14, 1887; re-elected June 18, 1889, and again, January 16, 1895; Chairman of Committee on Census, and member of other important Committees.

r  venue, from tea, sugar, coffee, and articles which rank as necessities, and which cannot be produced profitably at home or cannot come into competition with home productions, and in their stead levies discriminating duties upon articles that come in direct competition with home products.

The rate of such duties is adjusted, in theory, so that the foreign product cannot enter the home market at a price below what it can be produced for at home, with a fair profit included.

Some rates are prohibitory, as when there is desire or determination to found a new industry; but as a rule they are simply discriminative, and in favor of industries which exist, but which would cease to exist unless protected.

Since labor constitutes a large per cent. of manufactured products—in some products as much as ninety per cent. of the cost—the most direct effect of protection is to maintain the price of that labor as it enters into the home product, and preserve it from competition with the cheaper labor that enters into the same product abroad.

The effect of protection on labor is direct and indirect. When the price of labor in protected industries is maintained, that in the unprotected industries is also maintained.

The application of protection to industries in this country reverses the doctrine of political economists that the price of an article is increased to the consumer by just the amount of duty imposed upon it.

Protection may increase the price of an article temporarily, and by some per cent. of the duty levied, but the price declines as the home manufacture of the article enlarges and home competition sets in.

Protection encourages capital and invites it into enter-

prises from which it would shrink, owing to its natural conservatism.

The spirit of invention and the employment of labor-saving machinery and devices are encouraged by protection.

Labor yields most when aided by artificial appliances and cheered by liberal and certain remuneration.

The last three factors render production exceptional in this country. Together with the law of competition, they furnish an output of products better in quality and cheaper in price than those of nations that rely solely on cheap labor for cheap price. The cheapness of protection does not imply degradation of labor, but greater deftness of hand, quickened genius, advantage of natural opportunity.

The tariff is not a tax. While most articles, whose home manufacture has been encouraged by a duty upon them, sell at no higher price than when imported, many such sell for a less price than the duty imposed.

When the foreign producer lands his goods here, and finds them in competition with home-made goods, he pays the duty.

Says a Bradford, England, manufacturer: "The least possible reduction in the American tariff will be a grand thing for Bradford. We are selling our goods for the same prices we did before the higher tariff was enacted, and I know the Bradford manufacturer is paying the duty, not the American consumer."

Another English manufacturer says: "If the duties came out of the American consumer the English manufacturer would not care a button about the American tariff laws."

Friedrich List, founder of the German *Zollverein*, or Custom's Union, Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, all subscribe to the doctrine that a country which is exclusively agricultural is necessarily backward. They instance Poland.

† Since, then, although it is undoubtedly bad for privileges to give rise to artificial industries, many industries well suited to the nature of a country will never develop there unless at first protected. The best road to arrive at free-trade and obtain from it the maximum advantage lies through a temporary adoption of protection.”

Protection in this country at first vindicated itself by the example of all civilized nations. Then, by universal acquiescence in the principle that duties on imports were more cheerfully paid than any species of tax for revenue. Now it vindicates itself by what it has achieved for the country in the domain of capital and labor. It claims to have won by honest effort and practical results the title, “American System.”

“The safety and interest of the people require that they should promote such manufactures as tend to render them independent of others for essential, particularly for military, supplies.”—*George Washington*.

“That it may be expedient to guard the infancy of this improvement (‘useful manufactures’) by legislation of the commercial tariff, cannot fail to suggest itself to your patriotic reflections.” Again, “In adjusting the duties on imports to the object of revenue, the influence of the tariff on manufactures will necessarily present itself for consideration. However wise the theory may be which leaves to the sagacity and interest of individuals the application of their industry and resources, there are in this, as in all cases, exceptions to the rule.”—*James Madison*.

As to the highest duties of the government, Thomas Jefferson, in his second annual message, said: It is “to cultivate peace and maintain commerce and navigation in all their lawful enterprises; to foster our fisheries as nurseries

of navigation for the nurture of man; and to protect the manufactures suited to our circumstances."

"The restrictive legislation of 1808-15 was, for the time being, equivalent to extreme protection. The consequent rise of a considerable class of manufactures, whose success depended largely on the continuance of protection, formed the basis of a strong movement for more decided limitation of foreign competition."—*Prof. Taussig*.

Adam Smith, the father of free-trade, admits that could any number of communities, producing what each other wants, be brought into commercial contact, there would have been no need of his evolving the doctrine of free-trade. In this country there are forty-four, and more, of such communities.

What was a theory with Hamilton, that protection tended to lower the price of protected articles, became a fact under the operation of our tariff legislation.

The genius of a nation is at its best when not subjected to conditions foreign to it. To let institutions have sway here which are born abroad, and which may be best for abroad, would be for us to subject ourselves to monarchy. It would be just the same if we lost our commercial or industrial Americanism and became subject to the codes which demean labor by caste and enslave it by hereditary custom.

The protection which monarchical countries, without exception, patronized and by which they exist was never in the interest of labor as now in this country.

The conditions which exist in America are wholly different from those which gave color to free-trade as a doctrine with European economists. Had they been situated as we are, and known what we know, they would have col-
lated and deduced differently. In one hundred years

America has established a set of statistical facts which utterly destroy the deductions based on facts of an older regime and on conditions never dreamed of. Protection in the United States is really a new political economy, of far more worth to us than the economic visions of one hundred years ago, indulged by men who knew no distinction between labor and serfdom and who saw no hope for enterprise outside of capital linked with landed aristocracy and lordly title.

Protection has long since triumphed over the argument that it was unconstitutional. This argument is not urged to-day except by the very ignorant or very prejudiced. But the argument reappears in the charge that protection fosters monopoly. This was Calhoun's standing argument. He saw that it enured more to the benefit of free paid labor than of slave unpaid labor, and that it encouraged the manufacturing as against the planting classes. The industries which involved invention, skill, competition, live capital and paid labor were the ones which protection favored. Those which involved none of these received no benefit from protection and did not need it. His views of monopoly turned on this point. Since the downfall of slavery the heart has been taken out of the monopoly argument, for it has become plain to all that what improves the condition of the entire people does not savor of monopoly.

Protection protects against monopoly. Before the tariff of 1824 American cottons sold at 24 cents a yard. After that tariff, they sold at $7\frac{3}{4}$ cents a yard. New mills, improved machinery and increased competition, put a better material in the market at a third of the price.

The monopoly may be foreign. England sold us steel rails, for railroads, at \$150 per ton. She continued to do this till 1870, when a duty of \$28 a ton was levied. Under

this protection we began to build mills for their manufacture. The price of steel rails began to decline. They are now sold at a profit at from \$33 to \$40 a ton. English monopoly was costing us five prices for a ton of rails.

Protection gives us competing power abroad. Our cotton textiles are recognized as the best in the markets of the world. The same is true of our edge-tools and agricultural implements. European manufacturers imitate these American goods and use American labels in order to hold the markets of South America and the Orient. When this competing power is amplified by reciprocity and by direct steam communication, both of which are protective, no nation can rival us in South American and Chinese markets.

A tariff for revenue is a tax. A tariff on tea, coffee and sugar, raises the price to the consumer, because it offers no inducement, and cannot, by reason of soil and climate, for their home production. Sugar is partly an exception, as we can raise some sugar-cane. It may become wholly an exception if the experiment with beets prove a success. As to trading in manufactured articles, articles of art and handicraft, the application of the doctrine of natural right as claimed by free-traders, is suicidal to the younger or weaker nation. No nation recognizes it except in theory. Nations are not natural, one to the other, as to trade, except in the respect that they are selfish. They all claim the natural right to exist, to grow, to develop, to be independent. The natural right to be what nature intends is higher than any other. Nature never intended that one nation with numerous, large, long and swift streams, equal to billions of horse-power, should buy for all time the manufactures of nations with fewer, smaller, shorter and duller streams, equal to only millions of horse-power, even though the latter nations had

by reason of age, so far turned their power to account as to be able to furnish products cheaper than the former.

Nature never intended that one nation with a riches of coal and ores far exceeding that of another, should perpetually buy the manufactures of that other, because it had delved in its mines for ages, and could offer products cheaper than the first.

Nature never intended that a new nation with infinite resources of climate, soil, mine, genius and industry should subordinate its traffic to nations of inferior resources, but with the temporary advantage of age.

Nature never intended that nations that had grown old, ripe and rich by means of a protection, which was absolute in comparison with any that prevails to-day, should claim naturalness for a trade established by agencies they deny to others.

Nature never intended that conditions of labor under which a laborer can be an earner, saver, head of a family, house owner, voter and public-spirited citizen, should be subjugated to conditions of labor which give caste to occupation, demean calling, yield bare subsistence, crush manhood, stifle ambition, beget slavish routine, reduce to tread-mill task.

Nature never intended that the genius and capital of one nation with opportunity should forever obey the commands of another, with less opportunity, but whose opportunity had the advantage of age.

But nature did intend that each nation should profit by its gifts. If young and undeveloped, it should employ the arts of development that are commensurate with its gifts. If weak, it should cultivate strength. If dependent, it should learn independence. The art of doing this is its own affair. The art should be rational, based on what it knows of itself—its people, geography, topography, climate, soil, ores, streams,

woods, facilities and resources in general. If, in obedience to books and theories, it is wrong in doing this, no other nation is so white as to call it black. The consensus of nations in this respect is nature. The precise form of protection and development is immaterial. English free-trade is the highest, severest, most arbitrary form of protection of which she is capable. It is no more condemnatory of the American idea than was her duty of \$250 on every \$500 worth of iron, not otherwise enumerated, she imported from her colonies. It is no more acceptable to the American idea than was her stamped paper and tea-tax which brought on the Revolution.

The highest duty of a nation is to cultivate nature, for nature means its people, institutions and resources. In this respect America means far more than professors dream of, far more than books teach, far more than little, narrow men with sectional or foreign predilections prate of, far more than England, all Europe, or all the world can in their selfishness impress us with. As a nation we have escaped the thralldom of monarchies, the shackles of caste, the hindrances of mediæval institutions, the limitations of soil, climate and natural resource incident to a continent which last emerged from polar ice. As to people we are composite. Where and when the mentality and physique of civilization blend for the production of a type, that type will be what nature calls for, the survival of size, shape and qualities, fitted for, or rather shaped by, an environment such as has not hitherto existed. As to institution, we have inverted the pyramid of monarchy whose tip is on the throne and base in the air. Here the base is below, on the people, and the tip is in the air, a sublimation of popular will and not a matter of family or blood. As to areas and climate we blend orient and occident, tropic and arctic. It is Italy and Russia, London

and Constantinople. As to soil, mineral, wood and stream, the resource is varied and infinite. The alluvium between the Alleghenies and Rockies has no counterpart in the world. Not Ural, Alp or Apennine are richer in ores than our home ranges. No forests of Europe or Asia compare with our pine fastnesses. No streams run larger, fresher, swifter, more constant and frequent. It is the place for new men, genius, institution, development. The law, doctrine or custom, ripened by wholly different conditions, and sanctioned by antiquity, is not for us. We are a nation—an escape from antique environment. To be true we must be original. This is especially so as to economics.

The facts upon which Smith and Mill built free-trade theories are useless in America. Home facts, embracing periods of test, are the only true bases for home deductions. It is our right and duty to build on them and to evolve for ourselves the political economy which they warrant, regardless of the conclusions reached and the laws adopted by other nations. These facts and this use of them have evolved the common law of protection in this country, have confirmed a principle, have established a system—the system of American Protection.

When free-trade makes the claim that home competition cannot cheapen certain classes of home manufactures, protection answers that in such cases cheapness equal to that of a foreign product is undesirable; that there ought to be sufficient patriotic pride among us to pay more for such articles when home-made than when foreign-made, their quality and utility being the same; that we will be more than repaid for the difference in price by the encouragement extended to a home industry and by the establishment of a home market; that every cent spent at home is a contribution to the comfort of surroundings, the happiness of

neighbors, the erection of homes, the welfare of labor, the founding of a home market for the wool, wheat, corn, butter, cheese, eggs and vegetables of the farmers, for which there otherwise could be no possible demand; or if so, the demand would be of so foreign a nature as to eat up profit by the cost of transportation, by commissions, and by perishability.

All free-traders make much of the argument that protection tends to over-production and consequently to periods of depression and panic. The protectionists answer, first, that this is a confession that protection does stimulate production. Secondly, they deny *in toto* that protection tends any more to over-production and to periods of depression and panic, than free-trade. England is as much subject to periodic visitations of glut and depression as any protected country. The glut and depression in the iron trade of 1884 extended to every iron-producing country, and England suffered most of all.

In this connection protection points confidently to its history in this country, and relies upon the unshakable argument it furnishes.

The absolutely free-trade era between 1783 and 1789 was characterized by a glut of foreign products, suspension of industries, bankruptcy of manufacturers and merchants, ruinous depreciation of prices, beggary of artisans and laborers, starvation of farmers. Says a writer of the period: "We are poor with a profusion of material wealth in our possession. That we are poor needs no other proof than our prisons, bankruptcies, judgments, executions, auctions, mortgages, etc., and the shameless quantity of business in our courts of law."

This condition passed away with the enactment of the tariff Act of 1789. It was a modest provision, but sufficient to enunciate the principle of protection for new industries,

and to change the industrial and commercial situation. By 1808 the country had recovered from the evil effects of the free trade era. Then set in the restrictive measures preliminary to the war of 1812, as the Embargo Act of 1807 and the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809. Duties were doubled by the Act of 1812 with a view to secure revenue. These restrictive measures, followed by actual hostilities, proved to be an absolutely prohibitive tariff. Immediately every branch of domestic industry felt the stimulus. Establishments for the manufacture of cottons, woollens, iron, glass, pottery, etc., sprang up like magic. This instant and marvellous result was due to extreme protection, and it really formed the basis for that strong, persistent and intelligent movement which had for its view legislative limitation on foreign competition, and logical protection, as found in Henry Clay's American System.

This view found expression in the tariff act of 1816, which increased duties considerably, but most unfortunately for only a limited period. The 25 per cent. on cottons and woollens was to fall to 20 per cent. by 1819. What was barely protective became non-protective in three years. Limitation was to undo the affirmative work of the act. Though all that grew out of the ground remained high in price for a time, owing to shortages in Europe, manufactured goods declined. The long pent-up stream of English merchandise flooded the country after the close of the Napoleonic wars, and our manufacturers were forced to the wall. Panic set in, and with it depression, bankruptcy and all the evils of foreign inundation. The products of the soil found the level of devastation, and soon every interest was engulfed in the sad wave of commercial blight.

The lesson of this crisis was not lost to our statesmen and economists. That strong protective movement set in

which was to concern so intimately the next generation. England had grown restrictive, as evidenced by the passage of her corn laws. Cotton and all our farm products were ruinously cheap. The time was most favorable for the protection and growth of home manufactures and for the establishment of home markets. Home markets had not until this date been a leading argument for protection, but from this time on the argument grew in strength. The relief tariff of 1818 merely did away with the limitations of the Act of 1816, and extended the duties of the latter act till 1826.

After 1819, that is, in 1820, the protectionists made a vigorous effort to enact a really protective act. They failed by a single vote in the Senate. They succeeded in 1824, with a modifiedly protective act, which became more confirmedly protective in the act of 1828. This protective trend was most advantageous. Recovery from the effect of the panic of 1819 was perfect. Manufactures again sprang up. Labor got employment and reward. The farmer rejoiced at his plow. Prosperity and satisfaction reigned. The seven years after 1824 are counted as the most prosperous they had ever known.

Free-trade now came to mean the perpetuation of slavery, the nullification of law, secession. It threw itself on the very legislation it had encouraged, and with such ferocity as to compel the compromise tariff of 1833, in which the principle of protection was abandoned. Then the history of 1819 began to repeat itself. Depression set in. Values fell. Manufactures ceased. Merchants went into bankruptcy. Farmers became impoverished. Labor begged for bread. The horrors of 1819 were more than repeated in the final crash of 1837, when cows sold for \$1.00 a head and hogs for 25 cents. The panic of 1837 cost the country

\$1,000,000,000. To add to the terrible situation, the sliding scale of reduction of tariff rates brought duties so low by 1837 that the Government ran short of revenue, and the national credit fell so low that money could not be borrowed for necessary expenses except at enormous discount.

The reaction caused by this disastrous epoch swept the free-traders from power and the protectionists enacted the protective tariff of 1842, over the veto of President Tyler. Financial skies began to clear. The sun of prosperity broke forth. Spindles began to hum and labor to smile. The farmer held his plow with confidence. Customs' revenues leaped to seventy per cent. more than during the last year of the compromise Act of 1833. Prices rose, and every industry was inspired with new life.

But in 1844 free-trade, more wedded than ever to unpaid labor, and shivering at the importance of paid labor and protected industry, rallied under the banner of "Polk, Dallas and the Tariff of '42." How much it believed in the "Tariff of '42" was shown by the enactment of the Tariff of 1846, by the casting vote of Dallas in the Senate. This was a free-trade tariff, and its results were foreshadowed by its opponents. Happily there arose a series of circumstances which operated very much like the restrictive measures that followed the Act of 1808. They were all protective and sufficiently so to postpone the evil effects of the Act of 1846 for a time. They were the Mexican war, the discovery of gold in California, the Irish famine, and wars in Europe. But even by 1852 the decrease in the value of our exports of bread-stuffs and provisions had fallen off \$47,000,000, and the supposed incentive of a low tariff and increased importations from abroad was not being realized.

Another reduction of duties took place in 1857. Financial revolution set in, appalling in its widespread severity

and distress. The crisis of 1857 not only impoverished the people, but the public revenues became so small that the Government was compelled to borrow money at from 8 to 12 per cent. discount in order to provide running expenses. Said President Buchanan in his annual message: "With unsurpassed plenty in all the elements of national wealth, our manufactures have suspended; our public works are retarded; our private enterprises of different kinds are abandoned and thousands of useful laborers are thrown out of employment and reduced to want."

Since the passage of the Morrill Tariff Act of 1861, the doctrine of protection has found constant application. The Act of 1883 effected the largest change in that of 1861, by reducing duties and enlarging the free list, but it was crude in many of its provisions. The Act of 1890, known as the McKinley Act, still further enlarged the free list, addressed the principle of protection more directly to American labor, and introduced the policy of reciprocity. Protectionists claim for this period, 1861 to the present, the establishment and enjoyment of an industrial system which has assumed a larger national growth, a more rapid accumulation and broader distribution of wealth than ever before known in the history of our country. During that period there has been but one panic, that of 1873, and that differed from those of 1819, 1837, and 1857, in not being confined to this country, but in having an origin in general disturbance of credit abroad, the effect of which was to throw back upon us suddenly an inordinate number of our bonds. This caused sudden drain and great hardship for a time. The condition was almost repeated in 1890, when the failure of the Baring Brothers, and general disturbance in European credit, shook our commercial centres and tested our ability to withstand panic. In 1873 our mills did not stop running as in other

panics. Banks did not break by wholesale. Internal commerce was not interrupted. Every recuperative agency had play. We sold more than we bought, and reduced our national debt. Protectionists aver that the panic of 1873 was a blessing in disguise.

The eminent protectionist, Henry C. Carey, thus concludes his historic argument:—

“ We have had Protection in 1789, 1812, 1824, 1828, 1842, and from 1861 to 1894.

We have had Free-Trade, or very low tariff, in 1783, 1816, 1832, 1846, 1857, 1894.

Now note the unvarying results :

Under protection we have had :

1. Great demand for labor.
2. Wages high and money cheap.
3. Public and private revenues large.
4. Immigration great and steadily increasing.
5. Public and private *prosperity* great beyond all previous precedent.
6. Growing national independence.

Under Free-Trade we have had :

1. Labor everywhere seeking employment.
2. Wages low and money high.
3. Public and private revenues small and steadily decreasing.
4. Immigration declining.
5. Public and private *bankruptcy* nearly universal.
6. Growing national dependence.

The argument that protection injures the farmer has always been a favorite one with free-traders. It has steadily grown in favor, and has been given a decided turn in the Fifty-second Congress by the attempt to remove the duty from wool, binding twine and tin plate. The argument of the protectionist is that manufactured articles, and especially those which concern the farmer, are on an average 25 per cent. cheaper to-day than in 1860, when 80 per cent. of them were made abroad. That now 80 per cent. of them are made at home. That the farmer has been saved the cost of ocean transportation on this 80 per cent., and has had the benefit of the home market their manufacture has created for his

produce. That such market is certain, at his door, and already takes 80 per cent. of his wheat and 92 per cent. of his corn. That it keeps even pace with the growth of manufactures and will ere long take all his surplus, at a better rate than he can get for it abroad and in competition with the cheap wheat of India and Australia.

In addition to the above argument, protectionists show that our free list now embraces nearly half of our importations; that said list comprises all the articles which affect the comfort of the farmer or poor man, such as sugar, fruit, rice, breeding animals, tea, coffee, etc.; and that the dutiable list embraces high priced articles and articles of luxury, such as wines, liquors, cigars, silks, satins, glassware, diamonds, linens, cottons, etc., the duties on which are paid mostly by the wealthy.

The free-trader argues that "free raw material used in the manufactures" is especially worthy of a place on the free list. Among these he classes wool, flax, hemp, seeds, iron ore, pig iron, coal, marble, etc. The protectionist claims that the free-list, as enlarged under the Act of 1890, embraces a sufficient number of these articles; that those, like wool, which pay duty, come into competition with the products of our farmers and laborers in shops, mines and furnaces; that labor is a prime object of protection; that all the articles, technically classed as "raw material," are not such to the farmer, laborer, miner and furnace man, because they represent the labor, skill and even capital of the latter, as much as cloth represents the skill and capital of the manufacturer, or the coat those of the tailor.

Protection repudiates the doctrine that it is a device for the benefit of the privileged classes. It rests on the principle that it operates for the general development of the resources and the encouragement of the industries of the country. If



HON. JOSEPH R. HAWLEY.

Born in Richmond co., N. C., October 31st, 1826; educated at Hamilton College, N. Y.; admitted to bar in Hartford, Conn., 1850; editor of *Hartford Evening Press and Courier* from 1857 to present; enlisted in army April 16, 1861; promoted out as *Brevet Major-General* January 15, 1866; elected Governor of State, as a Republican, April, 1866; Delegate to Republican National Convention, 1872-76-80; President of Centennial Exhibition; elected to 42d Congress, November, 1872; re-elected to 43d and 46th Congresses; elected to U. S. Senate, as a Republican, March 4, 1881; re-elected in 1887, and again in 1893. Chairman of Committee on Military Affairs, and member of Committees on Coast Defences, Pensions, Nicaragua Canal, etc.



HON. THOMAS B. REED.

Born at Portland, Maine, October 18, 1839; graduated at Bowdoin, 1860; studied law and admitted to bar; Assistant Paymaster in Navy, 1864-65; member of State House of Representatives, 1868-69, and of Senate, 1870; Attorney General of Maine, 1870-72; Solicitor of Portland, 1874-77; elected, as a Republican, to 45th, 46th, 47th, 48th, 49th, 50th, 51st, 52d, 53d and 54th Congresses; elected and presided as Speaker of House in 51st Congress; an able and efficient parliamentarian; his decision as to actual presence and constructive absence in counting a quorum was sustained by the U. S. Supreme Court; a writer and speaker of originality and force; elected Speaker of House in 54th Congress; prominent candidate for Presidential nominee in 1896.

classes or capital are emboldened by it to undertake new ventures or to enter channels they would not otherwise do, that is a matter which does not affect the prime object of protection and cannot be controlled by legislation. It was not England's tariff system, but her free-trade system, which tended most to sustain her landed aristocracy. Out of the ten richest men in the United States, nine have accumulated fortunes in speculative and commercial pursuits, other than manufacturing, and one in manufactures that had to deal with protected articles.

So as to trusts. Protectionists say the facts do not support the theory that protection leads to trusts. The worst trust-ridden countries are free-trade countries. Trusts in America are quite frequently the result of English genius and capital. The Standard oil, Chicago gas, Street railway, Electric lighting, Cotton seed oil, Sugar deal, Reading deal, Richmond terminal, and others, which rank as trusts or combinations, exist in spite of the doctrine of protection and in no way concern it. It is by no means certain that these combinations are harmful to the public at large. For every one that finds an existence by reason of dealing in protected articles, ten can be found that would exist, tariff or no tariff.

Protection has made the manufacturer content with a reasonable profit. An annual profit of ten per cent. is barely possible in this country in the best-established manufactories. Said Mr. Bright in the English Parliament, in 1842: "America, as an independent country, has been a more valuable customer to England than she could possibly have been as a colony. On all the goods exported to America during the last quarter of a century you have made a net profit of forty per cent." Prices of home manufactures can therefore be trusted to home competition, but

foreign prices cannot be trusted at all, unless they are forced to meet our home competition. This was particularly glaring when England was charging \$150 for a ton of steel rails which afterwards, and in the face of our home competition, she was glad to get \$40 for. The removal of duty from tea and coffee in 1872 caused a rise in their price. There was a reason for the rise in coffee, because Brazil immediately levied an export tax on it. But neither tea nor coffee have been so cheap since 1872 as before, when tea paid fifteen cents and coffee two cents a pound duty. They avoid home competition entirely.

The protectionist supports his doctrine by calling in as a witness the material growth of the country since 1861, and comparing it with that of countries wedded to free-trade. He confidently asks judgment on the practical workings of his policy, and claims for the results a fulfillment of the prophecies of Washington, Hamilton, Jefferson, Madison, Jackson, Benton, Clay, Webster and even Calhoun, who in 1816 made his famous appeal in favor of the protection and importance of manufactures to the "national strength and perfection of our institutions," and in "binding more closely our widespread republic."

During thirty years of protection, and notwithstanding the wastage of four years of war, our population has grown at the rate of one million annually—a greater rate than that of England, France, Germany and Austria combined. Our wealth has grown from \$17,000,000,000 to nearly \$50,000,000,000, or at the rate of \$1,000,000,000 a year. There has gone into our savings \$885,000,000 yearly, or almost half as much as the savings of the entire world. The manufactories, mines and forests of Great Britain produced \$4,500,000,000 in 1886, an increase of 30 per cent. since 1850. The same products in the United States in 1880 were valued

at \$5,500,000,000, an increase of 160 per cent. since 1860. Since 1860 our farms have more than doubled in number and increased in value from \$6,000,000,000 to \$10,000,000,000, while their products, which were \$1,800,000,000 in 1860, were \$3,800,000,000 in 1880.

In 1880 the entire products of Great Britain—farms, factories, mines, forests and all—were \$6,200,000,000, or \$172 per capita. Of this product she exported \$1,300,000,000. In the same year the total products of the United States were \$10,000,000,000, or \$200 per capita. Of this product \$9,176,000,000 were consumed at home. Thus our home market consumed more than Great Britain consumed and exported, and more than double the combined exports of Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Holland and Austria. Besides this consumption of home products, we imported \$700,000,000 as against \$335,000,000 in 1860, and exported \$750,000,000 as against \$373,000,000 in 1860.

Protectionists do not claim that the system of protection is, or ever has been, perfect. It is not possible to make it so. But it has proved in practice that the arguments of its opponents are unsound. It has established itself as an essential part of our commercial and business habit and thought, and is open to the same equities, and laws of progress and adjustment, as any essential feature of industrial welfare. Its destruction, however, cannot be tolerated. Attack on it must be resented. It is not a system which can be trusted to its enemies for safe-keeping, or modification. Its friends are its natural custodians, and they alone are capable of perpetuating it in the forms best calculated to make it repeat its past triumphs for labor, capital and the general welfare, and to fit it for the legitimate requirements of a still more growthy and imposing future.

In 1890, under what was known as the McKinley Tar-

iff, the principle of protection was applied with a better understanding of its merits than under any former Act. The application was not indiscriminate, but with a view to protecting by duties the labor that entered into what we could make or produce at home, and of relieving from duties what we could not make or produce at home. The Act had an existence of only four years, but protectionists found in its operations the strongest historic argument in favor of their doctrine that time had up to that date produced.

They found that at the end of the protective era of 1861-1894 the country had reached its highest degree of prosperity, with a general diffusion of the comforts of life never before enjoyed by its people. The national treasury was in excellent condition, the country's credit above par, manufacturing, mining, farming and all industries were prosperous, labor was in demand and well paid, commerce was active. Hence they naturally pointed with pride to that vindication of their doctrine found in the statistics at command, for they had seen the total wealth of the country according to the census, rise from \$16,159,616,000 in 1860 to \$62,610,100,000 in 1890. Railroads had increased in the same time from 30,626 miles in length to 167,471 miles.

As to manufactures they pointed to the following census figures:

Capital in manufactures, 1880,	-	-	\$1,233,000,000
“ “ 1890,	-	-	\$2,950,735,000
Employees in 1880,	-	-	1,301,000
“ “ 1890,	-	-	2,251,000
Wages earned in 1880,	-	-	\$501,965,000
“ “ 1890,	-	-	\$1,221,000,000
Value of products 1880,	-	-	\$2,712,000,000
“ “ 1890,	-	-	\$4,860,000,000

More factories were started in 1892 than in any preceding year, and in the same year the foreign trade increased \$128,000,000 over that of 1891, or \$400,000,000 over the average for the preceding ten years. Coastwise trade showed a proportionate increase.

No. of depositors in saving funds 1860,	-	-	\$	693,370
“ “ “ “ 1890,	-	-		4,258,893
Deposits in saving funds 1860,	-	-		149,277,000
“ “ 1890,	-	-		1,524,844,000

Rate of wages touched the highest point in time of peace.

Value of farm products 1860,	-	-	\$1,364,000,000
“ “ 1891,	-	-	4,500,000,000

The national debt decreased \$245,000,000 from 1891 to 1893. The national income was more than enough to meet the annual expenditures.

The principal of protection was practically eliminated from our economic system by the passing of the Wilson Tariff of 1894. Pending its passage, and after the country passed through the throes of a depression which, at times, could hardly be distinguished from panic, so great was the change, or threatened change, in its economic policy. Protectionists found another powerful argument—the most powerful of any that had ever come to their support—in the condition of industrial financial and commercial affairs that set in in 1893 and lasted till 1897. They saw the manufactories of the country closed by the thousand, and innumerable hands thrown out of employment. They saw business of every kind pass into bankruptcy, credits ruined, commerce curtailed, products with-

out adequate price. In three years the treasury receipts fell off \$80,000,000, and the principal of the public debt was increased by borrowing \$262,000,000. In 1892, the average price of twenty different stocks was 75.68 per cent.; in a short time they fell to 49.10 per cent., a loss of 26.58 per cent. Exports declined rapidly, while imports increased greatly, those of woollens alone showing an increase of nearly 350 per cent. in 1894-95. Owing to removal of duty from wool, sheep decreased in number from 47,273,553 in 1893, to 33,298,783 in 1896, and the value decreased from \$125,909,264 to \$65,167,735, or nearly 50 per cent. in the same time.

Each year of the Cleveland administration showed a large treasury deficit, that of the first being \$72,000,000, of the second, \$62,000,000 and of the third \$30,000,000. The per capita circulation fell off from \$24.44 in 1892 to \$21.35 in 1896. The best financiers estimated the country's losses between 1893 and 1896 at a greater total than the cost of the Civil war, and the question was triumphantly asked by protectionists whether it was not entirely too much to pay for a trial of free trade theory.

They educed further figures:

Interest bearing debt March 1, 1893,	-	\$585,000,000
“ “ “ 1896,	-	845,000,000
Value of railroads 1893,	- - -	\$1,000,000,000
Depreciation in three years	- - -	250,000,000

Loss in value of farm animals in 1895, \$91,000,000. Decline in value of farm produce in 1895, \$133,603,073. Total decline in value of farm animals from 1892 to 1896, \$733,829,574. Total decline in value of farm crops from 1892 to 1896, \$750,000,000.

And so throughout every domain of industry and enterprise figures were educed which rendered the contrast between the free trade, or reform, and protection eras perfectly appalling; with the inevitable result that protectionists felt that their doctrines had been more fully vindicated by an experiment with the opposing doctrines of free trade, than by any arguments they had hitherto used. The lesson was an objective one, and so highly concentrated as to time, so immediate in its application, and so drastic in its effects, as to prove of lasting and invaluable benefit to economic science.

SILVER AND GOLD—AN HISTORIC REVIEW.

THE use of metal as a medium of exchange and a measure of value has an old and interesting history. The province of money has ever been a conspicuous theme in political economy. Lately in our country all discussion of money has been given a new turn, and been rendered momentous and exciting by the fact that political parties have chosen to divide upon questions of coinage, quantities, kinds and values of our metallic circulating medium, and seek to make them issues in their campaigns.

This has given to what is popularly known as "The Silver Question," or "The Free Coinage Question," a prominence it never had before. It is within the bounds of truth to say that the "Silver Question" quite overshadowed the "Tariff Question" in the Fifty-second Congress, and bids fair to divide honors with that question for a considerable time. Next to, and perhaps equal with, the doctrines of Free-Trade and Protection, it concerns the business interests, the life and work, the labor and property, of every man in the country, from the humblest toiler to the largest capitalist. No man who works for daily bread, no man who has a dollar saved, no man who has a house or farm, no man who has his capital in factories, stocks, mortgages, or other securities, ought to be ignorant of a question which so intimately concerns his welfare. It is, perhaps, a matter of regret that a question so purely economic should fall into political channels, but such is the fate of all these great questions under our free system of government, and our

people are seemingly better satisfied with results obtained in their own popular way, than through the media of learned theories and abstruse teachings. In as much they prefer to use their own judgments and to abide by their own verdicts, the obligation is imposed on them of informing themselves as far as possible respecting the merits of this question, and all questions that similarly affect them.

WHAT IS MONEY ?

Says Laveleye: "Money is the substance or substances which custom or the law causes to be employed as the means of payment, the instrument of exchange and the common measure of values."

The difficulty of bartering wares against wares brought into use an intermediate means of effecting the exchange. This means was money, which became an agent of circulation and a vehicle of exchange—the cart for transferring property in an object from one person to another, just as the actual cart transferred the object itself.

Again, money came to be the universal equivalent. When one sells a bushel of wheat for a dollar, the dollar is the equivalent of the wheat. One can, in turn, make the dollar the equivalent of other goods, which he needs more than the wheat or the dollar. Says Adam Smith: "A piece of gold may be considered as an agreement for a certain quantity of goods payable by the tradesmen of the neighborhood."

Still further, money is a common measure or standard of values. Some one has called it "The yardstick of commerce." Length, weight, value, need to be compared with something, in order to subdivide them and turn their parts to use. Hence, a foot is made a standard of long measure, and when we say a stick is twelve feet long, we know ex-

actly how long it is, and all men will know. This is much more definite and satisfactory than to say, the stick is as long as twenty hand-breadths, for some hands are larger than others, and the stick would be longer or shorter, according to each measurer. So, if we say a barrel of flour weighs as much as two pigs, we get but a vague and varying idea of its weight, for pigs differ in size and weight. But when we set up the pound as a standard of weight, and say that a barrel of flour weighs 196 pounds, all men will have a common idea of its weight. It is the same with value. The value of a horse may be equal to five cows, but as cows have one price to-day and another to-morrow, you have selected a very uncertain means of finding the value of a horse. By the use of money as a common valuer, as in the foot or the pound, you get a definite idea of the value of a horse. When you say it is worth one hundred dollars, or a hundred times one dollar—the dollar being the standard or measurer of value—all men fall to the idea, know what a horse is worth.

The foot standard is exactly ascertained and rigidly fixed. The pound standard is also accurately ascertained and rigidly fixed. In attempting to fix a standard for measuring values, great difficulty is encountered, for, unfortunately, the substances used for measuring the values of articles of commerce are themselves merchandise, and subject to variation in value like all goods. The best that can be done, therefore, as to values, is to select as true and invariable a standard of measurement as possible, to watch it closely, and to correct from time to time the expansions and contractions occasioned by commercial heat and cold.

KINDS OF MONEY.

The Siberians used furs as money. The Spartans used

iron. The African uses cloth, salt and cowrie-shells. Cattle held the largest place as money among the ancients and many of our financial and commercial words are derived from old words indicating the early prominence of the flock and herd. The arms of Diomedes were valued at nine oxen ; those of Glaucus at one hundred oxen. The Franks levied a tribute of oxen on the conquered Saxons. Our word "pecuniary" is the Latin *pecus*, "cattle." Our "fee" is the Saxon *feoh*, cattle.

Metal money was first employed as representing value in cattle. The ox or sheep became its emblem and was stamped on the metal.

As civilization progressed and exchanges became more frequent, gold and silver took the place of all cruder metals and devices, as money.

This was because time and experience had proved their superiority as measurers of value and media of exchange.

They do not deteriorate by keeping.

Their production is limited by scarcity of their ores. This gives great value in proportion to weight, and facilitates handling, transport and hoarding.

The annual losses of the precious metals by wear and tear and by absorption in the arts have so nearly equalled the annual production, as that the excess of production has seldom exceeded the ratio of increase in population and the growing demand for money. Thus the demand and supply being nearly equal, the value of gold and silver remains very stable, as compared with other metals, or other measures of value.

The accumulated stock of the precious metals, estimated in money and ornaments at \$10,000,000,000 in the world, tends to lessen variations in value that might be occasioned by diminution or failure of the annual supply.

All civilized nations seek and accept gold and silver as a means of facilitating exchange.

Gold and silver are easily divisible into parts and proportions of given weights and values.

They receive with ease and permanently the impression which distinguishes their weight, size, design and value.

They are readily distinguishable from other metals ; gold by its weight, silver by its sound.

THE VALUE OF MONEY.

The purchasing power of money ascertains its value. The pure silver which would have bought eight bushels of wheat during the Middle Ages, would bring only two bushels, after the discovery of America. Therefore, it was said of silver, that it had declined to one-fourth of its previous value.

Supply of an article usually affects its value, but a supply of money involves the quantity in existence and the rapidity of its circulation. A dollar that makes three exchanges a day is worth three dollars that make one exchange a day.

If the demand for money is less than the supply, its value decreases ; only we don't say so, but that prices rise. If the demand for money is greater than the supply, its value increases ; but we say, that prices fall.

Alterations in the value of money lead to confusion in commercial, legal and economic relations. A decrease in the amount or value of money seriously affects the debtor classes. An increase in the amount or value of money injures the creditor classes.

MONEY SYSTEMS.

The gold and silver that enter into money are not pure, but mixed with alloy, usually copper, to save the coins from

wearing. The quantity of alloy generally introduced is about one-tenth, that is, one part alloy to nine parts of pure metal.

In England, the unit of money, gold or silver, of which the other coins are multiples, is the sovereign or pound; in France, the franc; in Germany, the mark; in Holland, the florin; in the United States, the dollar. The larger coins are generally made a legal tender for debts, without limit. Smaller fractional or subsidiary coins are generally made a legal tender for debts, with a limit as to amount. Still smaller coins, cents, nickels, and such as rank as "token money," are made legal tender for debts of a still smaller amount.

Formerly, monarchs, cities, bishops and nobles claimed the right to coin money, and they frequently abused their right by diminishing the value of the currency, either by reducing the quantity of pure metal in the coins, or by declaring them to have a legal value far beyond their intrinsic value. Solon decreed that the mina should be worth a hundred drachmas instead of seventy-three. Plutarch says of this decree: "In this way, by paying apparently the full value, though really less, those who owed large sums gained considerably, without causing any loss to their creditors." Says Laveleye, "Plutarch here expresses the error which has inspired all issues of depreciated and paper currency. No one seems to lose, because payments are made just as well with coins reduced in value as with the unreduced. What is forgotten is that prices rise in proportion as the unit of money loses its value."

At the present time the right of coinage is, as a rule, reserved by the sovereign State, and is jealously guarded. In most countries the coining of the standard coin is free.

In France, Italy, Switzerland and Belgium, which countries agreed, in 1863, to form the Latin Monetary Union,

all gold coins and five-franc pieces are accepted as standard. The minor silver coins are a legal tender for only small debts, and the mints cannot issue them to a greater extent than the value of six francs for each inhabitant. The system of the Latin Union is the double standard or bi-metallic system; that is, it permits the free and unlimited coinage of both gold and silver pieces, to each of which it gives legal currency, or the right to be accepted in all payments. It has, however, been compelled to modify this system to suit circumstances.

Countries whose system is "single standard or mono-metallic," whether such standard be gold as in some, or silver as in others, accord free and unlimited coinage and legal-tender quality only to the metal they fix as the standard. The mono-metallic system is the simpler, as to relation of value between coins of different denominations; but as to relation of value between money and goods, the bi-metallic system is more sensitive and, consequently, exact.

In 1558 Thomas Gresham, one of the councillors of Queen Elizabeth, demonstrated that the money which has the less value will drive from circulation the money which has the greater value. This is known in monetary science as "GRESHAM'S LAW."

In 1717 Sir Isaac Newton showed that a means of obviating the ill effects of "Gresham's Law" existed, by fixing the relation of value between gold and silver the same in all countries. In later times attempts have been made to do this by means of International Monetary Congresses. Attempts to establish a fixed relation of value between gold and silver by single countries have not proved satisfactory. Economists are by no means agreed as to which metal, gold or silver, is preferable as a standard. That the largest number of countries, certainly the largest commercial coun-

tries, adopt gold as the standard metal, implies some powerful reason for it; but it by no means disproves the theory that gold itself shifts in value like silver and probably quite as much. Indeed, not a few aver that much of what appears to be a shift in the value of silver is really a shift in the value of gold, with which the silver is compared. They also say that in the very nature of things silver is a metal of more stable value than gold, because its production comes from deep mines, with costly machinery, and an annual output which cannot be increased except at great expense, nor lessened without great loss; whereas the product of gold, much of which comes from auriferous sands, may increase or diminish very greatly in a short space of time.

BEGINNING OF AMERICAN COINAGE.

Immediately after the peace of 1783, and while the Articles of Confederation constituted our only bonds of government, some of the prominent patriots, notably Morris, Jefferson and Hamilton, began agitation looking to the establishment of an American Mint. Naturally the character of the proposed mintage came under discussion. This was the "Coinage Question" of that day. It was neither political nor bitter as at present, but it was none the less earnest, and involved many of the points now under discussion.

Great respect was paid to the views of Morris, who, as Superintendent of Finance, was well qualified to speak upon the character of the mintage. He reached the conclusion that in as much as the relative values of gold and silver were continually changing, there could be no ratio established between them which would prove stable and satisfactory for purposes of law. Therefore, the only way out of the difficulty, as he reasoned, was for the government to

adopt silver alone as its metallic money, and proceed to coin it. He was a silver mono-metallist.


On account of Hamilton's mastery of finance, his views were equally courted. During the discussions of the subject, which preceded the adoption of the Constitution in 1787, Hamilton made it plain that he was a mono-metallist like Morris, but recognizing the greater value of gold, its higher place among commercial nations and its lesser liability to sudden and extreme fluctuation in price, he preferred it to silver as the metallic standard. Pending these discussions the Confederation came to an end, and the new Constitution appeared (1787) with its provisions as to money and coinage:—The Congress shall have power "to coin money, regulate the value thereof and fix the standard of weights and measures." Art. I.; Sec. 8. Again, "No State shall coin money, emit bills of credit, make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts." Art. I.; Sec. 10.

Here then was recognition of two metals as money, and provision for a bi-metallic currency, should such a result be deemed wise. The matter of establishing a mint came up as one of the earliest and most important under the new Constitution. Hamilton made it the subject of a full and able report to Congress in 1791. In this report he adhered to his views that, in the abstract, a mono-metallic standard would be best, but that such standard should be gold in preference to silver. However, reasoning on the line of expediency, he feared that the adoption of a single standard would tend to limit the amount of the circulating medium, a result by no means desirable, in the infant and experimental stage of the Government. Therefore, he concluded that a double standard would be best in practice, and as a policy sufficiently permanent to warrant the forms of law.



HON. ARTHUR P. GORMAN.

Born in Howard co., Md., March 11, 1839; appointed Senate page, 1852, and continued in service till 1866; served as Collector of Internal Revenue for Fifth Maryland District, 1866-69; elected as Democrat to Maryland Legislature, November, 1869. Re-elected 1871, and became Speaker of House; elected to State Senate, 1875; re-elected in 1879; elected to United States Senate, 1880; re-elected, 1886 and 1892; prominent exponent of Democratic thought and recognized leader; name familiar in connection with the Presidency; ability as an organizer conceded by all; member of Committees on Appropriations, Commerce, Inter-State Commerce, Printing, Rules, and Corporations Organized in D. C.



HON. HENRY M. TELLER.

Born in Allegany co., N. Y., May 23, 1830; admitted to bar in N. Y.; removed to Illinois, 1858; thence to Colorado, 1861; on admission of Colorado to Statehood, 1876, was elected to U. S. Senate as a Republican; re-elected to U. S. Senate for the term 1876-1882; appointed Secretary of Interior by President Arthur in 1882, and served till March 3, 1885; re-elected to Senate in 1885, and again in 1890; Chairman of Committee on Claims; member of Committees on Judiciary, Appropriations, Rules, etc

His reasons and conclusions proved to be acceptable to the Congress, but there was great diversity of opinion respecting the question of the relative value of the two metals. What should be the fixed ratio between gold and silver? In fixing such ratio, should the price, or purchasing power, of gold at home or abroad be taken? It was finally agreed that American values were alone to be considered, and that the commercial ratio between gold and silver should be as one is to fifteen. One ounce of gold was to be taken as worth fifteen times as much as one ounce of silver.

OUR FIRST COINAGE ACT.

The first Act of Congress relating to coinage was passed April 2, 1792, and was entitled "An Act establishing a mint and regulating the coins of the United States." This Act provided for the coinage of eagles, half-eagles and quarter-eagles of gold, and for "dollars or units," half-dollars and quarter-dollars, dimes and half-dimes of silver. The coinage of cents and half-cents of copper was also provided for. The value of each eagle was fixed as "ten dollars or units, and to contain 247 grains and four-eighths of a grain of pure or 270 grains of standard gold." The half and quarter-eagles bore respectively an exact proportion to the eagle in value, weight and fineness.

The dollar, or unit, was thus provided for:—"Dollars or units—each to be of the value of a Spanish milled dollar, as the same is now current, and to contain 371 grains and four-sixteenths of a grain of pure, or 416 grains of standard silver." The fractional silver coins contained exactly one-half, one-fourth and one-tenth, respectively, of the quantity of fine silver and alloy prescribed for the dollar. The ideal unit for years prior and subsequent to the establishment of the Mint was the pound sterling, yet the Spanish dollar,

during that early period, was the money of commerce and the practical monetary unit, and it was the general custom to express in contracts that payment should be made in Spanish milled dollars. The advocates of silver attach great importance to the expression, "dollars or units," and to the fact that the established unit was the silver dollar. Upon this is based their claim that the silver dollar is the unit of our monetary system, and that the gold coinage is based upon that unit. Each eagle is "to be of the value of \$10 or units," and it is declared that the dollar or unit shall be of silver.

This Act provided for the free and unlimited coinage of both gold and silver, and that both coins should be a legal tender. Thus Section 14 reads:

"It shall be lawful for any person or persons to bring to the said Mint gold and silver bullion in order to their being coined, and that the bullion so brought shall be assayed and coined free of expense to the person or persons by whom the same shall have been brought."

Free coinage in this sense does not mean that the mint did its work for nothing. It charged one-half per cent. to indemnify it for the time expended in assaying and coining the bullion.

Section 16 of the Act contained the legal tender clause, making the coins of both metals, even including the fractional silver coins, a legal tender.

A gold dollar, or rather a dollar in gold, at the ratio fixed in the above Act, would contain 24.75 grains of gold. Multiply this by 15 (for there must be fifteen times as much silver in a dollar) and you have 371.25 grains, as the quantity of fine silver for the silver dollar. This ratio was not quite that which prevailed at the time in Europe, the ratio there being about $15\frac{1}{2}$ to 1. Our Coinage Act, therefore,

put too low a commercial value on gold. It was worth more as bullion in the markets of the world than in the shape of one of our coins. There was, therefore, little or no inducement for any one to take gold bullion or gold plate to the mint to get it coined into gold money, for the utmost they could get for it would be coin of gold equal to fifteen times its weight in silver. In Europe the same weight of gold would command fifteen and a half times its weight of silver. Not only was there no inducement to sell gold to the mint for purpose of coinage, but even what was coined followed to a great extent the law of a commercial commodity, and was retired as something more worthy to hold than the cheaper metal, silver, which measured its value in a popular sense, or else it sought, even as gold coin, the market abroad, where one part of gold commanded fifteen and a half parts of silver.

In those early times we were not in a position as a nation to impress a commercial value on metals used as coin. The law fixed a ratio. The mint impressed the law on the coins. After that they followed largely the higher and more arbitrary laws of commerce and of nations. They were in the markets of the world and subject to their fluctuations. And this was true, even though we had great need for metallic money, as all new countries have where population is sparse, where intercommunication is slow and irregular, and where credit has not yet learned to lend its conveniences to trade.

In spite of the ratio of 15 to 1, established for our bi-metallic currency by the Act of 1792, the foreign, or commercial, ratio forced itself upon us, and for forty-two years, that is from 1792 to 1834, the value of silver, as compared with gold, fluctuated, often rising nearly to 16 to 1, but never falling to 15 to 1. It is clear, then, that silver was

cheaper than gold, and silver currency than gold currency, which fact, as those who oppose the free coinage of silver aver, proved the truth of Gresham's law, mentioned above, that where two metals are made a legal tender and given free coinage at a fixed ratio of value, the cheaper metal will circulate to the exclusion of the dearer.

To illustrate: A yard is 36 inches, but if a merchant finds that if, within law, he can satisfy his customers with a yard of $35\frac{1}{2}$ inches, he will prefer the shorter standard of measure. Sixteen ounces make a pound avoirdupois, but if he can, within law, satisfy his customers with fifteen ounces, he will do so. An ounce of gold is worth in the markets $15\frac{1}{2}$ ounces of silver; he will not use the gold, but the legal equivalent of the gold, or the $15\frac{1}{2}$ ounces of silver, namely, the 15 ounces which he finds in the shape of silver coin, and a legal tender.

This presumes that the ounce of gold set up as the standard of value is fixed, like the yard, as a standard of measure and the pound as a standard of weight. Commercial custom and monetary science incline more and more to this presumption, and as a fact gold is made to so largely measure the value of silver as well as all other commodities, among enlightened nations, as that it performs the functions of a yard stick as to lengths or a pound weight as to weights.

But here the advocates of bi-metallism and free coinage say that gold is not in itself an unchangeable measure of value, as the yard stick is of length and the pound weight is of weight. It has its own fluctuations just as silver has, though perhaps not to the same extent. It is, therefore, not a true measure of value for silver. The Hon. Marcus A. Smith, of Arizona, in his recent speech upon "The free Coinage of Silver," thus treats of this question of gold

measurements and of the principle underlying "Gresham's Law:"

"The inflexible and unchangeable value, which is often attributed to gold coin, is simply the arbitrary value of a standard only measured by itself. This is the value to which the quoted words plainly apply. Governments can no more give fixed commodities, or comparative value, to gold and silver than they can arrest the motion of the stars. David Hume, John Locke, Adam Smith, and all the older economic writers agree that gold and silver both fluctuate in value.

"Profs. Jevons and Walker, more recent authorities, show by comparative tables of statistics that between 1789 and 1809 gold fell 46 per cent.; that between 1809 and 1849 it arose 145 per cent., and that within twenty years after the latter date it fell 20 per cent. It is estimated that during the past eighteen years gold has again risen 30 per cent. Jevons says that—

"In respect to steadiness of values the metals are probably less satisfactory, regarded as a standard of value, than many other commodities, such as corn.'

"The discovery of new mines, the exhaustion of the old mines, the arbitrary adoption of the metals by governments for money purposes or their demonetization and disuse for such purposes, and the greater or less demand for them for artistic and mechanical uses, are accidents and circumstances which contribute to fluctuation in their value. Usefulness or utility gives desirability. This desirability leads to use, and whether the use be by governments or individuals, or both, for money or in the arts, or for both, it creates the demand which, in connection with supply, gives exchange value.

"The law, custom, or usage, that rendered the fabled

nugget of copper a proper tender by the mummy as a fee to Charon, gave it its monetary value for that purpose. It was the tribal law, custom, or usage which ordained the use of silver as money, that gave to the 400 shekels of silver which Abraham tendered to Ephron the Hittite, and 'current money with the merchants,' its monetary value; it was the law, custom, or usage which decreed the use of silver as money, that gave to the twenty pieces of silver for which Joseph was sold into slavery, and the thirty pieces of silver for which the gentle Nazarene was betrayed to his death, their monetary value.

"In each instance, even on the principles of barter, the use of silver, for other purposes than money, was a factor, contributing to its monetary value, and not by itself creating it. Where barter is applied the sum total of usage gives to the metals what is termed the monetary value, but what, more properly speaking, is only commercial value. Crusoe, on his desert isle, sitting among his sacks of gold, is the synonym of poverty until he finds the grain of wheat which gives promise of food and life. That gold had no commercial value. The grain of wheat was worth immeasurably more than all of it. But let civilized governments, or even barbarous tribes find it, and at once its use for the purposes of money makes it command a thousand times its weight in wheat.

"So far from the value of given articles 'for other purposes' being the sole cause of their monetary value, the former is not always even co-existent with and equal to the latter. Was it the 'value for other purposes' of the iron in the coins of Sparta, under Lycurgus, that gave to those coins their monetary value? Was it the value of the leather 'for other purposes' that gave to the money of Carthage its monetary value? Was it its 'value for other pur-

poses' that gave to the money made in China in the thirteenth century from the bark of the mulberry tree its monetary value? Was it its 'value for other purposes' that gave value to the wampum of the American Indians? Was it their 'value for other purposes' that gave to the glass coin of Arabia, the brass coins of Rome, the pasteboard bills of Holland, the tenpenny nails of Scotland, the musket-balls of Massachusetts, and the cocoa-beans of Mexico, their monetary value?

"Is it its value for other purposes that gives to the \$800,000,000 of silver coin in France to-day its monetary value? Is it its value for other purposes that gives to our \$400,000,000 of standard silver coin and the millions more of subsidiary and minor coin their monetary value? The commercial value of the silver in the coin of France is \$170,000,000 less than its monetary value, and in the United States nearly \$100,000,000 less. How obvious, therefore, it is that governments not only by the use of the metals as money add to their commercial value, but at times confer a monetary value beyond and independent of the commercial value?

"Much is said about one kind of money driving another kind out of circulation. The Gresham Law is simply a law of displacement. It applies to all articles of commerce as well as to money. The self-binder displaces the sickle, and the railway train displaces the stage-coach. But the theory that the scarcest money is the best money is on par with the idea that the smallest crop is the best crop. Gold and silver, like other commodities, go where the highest prices are offered, whether the offer comes from individuals or governments. Monetary value is national; commercial value is cosmopolitan. The single-standard metal, whether it be gold or silver, is alternately money and commodity

instrument and article of commerce. Economic law is inexorable.

"England adopted the single-standard in 1819, and Germany, the Latin Union, and minor European states, at a later day. Since 1819 the Bank of England has suspended specie payment nearly a dozen times, the land-owners of England have been reduced from 165,000 to less than 30,000. Her \$3,500,000,000 national debt is as large as at the close of the Napoleonic wars, yet bread riots have periodically startled her cities and agitated her statesmen. But two years ago, when heavy drafts were made on her gold by Russia, her Barings touched the borders of insolvency, and, in spite of all the assistance of the Bank of England, plunged several leading New York banks into ruin and carried our country to the edge of panic and financial disaster. Goschen, the chancellor of the British Exchequer, announced to Parliament that the perils attending the increasing competition for gold made a consideration of the return to bi-metallism advisable.

"The rule or law of Sir Thomas Gresham did not apply to gold and silver. In the reign of Queen Elizabeth, I think it was, the coin in circulation was found to be degraded by clipping and general short weight. It was found that as long as any clipped or abraded piece of silver would buy as much as a full-weight piece of silver, the heavy piece was kept out of commerce and used in the arts, and the spurious piece did the trade of the realm. The light displaced the heavy in commerce, or had such tendency, and this is all that the Gresham law meant."

However these things may be in theory, in fact our early gold coins, being worth more, when compared with silver, than the value which was stamped upon them, began to depart either from circulation or from the country entirely.

This movement began almost simultaneously with the passage of our first Coinage Act. It was very perceptible by 1810, and continued until 1834. In all that time there were less than \$12,000,000 in gold coined, a large per cent. of which was lost entirely to the country by export. By 1814 the mintage of gold coins had fallen to \$77,000. In 1815 it fell to \$3,000. In 1816 the coinage of gold amounted to nothing. After 1819 gold disappeared as a circulating medium in the United States.

During this time (1792-1834) there were only 1,439,417 silver dollars coined, and none of these were coined after 1805. The coinage of the silver dollar was in all probability discouraged by the fact that gold was seen to be disappearing, and with the hope that a scarcity of silver dollars might enhance their value. Or, their coinage may have ceased by reason of the fact that the foreign silver coins of that denomination were ample for trade purposes, the bulk of our metallic currency being at that time of foreign make. The mint was not, however, idle. It was busy on fractional or subsidiary coins. By 1834 it had coined \$50,000,000 of silver half dollars, and a proportion of lesser coins, which, with the large per cent. of foreign subsidiary coins, furnished an ample minor currency.

This currency condition was far from satisfactory. Bi-metallism was not proving the theories of its authors. The question of a change began to be mooted. Some few alterations were made in the Coinage Act from time to time, but the original Act remained in all its essential features up till 1834.

By 1831 Hon. Campbell P. White, an authority on such matters, had reached the conclusion that a system which sought to regulate the standard of value in both gold and silver had inherent and incurable defects. He thought it

had been clearly ascertained by experience that it was impossible to maintain both metals in concurrent, simultaneous and promiscuous circulation.

In 1832 a Committee on Coinage reported that it could not find "that both metals have ever circulated simultaneously, concurrently and indiscriminately in any country where there were banks or money dealers; and they entertain the conviction that the nearest approach to an invariable standard is its establishment in one metal, which metal shall compose exclusively the currency of large payments."

The time had now come for a substantial change in the Coinage Act of 1792. What was chiefly apparent to all in 1834 was the fact that the ratio between gold and silver, established by that Act, was no longer, if it had ever been, correct. It undervalued gold. But there was no general departure, so far as the debates show, from the bi-metallic idea. Statesmen still preferred to struggle with the intricate problem of finding a ratio between gold and silver which would prove to be the ratio of commerce.

The Director of the Mint, in his report to the Congress for the year 1833, said that the "new coined gold frequently remains in the mint uncalled for, though ready for delivery, until the day arrives for a packet to sail for Europe." And he concluded that the entire coinage of gold in the future, amounting to perhaps \$2,000,000 annually, would be exported, unless there was a reform of the gold standard.

In his advocacy of a change in the ratio between gold and silver, Hon. Thomas H. Benton, in a speech delivered in the Senate in 1834, said: "The false valuation put upon gold has rendered the mint of the United States, so far as the gold coinage is concerned, a most ridiculous and absurd institution. It has coined, and that at large expense to the United States, 2,262,177 pieces of gold, valued at \$11,852,820, and

where are the pieces now? Not one of them to be seen! All sold and exported! To enable the friends of gold to go to work at the right place to effect the recovery of that precious metal which their fathers once possessed—which the subjects of European kings now possess—which the citizens of the young Republics of the south all possess—which even the free negroes of San Domingo possess—but which the yeomanry of this America have been deprived of for more than twenty years, and will be deprived of forever unless they discover the cause of the evil, and apply the remedy to the root."

Under these auspices the Coinage Act of June 28, 1834, was passed. By this Act the pure gold in the eagle was reduced from $247\frac{1}{2}$ grains to 232 grains, and a corresponding reduction was made in the half eagles and quarter eagles. The alloy was changed from $22\frac{1}{2}$ to 26, making the eagle contain 258 grains of standard gold instead of 270 grains. The Act of 1834 made no change in the silver coins. This change in the gold coinage made the ratio nearly 16 to 1, the exact ratio being 16.002 to 1. Why this ratio was established, or, for that matter, why any change at all was made, is difficult to understand, in view of the fact that at that date the commercial ratio between the two metals was 1 to 15.6, which, for convenience, Europe was calling 1 to $15\frac{1}{2}$. The new currency ratio of 1 to 16 was as far removed from the commercial ratio of 1 to $15\frac{1}{2}$ as was the old currency ratio of 1 to 15. Only now the boot was on the other foot. By the Act of 1792 gold was undervalued and silver overvalued. By the Act of 1834 the matter was reversed, and gold was overvalued and silver undervalued. Or considering the bi-metallic views of the framers of these acts, the result of the Act of 1792 was to overvalue silver as to gold; and the effect of the Act of 1834 was to overvalue gold

as to silver. In their practical workings these Acts quite threw their framers from their bi-metallic base, and inasmuch as in the Act of 1792 they attempted to exalt silver at the expense of gold, they became, according to the laws laid down in economics, silver monometallists. So, inasmuch as in the Act of 1834 they sought to exalt gold at the expense of silver, they became gold monometallists. There were not wanting those who sounded the note of warning that the Act of 1834 would but repeat that of 1792, in the respect that cheap gold would drive out the silver circulation just as cheap silver had driven out the gold circulation.

The Act of 1834 proved very unsatisfactory in its operation. Silver fluctuated, in a commercial sense, for years, but it did not fall in price to the ratio of 16 to 1 of gold. Consequently silver became worth more, in relation to gold, as bullion or plate than as coin, and it began to disappear, there being no inducement to coin it. After 1840, sight of a silver dollar was rare, and as a coin, it played no conspicuous part in our circulation, for very many years. Monometallists regard the effects of the Act of 1834 as another striking vindication of the truth of "Gresham's Law," that the cheaper money invariably drives the dearer from circulation.

ACT OF 1837.

Dissatisfaction with the Act of 1834 led to that of January 18, 1837, which was, in its form, a supplement to that of 1834, yet a complete revision of the laws of mintage, and was in fact known as "The Mint Act of 1837." This Act changed the standard of both gold and silver coins and the ratio between the metals. The standard for gold and silver coins was fixed at .900 fine, that is, 900 parts of pure metal to 100 parts of alloy. This increased the pure gold in the dollar from 23.20 to 23.22 grains, and fixed the ratio between

the two metals at 15.98 to 1. The silver dollar was changed from 416 grains of standard silver to $412\frac{1}{2}$ grains, and the fractional coins were made to correspond in exact proportion. To make the alloy equal to one-tenth of the weight of the coin, it was necessary to add the small fraction of two-tenths of one grain of gold to the eagle. No change, however, was made in the quantity of pure silver contained in the dollar. That remained at $371\frac{1}{4}$ grains, and it continued at that figure. This Act also provided that "gold and silver bullion brought to the mint for coinage shall be received and coined by the proper officers for the benefit of the depositor." This provision for coinage was taken from the previous Acts, and continued the coinage of the two metals upon the same footing. The fact that there was no change in the quantity of silver in the dollar has given origin and currency to the phrase "Dollar of the Fathers," or the more alliterative and catchy term "Dollar of the Daddies."

What is regarded as a serious error in all the Coinage Acts up to and including that of 1837 was the fact that the minor coins had been made to contain the exact proportion of silver contained in the dollar. They, therefore, paid the penalty visited on the silver dollar. They shrank from circulation, or left the country, and this became particularly manifest after the inequality between the production of gold and silver in this country set in with the discovery of gold in California.

Prior to this discovery the world's production of gold and silver was nearly equal, the annual average of gold production between 1841 and 1851 being about \$38,000,000, and that of silver about \$34,000,000. But from 1849 to 1851 the world seems to have poured forth its treasures of gold with unparalleled liberality. California, Russia and Australia contributed a new and unprecedented output of gold.

In the five years, from 1851 to 1855, the world's production of gold leaped from \$38,000,000 to \$140,000,000 annually, while in those years the production of silver only increased from \$34,000,000 to \$40,000,000 annually. The equality between the two products prior to 1849 did not serve to materially affect their commercial ratio, but the inequality after that year greatly affected it, by giving a still higher value to silver. This fact, co-operating with the effect of the Coinage Act, enhanced the difficulty already spoken of with the circulation of silver coins of every denomination. "There is," said Mr. Dunham in Congress in 1853, "a constant stimulant to gather up every silver coin and send it to market as bullion, to be exchanged for gold, and the result is, the country is almost devoid of small change for the ordinary small transactions, and what we have is of a depreciated character."

The commercial ratio in Europe being about $15\frac{1}{4}$ to 1, silver coins were worth three per cent. more for export than our gold coins; that is, they were worth three per cent. more as bullion than as money. When it became apparent that the country was thus being depleted of its change, agitation set in for a remedy.

COINAGE ACT OF 1849.

The Coinage Act of March 3, 1849, was a provision for a fuller and larger mintage of gold, whose production bade fair to be greatly increased in this country owing to developments in California. It authorized the coinage of double eagles, and also of gold dollars. "Double eagles should each be of the value of twenty dollars, or units, and gold dollars should each be of the value of one dollar, or unit, these coins to be uniform in all respects to the standard for gold coins now established by law."

It was not until the Act of 1853 that the coinage of three dollar gold pieces was authorized, "of the value of three dollars, or units, conformable in all respects to the standard gold coins now authorized by law." The word "dollar or unit" was used in all the Coinage Acts to describe the value of the gold coins prior to 1873.

COINAGE ACT OF 1853.

This Act is significant in our monetary history as being the first which recognized the difficulty of maintaining a perfect bi-metallic standard, and the first which contained a step toward the demonetization of silver. It was passed in February, 1853, and it reduced the weight of the half dollar from $206\frac{1}{4}$ grains of standard silver to 192 grains of the same. All the smaller coins were reduced in proportion. At the same time the full legal tender quality was removed from these subsidiary coins, and they became no longer a legal tender for sums exceeding five dollars. This provision has not since been removed. Again, it was provided that the bullion for the coinage of fractional silver should be purchased directly by the government, or by the Director of the Mint on account of the government, and that the gain arising from the coinage thereof should be credited to the Mint. This was a blow at the "free and unlimited coinage" of the subsidiary coins. By this reduction of the amount of silver in the fractional coins to the extent of about seven per cent., all inducement to melt them up or sell them as bullion was removed; for, although the silver dollar still remained at from three to three and a half per cent. above the gold dollar in value, the seven per cent. reduction in the commercial value of the fractional coins brought them three to three and a half per cent. below the value of gold; quite enough of depreciation to save them to the circulation.

It must be remarked of the period which led to, embraced and immediately followed the Coinage Act of 1853, that it was a period in which there was hardly any coinage of silver dollars, and practically no circulation of them. In 1850 only \$47,500 silver dollars were coined; in 1851, \$1,300; in 1852, \$1,100. All attention was paid to the coinage of gold, the total coinage of which, in 1852, was \$56,000,000, fully \$2,000,000 of which was in gold dollars.

The framers of the Act of 1853 paid no attention to the fact that our silver production from 1851 to 1855 was about \$400,000 per year. They saw only the large gold production of over \$60,000,000 per year, and the spirit of the Act was to take advantage of the opportunity to establish, as far as possible, a single currency standard of gold. True, they did not interfere with the silver dollar. There was no need to. None were being coined. None were in circulation.

FROM 1853 TO 1873.

This period is marvellous in the history of metallic money and monetary systems at home and abroad. The world's production of gold from 1850 to 1870 was \$2,725,000,000, or five times as much as in the preceding twenty years, and quite as much as during the entire period from the discovery of America to the discovery of gold in California.

The commercial world became alarmed at these figures, fearing a general derangement of values. That the commercial value of gold was decreasing was manifest from the increase in the price of standard commodities all the world over. Theories arose in all directions as to remedies. Some French economists thought it an excellent time to demonetize gold, and establish a single silver standard. Others thought the time opportune to establish the principle of bimetallism, provided the several commercial nations could be



HON. RICHARD P. BLAND.

Born near Hartford, Ky., August 19, 1835; academically educated; moved to Missouri, 1855; thence to California and Virginia city, Nev.; practiced law and engaged in mining; County Treasurer of Carson co.; back to Missouri, 1865; practiced law at Rolla and Lebanon; elected, as a Democrat, to represent Eighth Missouri District in 43d, 44th, 45th, 46th, 47th, 48th, 49th, 50th, 51st, and 52d Congresses; rose to distinction as author of Bland Silver Bill, which became a law, with the Allison amendment, in 1878; Father of the Free Silver Coinage Bill in 52d Congress; defeated as straight Democratic candidate for the 54th Congress by Hon. J. D. Hubbard, his Republican opponent; prominently mentioned in connection with the Presidency by Free Silver party.



HON. HORACE BOIES.

Born in Erie co., N. Y., December 7, 1827; started, a poor boy, at sixteen, for Racine, Wis.; worked on a farm for a time and returned to New York; admitted to bar of Erie co., 1852; elected to Assembly, as a Republican, 1853; nominated a second time and defeated; moved to Waterloo, Iowa, 1867; practiced profession, and became large land owner; left the Republican party on account of its prohibition doctrines in 1883; advocated Cleveland's election in 1884; favored tariff reform, but not unqualified free coinage; nominated for Governor, on Democratic ticket, in fall of 1889, and elected; a Congregationalist, strictly temperate, and a patron of fine-stock raising. Prominently mentioned as candidate for the Presidency on Free Silver Democratic ticket of 1896.

brought to give common consent. France, Italy, Switzerland and Belgium formed what was called "The Latin Monetary Union" in 1863, based on bi-metallism. But in 1867 was held the "International Monetary Conference," at Paris, in which it was laid down that the adoption of a single gold standard was a principle necessary to universal coinage.

Following this, in 1871, came the defeat of France in the Franco-Russian war, and her payment of an immense subsidy in gold to Germany. Immediately, Germany, by a series of Coinage Acts from 1871 to 1873, demonetized her silver and adopted a single gold standard. She stopped coining silver and threw it on the market, selling \$140,000,000 worth between 1873 and 1879. This alarmed the countries pledged to a bi-metallic system. The Latin Union closed the mints of France, Belgium, Italy and Switzerland, to the coinage of silver, thus confessing their inability to maintain the two metals on an equality and as money. For thirteen years France did not issue a single legal tender silver coin, and on January 1, 1891, the Latin Union went out of existence.

Meanwhile, our own country was passing through the throes of war and the demoralization attending an expanded and strained credit. In 1861 the government became a borrower in gold to the extent of \$100,000,000. In February, 1862, it passed the "Legal Tender Act," under which \$150,000,000 in "Greenbacks" were issued as legal tenders. At once gold jumped to a premium. The government's promises to pay were so much cheaper and inferior as a circulating medium, that gold hid away and disappeared as currency.

In July of the same year another issue of \$150,000,000 of legal tenders was authorized. Gold rose to a still higher

premium. Even our fractional silver currency, depreciated as it was by the Act of 1853, went to a premium and disappeared with the gold. This made the fractional paper currency necessary. Subsequent uses of government credit in various forms and for war purposes, continued to advance the premium on gold till in July, 1864, it reached 185 per cent. Peace, the ability of the government to pay, as steps toward resumption showed, and final resumption in 1879, mark the decline of gold to par again, or rather the exaltation of the government promise to pay to the gold standard.

THE ACT OF 1873.

This Act has become more famous through subsequent discussions of it, than on account of its intrinsic merits or the debates which attended its passage. It is now "The Odious Demonetization Act of 1873" or "The Conspiracy Against Silver" of that year. The facts connected with its passage hardly support the charge that it was a "trick" played on the advocates of free silver coinage by their opponents. As to the intimation that "its contents were not fully known" or sufficiently known, that is matter personal to the majority which passed it and remote from its merits.

The approaches to no other Coinage Act seem to have been more deliberate and gradual. The original draft of the Act was presented to the Senate as early as April, 1870, by the then Secretary of the Treasury, Hon. Geo. S. Boutwell. It had been prepared with great deliberation, and under the supervision of Dr. Linderman, Director of the Mint. It proceeded on the theory that if the American silver dollar were made the equivalent of the five-franc piece of France—France being on a bi-metallic basis, and with a great volume of silver currency—said dollar might become interchangeable

with European coins of like value. The bill, therefore, fixed the weight of the silver dollar at 384 grains standard silver, that being the weight of the five-franc piece.

But as this was really to reduce the ratio between silver and gold to about 14.8 to 1, and as the bill gave to the silver dollar a limited legal tender power, it was not regarded as one which would effect its object and make our silver dollar float all over the world. It, therefore, flitted back and forward between the two houses of Congress for three years, the subject of repeated debates and amendments, the theme of much newspaper discussion, till at length it was passed by the House, with the clause providing for a silver dollar of 384 grains in it. This provision was struck out by the Senate, and what was called the "Trade Dollar" clause was inserted in its stead. This clause provided for a trade dollar of 420 grains standard silver and 378 grains pure silver, and a limit on its legal tender quality to sums of five dollars. The object was to provide a market for our production of silver and to make a dollar which would substitute the old Spanish dollar in the Pacific trade with China and Japan. It was a dollar of commerce and not circulation.

The bill then went to a Committee of Conference between the two Houses, where its final form was agreed upon. It then passed both Houses and became a law February 12, 1873. It provided that the gold coins "shall be a one dollar piece, which, at the standard weight of 25.8 grains, shall be the unit of value," etc.

The gold coins of larger denominations were based upon the one dollar piece. The silver coins were declared to be a trade dollar, etc., and "the weight of the trade dollar shall be 420 grains troy . . . and said coins shall be a legal tender at their nominal value for any amount not exceeding

five dollars in any one payment." Thus the standard silver dollar was not only struck from the list of coins, but its substitute was limited in legal tender power and classified with the fractional coins. No change was made in the weight or quality of the gold coins. The important changes made, and which have given rise to so much contention since, were:

1. The gold dollar was made the unit value.
2. The trade was substituted for the standard silver dollar.
3. Silver was deprived of full legal tender power, and limited to payments in sums of five dollars.

No change was made in the minting privilege accorded the two metals, except with reference to fractional coins. Owners of silver were permitted to deposit their bullion at the Mint upon the same terms as owners of gold bullion, so far as trade dollars were concerned. The provision of the Act of 1853, to buy silver bullion on Government account for coining fractional silver, was continued in the Act of 1873, but any owner of silver bullion could "deposit the same at any mint, to be formed into bars or into trade dollars," at a charge not to exceed the actual average cost to the mint. In answering the complaint that the Act of 1873 struck down silver, Mr. Ehrich, of Colorado, says:—

"Silver has been struck down, but not by the bill of 1873, nor by any bill concocted by man. The hand which struck down silver is the hand which will strike us all down in time, the hand which nothing can withstand, the irresistible hand of Nature. Silver has been struck down by the natural forces, by the great law of supply and demand. The yearly average of gold production in the twenty-five years from 1851 to 1875 was \$127,000,000. The yearly average product of silver for the same period was \$51,000,000. The average annual product of gold for the fifteen years from

1876 to 1890 declined to \$108,000,000, a falling off of 15 per cent. The average annual product of silver for the same period increased to \$116,000,000, an increase of 127 per cent. There is the whole silver question, and in the face of these facts, it is now impossible for the United States, single handed, with free and unlimited coinage, to bring silver to a parity with gold on any such basis as 16 to 1; it is more impossible than for a thousand men to pick up our great 'Pike's Peak' and transport it bodily to Denver."

ACTS RELATING TO THE TRADE DOLLAR.

By the Act of July 22, 1876, it was provided that "the trade dollar shall not hereafter be a legal tender," and the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to limit the coinage thereof "to such an amount as he may deem sufficient to meet the export demand for the same." By this Act the silver dollar was entirely eliminated from the list of United States coins. Subsequently an Act was passed authorizing the redemption of the outstanding trade dollars at par, and directing their recoinage into standard dollars. Before the passage of this Act, however, considerable loss was sustained by the people through the destruction of the trade dollar as lawful money. Trade dollars to the number of 35,965,924 were issued from the mints, a large proportion of which was sent to China and never returned for redemption.

EXTENT OF COINAGE UNDER ACTS TO 1878.

From the establishment of the mint in 1792, to 1806, the aggregate number of silver dollars coined was only 1,439,417, and from 1806 to 1835 there was no coinage whatever of this piece. In 1836 the number of dollar pieces coined was only 1,000. The two years following coinage of dollars was suspended, but was resumed in 1839, when 300 were issued,

and the coinage was continued until 1873, when the standard silver dollar was supplanted by the trade dollar. The largest annual coinage of standard silver dollars was made in the years 1871 and 1872, when it was \$1,117,136 and \$1,118,600 respectively, which is equal to nearly two-fifths of the aggregate of standard silver dollars coined from 1792 to 1873, which aggregate was 7,830,538. The number coined in January and February, 1873, was 296,000, which are included in the above aggregate. The "Demonetization Act" was passed February 12, 1873. It will be seen, therefore, that standard silver dollars were coined down to the passage of the Act which substituted the trade dollar.

COINAGE ACT OF 1878.

Remembering now that for seventeen years prior to 1879—the date of resumption—neither gold nor silver coins were in circulation in the United States, and that by 1876 silver had fallen to \$1.15 per ounce, we are prepared for the era of agitation which began with the introduction of free silver coinage bills into Congress. More than one of these was introduced into the House, but that particular one which was prepared and championed by Mr. Bland, of Missouri, passed the House in the fall of 1877. It became known as the "Bland Bill," and the coinage of silver that followed in its wake became known as the "Bland Dollars."

What was really the "Bland Bill," that is, the bill passed by the House and sent to the Senate, never became a law. The bill provided for the coinage of "silver dollars of the weight of 412½ grains Troy, of standard silver, as provided in the Act of January 18, 1837." . . . "Which coins, together with all silver dollars heretofore coined by the United States of equal weight and fineness, shall be a legal tender, at their nominal value, for all debts and dues, public

and private, except where otherwise provided by contract. And, any owner of silver bullion may deposit the same at any United States coinage mint or assay office, to be coined into such dollars for his benefit, upon the same terms and conditions as gold bullion is deposited for coinage under existing laws."

The above is the "Bland Bill" as to its vital points and as it passed the House and appeared in the Senate. It gave free coinage (that is, the same coinage as was given to gold) to any owner of silver bullion who presented it at the mint. It gave unlimited coinage of silver dollars for all silver bullion presented to be coined. It made coinage compulsory. At the ratio existing between silver and gold, it was practical mono-metallism, with silver as the standard and gold at a premium, for the cheaper metal, when coined, invariably takes the volume of circulation and expels the dearer.

The entire character of this bill was changed in the Senate by the Allison amendment and became known as the Bland-Allison Bill. It was then passed by both Houses and became the Bland-Allison Act. As passed, it involved the principle of bi-metallism, for it limited the coinage of the cheaper metal, silver, and undertook to maintain it at par with gold by providing for its redemption.

This Act of February 28th, 1878, restored the silver dollar of $412\frac{1}{2}$ grains to the coinage with full legal tender power, but did not restore silver bullion to the minting privilege which attached to it prior to 1873, and which was in every respect equal to that bestowed upon gold. This Act re-established the "dollar of the fathers," made it legal tender for all debts, "except when otherwise expressly stipulated in the contract," and directed the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase silver bullion monthly "at the market price thereof, not less than two million dollars' worth per

month nor more than four million dollars' worth per month, and cause the same to be coined monthly, as fast as so purchased, into such dollars." The third section provided that holders of silver dollars "may deposit the same with the Treasurer or any Assistant Treasurer of the United States, in sums not less than ten dollars, and receive therefor certificates of not less than ten dollars each."

It also provided as follows:—

"That immediately after the passage of this Act the President shall invite the governments of the countries composing the Latin Union, so called, and of such other European nations as he may deem advisable, to join the United States in a conference to adopt a common ratio between gold and silver, for the purpose of establishing internationally the use of bimetallic money and securing fixity of relative value between those metals."

This bill represented the same order of thought that pervaded the silver agitation of after years. Those who favored the "Greenback" inflation scheme were its ardent supporters. Representatives from the Silver-producing States were strongly in its favor, in the belief that it would enhance the value of their product. While it made the coinage of silver dollars compulsory to the extent of \$2,000,000 a month, it placed a limit at \$4,000,000. It was thought that this much circulation in silver dollars could be kept at par with gold, but it was soon found that the silver dollars would not circulate. Out of the 12,136 tons of silver purchased by the Government under the Act at a cost of \$308,199,262, and out of the 378,166,793 silver dollars coined therefrom under the Act, at an expense of \$5,000,000, not more than one out of eight found its way into circulation. For all the benefit to the circulation derived from the Act, the Government might as well have

saved itself the \$5,000,000 expense of coinage, and bought and stored the silver in bullion shape. The bullion was always worth more than the coined dollars, and could have been more safely and cheaply cared for in the Treasury vaults than its equivalent in coins. There was no expansion of the currency, as the ardent advocates of the bill fondly hoped. Nor was there an increase in the price of silver bullion, for it declined from \$1.12 an ounce in 1879, to 93½ cents an ounce in 1889, or in other words it declined to a point where it stood to gold as 22 to 1 per ounce value, and the value of silver in a silver dollar was only 72 cents.

The silver certificate feature of the Act proved of little practical value, and in the main the Act negatived its own provisions and bred causes for its repeal.

COINAGE ACT OF 1890.

But the Bland-Allison Act of 1878 was not without its uses. It satisfied neither its advocates nor its opponents, and increased rather than decreased the silver agitation. It led directly to and perhaps hastened the passage of the Coinage Act of July 14, 1890.

The bill which became the basis of this Act was prepared on a plan which embraced the views of Secretary of the Treasury Windom. It was submitted to the House, and passed. Its provisions were that any owner of silver bullion, not foreign, could bring it to any mint and obtain for it legal tender treasury notes equal in value to the then market value of the silver, which notes were redeemable either in gold or silver bullion, at its then market value, at the option of the government, or in silver dollars at the holder's option.

This bill was amended in the Senate by inserting a clause providing for free and unlimited coinage. It then went to

a conference committee, where it took the form in which it was passed finally and became a law, July 14, 1890.

As passed, it directed the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase 4,500,000 ounces of silver bullion each month at the market price thereof, not exceeding \$1 for every 371 $\frac{1}{4}$ grains of pure silver, and to issue in payment for such purchase Treasury Notes of the United States.

Those Treasury Notes were made redeemable in *coin*, gold or silver, at the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury, and had full legal-tender value. Following this clause was one which read, "It being the established policy of the United States to maintain the two metals on a parity with each other upon the present legal ratio, or such ratio as may be provided by law."

The Act also provided for the actual coinage of 2,000,000 silver dollars a month up until July 1, 1891.

By comparing the two Acts of 1878 and 1890, a better view of the silver controversy may be had. The Act of 1878 made it compulsory on the Government to buy silver bullion to the value of \$2,000,000 and not exceeding \$4,000,000 monthly, and to coin the same into silver dollars. This was a drain on the Treasury of at least \$24,000,000 a year. Holders of silver dollars could exchange them at the Treasury, in sums of ten dollars, for Silver Certificates, the coin remaining in the Treasury for the payment of the Certificate on demand. These Certificates were not given full legal tender value, except for payment of customs and all public dues. This approval of them by the Government confirmed them in popular estimation, and they were as freely accepted by the people as if they had been a full legal tender.

The Act of 1890 made compulsory on the Treasury the purchase of 4,500,000 ounces of silver per month, or 54,000,000

ounces a year. But instead of paying cash for it, payment was to be made in Certificates, called Treasury notes, especially issued, redeemable in gold or silver coin, and clothed with full legal tender power.

It will be seen that payment for the bullion, under the Act of 1878, was in cash; while payment for the bullion under the Act of 1890 was by Certificate, or Treasury note.

There was no compulsory coinage of the bullion under the Act of 1890, except at the rate of \$2,000,000 a month up till July 1, 1891. After that date no silver dollars were coined, but the bullion purchased was held in the form of fine silver bars. Under the Act, \$28,298,455 were coined, and up to April 1, 1891, \$89,602,198 in Treasury notes, to pay for bullion deposited, had been issued, \$77,605,000 of which were in circulation. At the same date the value of silver bars held by the Treasury was \$65,720,000.

On November 1, 1891, the total of silver dollars coined and in existence in the United States, under all the Acts, was \$409,475,368, of which \$347,339,907 were in the Treasury, and only \$62,135,461 outside of the Treasury, or in circulation.

Against this \$323,668,401 silver certificates had been issued, \$321,142,642 of which were outside of the Treasury and \$2,525,759 inside. At the same date the stock of silver bullion in the Treasury was \$33,094,234.

The 54,000,000 ounces of silver which the Government is required to buy yearly, and to issue Treasury notes therefor, was the exact output of the silver mines in the United States in 1890. A prime object of the law was, therefore, to furnish a sure market for the product of our mines, at the prevailing price of silver bullion when presented at the Treasury. The Act was a compromise Act, and both mine-owners and advocates of "free and unlimited coinage" ac-

cepted the compromise, as the best that could be done to secure a certain home market for their product, and at the same time increase the circulating medium of the country by just the number of Treasury notes required to purchase 54,000,000 ounces of silver.

Experience has shown that the Act really authorized the purchase of more than the silver product of American mines, available for coinage purposes, since some three to five million ounces of said product are annually used up in the arts.

It was a general belief, at the time of the passage of the Act of 1890, that its effect would be to increase the market price of silver. Indeed this was confidently prophesied by mine-owners and free-silver-coinage advocates. In anticipation of such rise, silver speculators entered the market and drove silver bullion up to \$1.05 an ounce in April, 1890; to \$1.08 in May; to \$1.15 in August; to \$1.21 in September. But now the natural law of supply and demand began to operate against them. They had to contend with the world's market and the world's prices, and no longer with a home market and home prices. The inevitable consequence was that the price of silver broke. The country that could sustain a certain amount of silver coin, as a circulating medium, at par with gold, could not sustain the market value of silver bullion at a point above where the laws of supply and demand, as established by the world at large, chose to fix it.

In October, 1890, silver fell to \$1.09 per ounce; in December to \$1.06. The decline was gradual for a long time. In December, 1891, silver was worth 94½ cents an ounce, and the fine silver in a dollar was worth only 73 cents. On May 23, 1892, silver sold for 88¼ cents per ounce. Therefore, even with so excellent a customer as the

Government, and one ready to take the entire output of the silver mines of the country, the market price of the product declined. The law of the world proved mightier than the law of the United States.

THE BLAND FREE COINAGE BILL—PROPOSED ACT OF 1892.

Failure of silver producers to realize their expectations under the Act of 1890, a growing desire to relieve depressed industrial and trade conditions, especially in the West and South, and the fact that political conventions in a great many States had given the silver question a party turn, rendered the opening of the Fifty-second Congress an opportune time to seek new coinage legislation. In the Democratic Conventions the planks favored the "free and unlimited coinage of silver;" in the Republican Conventions they favored the "maintainance of silver on a parity with gold."

The Congress opened with an overwhelming Democratic majority, and Mr. Bland, of Missouri, became the recognized leader of his party on the silver question. He introduced into the House what became known as the "Bland Free Silver Coinage Bill," and advocated it with his well-known ability. It drew around it the advocates of "free and unlimited coinage" and became the subject of animated and prolonged debate. When ripe for passage Mr. Bland demanded the previous question, which failed by the very remarkable vote of 148 yeas to 148 nays; there being enough of Eastern Democrats voting with the Republicans to cause this disappointing result to the friends of the measure.

As this vote by no means disposed of the measure finally in the House, or if so, as the question proved a leading one in the National campaign of 1892, it is well to understand the provisions of the bill.

It provides that the unit of value shall be the standard silver dollar as now coined, of $412\frac{1}{2}$ grains standard silver, or the gold dollar of 25.8 grains standard gold.

That the standard gold and silver coins shall be full legal tender.

That any holder of standard gold or silver bullion shall be entitled to have the same minted into coins free of charge, or may deposit said bullion at the mints and receive coin notes therefor, equal in value to the coinage value of the bullion deposited, the bullion thereupon to become the property of the government.

That the coin notes shall not be less than one nor over one thousand dollars in value and shall be a legal tender.

That issue of the Treasury notes in pay for bullion, provided for in the Act of 1890, shall be discontinued, and all such as are outstanding shall be called in and destroyed and coin notes shall be substituted for them.

That the issue of coin notes shall never be greater than the coinage value of the bullion in the Treasury.

That said coin notes shall be redeemed in coin at the Treasury, and the bullion deposited shall be coined as fast as said coins are needed for such purposes of redemption.

That any holder of gold or silver coins may deposit the same, in sums of ten dollars, and demand coin notes therefor.

That the Act of 1890 is repealed; and that the silver dollar of $412\frac{1}{2}$ grains may change to one of 400 grains as soon as France reopens her mints to free and unrestricted coinage of silver at the ratio of $15\frac{1}{2}$ of silver to 1 of gold.

Under the Act of 1890 the government must purchase 54,000,000 ounces of silver per annum, for which it pays the market price.

Under the proposed Act of 1892 the owner of gold or

silver bullion might have deposited his bullion at the mint, demanded its mintage free, or demanded coin notes for it at the mint value of the bullion.

Under the act of 1890, the owner of bullion got the bullion price for it on the day of deposit at the mint. Under the proposed Bland law of 1892, he got pay at the mint value of the bullion; that is, for every ounce of silver deposited, that has cost him, say ninety-five cents, he would have received one dollar and twenty-nine cents in coin. The opponents of free silver coinage put it this way: The mine owners, under the law of 1890, turned in their annual product of 54,000,000 ounces of silver, say in 1891, at a value of \$55,796,833, for which they received that amount of Treasury notes. Under the proposed Bland act, they could have deposited their 54,000,000 ounces, and demanded the mint value, or \$71,000,000 in coin notes. Therefore they would have received thirty per cent. in excess of the market value of silver.


During the financial and industrial depression following the political revolution of 1892, the new administration charged the disastrous times to the existence of the Silver Act of 1890, or rather to the purchasing clause of said act. In this it had a large support in both political parties, though the Republicans took the ground that as the act had proven harmless under the prior administration, the disease which afflicted the country was due rather to the standing threat upon its industries than to the Silver Act.

It was well known to President Cleveland that a large and aggressive sentiment existed in the South and West, in his own party and among the Populists, in favor of the free and unlimited coinage of silver in the ratio of 16 to 1, and against the repeal of the Sherman Act of 1890,

provided nothing more favorable could be substituted for it. Though persuaded in his own mind that existing deplorable conditions were due to that Act and could only be remedied by its repeal, though urged by the friends of repeal to call an extra session of the Fifty-third Congress to get the obnoxious measure out of the way, the President did not feel it safe to relegate so momentous a problem to the freshly chosen and untested membership of the Congress till the full effect of the commercial and industrial crisis had been felt by the congressional districts, and had served as an object lesson to teach the necessity for party unity in favor of repeal. The crises grew apace daily.

At length, June 30, 1893, the President called Congress in extra session on August 7. It met while the crisis was at its height, and amid devastations of enterprise unparalleled in our history. The President's brief message urged the Congress to adhere to the letter of the call, which was the repeal of the Sherman Act of 1890, and set forth all the arguments that had been used by politicians and business men in favor of such repeal. The paper pleased the Republicans who favored repeal. It embittered the free silver coinage men of both parties. As a large majority of these were in the Democratic ranks, he ran great risk of disrupting his own party and defeating the object of his call, but he trusted largely to his personal and administrative powers, to the value of the object lessons of the preceding months, and to the necessity for party cohesion, to sustain him in his course.

By August 28th, 1893, the debates over repeal of the act closed, and a vote was taken which stood 240 to 110 in favor of repeal. A vote was not reached in the Senate till October 30th, when it stood 43 to 32 in favor of re-



HON. WILLIAM M. STEWART.

Born in Wayne co.; N. Y., August 9, 1827; attended Yale College, 1849-50; started for California and arrived May, 1850; engaged in mining; studied law in 1852; appointed District Attorney in 1853, and elected next year; appointed Attorney-General of California, 1854; located at Virginia city, Nev., 1860; engrossed in mining litigation and development of mining industry; member of Territorial Convention, 1861; member of Constitutional Convention, 1863; elected U. S. Senator, 1864 and 1869; resumed general law practice for Pacific States; re-elected to U. S. Senate, as a Republican, for term beginning March 4, 1887 and again in 1893; prominent advocate of Free Silver Coinage; Chairman of Committee on Mines and Mining, and member of Committees on Claims, Irrigation, Indian Affairs and Pacific Railroads.



JOSEPH C. S. BLACKBURN.

Born in Woodford co., Ky., Oct. 1, 1838; educated at Sayres Institute and Centre College; studied law at Lexington, and admitted to the bar in 1858; entered Confederate army in 1861; resumed practice in 1865; elected to State legislature, 1871 and 1873; elected to House in 44th, 45th 46th, 47th and 48th Congresses; elected to U. S. Senate, 1885 and 1890; candidate for re-election in 1896, but legislature failed to elect; leader of free silver coinage party in his State, and prominently mentioned as Presidential nominee of Democratic party in 1896.

peal. The country at first felt a sense of relief over this repeal. Banks felt easier and credit grew bolder. But there was now little use for money. Industrial enterprise remained in a state of paralysis. It soon became manifest that the substantial benefits expected from repeal were not to be realized, and that the causes of depression and panic must be sought for in other directions.

In the first regular session of the Fifty-third Congress, December 4th, 1893, the question of silver coinage came up again. The Treasury reserve had fallen below the \$100,000,000 limit, deemed safe for redemption purposes. There was a deficit in Treasury receipts of about \$68,000,000. One loan of \$50,000,000 had been called for, and others were expected to follow. As a means of aiding the Treasury, Mr. Bland introduced into the House a bill providing for the coinage of the Treasury seigniorage. It was championed by all the free silver coinage men, who saw in it an opportunity they had lost during the extra session of the Congress. The estimated value of this seigniorage was \$55,000,000 which, if coined into silver dollars, would be so much straight gain to the Treasury. It was opposed stoutly by Republicans and an able Democratic contingent, as sheer inflation, without a particle of security behind it, since the value of silver bullion in the Treasury, against which \$153,000,000 of silver certificates had been issued, had fallen from \$126,000,000 to \$97,000,000. Adding the entire estimated value of the seigniorage (\$55,000,000) to this \$97,000,000, and the sum would still be short of the \$153,000,000 silver certificates which were to be protected. This bill did not pass, but it served to show that the question of the free-coinage of silver was a rapidly growing one and that the day might not be dis-

tant when it would project itself on the country in a form independent of existing political parties.

One of the arguments most depended on by the free silver coinage men is to the effect that the discrimination of existing laws against silver creates the disparity between it and gold, and that the removal of such discrimination would make the bullion value of silver and the price of it with the Government stamp upon it the same. They say that whenever the mints are open to the free coinage of silver, and whenever the owner of such silver can have it exchanged at the rate of one hundred cents for three hundred and seventy-one and one fourth grains, silver will be worth as much without as with the Government stamp.

Their opponents say, this argument quite loses sight of the fact that the moment three hundred and seventy-one and one-fourth grains of silver which are worth in the markets of the world, say seventy cents, become worth one hundred cents by sheer virtue of the stamp upon it, all the world will pour its surplus silver into our mints and completely swamp our metal currency. Gold would flee and there would be no means of sustaining silver money at par. They also say that as our country is at present situated, with barely gold enough to sustain our present silver circulation, the moment free silver coinage was adopted it would be accepted by the Treasury and by the banks as notice to suspend gold payments. Unless such suspension were resorted to, it would be no time before the gold reserve would be exhausted and disaster ensue.

The arguments in favor of free silver coinage gain great plausibility and become far reaching when they are turned to the account of the debtor classes. As seen from the

reasoning just above given, they could take advantage of the thirty per cent. difference between the market and mint value of the silver dollar and thus pay their debts at less than they had contracted to pay. The opponents of free silver coinage question the state of morals that sanctions this kind of repudiation, and add that it would be infinitely better for the Government to extend this difference as a charity to debtors, rather than run the risk of a dishonored currency and of the panics, disturbances and immense losses which would surely follow.

Again, the free silver coinage men say they are certain that their doctrine in practice will make the silver dollar the equal of the gold dollar. Their opponents say that if this be so, the silver dollar will be as hard to get as the gold dollar, and therefore, the debtor classes will be no better off than before. But, they also say, granting every advantage claimed by the free silver coinage men for the debtor classes, how about the creditor classes? They are by far the most numerous class. Every laborer is a creditor when his day's work is done, every pensioner, every saving institution, etc. If the cheaper dollar scales the mortgage on the debtor's farm, and makes it easier to pay, a thing the mortgagee might stand, would not the cheaper dollar equally scale the debt due at night to the miner, artisan, day laborer and servant?

No, says the free coinage man, for the dollar would still be a dollar. But, answers his opponent, it being a dollar whose intrinsic value is worth only sixty or seventy cents, and being plenty, prices must rise, and the daily earning can only be exchanged for what was formerly much less in value.

It is somewhat lamentable that so momentous a question as that of silver and gold, or in other words, our currency

of redemption, should in late years have become clouded with theories and visions. After all, there are but a few infallible laws underlying the whole question of metallic currency, and these have been stated in this article. All else is "the stuff that dreams are made of," glittering but ephemeral, plausible but perishable. They may serve to whet a fancy for an hour, but never to nerve a judgment for a lifetime.

There are many who seriously deprecate the rapid drift of this question of metallic currency into partyism. As it seems impossible for it to escape this fate, judging from the tenor of latest sentiment, it were perhaps best for it to pass through the inevitable ordeal—that alembic of a popular campaign of square issues, which shall serve to separate the dross of theory from the pure ingot of fact. But in so passing, it should be a supreme study and superhuman effort on the part of all to keep it free from those animosities and acerbities that belittle its importance and shroud it with dangers. To make it a question of party, and to settle it on a basis of political sentiment, if such must needs be, it is surely not necessary to array the poor against the rich, the debtor against creditor, section against section; nor is it necessary to supplement argument and calm reasoning with threats to fire on another Sumter and force another secession and rebellion.

Above all it should not be forgotten that other countries have done with their silver just what it is proposed to do with ours, and that they—notably the intelligent, manufacturing and commercial countries of the Latin Union—had to give up in despair their effort to sustain silver coin at par with gold, in quantities beyond the ordinary needs of trade. With a steady reserve of gold in our treasury, a fair, which means a large, quantity of silver can

always be floated, but to give silver the preponderance by admitting it to free and unlimited coinage at a ratio not warranted by its intrinsic value, is to place gold at its mercy, if the experience of other nations, and all former experience of our own, is worth anything.

We are a young nation, independent of others politically, but unfortunately not yet so far on as to be independent of the world in a commercial sense. We are a debtor nation, and have a national credit at stake. If the nations that have dealt with us, and with whom we expect to deal on an honorable basis, were co-movers with us in a readjustment of metallic ratios and in the establishment of free and unlimited coinage of gold and silver, the question would rush quickly toward final and satisfactory settlement. It was with this view that the recent international monetary conference was instituted. It did not achieve its aim at a single session, but it set all the attending nations to serious thinking, and in its moral effects the conference won a greater success than was expected. It remains to be considered by friends and foes of free silver coinage whether the international method of settling the metallic currency question finally is not the quickest and surest, and therefore the one to be pursued to the end by a nation possessing our instincts of honor, and so intimately related to all the commercial nations of the globe.

SILVER ARITHMETIC.

Question—On June 22, 1896, silver bullion sold in New York for 69 cents per ounce of 480 grains; what was the price of a grain of such silver?

Solution—Divide 69 cents by 480 grains, and the result will be .01437+cents, as the price of a grain of such silver.

Question—In a silver dollar there are $371\frac{1}{4}$ grains of silver; what is the cost of the silver dollar if each of said $371\frac{1}{4}$ grains is worth .01437 cents?

Solution—Multiply $371\frac{1}{4}$ grains by .01437 cents, and the result will be $53\frac{1}{3}$ cents as the cost of the silver in a silver dollar.

Question—If a man gets one dollar, or 100 cents, for the silver which cost him only $53\frac{1}{3}$ cents; how much would he get for that ounce of silver bullion which sold on June 22, 1896, for 69 cents?

Solution—As $53\frac{1}{3}$ cents is to 100 cents, so 69 cents to the answer, which is \$1.294 per ounce for his silver bullion.

Question—When we speak of *bullion* value of silver or gold, what do we mean?

Answer—We mean the value of the pure metal, as found in the commercial bar, ingot or bullion.

Question—What is meant by *standard* value of silver or gold?

Answer—Standard value is that of the coined metal. That is, it is the bullion or pure metal value decreased by the amount of alloy—say about one-tenth—introduced for purposes of coinage.

Question—What does the ratio of 16 to 1 mean?

Answer—It means that if $371\frac{1}{4}$ grains of silver, as above, enter into a silver dollar, it shall correspond to the 23.22 grains of gold in a gold dollar; or, that since 23.22 grains of gold make a gold dollar, therefore $371\frac{1}{4}$ grains of silver shall make a silver dollar. These two components, in grains, stand to each other as 16 to 1, nearly.

HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS.

THE COLONIAL PERIOD.

THE English colonial system in America began, in 1616, with the Virginia charter.

It extended until the colonies numbered thirteen, embracing the Atlantic front from Georgia to Maine, and extending inland indefinitely.

Whatever the ambition or object of the colonists, they did not cut the apron string of allegiance to Great Britain, but agreed to obey the decrees of her kings, the edicts of her parliaments and the behests of her institutions.

This may seem strange, since every colony was a protest against home hardship and an escape from tyrannical interference with individual rights.

But questions of title to land, incipient government, protection against foes, and various others, proved paramount and decided the terms of colonization.

As to the mother country, those terms implied political allegiance and commercial contribution.

Legitimate trade dates from the reign of Elizabeth. Holland, England and France vied with each other in that paternalism which went out to the industries and to commerce in the shape of protective legislation.

From the reign of Elizabeth to 1846, there are four hundred Acts of Parliament—tonnage laws, poundage laws, protective tariff and commercial regulations—relating to manufactures and trade.

Some of these prohibited imports. Some prohibited ex-

ports, lest inferior nations should acquire the skill of the mother country. There is no historic record of a protective system so extreme in its conditions and so arbitrarily applied as that of Great Britain, if we exclude the despotic system of China.

Says McCullough in his *Commercial Dictionary*:—"It was a leading principle in the colonial policy, adopted as well by England as by other European nations, to discourage all attempts to manufacture such articles in the colonies as could be provided for them in the mother country."

Says Bancroft in his "History of the United States":—"England in its relation with other states sought a convenient tariff. In the colonies it prohibited industry."

In 1699 the British Parliament enacted that no wool, yarn, cloth, or woollen manufactures of the English Plantations in America should be shipped from any of said Plantations, or otherwise laden, in order to be transported thence to any place whatsoever, under a penalty of forfeiting both ship and cargo, and a fine of \$2500 for each offence.

In 1732 Parliament prohibited the exportation of hats from province to province (colony to colony) in America, and limited the number of apprentices to be taken by hatters.

In 1750 the Parliament prohibited as a common nuisance the erection of any mill in America for slitting or rolling iron, or any plating forge to work with a tilt-hammer, or furnace for making steel. The penalty for such crime was \$1000.

A little later an Act was passed prohibiting the making of nails in the province of Pennsylvania.

About the same time Lord Chatham announced it as his opinion of colonial dependence that the American colonies ought not to be permitted to make even a hob-nail or horse-

shoe for themselves, and these views were incorporated into the Act of 1765 which absolutely prohibited the migration of artisans to the American colonies.

In 1781 the Parliament enacted that no woollen machinery should be exported to the American colonies.

In 1782 Parliament enacted that no cotton machinery should be exported to the colonies, and that no artificers in cotton should migrate thither. In the same year the duty on bar-iron was fixed at \$12 per ton. This rate lasted till 1795.

In 1785 Parliament prohibited the exportation of iron and steel making machinery to the colonies, and the migration of workmen, skilled in those branches of trade, thither.

In 1797 Parliament levied a duty, then deemed prohibitive, of \$14 per ton on all foreign bar-iron imported into Great Britain. In 1798 this was increased to \$15 per ton; in 1806 to \$23 per ton; in 1810 to \$24 per ton; in 1818 to \$28 per ton; in 1825 to \$33 per ton, if imported in British ships, and to \$38, and over, per ton, if imported in foreign ships. During the same period, other manufactures of iron paid \$90 per ton, and iron not otherwise enumerated \$250 for every \$500 worth imported. All of these rates were designed to be absolutely prohibitive, in accordance with the existing policy of the realm, which policy was that of France and Holland, both countries with colonial possessions, and both striving for commercial and manufacturing independence.

In 1799 the English Parliament prohibited the migration of colliers, lest other countries should acquire the art of mining coal.

Says Adam Smith, the father of English political economy, "Even up to 1776 England prohibited the exportation from one province (American) to another by water, and even the

carriage by land, upon horseback or in cart, of hats, of wools and woollen goods, of the produce of America, a regulation which effectually prevents the establishment of any manufacture of such commodities for distant sale, and confines the industry of her colonists in this way to such coarse and household manufactures as a private family commonly makes for its own use, or for that of some of its neighbors in the same province."

The enactments cited are fair samples of those which went to compose the English Colonial policy. They help to an understanding of the leading object, which was to limit Colonial America to a farming community. America was to play the part of India and Australia, as a cereal feeder of a little island whose commercial and manufacturing genius was far in excess of its ability to supply the necessaries of life for its working population.

Of course the suspicion could not escape so inquiring a country, that America might prove as rich in raw materials, suited to English manufacture, as in farm products. Therefore the English policy, when fully developed, made America a provider of food and of raw materials for England. England, the main market, would receive nothing manufactured in the colonies. England, the supreme country, would permit nothing to be manufactured in the colonies. England, the dominant commercial country, would permit no trade with the colonies, except in British bottoms, and of an agricultural surplus, or a raw material, in exchange for her own manufactured products.

This was severe on the colonial agriculturist, who, not having a voice in the carrying trade, nor a say in what should come to him, could not thus early raise an agricultural surplus sufficient to pay for what he was compelled to receive as an import. He could not manufacture, except as

to the coarse things necessary for family use, and he could not have interchanged manufactures between the provinces by using the natural waterways nor by means of carts.

The colonist paid nothing on his imports. They were free. The prohibition was on his exports, and especially if in manufactured shape. The prohibition was on his domestic change of manufactured articles. All inducement to manufacture was taken away. A home market for agricultural products, or for raw materials, was not to be encouraged or tolerated. The plan was ingenious and most successful, so far as English manufacturers and capitalists were concerned. In 1771 colonial imports exceeded the exports by \$13,000,000, and as trade was more nearly barter than now, it may be said that the colonies incurred a debt to England of \$13,000,000 in 1771, which they had no visible means of paying.

It must not be supposed that the British policy was effecting all its objects. Nature and opportunity in America were entering their quiet protests. After the invention of the puddling furnace and rolling-mill by Henry Cort, we find the English statutes most rigid against the exportation of tools, utensils and artisans to foreign parts, as in 1785 and 1799. Yet the first rolling-mill in America was built and started for Col. Isaac Meason, at Plumsock, Fayette county, Pa., by two Welshmen, Thomas and George Lewis, who came under the prohibited head of "British skilled iron-workers," and as such were compelled to smuggle their way across the Atlantic and into the colony of Penn.

So, nature having provided excellent ship timber and the colonists having a genius for ship-building and sailing, they quietly established a remunerative trade with the West Indies and with many nations more or less remote. This was intolerable to the mother country. The Navigation

Act was passed as a remedy. It provided that "No goods or commodities whatever, the growth, production or manufacture of Europe, Africa or America, shall be imported into England or Ireland, or into any of the Plantations (American colonies), except in ships belonging to English subjects, of which the master and the greater number of the crew shall also be English."

This and subsequent navigation acts destroyed our West India trade. Prices of goods imported and exported, and their quantities, fell entirely under English jurisdiction. All she sent to us was free of duty. All sent to her was upon her own conditions. Nothing could be sent, except in her bottoms, and to the destination and upon the terms she imposed. As Burke said in Parliament, "By it (the Navigation Act) the commerce of the colonies was not only tied, but strangled."

Our Revolutionary history, familiar to every schoolboy, acquaints us with the English method of extracting revenue directly from her colonies by means of such inventions as the Stamp Act, the Tea Tax, etc. They were but parts of an ingenious and stupendous system of home protection which eventuated in established manufactures and commerce, and in a final declaration of independence of the rest of the world in these respects.

Just here, the thought is foreign to neither the theme nor time, it may well be wondered why so astute a nation as Great Britain, after two hundred years of an attempt to make a simple wheat granary of America, and after the energies which followed American independence fully established the fact that such a granary was within reach, did not rather choose to take advantage of it, than fly to others in India and in the Islands of the sea, far more remote and far less obedient to the comities of trade. Did she

scent the possibilities of American development and the rise of a home market, which would absorb the annual agricultural product, or at least create a demand from which her capital would shrink?

A FIRST EXPERIMENT.

After the treaty of 1783 which closed the Revolutionary war and established American Independence, up until 1789, the date of the first American Tariff Act, the ports of this country were open to the goods of all nations. Most of this time (to 1787) was the era of the Confederacy. This period was one during which the States were held together by very weak ties, by "a rope of sand" as one historian has it. They had conceded little in their "Articles of Confederation," and had withheld entirely from the central government the right to regulate their commerce. Each State strove to secure trade for itself, and each imposed restrictions on foreign commerce as it saw fit, or left them unimposed. The consequence was that there was no concert of action. The condition which arose was worse than a free-trade condition, for one State was sure to nullify the commercial enactments of another, through jealousy or some other motive.

When Pennsylvania imposed a slight tariff on certain classes of imports, New Jersey opened a free port at Burlington and flooded the city of Penn with smuggled goods. When New Jersey voted to impose a general tariff New York refused, and in revenge the free port of Paulus Hook began to supply New York with non-dutiable imports.

Thus the States were a prey to one another. The statesmen of the day saw how suicidal the policy, or rather, the lack of policy, was, and there was no one source of weakness that seemed so fatal, nor the lack of any vital principle

that impelled so powerfully toward a more perfect constitution than this commercial discord. Not even the flat refusal of New Jersey to comply with an Act of the Congress, nor the open offence of Massachusetts in raising troops to crush Shay's rebellion, affected the public mind so forcibly and paved the way so directly toward a stronger central union, as the quarrel between Virginia and Maryland as to commercial rights on the Chesapeake and Potomac. This last brought the Annapolis convention in 1786. Hamilton, Madison and Dickinson were there, and they saw no way of preventing the subordination of the States to foreign influence and their extinction as sovereign bodies, except by creating a stronger central government and endowing it with powers sufficient for the settlement of all such discords.

It seemed to require some such mighty exigency to move the States to their second independence. There was nothing so supreme as the thought that colonial independence meant escape from a discriminative and ruinous commercial policy on the part of Great Britain. Search the colonial debates through, and there is not one of moment that does not inveigh against the efforts of England to enrich herself at the expense of other nations, and to complete her commercial and industrial supremacy by overriding their protective systems and sapping their powers for competitive and independent existence. The Declaration of Independence submits it to "a candid world" that Great Britain meant to establish "an absolute tyranny over these States" by "cutting off our trade with all parts of the world," and that among the foremost rights of a free people is the right to "establish commerce."

Says a learned historian: "The most fatal defect of the Articles of Confederation was absence of power to collect revenue, regulate trade, encourage industry. The thoughts

of all our early statesmen were turned to this defect, which to them was the more glaring, because of intimate acquaintance with the British system. So paramount was the necessity for escape from industrial and commercial dependence, and so momentous was deemed the power to protect ourselves that Washington confidently looked to the trade regulations of a more efficient government as a means of giving the country its proper weight in the scale of empires and, with a feeling foreign to his better nature, he declared that such government "will surely impose retaliating restrictions, to a certain degree, upon the trade of England."

The proceedings of the Continental Congress abound in debates, resolutions and committees, having for their object the promotion of home products and the development of home resources. There seemed to be no question among the leaders of thought, so far as the debates show, of the right and duty of the government to foster industry by legislative enactment, nor of the necessity for a new government endowed with ample power to provide revenue through a tariff and at the same time protect its vital interests.

But while this was all so in the minds of statesmen, the inchoate States were afloat on the sea of discord. They had industry, commerce, tariffs, in their own hands. There was no uniform import law, and consequently none at all. One State nullified the laws of another. They were, as Hamilton said, "jarring, jealous and perverse, fluctuating and unhappy at home, and weak by their dissensions in the eyes of other nations."

A prey to one another, they were the natural victims of more knowing, designing, older, richer and advanced nations, and especially that one which sought to revenge defeat of arms by political segregation and commercial conquest.

With intelligence and the instinct of self-preservation arrayed against free traffic with foreign nations, there existed the hard compulsion of circumstances to render the States helpless. Depleted by a long war, with few factories, mills and workshops, with limited means of recuperation, with thirteen hostile systems of commercial independence, they were at the entire mercy of the foreign merchant and manufacturer. There was absolutely no law against importations. The era was one of free-trade, uninterrupted by effective statute, unimpaired by anything except ineffective sentiment.

The consequences must be faced. Says Carey:—"At the close of the Revolution the trade of America was free and unrestrained in the fullest sense of the term, according to the theory of Adam Smith, Say, Ricardo, the 'Edinburgh Reviewers' and the authors of the 'Encyclopædia.' Her ports were open, with scarcely any duties, to the vessels and merchandise of other nations." What befell? As the States were discordant, foreign powers passed laws as they pleased to destroy our commerce. Nearly every foreign nation shipped goods into the country and dumped them promiscuously on our wharves. The consequences followed which never fail to follow such a state of things. Competition on the part of our manufacturers was at an end. They were bankrupted and beggared. The merchants whose importations had ruined them were involved in calamity. Farmers, who had longed to buy foreign merchandise cheap, went down in the vortex of general destruction.

Said a statesman of the day, "The people of America went to war to improve their condition and throw off the burdens which the colonial system laid on their industry. And when their independence was attained they found it was a piece of parchment. The arm which had struck for it in the field was palsied in the workshop. The industry



HON. ROGER Q. MILLS.

Born in Salem, Kentucky, in 1832; when seventeen years of age he emigrated to Texas; he became a lawyer, and when twenty-seven years of age was elected to the Texas Legislature; at the breaking out of the civil war he joined the Southern army as Colonel of a regiment of infantry; he was wounded a number of times, though not seriously, and, returning to his home at Corsicana, resumed the practice of his profession; in 1873 he was elected to Congress on the Democratic ticket, and has been returned at every subsequent election. His majority at the last election was over 16,000; Mr. Mills was always a tariff reformer, and he was entrusted by Speaker Carlisle in the Fiftieth Congress with the task of framing a tariff bill, which was the issue of the campaign of 1888, in which the Democrats were defeated; Mr. Mills was a candidate for Speaker for the present House, but Mr. Crisp secured the prize, elected to U. S. Senate, March 22, 1892, and re-elected for the full term in 1893.



WM. L. WILSON,

*Chairman of House Committee of Ways and Means and Author of
the Wilson Tariff Bill.*

Born in Jefferson co, Va., May 3, 1843; graduated from University of Virginia in 1860; served in the Confederate army; for several years Professor in Columbian College; resigned and entered practice of law at Charlestown, W. Va.; elected President of West Virginia University in 1882; elected to 49th, 50th, 51st, 52d and 53d Congresses; in latter Congress served as Chairman of Committee on Ways and Means; father of the Wilson Tariff Bill; nominated by President Cleveland as Postmaster-General, February 28, 1895, and took oath of office, April 4, 1895.

which had been burdened in the colonies was crushed in the free States. At the close of the revolution the mechanics and manufacturers of the country found themselves, in the bitterness of their hearts, independent—and *ruined*."

Says Bancroft, of the year 1785, "It is certain that the English have the trade of these States almost wholly in their hands, whereby their influence must increase; and a constantly increasing scarcity of money begins to be felt, since no ship sails to England without large sums of money aboard, especially the English packet boats, which monthly take with them between forty and fifty thousand pounds sterling. The scarcity of money makes the produce of the country cheap, to the disappointment of farmers and the discouragement of husbandry. Thus the two classes, the farmer and the merchant, that divide nearly all America, are discontented and distressed."

Said Webster of this period, in a speech delivered in 1833, "From the close of the war of the Revolution there came a period of depression and distress on the Atlantic Coast, such as the people had hardly felt during the crisis of the war itself. Ship-owners, ship-builders, mechanics, artisans, all were destitute of employment and some of them destitute of bread. British ships came freely, and British ships came plentifully; while to American ships and American products there was neither protection on the one side nor the equivalent of reciprocal free-trade on the other. The cheaper labor of England supplied the inhabitants of the Atlantic shores with everything. Ready-made clothes, among the rest, from the crown of the head to the soles of the feet, were for sale in every city. All these things came free from any general system of imposts. Some of the States attempted to establish their own partial systems, but they failed."

There is no history of America covering this time but what repeats the above views, over and over again, and if anything, in still more lugubrious terms.

The situation simply affirmed what Lord Goderich said in Parliament:—"Other nations know that what we English mean by free-trade is nothing more nor less than, by means of the great advantages we enjoy, to get the monopoly of all the markets of other nations for our manufactures, and to prevent them, one and all, from ever becoming manufacturing nations."

With equal sincerity and emphasis David Syme, another member of Parliament, declared:—"In any quarter of the globe where competition shows itself as likely to interfere with English monopoly, immediately the capital of her manufacturers is massed in that particular quarter, and goods are exported there in large quantities, and sold at such prices that outside competition is immediately counted out. English manufacturers have been known to export goods to a distant market and sell them under cost for years with a view of getting the market into their own hands again, and keep that foreign market, and step in for the whole when prices revive."

END OF THE FREE-TRADE ERA.

It became manifest to even the dullest mind that America was about to lose her political independence in the mire of industrial and commercial subserviency. Says Mason:—

"Depreciation seized upon every species of property. Legal pressure to enforce payment of debts caused alarming sacrifices of both personal and real-estate; spread distress far and wide among the masses of the people; aroused in the hearts of the sufferers the bitterest feelings against lawyers, the courts and the whole creditor class; led to a popular

clamor for stay-laws and various other radical measures of supposed relief, and finally filled the whole land with excitement, apprehension and sense of weakness and a tendency to despair of the Republic. Inability to pay even necessary taxes became general, and often these could be collected only by levy and sale of the homestead."

Figures began to pile up and to tell their awful tale. In 1784-85, imports from Great Britain alone swelled to \$30,000,000, while our exports reached barely \$9,000,000. In Hildreth's history we read: "The large importation of foreign goods, subject to little or no duty, and sold at peace prices, was proving ruinous to all those domestic manufactures and mechanical employments which the non-consumption agreements and the war had created and fostered. Immediately after the peace, the country had been flooded with imported goods, and debts had been unwarily contracted, for which there was no means to pay."

In Maine a Convention was held for the purpose of revolting from Massachusetts on account of the prevailing distress. In New Hampshire the people surrounded the Legislative hall and declared the body should not adjourn till it passed a measure to absolve the people from debt. Shay's rebellion in Massachusetts was but a protest against suffering on the part of the people. In speaking of its causes Hildreth says:—"The want of a certain and remunerative market for the produce of the farmer, and the depression of domestic manufactures by competition from abroad."

In Connecticut alone five hundred farms were offered for sale to pay taxes. The condition was the same in Pennsylvania and the Carolinas. Real estate found no market. Debtors were compelled to close out at one-fourth the value of their lands. Men distrusted one another. The best securities were offered at half their face value.

At length the newspapers of the period, without regard to party, began to clamor for change. Pamphleteers arose without number, and joined in the cry of necessity for a change. Merchants, business men, farmers, artisans, laborers echoed the universal sentiment:—"We have had enough of free-trade. It has but one meaning for America, and that is utter neglect of ourselves and the forced sale of our energies, opportunities and resources to the older and better equipped nations. We have won political independence at a cost of seven years of war, we have yet to win the still longer battle for industrial and commercial independence, or else the victory of foreign nations over us will be greater than our recent victory over them."

Every one saw what was patent to John Stuart Mill, and what he incorporated into his "Principles of Political Economy," that: "What prevented the rapid recuperation of the United States, after the peace of 1783, was the system of free foreign trade, allowed to add its devastations upon industry to those of the Revolution."

Educated by a dreadful experience, it became the conviction of all parties that the power of industrial and commercial protection, so conspicuously and fatally absent in the Articles of Confederation, must repose somewhere. No other thought impelled more powerfully toward a Union of States under a Federal Constitution. "Four causes," says Bancroft, "above others, exercised a steady and commanding influence. The New Republic, as one nation, *must have power to regulate its foreign commerce ; to colonize its large domain ; to provide an adequate revenue ; to establish justice in domestic trade by prohibiting the separate States from impairing the obligation of contracts.*"

From this time on till the Constitution became a fact, September 17, 1787, or rather, until the Government became

a fact, April 30, 1789, a unanimous political and business sentiment persistently and eloquently urged a stronger government, imbued with the paternal instinct, able and willing to defend and encourage home industries and interests. State responded to State in this behalf; statesmen echoed the complaints and arguments of statesmen. Every political school joined in the pleas for industrial and commercial independence. One of the most assuring phases of the situation was the entire unanimity of artificers, mechanics and working men, who gathered in large assemblies, and by means of public speeches, whose logic was even more forcible than those of learned statesmen, and by printed resolutions of great vigor and aptness, demanded exemption from the degrading and ruinous competition forced upon them by the free and inordinate influx of foreign goods, upon whose manufacture they depended for a living.

Under these auspices the New Constitution took shape, and Clause 1 of Section VIII. provided that "Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, and to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States."

In order to achieve what was equally important in an industrial and commercial sense, viz., perfect interchange of goods and products between the States themselves, or in other words "free-trade" between all the inhabitants of the Union, it was ordained that Congress should never have the power to levy "a tax or duty on articles exported from any State."

Thus endowed, the New Government started on its career. The writers of the *Federalist*, Hamilton, Madison and others, saw in the above clauses sufficient power to remedy the evils complained of, and they eloquently assured their coun-

trymen that the protection they demanded for their infant industries could now be given beyond doubt.

Says Bishop : " That the productive classes regarded the Constitution of 1787 as conferring the power and right of protection to the infant manufactures of the country is manifest from the jubilant feeling excited in various quarters upon the public ratification of that instrument."

THE FIRST TARIFF ACT.

The first petition presented to the First Congress, in March, 1789, came from 700 mechanics and tradesmen of Baltimore. It lamented the decline of manufactures since the Revolution, and prayed that the efficient Government with which they were, for the first time, blessed, would render the country "*independent in fact as well as in name*" by early attention to the encouragement and protection of American manufactures and by imposing on "*all foreign articles which could not be made in America such duties as would give a decided preference to their labors.*"

Leagues of artisans and tradesmen, merchants and manufacturers were formed in all the leading cities and industrial centres for the purpose of urging on Congress an early interpretation of the new powers conferred by the Constitution in the interest of industry and commerce. Charleston shipwrights followed the Baltimore artisans with a powerful petition to the First Congress. Similar petitions came in from Boston, New York and Philadelphia.

As already stated, the universal sentiment of the hour was that the Constitution gave Congress ample power to regulate commerce by a tariff for revenue, for protection or for prohibition, as the case might be. The words "for the regulation of commerce" had a well-understood meaning among American statesmen. They were the words used in

English enactments when like objects were in view and when like powers were conferred, and they had been interpreted so often both on the bench and in actual practice that rational dissent to their meaning was out of the question. Hamilton, Franklin, Madison, Jefferson, Monroe, accorded perfectly as to the nature of the power and the object of the clause. Gallatin said that on his entrance into public life he found but one sentiment respecting the clause among statesmen. There was then no such objection as afterwards arose, and still exists, and which is to the effect that a power to raise revenue by a tariff does not carry the power to protect home manufactures and industries.

Said Washington in his first annual message, "The safety and interest of a free people require that they promote such manufactures as tend to render them independent of others for essentials, particularly military supplies."

The question of a tariff was thus injected into the First Congress, and became the first theme for discussion. It was a Congress which embraced many farmers, merchants and manufacturers, an industrial rather than professional Congress, though, of course, containing many illustrious lawyers and statesmen. That first great question thrust upon it has survived all others, and is as momentous to-day as ever. The other class of questions which drew fiercer, but not more learned, discussion, such as nullification, the national bank, slavery, secession, reconstruction, has happily found a grave.

After the passage of a bill regulating the oath of office, the Congress took up the tariff bill, and it became the first general Act of the First Congress. Its preamble foreshadowed its purport: "Whereas, it is necessary for the support of the Government, for the discharge of the debt of the United States, and for the encouragement and pro-

tection of manufactures, that duties be laid on imported goods, therefore be it enacted," etc.

This preamble drew no dissent. Statesmen North and South gave it sanction. The bill itself drew the widest range of debate, and the learning brought into the discussion of its merits has never been surpassed in considering the same subject, though of course facts, statistics and experience have changed the lines of argument, and remodelled theories. This learning not only bore on all the economic phases of the question, as then understood, but it was exhaustive of the principle that the Constitution designed to secure to the infant manufactures and struggling industries of the country the protection they needed against the riper experience and cheaper labor of Europe.

The debates upon this bill were not as to the necessity for protection, nor as to the fact that the legislation proposed was or was not in principle the best for the purpose. They were rather upon the question of general method of procedure, and as to whether or not the States might be robbed of some of their reserved rights if too liberal a construction were thus early put upon the Constitution. The question of what rate of duty would raise the required revenue and what would insure the needed protection was also a novel one and the subject of animated discussion, as it broke entirely new ground, and was beyond the range of all precedents and experience. Among the leading debaters were James Madison, Richard Henry Lee, Charles Carroll, Rufus King, Oliver Ellsworth, Fisher Ames, Roger Sherman, James Trumbull, and others, and these all impressed their genius and wisdom on the First American Tariff Act.

The Act became a law by the signature of Washington, affixed July 4, 1789. The rates of duty provided by the Act were, in modern acceptation, ridiculously low, yet as

the legislation was entirely experimental, and as there were no precedents to steer by, there was general acquiescence in the provisions, not only as insuring revenue but as establishing protection. The class of articles subjected to duty is the best guide to the spirit of the Act. It imposed the highest duties on those manufactures and industries which were deemed most in need and most worthy of encouragement. They embraced the iron and steel of Pennsylvania; the glass of Maryland; the cotton, indigo and tobacco of the Southern States; the wool, leather, paper and fisheries of the Eastern States. There was hardly an article introduced into it whose freedom from foreign competition had not been petitioned for, and the desirability of whose home growth or manufacture had not been made clear to the majority in Congress.

A powerful spur to the passage of this Act had been the oft-repeated boast of Great Britain that while America had achieved political independence, it had been reconquered commercially, and was a more abject and useful appendage than before. It was therefore quite natural that the friends of the Act, and those who hoped most from its provisions, should regard it as in the nature of a second Declaration of Independence, and as far more valuable to the Government and the people for the spirit it evinced and the possibilities it contained, than for the rates of duty it established.

This Act was followed the next year, 1790, by Hamilton's lengthy and able report upon "Commerce and Manufactures." This report was designed to emphasize the principle of protective legislation. It embraced all the learning and experience of the older nations bearing upon the subject, and it served the purpose of reconciling an almost universal party sentiment to the operations of the Act of 1789, while it more than ever committed the budding nation

to the doctrine he advocated. It was in this report that he enunciated the principle which protectionists of to-day claim to be fully proved by experience, to wit, that internal competition is an effectual corrective of monopoly, and in the end tends to a lower scale of prices for protected manufactures than prevailed for foreign. His interpretation of the powers conferred on the Government by the clause of the Constitution relating to taxes, revenue and the common defence has been accepted by all political parties, and it now prevails without regard to party lines.

This Act of 1789 and this report of 1790 form the beginning of an historic and practical protective era in the United States. It was an era which lasted, under varying conditions, which we shall note, up until 1816.

The previous session of the First Congress had been an extra one. It was now, January 4, 1790, in First Regular Session at Philadelphia and had received Hamilton's celebrated report. Federals and Anti-Federals divided over the payment of the debts, especially those of the States, and the doctrine of open or close construction of the Constitution was fast shaping up political lines. However, there was very little division of sentiment on the propriety of increasing the rates of duty provided by the Act of July 4, 1789, and they were increased by the Act of August 10, 1790, which went into effect January 1, 1791.

During the Second Session of the First Congress, which opened October 24, 1791, at Philadelphia, there was much excitement owing to opposition to the Excise Laws of the previous session and the rebellion against them in Pennsylvania, known as the "Whiskey Rebellion." The animosities thus aroused served to widen the gap between the Federals and Anti-Federals, but not enough to defeat further tariff legislation. The Act of May 2, 1792, was passed without

much difficulty. It took effect July 1, 1792, and it increased the *ad valorem* rates of duty from $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 5 per cent. This was the third Tariff Act in three years, and the drift of legislation was in favor of higher and more protective duties.

During the First Session of the Third Congress which met December 2, 1793, party lines became still more distinct over matters of tariff legislation. The Anti-Federals had now taken the name of Republicans, and, though without a definite policy of their own, found means of coherence and growth in opposing Federal doctrines. Yet it was a comparatively easy matter to pass the Tariff Act of June 7, 1794, which took effect July 1, 1794. All parties were agreed as to the necessity of providing additional revenue, which the increased *ad valorem* rates in the Act were designed to secure. All parties were also agreed that a tariff was the quietest and easiest way of attaining such revenue, and the Anti-Federals, or Republicans, who had violently opposed the excise laws, were even more fully committed to a tariff as a revenue measure than the Federals. They, however, began to draw the line when the doctrine of protection was broached. Not all, of course, but a few whose strict construction notions dominated their economic views.

The next tariff legislation was the Act of May 13, 1800, which took effect July 1, 1800. This legislation was not difficult and was still in the line of protective duties. It raised the duties on sugar half a cent a pound and on silks $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

On March 26, 1804, an amended Tariff Act was passed which took effect July 1, 1804. It must be remembered that now the country had undergone a political revolution, that the Republicans were in power in Congress and that Jefferson was President. Yet the Tariff Act of 1804 was in the line of increased duties.

All the Acts thus far were amendatory of the original Act of 1789, and were helpful of the provisions and operations of that Act. As sufficient time had elapsed to form opinions of the workings of that Act, or in other words, to witness the effects of incorporating protective tariff legislation into our institutions, it will be profitable to turn to the sentiment of the times respecting it.

In his seventh annual message, Washington said :—" Our agriculture, commerce and manufactures prosper beyond example. Every part of the Union displays indications of rapid and various improvement, and with burdens so light as scarcely to be perceived."

John Adams in his last annual message said :—" I observe with much satisfaction that the product of the revenue during the present year is more considerable than at any former period."

Thomas Jefferson in his second annual message said :—" To protect the manufactures adapted to our circumstances is one of the land-marks by which we should guide ourselves."

The provisions of the Act of 1789 and its amendments had, in their practical workings, so far exceeded expectations, that in 1806 Jefferson found the revenues more than ample for the requirements of the Government. In speaking of the surplus he said in his sixth annual message :—" Shall we suppress the imposts and give that advantage to foreign over our domestic manufactures? On a few articles of more general and necessary use, the suppression, in due season, will doubtless be right, but the great mass of the articles on which imposts are laid are foreign luxuries, purchased only by the rich, who can afford themselves the use of them."

In 1809 he wrote to Humphrey thus :—" My own idea is

that we should encourage home manufactures to the extent of our own home consumption of everything of which we raise the raw materials."

Said Madison in his special message of May 23, 1809:—"It will be worthy of the just and provident care of Congress to make such further alterations in the laws as will more especially protect and foster the several branches of manufactures which have been recently instituted or extended by the laudable exertions of our citizens."

Says Harriman in writing of the Tariff of 1789:—"Agriculture became more extensive and prosperous; Commerce increased with wonderful rapidity; old industries were revived and many new ones established; our merchant navy revived and multiplied; all branches of domestic trade prospered; our revenues exceeded the wants of government; the people became contented and industrious; the whole country was on the high road to wealth and prosperity."

THE EMBARGO AND TARIFF OF 1812.

Now while many provisions in the Tariff Acts up to 1808 embraced the protective doctrine, such as duties on hemp, cordage, glass, nails, salt and various manufactures of iron, as has been noted the duties were low, according to present standards. Protection of the textiles and of unmanufactured iron had not been much thought of. But they were soon to draw attention and become the great subjects of the protective controversy.

The year 1808 marks a turning-point in the industrial history of our country. The Berlin and Milan decrees of Napoleon and the English Orders in Council led to the Embargo Act of December, 1807. The Non-Intercourse Act followed it in 1809. War was declared against Great

Britain in 1812. On July 1, 1812, the Tariff Act was passed, which became a law immediately.

The passage of this Act was strongly urged by Madison in his message to the Twelfth Congress:—"As a means to preserve and promote the manufactures which have sprung into existence and attained an unparalleled maturity throughout the United States during the period of the European wars." The younger leaders of the Republican party took up Madison's request and were prepared to go to any length to grant it. Calhoun and Lowndes joined their logic to Clay's eloquence in favor of the doctrine that protection to home industries should no longer occupy a place secondary to the revenue idea. South Carolina became the highest protection State in the Union, England having levied a duty on raw cotton. The entire Republican party swung away from its strict construction notions and became such liberal interpreters as that they quoted with the utmost favor the report of Hamilton upon which the earlier Tariff Acts were based. The Federals were dazed with the situation, and, failing to see anything good in their opponents, quite forgot their own traditions, and swung, under the lead of Webster, quite to the anti-protection side of the controversy.

Out of the confused situation came the "American Idea" and the Whig party, which was Clay's outlet from the strict construction columns. The Tariff Act of the session—a Republican, or, as some have it, a Democratic Act—marks the highest rates of duty reached from the foundation of the government up till 1842. It practically doubled the rates existing before. Sugar went from $2\frac{1}{2}$ cents per pound to 5 cents; coffee from 5 cents to 10 cents; tea from 18 cents to 36; pig iron from $17\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. to 30 per cent.; bar iron from $17\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. to 30; glass from $22\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. to 40; manufactures of cotton from $17\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. to

30; woolens from 17 per cent. to 30; silk from 15 per cent. to 25.

The Embargo Act of 1808, the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809, and the highly protective Tariff Act of 1812, constituted a series of restrictive measures which had the efficacy of prohibitive duties. They gave an enormous stimulus to all branches of industry whose products had before been imported. Establishments for the manufacture of cottons, woolens, iron, glass, pottery and other articles, sprang up as if by magic. The success of this extreme protection formed the basis of that powerful movement which subsequently became the heritage of the Whig party, and which had for its object the decided limitation of foreign competition both as to manufactures and commerce.

TARIFF ACT OF 1816.

The logic of the Tariff Act of 1816 is not understood by economists, nor can it be accounted for by any one except upon the theory that having passed through a war, the country would probably settle back into some such condition as existed prior to 1808. The controlling element in Congress was still the young element, the element responsible for the war and therefore responsible for its results. They had proven themselves avowed protectionists by the passage of the Tariff Act of 1812, and by the favor with which they regarded the new manufactures which had arisen. They were still willing to assist them, for they clung to fair duties in the Act of April 27, 1816, on those goods in which the most interest was felt, as in textile fabrics.

But here the fatality which overhung the Act came in. Cotton and woolen goods were to pay a duty of 25 per cent.—a protective duty—till 1819. After that they were to pay 20 per cent. On some other classes of goods the duties

were decreased directly, on others increased. As to the textiles, Calhoun urged strongly the argument in favor of protecting young industries, and at the same time limiting the protection, after a period when they ought to be on their feet.

As a whole the Act of 1816 was protective, but it looked to a period only three years off, when it would no longer be so. This was its misfortune. It prepared foreign nations for our market. Though our breadstuffs, provisions, cotton and every product of the soil were high in price; though wages and rents were high; the currency was very weak and unsettled. Home competition had reduced the price of our manufactured products. The manufacturers of Great Britain found their warehouses bursting with wares. They looked with awe on the American situation, which revealed to them the fact that our home industries had robbed them of a market. This must not be. Those industries are only tentative. By 1819, when the duties of 1816 reach their minimum, they can no longer survive. We will begin the crushing process now. Said Lord Brougham in the House of Commons, "It is well worth while to incur a loss upon our first exportation, in order, by the glut, to stifle in the cradle, those infant manufactures in the United States, which the war has forced into existence."

Great Britain began to unload her surplus manufactures upon our shores at far below cost. They were goods that were not new, nor fashionable, nor in demand at home. The protective features of the Act of 1816 were insufficient to stay the flood. More than twice the quantity were imported that could be consumed. Great depression in business set in. Bankruptcy became general. The near approach of 1819, when the minimum rates of duty should go into effect, but encouraged the inflow of foreign products. Says



HON. WILLIAM P. FRYE.

Born at Lewiston, Me., September 2, 1831; graduated at Bowdoin College, 1850; admitted to the bar; elected to State Legislature, 1861, 1862, 1867; Mayor of Lewiston, 1866-67; Attorney-General, 1867-68-69; member of Republican National Executive Committee, 1872-76-80; Presidential Elector, 1864; Delegate to Republican National Conventions, 1872-76-80; elected member of 42d, 43d, 44th, 45th, 46th and 47th Congresses; elected to succeed James G. Blaine in United States Senate in 1880; re-elected Senator in 1883-1888 and 1895; Chairman of Committee on Commerce, and a member of Committee on Foreign Relations, and other important Committees.



DAVID TURPIE.

Admitted to practice at Logansport, Ind., 1849; Judge of Common Pleas, 1854, and of Circuit Court, 1856, both of which he resigned; member of Ind. Legislature, 1853 and 1858; elected to U. S. Senate, 1863, for unexpired term of Jesse D. Bright; member of Ind. Gen. Assembly and Speaker of body, 1874-75; Commissioner for Revision of Indiana Laws; U. S. Dist. Atty., 1886-87; Delegate-at-Large to Dem. Convention, 1888; elected U. S. Senator, 1887 and 1893; member of Committees on Census, Foreign Relations, Land Claims, Privileges and Elections, Transportation, and U. S. University.

Thomas H. Benton, "No price for property; no sales except those of the sheriff and marshal; no purchasers at execution sales save the creditor or some money hoarder; no employment for industry; no sale for the products of the farm; no sound of the hammer save that of the auctioneer knocking down property. Distress was the universal cry of the people; relief, the universal demand, was thundered at the doors of Legislatures, State and Federal."

This condition of affairs appalled Congress and brought about the Tariff Act of 1818, which simply extended the already ineffective provisions of the Act of 1816 for a period of seven years and placed some few free articles on the dutiable list. It did not prove remedial to the extent expected and the panic of 1817-19 extended over a period of several years.

TARIFF ACT OF 1824.

The sad condition of affairs, before described, rendered relief necessary. The liberal side of the Republican party held the ascendant in the Eighteenth Congress, December 1, 1823, and elected Clay Speaker of the House. In his message, President Monroe not only announced the celebrated "Monroe Doctrine," but inclined to the popular faction of his party on matters of protection and internal revenue. He urgently recommended "additional protection to those articles which we are prepared to manufacture."

A bill was framed and debated for two months. Calhoun who had deserted Clay, Daniel Webster and John Randolph, led the free-trade forces. Andrew Jackson and James Buchanan were among the strongest advocates of the bill. It did not fix rates as high as the Act of 1812, but it recognized the doctrine of protection more distinctly than any former Act. The strict constructionists urged their old argument against the constitutionality of protection and, for

the first time in our history, supplemented it with the argument that a protective tariff was unfair to the South. As the lines shaped up they presented almost a solid array of Southern against a solid array of Northern States.

The bill passed by a close vote, May 22, 1824, and it fully engrafted the "American System" on our national politics. It fixed a duty on sugar of 3 cents per pound; coffee, 5 cents; tea, 25 cents; salt, 20 cents; pig-iron, 20 per cent.; bar-iron, \$30 per ton; glass, 30 per cent. and 3 cents a pound; manufactures of cotton, 25 per cent.; woollens, 30 per cent.; silk, 25 per cent.

The financial and industrial situation responded promptly to this Act. There was such a pronounced betterment of affairs that the friends of the Act were encouraged to try their hand at further legislation in the line of protection.

TARIFF OF 1828.

In the Twentieth Congress the Democrats (formerly Republicans) were in a majority. They were divided, however, over a Protective Tariff. Those of the Northern States united with the National Republicans (Whigs) and brought about the Tariff Act of May 19, 1828. It was largely a Jackson measure, who had carried New York, Pennsylvania and Illinois, on his protective tariff record.

This Act of 1828 had little peculiar about it, except that it increased the duty on woollens and few raw materials, including wool. Yet it proved to be one of the most momentous Tariff Acts in our history. (1) It emphasized the "American Idea" by introducing protection in every change of the Act of 1824. (2) It was the turning-point of the hitherto hostile New England sentiment, Webster having changed ground and entered on its advocacy. (3) The South entirely sectionalized its opposition to it, and justified

nullification of it as a blow at the planting interests, as a discrimination against unpaid labor, and as unconstitutional.

Of the operations of the two protective Acts of 1824 and 1828, Jackson said in his message of 1832 :—Our country presents on every side marks of prosperity and happiness, unequalled perhaps in any portion of the world." Webster said :—"The relief was profound and general, reaching all classes—farmers, manufacturers, ship-owners, mechanics, day laborers." Clay said :—"If the term of seven years were selected to measure the greatest prosperity of this people since the establishment of the Constitution, it would be exactly that period of seven years which immediately followed the passage of the Tariff Act of 1824."

TARIFF ACT OF 1832.

The Tariff Act of 1828 led to bitter party and sectional turmoil. The South was bitterly opposed to it. It had become a kind of fashion to prepare for a National Campaign by amending the Tariff Act. An Act passed May, 1830, which scaled considerably the rates of duty of the Act of 1828, proved unsatisfactory, because it did not eliminate the protective features of that Act. The nullifying sentiment of the South demanded the repudiation of the protective policy and the affirmation of the free-trade policy by the government. It was a powerful sentiment and must be appeased, else Jackson could not hope to succeed himself.

Hence the Tariff Act of 1832, which reduced the rates of duty considerably and placed coffee and tea on the free list. It failed of its purpose, because it contained no repudiation of the protective idea. Nullification set in all the same and South Carolina, November 19, 1832, declared the Tariff Acts of 1828 and 1832 "null and void,"

TARIFF ACT OF 1833.

The Twenty-second Congress—December 3, 1832—at its second session, had to meet the question of Nullification. It passed the "Force Bill," which enabled Jackson to collect the duties under the Act of 1832, and then it changed the tenor of the Act by the Compromise Act introduced by Henry Clay, passed March 2, 1833, and designed to show to the nullifiers that the protectionists were not necessarily their enemies. It had the weakness of all compromises, and was immediately heralded by the nullifiers as their vindication, as a surrender of the "American System" and as a justification of South Carolina. It did not enact anything affirmatively, but took the tariff of 1832 as a basis, and scaled its rates by biennial reductions, till at the end of ten years a uniform rate of not exceeding 20 per cent. should prevail. This was ingenious and gradual repeal of a protective Act and a practical abandonment of the protective principle. It was notice to the people and was accepted as such by all foreign countries, that the United States had repudiated its earlier policy of protection. Henceforth the tariff was fully afloat on the sea of politics.

A very few biennial reductions brought the rates of the tariff of 1832 to where they were no longer protective, and there came an inundation of foreign goods as in 1817-19. Financial depression followed. Prices fell; production diminished; workmen became idle; farm products found no market; public revenue fell off 25 per cent.; the government had to borrow at a ruinous discount in order to pay current expenses. The nation was in the midst of the calamitous panic of 1837—worse even than that of 1818-19. Aside from the moral strain of the disaster, the money loss was estimated at \$1,000,000,000.

TARIFF OF 1842.

The drift of popular sentiment was entirely away from Van Buren, 1837-1841. The Whigs took the lead and nominated William Henry Harrison, in December, 1839, without a platform. The Democrats renominated Van Buren in May, 1840, and placed him on an elaborate platform which contained the plank:—"Justice and sound policy forbids the government to foster one branch of industry to the detriment of another, or one section to the injury of another." It also contained a plank which read:—"The Constitution does not confer the right on the government to carry on a system of internal improvements."

Harrison was elected President and the Congress had a Whig majority of six in the Senate and twenty-five in the House. Harrison died in just one month after his inauguration, April 4, 1841, and Tyler became President. It was well known that he was not a protectionist. The Whigs enacted the Tariff Act of August 30, 1842, in obedience to a popular demand. The debates on it were acrimonious and, as to the opponents, involved the old arguments of 1828 and 1832, against the constitutionality of protection and the right to nullify an Act of Congress. It passed, however, and President Tyler vetoed it, giving as a reason that it violated the compromise of 1833, which, as to protection and revenue, was to run till 1842, and, as to non-discrimination against the planting interests, was practically without time. This Act contained pronounced protective features. Another Act was passed, without protective features, but with a clause providing for the distribution of any surplus that might arise to the States. This too was vetoed. A third Act was passed without the *surplus* clause. This became the Tariff Act of August 10, 1842.

It found, under the operation of the Scaling Act of 1833, a uniform duty of 20 per cent. This it changed, by raising cotton goods to 30 per cent.; woollens to 40 per cent.; silks to \$2.50 per pound; bar-iron to \$25 per ton; pig-iron to \$9 per ton; sugar to 2½ cents per pound. Tea and coffee remained free. Clay and Calhoun, who were together in the Compromise of 1833, were antagonists over this Act of 1842. This was the Twenty-seventh Congress.

The Act of 1842 was so shorn of its original features that it could scarcely be called protective, but such as it was it sufficed to lift the cloud of depression and introduce an era of prosperity which had not been witnessed since 1832. Business revived. Factories began to operate. Customs receipts rose and put the Government in possession of much needed revenue. Labor sprang into demand. Farm produce rose in price. A large demand arose for iron, wool, cotton, coal, and through competition in manufactures, and the introduction of labor-saving machinery, the prices of manufactured articles were cheaper than ever before. Roads, canals, ships, returned a profit. Corporations, States, and even the general Government, rose from bankruptcy to high credit. Said President Polk in his message of 1846, "Labor in all its branches is receiving ample reward. The progress of our country in resources and wealth and in the happy condition of our people, is without example in the history of nations."

THE TARIFF ACT OF 1846.

The National Whig Convention of 1844 introduced this plank into its platform:—"A tariff for revenue, discriminating with reference to protection of domestic labor." The Democrats reaffirmed their opposition to protection, as in the platform of 1840, though they went to the country on

the cry of "Polk, Dallas and the Tariff of 1842." The election of Polk and a Democratic House favored the passage, in the Twenty-ninth Congress, of a Tariff Act which should repeal or modify that of 1842, for it was known that the South was bent on such repeal. But northern Democrats refused to bow to the situation. Debate took a sectional turn. Northern Democrats pleaded the promises of the campaign, not to interfere with the Tariff of 1842. They were overruled. The Act of July 30, 1846, passed the House, which had a Democratic majority of 61 votes. In the Senate, which had a Democratic majority of five, it met with a tie, and the tie was broken by the casting vote of George M. Dallas, Vice-President, who voted in favor of the measure. The Act of 1846 reduced the rates of 1842, from 5 to 25 per cent., introduced the theory of general *ad valorem* duties, and affirmed the doctrine of revenue without incident protection. It was a disappointing Act to Northern Democrats and Whigs, and while it was far removed from the promises of the campaign, it nevertheless fitted in with the National platform.

While the reduced tariff of 1846, and the means by which such reduction was secured, led to that revulsion of public sentiment which culminated in the Whig successes of 1848, the country happily escaped for a time the disasters which had followed, quickly and inevitably, former tariff reductions.

The Mexican war (1846-48) created an extra demand for munitions and supplies estimated at over \$100,000,000.

The discovery of gold in California (1849) increased the demand for labor, agricultural products, mining materials and shipping; and sent for ten years \$55,000,000 a year in gold into the country.

The European countries were in revolution (1848-51).

Their agricultural and manufacturing industries were paralyzed. They could not export; on the contrary required food supplies.

The Crimean war followed, involving all Europe, and creating an extraordinary demand for American breadstuffs.

The Irish famine occurred and added to the demand for additional breadstuffs.

From 1846 to 1856 these adventitious aids to the industries and trade of the United States proved to be better than any protective agency that might have been sought through forms of tariff laws. But unfortunately they were foreign to sober enactment and any economic principle. They came and went without regard to our domestic situation, our comfort or discomfort, our weal or woe.

By 1854 the true economic condition began to assert itself. Foreign imports reappeared in our marts in amazing quantities and at demoralizing prices. The crises abroad being over, our exports declined. Manufactories suspended operations, being unable to compete with the supply from abroad.

In 1848 the national Democratic platform contained a plank denouncing a Tariff, except for revenue, and hailing "the noble impulse given to the cause of free-trade by the repeal of the tariff of 1842, and the creation of the more equal, honest and productive tariff of 1846." The Whigs did not adopt a platform.

The National Democratic platform of 1852 reaffirmed that of 1848, in great part; and that of the Whigs affirmed "a tariff for revenue with suitable encouragement to American industry."

The Democratic platform of 1856 contained the plank:—"That the time has come for the people of the United

States to declare themselves in favor of free seas and progressive free trade throughout the world."

The new Republican party did not introduce a tariff plank into its platform of 1856.

THE TARIFF ACT OF 1857.

In the Thirty-fourth Congress, December 3, 1855, the Democrats had a majority of 9 in the Senate, but their magnificent majority in the previous House was turned into a medley of straight Democrats, pro-slavery Whigs, Know-Nothings and Anti-Nebraska men. Owing to the Kansas-Nebraska troubles, the Congress was not a dispassionate body. While it showed a spirit of generosity in encouraging railroad enterprise and grants of public lands, it swung without apparent cause, and in the face of solemn admonitions, clear over to a free-trade policy, and under existing circumstances struck the country a cruel blow on the very last day of its Second Session, March 3, 1857. This is the date of the Tariff Act of that year. The only excuse offered for its passage was the redundancy of revenue. This was almost instantaneously met by a flood of importations, for the Act reduced duties along the entire line of imports of leading articles, almost to such rates as had prevailed before the war of 1812, and had prevailed at no time since, except at the end of the sliding scale in 1841, as provided in the Compromise Act of 1833.

As had ever been, the already tottering industries were struck with paralysis, and there occurred an exhaustive out-pour of specie to foreign parts. Within six months of the passage of the Act the country was in the midst of distressing panic. No branch of industry escaped the disaster. Ruin was deep and universal. Ere it ceased there were 5,123 commercial failures. The government was compelled

to borrow money for necessary expenses at a discount of eight to ten per cent. Up to 1861 the public debt increased \$46,000,000, and during the same time the expenditures exceeded the receipts by \$77,234,116. President Buchanan, in his annual message, said: "With unsurpassed plenty in all the productions and all the elements of natural wealth, our manufacturers have suspended; our public works are retarded; our private enterprises of different kinds are abandoned; thousands of useful laborers are thrown out of employment and reduced to want. We have possessed all the elements of material wealth in rich abundance, and yet, notwithstanding all these advantages, our country, in its monetary interests, is in a deplorable condition."

TARIFF ACT OF 1861.

The Democratic platform of 1860 affirmed that of 1856. The Republican platform favored a revenue for duties, with such adjustment of them as would "develop the industries of the whole country."

By the withdrawal of members from the Thirty-sixth Congress, to follow the seceding States, the Republicans came into a strong majority during the second session, met December 3, 1860. They improved their opportunity by the passage of the Tariff Act of March 2, 1861. The Act was natural to the party and the situation. It increased duties all along the line of imports, and reintroduced the protective principle which had prevailed with slight modification from 1789 to 1832, and from 1842 to 1846. It is needless here to inquire into the rates of duty established by this tariff. They differed radically from those imposed in the Act of 1857, and were so laid as to best effect the object of revenue, which was then, or soon would be, greatly

needed, and at the same time apply and confirm the doctrine of protection, as to labor, manufactures and a home market.

The war of the Rebellion helped to sanction this Act to the popular will and universal need. It was amended by the Act of December 24, 1861, so as to increase the revenues. It was still further amended by the Act of June 30, 1864, which increased rates of duty, and made them more protective. There was another amendment, March 2, 1867, which chiefly related to manufacture of woollens, an industry which had been greatly stimulated by the war, and which was threatened by foreign competition in time of peace.

The principle of both revenue and protection had now been strained to the uttermost by the exigency of war, and the period had arrived for a modification of duties. This modification came about under the amendatory Tariff Act of June 6, 1872, which reduced duties to a considerable extent, but without much discrimination, and added largely to the free list.

TARIFF ACT OF 1874.

Though this Act did not attempt general revision, and was still amendatory, it was nevertheless important in the respect that it was an attempt to correct the inconsiderate reductions of the Act of 1872. The panic of 1873 had followed the reductions of 1872, and though it was a world's panic, and hardly attributable to the legislation of any one nation, it served as a reminder that such catastrophes had invariably succeeded a too rapid reduction of duties and too wide a departure from the policy of protection. Therefore the Act of June 22, 1874, stiffened rates on dutiable articles of a kind which was liable to suffer from competition, broadened the protective idea as to new industries and home labor, and at the same time allowed a liberal free list, mostly of raw materials and unmanufactured articles. It was passed

during the first session of the Forty-third Congress, which had a large Republican majority.

TARIFF ACT OF 1883.

The Republican platform of 1880 contained a distinctive protective plank; the Democratic platform declared for "a tariff for revenue only." The Forty-seventh Congress had a Republican working majority in the House, but a tie in the Senate. Owing to the death of Garfield and the little work done by the previous Congress, it stood at the apex of an immense amount of legislation. At the first session, a bill was passed, May 15, 1882, creating a Tariff Commission. This Commission sat at various places during 1882, and its report became the basis of the Tariff Act of the succeeding session. It was a non-partisan Commission, and its existence was due to a sentiment pervading all parties that some highly deliberate step was necessary to correct the incongruities of existing Tariff Acts, and re-adapt rates of duty to our newer and more widely diversified industries.

The Commission worked laboriously, and with deference to the spirit of reform which had called it into existence, and, it may be said, with due regard to the sentiment of the hour against prohibitive, or even protective, rates as to established industries. Its conclusions pointed to measures which reduced duties along the entire line of imports, in general at least 25 per cent., in some cases more, in others less. Though the Congress did not adopt all of the conclusions of the Commission, its report, as already stated, formed the groundwork of the Act of 1883.

The Act was passed March 3, 1883, after protracted discussion. While it strove to equalize rates and abolish incongruities, it did not prove to be a success. Interests were so conflicting that it was impossible to avoid crudities and

hardships. The demands of manufacturers for lighter duties on, or for free, raw materials worked to the injury of the producing classes, and *vice versa*. The Act was in the nature of a compromise all round, but it showed that the entire country had come to regard this class of legislation as of the highest moment, and vital to its interests.

In the Forty-eighth Congress (1884), which, after the political "tidal wave" of 1882, contained a large Democratic majority in the House, a determined effort was made to pass the Morrison Tariff Bill, which provided for a horizontal reduction of duties to the extent of twenty per cent. The Democrats divided on the merits of the bill and it was disposed of by striking out its enacting clause.

TARIFF ACT OF 1890.

The Republican National platform of 1884 distinctly enunciated the doctrine of protection. The Democratic platform contained a pledge of "tariff revision." There was no further excitement over the tariff till President Cleveland delivered his message to Congress in December, 1887. It was devoted almost wholly to tariff systems and laws, excepted to existing duties on wool and necessities, and directly opposed the protective idea. It was an earnest paper and had all the weight of a deliberate and special announcement to the American people. The free-trade wing of the party hailed it as a recognition of their views. The "revenue reform" element, headed by Mr. Randall, regarded it as unwise, as containing the seeds of political disaster, and as crushing out the minority element in the party. The Republicans treated it as a challenge to contest to the bitter end the issue of Free-Trade *vs.* Protection, though they regarded it as unnecessarily bitter in expression, especially in such sentences as, "But our present tariff laws,

the vicious, inequitable and illogical source of unnecessary taxation, ought to be at once revised and amended." The English press was profuse in its praise, and as the *Spectator* said, "His terse and telling message has struck a blow at American protection such as could never have been struck by any free-trade league."

What became known as the "Mills' Tariff Bill," supposably framed to meet the President's views, was reported to the House of Representatives March 1, 1888. It made significant reductions in existing tariff rates, and at once became the absorbing measure of the first session of the Fiftieth Congress. It was evident that upon it, and the repeal of internal taxation, party lines would be closely drawn, except as to the Democratic contingent led by Mr. Randall. The bill proved to have been hastily and crudely drawn, and the debates upon it took a wide range and were exhaustive of the merits of free-trade and protection. It passed the House July 21, 1888, but was met by a counter bill in the Senate, which embodied the Republican doctrine of protection. The two parties were now hopelessly wide apart, the time of the session was exhausted, and both appealed to the country on the record made in the Congress.

The Republican national platform of 1888 pledged uncompromising favor for the American system of protection. The Democratic platform reaffirmed that of 1884, endorsed the views of President Cleveland in his last annual message, and also the efforts of the Democratic Congress to secure a reduction of excessive taxation.

The issue of the campaign of 1888 is well known. With Harrison was elected a Republican Congress. The issue had been so wholly that of Free-trade *vs.* Protection that the way of the Republican majority was plain. The Com-

mittee of Ways and Means, whose chairman was William McKinley, invited all the interests concerned in tariff revision to a hearing. A bill was finally framed, which became known as the "McKinley Bill." The effort was to embody in the bill the experience of all former tariff legislation, and what was best of all former Acts; to impose rates of a distinctively protective character, and in the interest of American labor, on manufactures which could exist here, but whose existence was threatened by foreign competition; to impose similar rates on goods, such as tin plates, which we did not, but could manufacture, and ought to; to largely reduce the duty on necessities, or exempt them altogether, as by making sugar free; to increase the free list by placing all raw materials on it whose importation did not compete with the home growth of the same; to introduce the policy of reciprocity by which we could gain something by enlarged trade in return for the loss of duties on sugars and such articles.

A great deal of thought was given to the bill, and it was fully debated in Congress. Perhaps no Tariff Act was ever passed, in whose preparation so many interests had been so fully consulted, and with whose provisions the varied interests were so fully satisfied. Certainly none ever passed that had to undergo more minute criticism, whose merits were more elaborately discussed, and respecting which so many prophecies, good and bad, were indulged. Its passage occupied the entire time of the first session of the Fifty-first Congress, and it was not until October 1, 1890, that it became a law. No other enactment of the Congress approached it in importance.


So prominent was this legislation, and such the character of prophecies respecting it, that hardly anything else was heard in the Congressional campaign of 1890. As the im-

aginations of its opponents had free play, and as nothing could be affirmed of its practical workings by its friends before it began to work, there was another political "tidal wave" like that of 1882, and the Democrats entered the Fifty-second Congress with an overwhelming majority.

They were under the same obligations to repeal the obnoxious McKinley Act, and enact a measure which embraced their views, as the Republicans were in the Fifty-first Congress. They were in far better condition to do this, as to the House, for their majority was overwhelming. They, however, did not attempt repeal or general revision, but introduced a series of Acts relating to special articles, such as the lowering of duties on manufactures of wool and on tin-plates, and the placing of wool, binding twine, etc., on the free list. The discussion of these provisions was animated, and in general they passed the House. They served to keep the sentiment of the respective parties prominent, and to shape the issues for a retrial in the campaign of 1892, by which time the practical workings of the Act of 1890 would have tested many theories, and would compel orators to hew closely to lines of facts and figures in order to carry conviction.

The McKinley Act increased duties on about 115 articles, embracing farm products, manufactures not sufficiently protected, manufactures to be established, luxuries, such as wines. It decreased duties on about 190 articles, embracing manufactures established, or which could not suffer from foreign competition. It left the duties unchanged on 249 articles. It enlarged the free list till it embraces 55.75 per cent. of all imports, or 22.48 more than previous tariffs. The placing of sugar on the free list was a loss of revenue equal to \$54,000,000 a year.

Yet in its practical workings, the act never failed to



HON. WILLIAM C. WHITNEY.

Born in Conway, Mass., July 15, 1841; graduated at Yale, 1868; graduated at Harvard Law School, 1865; continued study of law in New York city and admitted to bar there; prominent member of Young Men's Democratic Club; conspicuous for activity against "Tweed Ring;" Inspector City Schools, 1872; candidate of Reformed Democracy for District Attorney and defeated; appointed Corporation Counsel for New York city, 1876-80; reputed to have saved the city large sums by resisting fraudulent claims; resigned office, 1882; appointed Secretary of Navy by President Cleveland, March 5, 1885; received degree of LL. D. from Yale, 1888; advocate of a new navy, and made this a conspicuous feature of his administration.



HON. DAVID B. HILL

Born in Chemung co., N. Y., August 29, 1843; graduated at Havanna Academy; admitted to Elmira bar, November, 1864, and appointed City Attorney; member of State Assembly, 1871-72; President of Democratic State Conventions, 1877, 1881; elected Mayor of Elmira, 1882; President of New York Bar Association, 1886-87; elected Lieutenant-Governor of New York, November, 1882; succeeded Grover Cleveland as Governor, January, 1885; elected Governor, November, 1885, on Democratic ticket; re-elected Governor, 1888; elected to United States Senate, as Democrat, 1891; a distinguished party organizer and leader; name much discussed in connection with the Presidency.

raise the revenue expected of it, which was ample for all the needs of the Government, with a fair margin to spare.

TARIFF OF 1894.

It was thought at the time that the failure of the Fifty-second Congress to pass a tariff act virtually repealing that of 1890 was due to the fine hand of Ex-President Cleveland. Whether this were true or not, there can be no doubt that the Democratic majority in the House of that Congress not only escaped the danger it feared through excess of untrained forces, but, consciously or unconsciously, paved the way for Mr. Cleveland's re-nomination. The lustre of his championship of tariff reform, the making of it a party issue, the high hope he indulged as to its future success, the shrewd calculation on his part that the battles must be many and stubborn before a system so strongly entrenched as protection could be made to yield, were all so many pointers toward his selection as leader of his party in the Presidential campaign of 1892. In the Convention which placed him in nomination, it was said of him that, "if he did not create tariff reform he made it a presidential issue. He vitalized it, and presented it to the Democratic party as the issue for which we ought to fight, and continue to battle upon it until victory is now assured. It consolidated into one solid phalanx the Democracy of the nation. In every State of this Union that policy has been placed in Democratic platforms, and our battles have been fought upon it, and this great body of representative Democrats has seen its good results."

In that Convention the Committee on Resolutions reported a tariff plank which supported the traditions of the party, but it was not deemed radical enough by a

majority of the Convention, to whom "tariff reform" had no meaning, who wished to express their disgust at the cowardice of the party in the Fifty-second Congress, or who believed that the time had passed for further disguise of the fact that the real issue was one between "Free Trade and Protection." This majority, therefore, agreed to make their departure then and there, cost what it might to the party. It was loudly hinted that in their rather desperate action they cared but little for Mr. Cleveland's success, but it is more than likely that their real aim was an issue without disguises. They were confident of the support of the solid South, where the Confederate Constitution had in years gone by enacted free trade. So they determined to throw the gauntlet squarely down, and by one herculean effort purge our institutions of the protective doctrine.

They took their radical step by moving the following plank as a substitute for that which had been proposed by the Committee on Resolutions:

"We denounce Republican protection as a fraud—as a robbery of a great majority of the American people for the benefit of a few. We declare it to be a fundamental principal of the Democratic party that the Government has no constitutional power to impose and collect a dollar for tax except for purposes of revenue only, and demand that the collection of such taxes be imposed by the Government when only honestly and economically administered. We denounce the McKinley law enacted by the Fifty-first Congress as the culminating atrocity of class legislation. We endorse the efforts of the Democrats of the present Congress to modify its most oppressive features in the direction of free raw materials and cheaper manufactured goods that enter into general con-

sumption, and we promise its repeal as one of the beneficent results that will follow the action of the people in entrusting power to the Democratic party. Since the McKinley tariff went into operation there have been ten reductions of the wages of laboring men to one increase. We deny that there has been any increase of prosperity to the country since that tariff went into operation, and we point to the dulness and distress, the wage reductions and strikes in the iron trade, as the best possible evidence that no such prosperity has resulted from the McKinley act."

This extraordinarily bold announcement of sentiments to which a great party was asked to subscribe, and upon which it was to stake the issues of a presidential campaign, was everywhere received with surprise and consternation. They indicated such a bold advance and such a revolutionary temper as must have inevitably led to party schism and final defeat, had it not been possible to indulge the saving thought that Mr. Cleveland could well afford to be a platform unto himself, and would undoubtedly repudiate whatever he found offensive in the above radical plank. Indeed he greatly modified the asperities of the plank in his letter of acceptance, and gave the country the assurance that no war of extermination was contemplated against American interests. Having taken the sting out of the savage sentences of the platform on which he stood, he hoped thereby to reconcile the results of the Convention to those who before saw in them the seeds of certain disaster.

Mr. Cleveland was elected President, and with him a majority of both Houses of the Fifty-third Congress, thus giving the Democrats full control of all the departments of Government for the first time in thirty-two

years. So pronounced a victory brought the party face to face with its platform doctrines and pledges, and not a few of the leaders clamored for a swift and deadly blow at the fabric of protection. But Mr. Cleveland was by no means as decided in his tariff reform views as he had been in his celebrated message of 1887. In his message to Congress he generalized on his favorite subject, and glossed his attacks on protection by referring to the evils of paternalism. His language was, "The verdict of our voters which condemned the injury of maintaining protection for protection's sake, enjoins upon the people's servants the duty of exposing and destroying the brood of kindred evils which are the unwholesome progeny of paternalism. This is the bane of republican institutions and the constant peril of our Government by the people. It degrades to the purposes of wily craft the plan of rule our fathers established and bequeathed to us as an object of veneration. It perverts the patriotic sentiments of our countrymen and tempts them to a pitiful calculation of sordid gain to be derived from their Government's maintenance. It undermines the self-reliance of our people and substitutes in its place dependence upon governmental favoritism. It stifles the spirit of true Americanism and stupefies every ennobling trait of citizenship."

This generalization betokened caution on the part of the President, and it was disappointing to those who sought an immediate application of the unequivocal doctrine of the platform of 1892. But he had witnessed the dangers that arose from a large, newly elected and incongruous majority of his party in the House of the Fifty-second Congress. Now the elements were still more incongruous, for the political upheaval that had assured his election, and the majority in the Congress, had come about by strange

alliances with the populistic and communistic elements of the country, and with the discontented of every political persuasion; and now too he was aware of the strong disposition of his party to regard victory as a vindication of the bold stand taken in the tariff plank of the platform rather than of his modification of the same. He must, therefore, see these new men and get acquainted with these new forces, during the calm after the storm, in order to take the bearings for his administration.

Almost synchronous with Mr. Cleveland's inauguration, waves of commercial doubt swept over the country. Amid conditions bordering on panic, industries withered, and idleness, want and distress became the portion of labor. The existence of the Sherman Silver Act was fixed on as a cause, though to all protectionists it was manifest that the real cause was the demoralizing uncertainty created by the threatened overthrow of the protective system. In obedience to the clamor for the repeal of the Sherman Act, Mr. Cleveland called the Fifty-third Congress in extra session, August 7, 1893. It met the object of the call by repeal of the purchasing clause of the act. Though this was its exclusive official work, the framework of what was to become known as the Wilson Tariff Bill was then and there erected. The election of Speaker of the House, the arrangement of committees, and such other steps as could be taken without interference with the special object of the session, all pointed to early action on the tariff bill. This was particularly true of the Committee on Ways and Means, with whom the bill was to originate. Hon. William L. Wilson, of West Virginia, was selected as chairman of the committee. This choice was pleasing to Mr. Cleveland, and was, perhaps, dictated by him. He had long admired Mr. Wilson for his industry

in the House and his grasp of economic questions. He was a scholarly man, and thoroughly imbued with the doctrines of the free trade school of statesmen, especially as found in books. As to fitness for the particular work in hand, the choice could not have fallen on better shoulders.

What time could be spared from the immediate work of the special session of Congress, was devoted by the Democratic majority of the Committee of Ways and Means to the preparation of the new tariff bill. This work was extended over the vacation period, the object being to have the bill as far advanced as possible, and ready for early presentation to the Congress at its first regular session, December 4th, 1893. This object was achieved and the bill came into the House soon after the session opened.

In the preparation of the bill the Democratic majority of the Committee permitted no interference with its purposes. Complaint was made that the various interests of the country were denied a hearing such as had been accorded when the McKinley bill of 1890 was under preparation, or, if granted a hearing, that their facts and arguments were ignored. But it was not deemed necessary to hear fully or favor at all, for the theory of the bill was to eliminate the protective principle as far as possible, and to establish a system of purely revenue duties, with as near an approach as circumstances would admit of, by an enlargement of the free list, to the principles of free trade.

When the bill appeared in the House, its opponents quickly pointed out that it was full of incongruities due to a desire to placate certain sections and favor certain industries. In this respect it was at odds with the platform

of the party which had denounced as unconstitutional all duties levied for protective purposes, and it, at the time, contained the admission that, after all, protection was necessary for the existence and encouragement of certain industries. A leading characteristic of the bill was the almost universal departure from the principles of specific duties and the adoption of *ad valorem* rates. In this respect it copied the old Walker Tariff Act which went out of existence with the adoption of the Morrill Tariff of 1861. Against this feature of the bill its opponents inveighed strongly in House and Senate, deeming the change a direct invitation to fraud upon the Government by undervaluation of goods by foreign exporters. The counter argument was that it was equitable and furnished a sliding scale of duties according to the rise and fall of prices.

In general terms the bill made sweeping reductions in duties as fixed in the McKinley Act, turned the lumber schedule practically into a free list, placed wool, coal, animals and iron ore on the free list, and brought all manufactures of wool below the protective rate. The further enlargement of the free list was effected by modifications in all the schedules, and especially in those which embraced products of the farm. It struck a direct and exterminating blow at the principle of reciprocity which had been incorporated into the McKinley Act, and brought about the speedy abrogation of the numerous treaties which had been negotiated under that Act, looking to an enlargement of reciprocal trade relations with other countries, and which had already brought about great increase in commerce.

Perhaps the most conspicuous, certainly the most novel and unexpected feature of the bill, was that levying a tax

of two per cent. on all incomes in excess of \$4,000. During the civil war a similar tax was levied, but it was deemed an emergency tax, was exacted for only a brief while, and after the return of peace, the unexpended proceeds of the tax were refunded to the States. Such a tax had ever met with the bitterest hostility of the Democrats, who refused to justify it even as a war measure. It had never found favorable mention in any Democratic platform. There was no open evidence anywhere that the party had undergone a change of heart respecting this kind of taxation. The only platform of any party, in 1892, that contained a favorable mention of such a tax was the Populist platform, adopted at Omaha, in which the demand was for "*a graduated income tax.*"

It was charged that this furnished the reason for the incorporation of the income tax clauses in the Wilson Tariff bill, and that the demand for its insertion by those who had proved such willing and profitable allies of the Democrats in 1892 could not be denied, and this especially since the demand proved pleasing to the South, where the blending of Populistic and Democratic doctrines was such as to obscure the political identity of both. In the after discussion of the bill, especially in the Senate, the Populist members laid bold claim to the fatherhood of this income tax feature, a claim which was not denied. It was therefore a concession to this new and helpful political element, though a wide departure from the recognized principles of Democracy, and a reflection on its record as spread abroad in convention, legislative hall and in the hustings. Its one justification by those who fathered it, was that the rich were not bearing their full share of taxation. To this argument, those who introduced it into the tariff added another, to the effect that it was a necessity be-

cause the tariff bill as then framed would fail to raise sufficient revenue to meet the wants of the Government. It is needless to say that this argument struck the minds of economists and statesmen as somewhat remarkable, since the underlying principle of the Wilson bill was to substitute a revenue tariff for a protective one; and since in the introduction and establishment of a principle so momentous and a doctrine so cardinal, the one central feature of the bill, the *revenue* feature, should be so faulty as to wring a confession in advance that it was a failure.

The heading of the Wilson Tariff bill was "*A bill to reduce taxation, provide revenue for the government and for other purposes.*" Mr. Wilson presented the bill in the House with a speech, in which he justified the departure indicated by the bill, by the doctrine that protection was opposed to the instincts of a free and prosperous people, that paternalism had proven harmful in widening the gap between labor and capital, and in favoring the classes at the expense of the masses. Passing over and explaining the various schedules, he asked for the measure that support which his party was bound to give if it expected to redeem its pledges to the people.

The parliamentary struggle over the bill now began. It was to be a prolonged contention. While Mr. Wilson in his introductory speech had sounded the keynote of argument, and had the administration at his back, and therefore presumably his party at his back, it became apparent at an early day that the bill contained inherent weaknesses which might force its material modification and greatly postpone its passage. It was not such a bill as out and out free traders had demanded and expected. It alarmed conservative Democrats who found their home interests threatened by it. It became an object of per-

sistent and merciless attack by Republicans, who condemned it more for its glaring inconsistencies than for its general aim. As was facetiously stated at the time, it was a bill which met the views of but few of its friends, yet to which all subscribed under the plea that party necessity compelled its support without regard to its intrinsic merits.

The question of its passage in the House, therefore, became one of holding the party together, of keeping up a daily quorum, and of forcing issues as they arose. The rules of the House had been made exceedingly strong for this purpose, and the rulings of the speaker strenuous. Yet with all this it made difficult and tardy headway. Interest flagged as the debates progressed, and it became possible for the opposition, by refusing to help the majority to keep up a quorum, to check all progress. This brought about a change of rules, and the adoption of that principle of counting a quorum which the Republicans had adopted in the Fifty-first Congress, and which the Democrats had then so bitterly opposed.

Thus fortified, and with the idea more dominant than ever that the bill was a party necessity, it moved more rapidly toward passage. Few opportunities for amendment were given, though amendments were offered in great numbers. The heavy, dangerous end of the bill was its income tax feature. This was terrifically attacked by the Republicans as giving to the bill a sectional and revengeful turn, and as being at odds with all ideas of justice and a discouragement to frugality. It was as powerfully attacked by an able Democratic contingent, whose hostility, however, was rendered innocuous by the fact that in the end they would vote for it.

After nearly two months of discussion in the House,

the bill was passed, February 1st, 1894, by a large and almost strictly party majority, augmented by the Populist strength. The vote stood 204 for, and 140 against it, seventeen of the latter being Democrats. The dominant forces had been well kept together during the struggle, and the passage of the bill was heralded as a signal victory for Mr. Cleveland's administration.

It was now ready for the Senate, and the great problem was how it would fare in a body of conservative tendencies and where the Democratic majority was meagre. Once in the Senate, it passed into the hands of the Finance Committee, and was immediately referred to a subcommittee composed of Senators Mills of Texas, Jones of Arkansas and Vest of Missouri. The bill had been bitterly denounced by the Republicans in the House as the boldest stride toward free trade taken since the celebrated Walker Tariff Act of 1846, as a sectional bill framed in the interests of the South and containing a cruel and unnecessary blow at the wealth and industry of the North, and as utterly ruinous to American prosperity. If this were so, it was surely now in the hands of its real friends, for the subcommittee which had it in charge, represented three contiguous southern States, neither of which had large commercial or manufacturing interests at stake. The committee evidently knew for what it had been chosen, for it went about its work in earnest, but in a way which soon led to loud public censure. It refused hearings to manufacturing interests where they were confidently expected and had been usually granted, on the plea that such hearings would lead to waste of time and indefinite postponement of conclusions. It attempted to remedy this defective method of procedure by sending out circulars inviting opinions as to the effect of changes

in rates of duty, but the complaint was still general, that answers, which could not be satisfactorily framed in this way, were treated with indifference or wholly ignored.

After a period of suspense, which was greatly intensified by the prostrated condition of the country, an outline of such bill as the Finance Committee had agreed to report was tentatively submitted to the Senate. It immediately drew the fierce fire of the Republicans, and after one or two tests of strength, it was seen that further attempt to push the measure would prove a failure. While it was not directly recalled, the Committee gave it out that it had a more complete and satisfactory measure in reserve. When this was forthcoming it proved to be a revelation and sensation. It was no longer the Wilson bill as it had passed the House, and hardly a semblance of it, for it had been disfigured and transformed by more than four hundred amendments.

Why and how these amendments came to be made—amendments sufficient in number to constitute a new bill—can never be historically explained; yet it may be truthfully said that so far as conservative Democrats were concerned, they urged the importance of such concessions as would insure the speedy passage of the bill and give the country relief. These concessions were not only for reasons existing within the party, but for the purpose of modifying the ferocity of the Republican attack. Interests that had at first been denied a hearing were considered, and many of them obtained concessions that were of great value, if not entirely satisfactory. Several articles, such as coal, etc., which had found a place in the free list, were turned back to the dutiable list, every such change being a departure from the spirit of the original bill, and tending to make it more confused and anomalous

as a revenue measure. The situation in the Senate repeated that of the House. Every friend of the bill was dissatisfied with it; yet willing to support it for the sake of party.

At this juncture the bill became a source of public scandal. The charge was made that it had been turned into a matter of bargain and sale by the Sugar Trust, whose members had secretly visited members of the Senate Finance Committee, and had secured a modification of the sugar schedule in the interest of the Trust, by means of which it would reap great profits. These profits were to be realized by placing a duty on sugar, but postponing its collection till January 1st, 1895, thus giving the Trust a chance to stock up without duty, but at the same time to advance the price of refined sugar to the extent of the duty. The charge was further made that the Secretary of the Treasury had personally written, or dictated, a change in the sugar schedule in accordance with the wishes of the Trust. Still another charge was made that the Trust demanded and obtained this valuable concession in pursuance of a preëxisting agreement with the leaders of the Democratic party that its (the Trust's) interests should be protected for the consideration of a gift of a sum of money, estimated at \$500,000, for campaign purposes in 1892. And again it was charged that information respecting the work of the Finance Committee had been sent out secretly to New York brokers, and that Senators had taken advantage of this leakage to speculate in sugar stocks.

The publication of these charges created quite a sensation, dragged the high character of the Senate in the mire, and cast a taint on tariff legislation. An investigation was ordered. The newspaper men who had made the

exposures refused to give the names of their informants and were turned over to the criminal courts to be tried for contumacy. The sugar magnates who were called to testify admitted the giving of money in unremembered amounts to State, but not the National, Campaigns, on the score of business, and for which they expected corresponding benefits. Other witnesses testified in a modified way, and some with very proper and natural excuses, to the truth of what had been charged, while even Senators when called did not in every instance place themselves beyond the suspicion that they had taken advantage of the situation to turn a penny in sugar stock speculation.

The revelations were a terrible blow to the national pride and to every sense of honor and honesty, but they did not serve to loosen the grip which the Trust had on the Senate. On the contrary, they served rather to explain what had before been a rumor, that the position of the Trust was so strong that the fate of the entire tariff bill depended on its getting the protection it wanted. They also served to explain the indifference of the Trust to the sugar schedule when the bill was in the House, at which time it was given out that the Trust depended on the Senate for the protection it desired. Moreover they intensified the opposition to the bill in general, for the taint, like mildew, spread to other parts of it, especially to the internal revenue clauses relating to the taxes on whiskey and beer.

That there should have been such favoritism shown to a gigantic Trust, at a time when the exalted principle of tariff reform was seeking for recognition in our industrial and commercial economy, was made all the more inexplicable by the clause in the Democratic platform of 1892, which read:—

"We recognize in the Trusts and Combinations which are designed to enable capital to secure more than its just share of the joint product of capital and labor a natural consequence of the prohibitive taxes which prevent the free competition which is the life of honest trade, but believe their worst evils can be abated by law, and we demand the rigid enforcement of the laws made to prevent and control them, together with such further legislation in restraint of these abuses as experience may show to be necessary."

The bill was debated in the Senate for months with blended ability and acrimony. It was subjected to gradual modifications, generally in the direction of increased duties and additional inconsistencies. The income tax portion precipitated the strongest debates, and, as had been the case in the House, the bitterest opponents of the tax were Democrats themselves. The opposition speeches of Senators Hill of New York and Smith of New Jersey, were remarkable for their vigor and ability. The ground taken by the former was not only economically important, but showed the great danger to the party likely to spring out of this kind of legislation. He deemed it unwise to incorporate an income tax into a reform bill, or to attach it to any measure of tariff revision. It was a war tax in time of peace. Democracy had never favored such a tax. It was a Populistic measure. It fulfilled no Democratic doctrine or promise. He ridiculed the idea that the United States should copy this form of taxation from England, whose form of government, natural surroundings and obligations were essentially different. But even in England it was rather tolerated than approved. Waxing warm, he repudiated the "Spurious Democracy of those modern apostles and prophets, who are part Mug-

wump, part Populist, and the least part Democratic, who seek to lead us astray after false gods, false theories and false methods."

The arguments against the tax may be summed up thus: (1) It had no legitimate place in a tariff reform bill. (2) It was neither Democratic nor Republican in principle; had never been approved by the public; was a doctrine of Populism. (3) It was unnecessary as a revenue measure. (4) It was a direct tax and therefore unconstitutional. (5) It was unequal, unjust and sectional in its operations. (6) It revived an odious war tax. (7) Its exemption stamped it as an offensive piece of class legislation; all incomes should be taxed or none. (8) It was retroactive. (9) It usurped a field of taxation law fully belonging to the States. (10) It was inquisitorial and offensive. (11) It would lead to conflict between State and Federal authorities. (12) It selects a class for Federal taxation.

The Populist senators were persistent and aggressive in support of the income tax clause. They averred that the tax was favored by a majority of the people; that the laboring classes thought the rich were not bearing their share of taxation; that officials who had to do with public moneys were corrupt, and the rich could secure from them lower assessments; that millionaires were too numerous, seventy of them averaging estates of \$37,000,000 each.

As the summer of 1894 wore away, and there was a prospect of the passage of the Wilson bill in the Senate, anxiety arose as to how it would be received in its transformed shape on its return to the House. There was much probing of sentiment as to this, and it was found that many disciplinary lessons would be required in order



GROVER CLEVELAND.



HON. JOHN G. CARLISLE.

Born n. Kenton co., Ky., September 5, 1835; educated in common schools and as teacher; admitted to bar, 1858; member of Kentucky State Legislature, 1859-61; elected to State Senate, 1866 and 1869; elected Lieutenant-Governor of State, 1871; elected to 45th, 46th, 47th, 48th, 49th, 50th and 51st Congresses; presided as Speaker of House in 48th, 49th and 50th Congresses; a dignified officer and skilled parliamentarian; elected to United States Senate, as Democrat, to succeed Senator Beck, deceased, May 17, 1890; member of Committees on Finance, Territories, Canadian Relations, Indian Depredations and Woman's Suffrage; resigned his seat in the Senate to accept Secretaryship of Treasury in President Cleveland's Cabinet; confirmed March 6, 1893, and entered upon duties of office March 9, 1893.

to win support for it. Of course there had been no abatement of the anti-protection sentiment, but there was reluctance in surrendering to the terms of the Sugar Trust. However, the dilemma was to pass with the passage of the bill by the Senate, July 3, 1894, by a vote of thirty-nine yeas to thirty-four nays, the Populists voting with the Democrats.

It was carried back to the House, where an understanding already existed that it should not be opened to debate, but should be referred at once to a Committee of Conference. It was also understood in the House, by this time, that with the Sugar Trust it was to be either the Senate legislation or no legislation, while with the party in power it was to be a tariff bill, no matter how incongruous, nor what confession of inability to legislate it contained, or else a violation of all the party's pledges and promises to the country, and perhaps its ultimate ruin.

The bill, metamorphosed in form as well as name, for it was now not improperly dubbed the Gorman-Brice bill, was duly referred to a Conference Committee, after a speech on a motion to non-concur with the Senate, by Mr. Wilson, in which he said that the bill had come back to the House with six hundred and thirty-four amendments to it, and that it no longer represented the principle that revenue taxes under a tariff should be levied on finished products and not on raw materials. Only wool and lumber came back undisturbed by the Senate. The bill had been rendered further unsatisfactory by numerous changes from *ad valorem* to specific or compound rates of duty.

The Democratic members of the Conference Committee took hold of the bill to the exclusion of the Republicans. In the contention over the departure from *ad valorem*

rates the Senate members proved the stronger, for it was supported by the fact that nearly every civilized government had adopted the principle of specific rates. Aside from the question of general principles the Committee found grounds for agreement in many of the schedules, and work progressed slowly but satisfactorily for a time. It, however, became manifest that a serious hitch was to occur over the sugar schedule, and the items of coal and iron ore, all of which were free in the House bill, as a matter of party pledge and economic principle, but which had been made dutiable in the Senate bill on the plea that thus only could its passage be secured in that body, yet under the general charge of the Republicans and of the ablest representatives of the Democratic press that the changes had been made in pursuance of campaign promises to protect the interests of the Sugar Trust.

The bill had now reached one of the most critical points in its history, and the developments which marked its progress from this time on were the most interesting in connection with economic legislation, even if they did not indicate a permanent schism of the dominant party. What startled most the moral sense of the country was the fact that the criminations and re-criminations of the Democratic factions helped to confirm the suspicion that the bill was by no means a reflex of a majority sentiment of the party, but a mere measure of expediency, framed or rather adopted, on the principle that something must be done rather than nothing; and further, that the schedules over which differences were most irreconcilable and bitter had been dictated by the trusts and syndicates in pay for past and prospective favors.

On July 19, the committee of conference reported a disagreement to both the Houses of Congress. In the House,

Mr. Wilson deprecated this disagreement in strong, but sad, terms. He said the committee on the part of the House could not accede to the Senate's demands without further instruction. He pointed out the difference between the rates of duty as originally fixed in the House bill and as found in the Senate bill. In the course of his speech he said:—"If it be true, as stated by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Johnson)—of which I have seen myself some confirmation in the press—if it be true that the great American Sugar Trust has grown so strong and powerful that it says that no tariff bill can pass the American Congress in which its interests are not adequately guarded; if, I say, that be true, I hope this House will never consent to adjournment. I hope, whatever the result of the general tariff bill is, that this House will not consent to an adjournment until it has passed a single bill putting refined sugar on the free list." In conclusion Mr. Wilson eulogized President Cleveland, and then, to the astonishment of the House, read a letter from him dated July 2, 1894, and before the passage of the bill in the Senate. The letter was addressed to Mr. Wilson and had been in his private keeping ever since its receipt. Mr. Wilson now made it public with President Cleveland's consent. It was such a remarkable letter, and led to such serious consequences, that it came to be regarded as one of the most momentous chapters in the history of the Wilson Tariff bill, if not one of the boldest of executive attempts to influence legislation. No just and impartial history of the tariff bill nor even of the times would be complete without an opportunity to read it. It ran:

"My Dear Sir:—The certainty that a conference will be ordered between the two Houses of Congress for the

purpose of adjusting differences on the subject of tariff legislation makes it also certain that you will be again called on to do hard service in the cause of tariff reform.

"My public life has been so closely related to the subject, I have so longed for its accomplishment, and I have so often promised its realization to my fellow countrymen as a result of their trust and confidence in the Democratic party, that I hope no excuse is necessary for my earnest appeal to you that in this crisis you strenuously insist your party honesty, good faith and a sturdy adherence to Democratic principles. I believe these are absolutely necessary conditions to the continuation of Democratic existence.

"I cannot rid myself of the feeling that this conference will present the best, if not the only hope, of true Democracy. Indications point to its action as the reliance of those who desire the genuine fruition of Democratic effort, the fulfilment of Democratic pledges and the redemption of Democratic promises to the people. To reconcile differences in the details comprised within the fixed and well defined lines of principle, will not be the sole talk of the conference ; but, as it seems to me, its members will also have in charge the question whether Democratic principles themselves are to be saved or abandoned.

"There is no excuse for mistaking or misapprehending the feeling and the temper of the rank and file of the Democracy. They are downcast under the assertion that their party fails in ability to manage the Government, and they are apprehensive that efforts to bring about tariff reform may fail ; but they are much more downcast and apprehensive in their fears that Democratic principles may be surrendered.

"In these circumstances they cannot do otherwise than to look with confidence to you and those who with you

have patriotically and sincerely championed the cause of tariff reform within Democratic lines and guided by Democratic principles. This action is vastly augmented by the action, under your leadership, of the House of Representatives upon the bill now pending.

“Every true Democrat and every sincere tariff reformer knows that this bill in its present form and as it will be submitted to the conference committee falls short of the consummation for which we have long labored, for which we have suffered defeat without discouragement; which in its anticipation gives us a rallying cry in our day of triumph, and which in its promise of accomplishment is so interwoven with Democratic pledges and Democratic success that our abandonment of the cause and of the principles upon which it rests means party perfidy and party dishonor.

“One topic will be submitted to the conference which embodies Democratic principle so directly that it cannot be compromised. We have in our platforms and in every way possible declared in favor of free importation of raw materials. We have again and again promised that this should be accorded to our people and our manufacturers as soon as the Democratic party was invested with power to determine the tariff policy of the country.

“The party now has that power. We are as certain today as we ever have been of the great benefit that would accrue to the country from the inauguration of this policy, and nothing has occurred to release us from our obligation to secure this advantage to our people. It must be admitted that no tariff measure can accord with Democratic principles and promises or bear a genuine Democratic badge that does not provide for free raw material.

“In these circumstance it may well excite our wonder that Democrats are willing to depart from this, the most Democrats of all tariff principles, and that the most inconsistent absurdity of such a proposed departure should be emphasized by the suggestion that the wool of the farmer be put on the free list and the protection of tariff taxation be placed around the iron ore and coal of corporations and capitalists. How can we face the people after indulging in such outrageous discrimination and violation of principles?

“It is quite apparent that the question of free raw materials does not admit of adjustment on middle ground, since their subjection to any rate of tariff taxation, great or small, is alike violative of Democratic principle and Democratic good faith.

“I hope that you will not consider it intrusive if I say something in relation to another subject which can hardly fail to be troublesome to the conference. I refer to the adjustment of tariff taxation on sugar.

“Under our party platform and in accordance with our declared party purposes, sugar is a legitimate and logical article of revenue taxation. Unfortunately, however, incidents have accompanied certain stages of the legislation which will be submitted to the conference, that have aroused in connection with this subject a national Democratic animosity to the methods and manipulations of Trusts and Combinations. I confess to sharing in this feeling, and yet, it seemed to me, we ought, if possible, to sufficiently free ourselves from prejudice to enable us coolly to weigh the consideration which, in formulating tariff legislation, ought to guide our treatment of sugar as a taxable article.

“While no tenderness should be entertained for Trusts, and while I am decidedly opposed to granting them, under

the guise of taxation, any opportunity to further their particular methods, I suggest that we ought not to be driven away from the Democratic principle and policy which lead to the taxation of sugar by the fear, quite likely exaggerated, that in carrying out this principle and policy we may indirectly and inordinately encourage a combination of sugar refining interests. I know that in present conditions this is a delicate subject, and I appreciate the depth and strength of the feeling which its treatment has aroused.

"I do not believe we should do evil that good may come; but it seems to me that we should not forget that our aim is the completion of a tariff bill, and that in taxing sugar for proper purposes and within reasonable bounds, whatever else may be said of our action, we are in no danger of running counter to Democratic principles. With all there is at stake, there must be in the treatment of this article some ground upon which we are all willing to stand, where toleration and conciliation may be allowed to solve the problem without demanding the entire surrender of fixed and conscientious convictions.

"In the conclusions of conference touching the numerous items which will be considered, the people are not afraid that their interests will be neglected. They know that the general result, so far as they are concerned, will be to place home necessities and comforts more easily within their reach and to insure better and surer compensation to those who toil.

"We all know that a tariff law covering all the varied interests and conditions of a country as vast as ours must, of necessity, be the result of honorable adjustment and compromise.

"I expect very few of us can say, when our measure is

perfected, that all its features are entirely as we would prefer. You know how much I deprecated the incorporation into the proposed bill of the income feature. In matters of this kind, however, which do not violate a fixed and recognized Democratic doctrine, we are willing to defer to the judgment of a majority of our Democratic brethren. I think there is a general agreement that this is a party duty.

“This is most palpably apparent when we realize that the business of the country timidly stands and watches for the result of our efforts to perfect tariff legislation, that a quick and certain return of prosperity waits upon a wise adjustment, and that a confiding people still trust in our hands their prosperity and well being.

“The Democracy of the land plead most earnestly for the speedy completion of the tariff legislation which their representatives have undertaken; but they demand not less earnestly that no stress of necessity shall tempt those who trust to the abandonment of the Democratic principle.

Yours very truly,

GROVER CLEVELAND.”

This letter, extraordinary as to time and sentiment, gave rise to a variety of comment, most of which was hostile. It threw the warmest friends of the Wilson Bill into panic, lest it would widen the breach between the two Houses, and thus defeat its object, or the passage of any tariff bill at all. The Republicans, and eminent constitutional lawyers, regarded it as effrontery, or something worse, on the part of the President, and it was denounced as the rankest violation of the privileges of the legislative branch of the Government in its history.

As the letter was a blow aimed at the Democratic Sena-

tors, whose actions in imposing duties on articles which had been made free in the House bill were characterized as "alike violative of Democratic principle and Democratic good faith," it was naturally they who were most interested in and incensed at its contents. They could not understand how the President could prove so vindictive, and so free to charge bad faith, when he had been consulted relative to changes in the Senate bill and had given Senators of his party to understand that such changes had his concurrence. Some of the Senators, such as Senator Gorman of Maryland, looked upon the letter as a personal drive at them, and they determined to resent it. Senator Hill of New York, who had all along been one of the bitterest opponents of the President, found comfort in the letter because it suited his views as to the Democratic doctrine of free raw materials. The Republicans saw in the letter a concession of the President to trusts of all kinds—to the Sugar Trust, in his plea for a duty on sugar; to the Nova Scotia Coal Syndicate, in his plea for free coal; to the Cuban Iron Syndicate, in his plea for free iron ore. It was evident to friend and foe of the bill that the President had thrown his great weight into the House scale, and that the future of the tariff bill was to be an issue in the Senate.

Under the House rules, in cases of disagreement, the bill was referred back to the Senate, where it became the subject of lengthy and acrimonious debate, not between political opponents, but between Democratic factions. The President was excoriated by Democratic Senators for his violation of Democratic principles in daring to interfere with the prerogatives of the legislative branch of the Government. Said Senator Vest of Missouri, "Mr. Cleveland is a big man. But the Democratic party is greater

than any one man. It had survived Jefferson, Madison, Jackson; it would survive Grover Cleveland. Under what clause of the Constitution did Mr. Cleveland get the right, after a bill had been sent to full and free conference between the two Houses, to make any appeal to his party friends to stand by his individual views?"

But of all the arraignments of the President by Senators of his own party, that of Senator Gorman of Maryland was the severest. He said that in "patriotism the Democratic Senate had gone to work to save the country and keep their party in power, when suddenly in the midst of their work came the President's letter. It was most uncalled for, the most extraordinary, the most unwise communication that ever came from a President of the United States. It placed the Senate in a position where its members must see to it that the dignity and honor of the chamber must be preserved. It places me in a position where I must tell the story as it occurred. The limit of endurance has been reached."

Senator Gorman then went on to tell the history of the tariff bill after its introduction into the Senate. He showed how Senators Jones and Vest had had frequent conferences with the President and Secretary Carlisle during the progress of the work; how Secretary Carlisle had endorsed the completed Senate bill; how no one who had been consulted had ever suggested that the bill was in violation of Democratic principles. Mr. Gorman called on Senators Vest, Jones and Harris to substantiate the truth of his assertions, and each of them rose in his place and did so.

After this dramatic vindication, Senator Gorman went on to denounce the President in immeasured terms, and defended the position the Senate had assumed. His de-

nunciation and defiance of the President created the greatest excitement in the Senate and made a deep impression on the party and the public. It turned the indictment of the Senate contained in the President's letter to Mr. Wilson, into an indictment of the President. If there had been deceit anywhere it had been with the President and not with the Senate. Of course Mr. Cleveland was defended by his friends in the Senate, but they could not break the force of Mr. Gorman's arraignment. The gage of battle was down and there could be no surrender till time came with her balm for the wounds and bruises of inter-party conflict.

The Democratic majority was now in such a wrangle in the Senate that a caucus was called to smooth its future pathway. After a two days' session this caucus determined to send the bill back to a conference committee without instructions to the conferees, the prevalent feeling being that no greater calamity could befall the party than failure to pass any tariff bill at all. It took several days to secure the sanction of the Senate to this decision of the caucus committee. But on July 27th, the resolution of reference passed by the slimmest of majorities, and the Senate was happily rid of the bill for a second time.

In this second conference the situation was, at first, the same as before. The Senate conferees were not prepared to make concessions. Mr. Wilson, on the part of the House was as emphatic as before in his opposition to the Senate bill. Under these unfavorable auspices, conferences were brief and uninteresting for a time, but the impression daily grew that with the help of President Cleveland, who seemed now to have entire mastery of the House situation, early and important revelations might be expected.

Pending these conference discussions, the Senate committee, appointed to investigate the charges of senatorial collusion with the Sugar Trust, made a majority report exonerating all Senators from the charges made. A minority report showed that the Sugar Trust had made campaign contributions for corrupt purposes, and that it had secured the very legislation it desired. But the investigation had been partial and farcical, and the conclusion reached by the majority of the committee was so at odds with the testimony as published from time to time, that the report was classed by friend and foe as a bald piece of "whitewashing."

The conference committee on the tariff held sessions with little show of agreement till August 9th, when the Democratic members of the House, in disappointed and disgruntled mood, resolved to call a party caucus, as the Senate had previously done, to agree upon and force a line of procedure which would end the dead lock in the conference, and bring about a bill which could be passed by both Houses. Though this caucus had not the sympathy of Mr. Wilson and Speaker Crisp, nevertheless it was attended by one hundred and sixty-six Democratic members, most of whom were determined to shape matters so as to bring about some decisive result. But by means of conciliatory speeches, and promises of an early agreement by the conferees, they were induced to withhold hasty and radical action, and the resolutions they had prepared were not passed. Mr. Crisp regarded the caucus as a "back fire from its own House." Mr. Wilson feared that any action the caucus might take would cause the Senate to withdraw entirely from the conference. He looked upon the situation as a crucial one for the fate of

the bill, and regarded time and patience as the two virtues which were essential to further success.

The general effect of the caucus was to spur the conferees on the part of the Senate to sharper action, for it became apparent that a motive existed on the part of the House conferees to consume more time than could be spared if the Senate was to hold the points it had gained. The sympathy of the President was so decidedly with the House, and the influence that could be wielded was so powerful, that dalliance on the part of the Senate invited the defeat of the measure. Consequently the Senate conferees made an overture to place iron ore on the free list. This was met by a counter proposition on the part of the House conferees to put coal on the free list. The Senate refused to accept this, and the conferees were as much at sea as ever. The conference finally broke up entirely. On August 11th, the House conferees met and endeavored to hold another joint session with the Senate members, but the latter did not respond.

There were, at this critical juncture, several methods of procedure open to the House conferees, and that especially since they were in physical possession of the bill; but the one that seemed to be most appropriate and forcible was to make the surrender demanded by the Senate, agree to pass the Senate bill as it stood, and trust to the future for vindication. This action was, however, not deemed entirely safe till after an expression of party opinion in a caucus called for the purpose. Such caucus was called, August 13th, and the sentiment in it was that policy dictated the surrender of the House to the Senate. On the same day the House passed the Senate bill without change by a vote of 182 yeas to 105 nays, the vote being a party one, with the exception of twelve Democrats who voted

with the Republican minority. At the same time and under rules specially framed for the purpose, the House passed a series of "pop-gun" bills placing coal, iron ore, sugar and barbed wire on the free list. This was done as a protest against the position the House had been forced into by the Senate, and with a view to future political effect, as no serious thought existed anywhere that the Senate would consider such bills favorably, or even countenance the design embraced in their passage by the House.

The attitude of surrender thus assumed by the House was regarded as humiliating in the extreme. None felt the blow more keenly than Mr. Wilson, the father of the bill, and he deprecated the surrender in pathetic language. Speaker Crisp looked more optimistically on the situation, and favored the surrender. Many of the ablest exponents of Democratic faith denounced it bitterly, as inglorious, and as calculated to cause the country to doubt the sincerity of Democratic convictions and the ability of the party to solve successfully the economic problems it had in hand. The Republicans very naturally took advantage of the opportunity afforded them to point out Democratic inconsistency and weakness, and they made the pitiable situation the occasion for some of their most satirical and brilliant speeches. President Cleveland came in for a large share of animadversion as well as satire, by those who regarded the surrender as more that of the executive than of the House, and his share in contributing to it by means of his unwise letter to Mr. Wilson as larger than that of any other one man or body of men.

This very remarkable action of the House, as well as general tenor of the bill, drew forth many opinions and provoked wide newspaper discussion. Very few Democrats

were satisfied with the result. Many expressed themselves for publication in the bitterest and angriest terms. Their leading party papers could not see how such a consummation could have been reached after the bold utterances and solemn pledges of the Chicago platform; after the very pronounced views and serious advice of President Cleveland upon tariff reform; after the shameful exposures of the operations of the sugar, iron and coal trusts, and their dominancy in party affairs; after the pointed letter of the President setting forth the Senate modification of the original Wilson bill as an act of "party perfidy and dishonor"; after a year of heated discussion and energetic effort.

What the country needed most at this juncture, and after an agonizing wait, was a settlement of the tariff issue in some form. This it demanded both as relief from suspense and as a means of recuperation from a period of severe depression. All parties were a unit on this point. But the passage of the Wilson Tariff bill, or to be more exact, the Gorman-Brice Senate bill, did not prove to be such a settlement as was promised and expected. It was a bill which had been tortured out of original shape, and twisted from original intent by amendments, substitutes and counter influences. It had been rendered intricate, erroneous, and impossible of clear and speedy execution. It had been emasculated by tricky and cowardly compromises. The very best that could be said of it by even its warmest friends was that it was a break into the principle of protection, an entering wedge of free trade, an encouragement to further agitation, a successful skirmish preparatory to greater battle, a presage of larger victory, all of which, while hopeful for a cause, was just the opposite of what the country had been yearning for through the

earthquake of panic and the long, dark midnight of crisis and depression. There was not only no settlement of a pervading, vital issue, but, on the contrary, a prospect of further unsettlement.

The curiosities of legislation respecting the bill were not yet ended. When the House "pop-gun" bills went to the Senate, they were met there by advices from the Secretary of the Treasury to the effect that any change in the sugar schedule looking to the placing of sugar on the free list—and the same was said of iron ore and coal, though they were not so important—would reduce the revenues of the Government below its expenses. The Senate was only too glad too accept this as a justification of its past actions and as an excuse for paying no attention to the House bills. It passed the main bill August 17th, and sent it to the President.

And now much speculation arose as to what the President would do with it. A spell of illness had taken him away from the capital for a time. This served to increase speculation and anxiety. After his favoritism toward the original Wilson bill, his stout adherence to tariff reform, his hostility toward the Senate bill and his denunciation of its adherents and advocates, the opinion was widespread that he could do nothing to save himself from stultification and uphold his reputation for firmness but veto the bill outright.

Another current of opinion viewed such action as suicidal in a party sense, and saw no duty ahead for the President but to approve the bill. A subdued branch of this sentiment inclined toward that indefinite and shirking sanction, found in the permissive clause of the Constitution, making a bill a law after the lapse of ten days, both Houses being in session. The fact that the President



KNUTE NELSON.

Born in Norway, Feb. 2, 1843; migrated to U. S., 1849; moved from Chicago to Wisconsin, 1850; thence to Minnesota, 1871; served in 4th Wisconsin Reg. during Civil War; wounded and prisoner at Port Hudson, La., 1863; admitted to bar, 1867; member of Wisconsin Legislature, 1868-69; Dist. Atty. of Douglas co., Minn., 1872-74; State Senator, 1875-78; Presidential Elector, 1880; member of Board of Regents, 1882-93; elected Governor of Minn., 1892; re-elected, 1894; elected U. S. Senator, 1895; Chairman of Committee on Mississippi Improvement, and member of Committees on Commerce, Immigration, Railroads and U. S. University.



WILLIAM J. SEWELL.

Born in Ireland, 1835; migrated early; engaged in mercantile pursuits; Captain of 5th N. J. Vols. in Civil War; brevetted Brigadier for service at Chancellorsville; promoted to Major-General; Official in N. J. branches of Pa. R. R.; State Senator, 1872-80; President of Senate, 1876-1880; elected to U. S. Senate, 1881; Delegate to Rep. Nat. Conventions, 1876, 1880, 1884, 1888, 1892; Nat. Com. to Col. Fair; V.-P. of Managers of Nat. Home for Disabled Vols.; Commander of 2d Brigade of N. J.; connected with various banks, trusts and Philanthropic societies; re-elected to U. S. Senate, March 3, 1895; Chairman of Com. on Enrolled Bills; member of other Committees.

remained absolutely non-committal, added to his absence, and the further fact that every day the bill remained unsigned enured to the enrichment of the sugar and whiskey Trusts, intensified the anxiety respecting the fate of the bill, and multiplied conjectures.

Even after the President's return to Washington in better health, he refused to relieve the tension. Both Houses agreed to adjourn on August 28, at two P. M. The bill drifted into a law at midnight of August 27, 1894, without the President's sanction and signature. The only sentiment he made public respecting its fate was in a letter, dated August 27, addressed to Mr. Catchings of Mississippi and Mr. Clarke of Alabama, in which he said that he felt the utmost disappointment at being denied the privilege to sign such a bill, as he had hoped to see passed—one which embodied Democratic ideas of tariff reform. He did not claim to be better than his party, nor intend to shirk any of its responsibilities, but the bill contained provisions not in the line of "honest tariff reform," and also "inconsistencies and crudities which ought not to appear in tariff laws." He would not separate himself from his party by a "veto of tariff legislation which, though disappointing, was chargeable still to Democratic effort." Besides, there were incidents attending the passage of the bill in its later stages which made every "sincere tariff reformer unhappy," and which "ought not to be tolerated in Democratic reform councils." Yet he looked to the bill as a "barrier against the return of mad protection," and a "vantage ground for further operations against protected monopoly."

The President grew warmer as his letter proceeded. He said he took his "place with the rank and file of the Democratic party, who believe in tariff reform and who

know what it is, who refused to accept the results embodied in this bill as the close of the war, who are not blinded to the fact that the livery of Democratic tariff reform has been stolen and worn in the service of Republican protection, and who have marked the places where the *deadly blight of treason has blasted the counsels of the brave in the hour of their might*. The trusts and combinations—the communism of pelf—whose machinations have prevented us from reaching the success we deserved, should not be forgotten nor forgiven. We shall recover from our astonishment at their exhibition of power, and then if the question is forced upon us whether they shall submit to the free legislative will of the people's representatives or shall dictate the laws which the people must obey, we will accept that issue as one involving the integrity and safety of American institutions."

This animated and caustic letter concluded with an exhortation to Democrats to stand by the principle of free raw material, and censured those who refused to put coal and iron ore on the free list. The letter provoked wide discussion and received the severest criticism of the President's party associates, some of whom denounced it as more fatal to Democratic political prospects than his Wilson letter had proven to be the cause of tariff reform. They refused to see in it an excuse for not signing the tariff bill, and looked upon the entire party situation as far more complicated and serious than if the President had signed the bill without comment.

In its practical workings the Wilson Tariff Act proved faulty in two important respects. First, its income features were declared to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States. Second, it failed to raise sufficient revenue to meet the wants of the Treasury. Whether in other respects it is meeting the theories of its

authors and advocates is more a matter of discussion than history. Protectionists have never ceased to attribute the industrial and financial depression, extending from 1893 to 1896, to its presence. They see in it, when coupled with other measures relating to finance, the source of those ills that characterized the entire period of President Cleveland's second administration. Whether they are correct or not, is again a matter of discussion.

But there are some historic contrasts that cannot be avoided by anyone. Says Mr. Mulhall, the great English statistician, in speaking of this country from 1880 to 1890:

"It would be impossible to find in history a parallel to the progress of the United States in the last ten years. Every day that the sun rises on the American people it sees the addition of \$2,500,000 to the accumulation of wealth in the Republic, which is one-third of the daily accumulation of all mankind outside of the United States."

In the first year of the operation of the McKinley Tariff Act the Government receipts were \$37,239,763 in excess of expenditures. In 1892 the receipts were \$9,904,453 greater than expenses, and in 1893, \$2,341,674 greater.

In the first year of the operation of the Wilson Tariff Act, the Government receipts ran \$42,805,223 behind expenses, and in the second year about \$30,000,000 behind.

In 1893, under the McKinley Act, the importation of woolen goods amounted only to \$36,000,000 in value, from which the Treasury received \$34,000,000 in revenue. Under the new tariff, in 1895, notwithstanding the reduced per capita consumption of such goods, the importation aggregated \$60,000,000, from which the Government received a revenue of only \$27,000,000. From wool and woolens together the Government obtained a revenue of nearly \$44,000,000 in 1892 and only \$27,000,000 in 1895.

Here was a loss of \$17,000,000 revenue in these two

articles. At the same time the manufacture of \$30,000,000 of woolen goods was transferred to Europe.

For the fiscal year of 1894, the last full year under the McKinley law, the exports of manufactures amounted to \$183,718,484 in value. For the calendar year 1895, the first full official year under the Wilson Law, the exports of manufactures were \$201,152,771, an increase of \$17,434,287. But the exports of agricultural products in the corresponding periods showed a net decline of \$82,648,663.

Hence the country gained in the exports of manufactures \$17,434,287, and it lost in the exports of agricultural products \$82,648,663, or a net loss of \$65,214,356 in the exports of these two classes in a single year. In the total exports there was a net loss of \$69,000,000 in the first calendar year of the new tariff as compared with the last fiscal year of the old tariff.

But when the imports are taken also into consideration the difference is still greater. Under the McKinley tariff in the period mentioned, the imports were \$654,994,622. Under the Wilson tariff they were \$801,663,490, showing a net increase of imports of \$146,668,868. Add that amount to the net loss in exports and it shows a change in the trade balance of the United States of \$215,000,000 on the wrong side of the balance sheet.

The Wilson Tariff Law had been in force nineteen months up to March 31, 1896. During that period the receipts from customs were \$257,069,000, and the receipts from internal revenue were \$201,069,000. During the first nineteen months of the operation of the McKinley Law the receipts from customs were \$302,884,000, and the receipts from internal revenue were \$231,222,000. The revenues under the Wilson Law were, therefore, about \$76,000,000 behind those of the McKinley tariff during the first nineteen months of both laws.

DRIFT OF TARIFF LEGISLATION ABROAD.

The nations which occupy the Continent of Europe have, without exception, introduced into their commercial and industrial systems, within a very few years, the principle of protection. This has been marked by economists of every school. Great Britain alone has remained firm to her doctrine of free-trade. On May 23, 1892, Lord Salisbury, the English Premier, delivered a speech at Hastings, in which he discussed the attitude of Great Britain as to her external trade. The speech, coming from so high an authority, created great excitement among English Conservatives, drew a wide range of comment from the newspapers of the world, and seemed to presage a new departure in the applied economics of the realm.

Its points, bearing on external trade, were:—

“After all, this little island lives as a trading island. We could not produce in foodstuffs enough to sustain the population that lives in this island, and it is only by the great industries which exist here, and which find markets in foreign countries, that we are able to maintain the vast population by which this island is inhabited.

“But a danger is growing up. Forty or fifty years ago everybody believed that free-trade had conquered the world, and they prophesied that every nation would follow the example of England and give itself up to absolute free-trade.

“The results are not exactly what they prophesied, but the more adverse the results were, the more the devoted prophets of free-trade declared that all would come aright at last.

“The worse the tariffs of foreign countries became the more confident were the prophecies of an early victory, but we see now, after many years experience that explain it,

how many foreign nations are raising, one after another, a wall—a brazen wall of protection—around their shores which excludes us from their markets, and, so far as they are concerned, do their best to kill our trade, and this state of things does not get better. On the contrary, it constantly seems to get worse.

“Now, of course, if I utter a word with reference to free-trade, I shall be accused of being a protectionist, of a desire to overthrow free-trade, and all the other crimes which an ingenious imagination can attach to a commercial heterodoxy.

“But, nevertheless, I ask you to set yourselves free from all that merely vituperative doctrine and to consider whether the true doctrine of free-trade carries you as far as some of these gentlemen would wish you to go.

“Every true religion has its counterpart in inventions and legends and traditions, which grow upon that religion. The Old Testament had its Canonical books and had also its Talmud and its Mishna, the inventions of rabbinical commentators.

“There are a Mishna and a Talmud constantly growing up. One of the difficulties we have to contend with is the strange and unreasonable doctrine which these rabbis have imposed upon us.

“If we look abroad into the world we will see it. In the office which I have the honor to hold I am obliged to see a great deal of it.

“We live in an age of a war of tariffs. Every nation is trying how it can, by agreement with its neighbor, get the greatest possible protection for its own industries, and at the same time the greatest possible access to the markets of its neighbors.

“This kind of negotiation is continually going on. It

has been going on for the last year and a half with great activity.

"I want to point out to you that what I observe is that while A is very anxious to get a favor of B, and B is anxious to get a favor of C, nobody cares two straws about getting the commercial favor of Great Britain.

"What is the reason of that? It is that in this great battle Great Britain has deliberately stripped herself of the armor and the weapons by which the battle has to be fought.

"You cannot do business in this world of evil and suffering on those terms. If you go to market, you must bring money with you. If you fight, you must fight with the weapons with which those you have to contend against are fighting.

"The weapon with which they all fight is admission to their own markets, that is to say, A says to B: 'If you will make your duties such that I can sell in your market I will make my duties such that you can sell in my market.'

"But we begin by saying that we will levy no duties on anybody, and we declare that it would be contrary and disloyal to the glorious and sacred doctrine of free-trade to levy any duty on anybody, for the sake of what we can get by it.

"It may be noble, but it is not business.

"On those terms you will get nothing, and I am sorry to have to tell you that you are practically getting nothing.

"The opinion of this country, as stated by its authorized exponents, has been opposed by what is called a retaliatory policy.

"We, as the government of the country, have laid it down for ourselves as a strict rule from which there is no departure, and we are bound not to alter the traditional

policy of the country unless we are convinced that a large majority of the country is with us, because in these foreign affairs consistency of policy is beyond all things unnecessary.

“ But, though that is the case, still if I may aspire to fill the office of a councillor to the public mind, I should ask you to form your own opinions without a reference to traditions or denunciations, not to care two straws whether you are orthodox or not, but to form your opinions according to the dictates of common sense—I would impress upon you that if you intend in this conflict of commercial treaties to hold your own you must be prepared, if need be, to inflict upon the nations which injure you the penalty which is in your hands, that of refusing them access to your markets.

“ The power we have most reason to complain of is the United States, and what we want the United States to furnish us with mostly are articles of food essential to the feeding of the people and raw materials necessary to our manufacturers, and we cannot exclude one or the other without serious injury to ourselves.

“ Now, I am not in the least prepared, for the sake of wounding other nations, to inflict any dangerous or serious wound upon ourselves.

“ We must confine ourselves, at least for the present, to those subjects on which we should not suffer very much, whether the importation continued or diminished.

“ But what I complain about of the rabbis of whom I have just spoken is, that they confuse this vital point. They say that everything must be given to the consumer. Well, if the consumer is the man who maintains the industries of the country or is the people at large, I agree with the rabbis.

“ You cannot raise the price of food or of raw material, but there is an enormous mass of other articles of importation from other countries besides the United States which are

mere matters of luxurious consumption, and if it is a question of wine or silk or spirits or gloves or lace, I should not in the least shrink from diminishing the consumption and interfering with the comfort of the excellent people who consume these articles of luxury, for the purpose of maintaining our rights in this commercial war, and of insisting on our right of access to the markets of our neighbors.

"This is very heterodox doctrine, I know, and I should be excommunicated for maintaining it.

"But, as one's whole duty is to say what he thinks to the people of this country, I am bound to say that our rabbis have carried the matter too far.

"We must distinguish between consumer and consumer, and while jealously preserving the rights of a consumer who is co-extensive with a whole industry, or with the whole people of the country, we may fairly use our power over an importation which merely ministers to luxury in order to maintain our own in this great commercial battle."

AMERICAN RECIPROCITY—AN HISTORIC REVIEW.

GENERAL VIEW.

THE idea, or rather the doctrine, of reciprocal trade is by no means new. As a principle it has been long recognized in this country. In England it is what is called "Fair Trade," and is upheld by a school of economists and statesmen who oppose "Free Trade," or seek to escape from the effects of "Free Trade," by a system which shall not be one-sided only.

The doctrine, pure and simple, is this, if a nation does not impose duties on our goods entering its ports, we will not impose duties on its goods entering our ports; and if a nation levies duties on our goods, we will levy duty on its goods.

This, say fair-traders, is but the doctrine of *lex talionis*, tit-for-tat, as applied to trade. This, say free-traders, is the folly of imposing a double loss on ourselves. Thus, foreigners tax our products when they enter their ports. This imposes a loss on us. Then, in turn, we tax their products when entering our ports. This imposes a second loss on us. They say, that for an injury done us by others, we fine ourselves. When others impoverish us, we respond by a system of impoverishment.

Protectionists eschew theories and refinements, and say that each country is a law unto itself respecting trade. All prosperous countries have been built on this principle. All recognize it in one way or another, whatever their outward professions, or present economic leanings. It is but the

duty of caring for one's self. It is but the right to live, and to enjoy advantages, if such exist.

COMMERCIAL TREATIES.

Reciprocity has for ages been established and determined between nations by means of commercial treaties. The usual process has been for two nations, about to treat, to consult their respective tariff lists, and to grant reductions of duties on the class of goods which they desire most to receive from each other. Equally, each country seeks to secure the lowest rate of duty on the class of goods whose manufacture constitutes its own industry, and whose sale abroad it wishes to cultivate. Thus, England makes the best bargain she can for the foreign sale of her hardware and cottons, France for her silks and wines, Belgium for her iron products, the United States for her flour and meat. The free-trade countries of the world are the most prolific of reciprocity treaties, yet there never was a reciprocity treaty that did not recognize the doctrine of protection, else it would have been of no use. The essence of all commercial treaties is home-trade advantage, home-industry advantage, home-development advantage, whether directly by encouragement to labor and capital on the spot, or indirectly by reason of enlarged markets abroad.

Says Leveleye, one of the ablest of French Political Economists, and a pronounced free-trader:—"Commercial treaties are useful in assuring to industry what is so essential to it, the fixity of foreign customs dues throughout the period embraced by the treaty. Nowadays commercial treaties are of more importance than political treaties, for it is on commercial treaties that the progress of industry in each country in a great measure depends, and also what is no less im-

portant, the development of commercial relations and community of interest between different lands."

"MOST FAVORED NATION" CLAUSE.

Very often the parties to commercial treaties stipulate that each of them shall enjoy all the advantages that may come to, or be secured by, the other through a reduction of duties between it and still other countries. This has come to be known in diplomacy as "*the most favored nation clause*," a term which grows more familiar each year. It stands thus:—England agrees to abolish, or reduce to a minimum, her duties on French silks, as a concession to France for so reducing, or abolishing, her duties on English cottons. But at the same time England says to France, and it is agreed, that if you succeed in getting similar terms with any other country by reason of a desire for your silks, we expect our cottons to follow in the wake of your silks. The favors your silks secure for you must extend to our cottons. So France says to England, and it is agreed, that if you succeed in getting similar terms with any other country by reason of a desire for your cottons, we expect our silks to follow in the wake of your cottons. The favors your cottons secure for you must extend to our silks. Thus "*the most favored nation clause*" may suffice to carry the favorite product of a highly industrial and ingenious nation, with commercial facilities, into every mart of the world.

This extension of, and refinement on, the principle of reciprocity as established by commercial treaties, is only an enlargement of the spirit of advantage between nations. Clearly, nothing is given without something, and the like, is expected. As nations do not trade for pure love of the thing, something more is expected than is given, if not directly, at least indirectly. But this is protection, says

the protectionist, for each nation seeks to advantage itself, and it matters not whether it proceeds on the principle of denial or concession. Not so, says the free-trader; it is free-trade, for the moment you concede the principle of concession you repudiate that of denial, or, in other words, discrimination by duties. And so economists bandy theories, and prove to the world that their science is weightier in words than worth.

But while commercial treaties have been the usual, almost the sole, means of establishing reciprocity, or reciprocal trade, between commercial nations, they have been slow and cumbrous of formation and operation, and always costly of negotiation. They have proved of doubtful construction and uncertain worth, except where the inducement to make them was very great, and the power to enforce them reposed in the contracting parties. New and weak countries were placed at a disadvantage by them, even if the inducement to make them existed, and, indeed, no such inducement could exist till a country was sufficiently advanced to have something substantial to offer for what it desired to receive.

POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES.

As long as the United States was going through its early experiments with free-trade and protection, there was hardly a thought of reciprocity or reciprocal trade as we have come to understand it. In all the early arguments respecting the advantages of protection by means of duties on foreign imports, the central thought was that protection was necessary in order to foster infant industries. There was hardly any diversity of opinion about this. Statesmen of all parties and economic schools joined in the thought and sought by speech and vote to establish the principle. Politics did not seriously tinge a tariff debate as long as the idea was

dominant that the infancy of industry required the protective hand of the Government. In this the most pronounced free-traders had the sanction and support of the English economic writers, who, almost without exception, admitted the doctrine that in order to establish and foster infant industries, protection was right in law and morals. England had universally and persistently applied the principle, till she had grown rich, powerful and independent by means of it.

It was not until 1824, when the old arguments respecting the uses of protection began to be tinged by partyism, that attention began to be turned seriously to the advantages of reciprocal trade. The country was then sufficiently advanced to make it a question in the minds of statesmen. Free-traders, the very ones who had all along favored protection as a means of fostering infant industries, now turned their arguments against protection in general. The peculiar condition of the country, divided into a strictly planting class, with unpaid labor at its command, and a manufacturing, commercial and more diversified industrial class, with only paid labor at its command, contributed to the change of sentiment and the tone of argument. The planting class, with its unpaid labor, saw a menace in the growth of manufactures and commerce, with their paid labor. The system of free, paid labor was a harsh contrast with, and a standing threat upon, the system of slave, unpaid labor. Established manufactories and profitable commerce were proving a source of wealth, population, importance and comfort, which might in the end overshadow the planting class and its geographic section, even if it did not endanger the slave institution.

Therefore the free-traders injected into their opposition to protection the argument that protection had already done

its legitimate work in grounding and fostering the young industries of the country, and was no longer necessary. They said it was a stretch of power any how on the part of the government, and was no longer justified. They said that inasmuch as it could be of no earthly use to the planting sections, it was unfair for the nation to legislate in the interest of the manufacturing and commercial sections. They attacked the constitutionality of tariff legislation. As time went on, and the issue of slavery became more a matter of question, the tariff debates brought out in stronger lines the above arguments. The doctrine of free-trade took passionate and almost sectional turn. It came nearer than ever to cleaving and dividing politics. Calhoun did not hesitate to declare that the further fostering of industries by means of protection would destroy the planting class and the institution of slavery; that the object of free-trade, as he advocated it, was to strike a blow at paid labor and the prosperity of the manufacturing classes; that the tariff system was so unfair, so unconstitutional, such an infliction on the States of his section, as to warrant nullification of tariff laws, and if this did not provide an escape from their operation, then secession would be justified.

THE NEW PROTECTIVE IDEA.

These arguments were so ably maintained, and the situation became so serious, as to force the protectionists on to new ground. It is no disparagement to their numbers or ability to say that they could no longer maintain themselves on the plea of protection to infant industries—the common ground of all statesmen in the beginning. They were compelled, or perhaps the time had arrived for it, to broaden their ground, and to make it more secure by a new declaration of protective principles by, one may say, a new depart-

ture in political economy. This became the dawn of those doctrines which, elaborated by time and modified by circumstances, comprise American protection as enunciated by modern statesmen, and as they seek to embody them in protective legislation.

The gist of these doctrines is, that as labor constitutes a very large per cent. of the cost of an article, the true measure of protection is a duty which will cover that element of cost, and thus save our labor from competition with the low-priced labor of foreign countries. Along with this goes the doctrine that the free-list may safely embrace only those articles which are impossible of production with us by reason of our soil, climate and natural advantages.

POLICY OF SUBSIDY.

Abreast of this doctrine is another, daily growing more momentous, and one which has been enforced by the fact that our genius and facilities tend to overcrowding in our own markets; it is, that the very best protection that can be afforded in such case is the establishment of steamship lines to carry our surplus products to those who need them most, or to those of whom we buy most and to whom we have to pay most. This has been a favorite and universal means of protection with all commercial countries, and it has been employed at great outlay on the part of those countries in the way of pay, or subsidy, to said lines, first in order to start them, and second in order to maintain them. But this means of protection has not yet been reached in this country. Subsidy is a word our people cannot yet abide. No theory of protection that embodies the word directly has ever yet been framed in this country that could withstand the assaults of its opponents. The reason is that it appeals too directly to the capitalistic or monopolistic spirit and



HON. WILLIAM F. VILAS.

Born at Chelsea, Vt., July 9, 1840; moved to Madison, Wis., 1851; graduated at State University, 1858; studied law at University of Albany, N. Y., 1860, and admitted to bars of New York and Wisconsin; Began practice at Madison, July 9, 1860; entered Union army, and mustered out as Lieutenant-Colonel of 23d Reg. Wis. Vols.; a Professor in Law Department of State University since 1868; Regent of same, 1880-85; member Board of Revision of Statutes, 1878; elected to Wisconsin Legislature, 1885; delegate to Democratic National Conventions, 1876-80-84; appointed Postmaster-General by President Cleveland, March 7, 1885; appointed Secretary of Interior, January 16, 1888; elected to United States Senate, January 28, 1891; member of Committees on Civil Service, Pensions, Judiciary, Post Offices and Roads and Public Lands.



HON. ADLAI E. STEVENSON.

Born in Christian co., Ky., October 23, 1835; moved to Bloomington, Ill., 1852; educated at Wesleyan University and Centre College, Ky.; began practice of law in Metamora, Ill., December, 1858; Chancery Master of Woodford co., 1861-65; State's Attorney, 1865-69; Democratic Presidential Elector, 1864; moved to Bloomington, 1869; elected to 44th and 46th Congresses; member of Board of Visitors to West Point, 1877; First Assistant Postmaster-General, 1885-89; elected Vice-President on Democratic ticket, 1892; took his seat March 4, 1893.

class. On the part of the government it is too direct a kind of paternalism. As to the recipients, it is too special a gift. It is no answer to all this, as yet, to say that as no other commercial country ever succeeded in protecting itself through the establishment of steamship lines, except by starting and fostering them by subsidies, so this country has not done, and can never be expected to do, the same without the employment of similar agencies. Nor is it, as yet, a sufficient answer to say that the word subsidy in this connection can only be rendered offensive when narrowed to its apparent recipients, who really ought not to be considered at all, or, if considered, ought to find their true infinitesimal place in comparison with the tens of thousands of manufactories, the hundreds of thousands of laborers and farmers, and the millions of capital, which an exit for our over products would keep employed.

POLICY OF RECIPROCITY.

Still further, abreast of this doctrine is the policy of reciprocity; or, as we had better say, the principle of practical, or applied, reciprocity, rendered conspicuous, as formulated in the Tariff Act of 1890, and adopted as a measure of the Harrison Administration. This policy presumes that we ought to have better outlet for our manufactures. It presumes that direct trade with those from whom we buy most and to whom we sell least, would be a most desirable and advantageous trade to establish, as serving to balance accounts without draining us of gold cash. It presumes that, as to certain countries at least, notably those nearest to us, and especially those whose products we take largely and which we cannot duplicate at home, we are in a position to offer what they require, of as good quality and on as fair terms, as they can secure elsewhere.

It presumes that inasmuch as we are sufficiently advanced and sufficiently well off to remit entirely duties on their products,—most of which are necessities of life, and hitherto subjected to duty for sheer purposes of revenue,—and actually do remit such duties, that they ought to reciprocate by either abolishing or lowering their duties on articles we send to them. Not to do so would be unreciprocal. It would be for us to enlarge our inducements for their trade, by removing duties upon it, and for them to reject these inducements by refusing to modify or abolish duties on our trade.

COUNTRIES MOST INTERESTED.

It is clear to every one that the countries most directly affected by what may now be called the American policy of reciprocity, are those countries to the south of us, which comprise Mexico, Central America and South America. To these may be added other countries whose, or any part of whose, products are as theirs are. This being so, even the casual student of history will be struck by a comparison of two American continental epochs or eras, the one *political*, the other *commercial*.

Let us take the political one and consider it. It began in 1787, the date on which our Republican experiment was launched, the date of our Federal Constitution. Add thirty years to it, so as to make it embrace a period up to the date of what may be called general and successful revolt against Spanish supremacy in South America, and the establishment of the South American Republics. Fix this date at say about the year 1824. These thirty years, or thereabouts, saw the United States engaged in finding a permanent place for her political institutions. She was manfully meeting the trials to which young countries are subjected, and especially

those countries that have been compelled to conquer their independence by means of war, and have been bold enough to dare a political experiment at odds with the systems, traditions and instincts of the mother countries. She was heroically and successfully passing through the stages—many of them severe, even to the point of a second war—which led up to full independence, to universal recognition of her right to exist as a government and nation, and to that conspicuous place in the firmament of Western Republics, which made her a cynosure in the eyes of all.

At the beginning of this period what did she find? The entire continent to the south of her was Spanish. Spanish political domination was complete as it could be, all things considered. Then came the gradual breaking away from foreign and monarchical moorings, under the lead of brave generals, like Bolivar, under the influence of enlarged ideas of freedom, under the inspiration furnished by the success of the northern experiment.

So busy had the United States been with her own experiment, that she had not had time to more than note what was going on to the south of her. Her own expanse was so ample, her resources so sufficient, her thought so distinctive, as that political confederacy on the continent had not occurred to her, or at least had taken no definite shape. Neither had political co-operation, or, in other words, political reciprocity, taken even vague shape. Sympathy existed for every effort looking to the breaking of the Spanish yoke. Indirect encouragement was offered to the erection of every republican temple founded on the ashes of European monarchy. But that was all, until the time should come when, her own political destiny being assured, and a new order of statesmen having arisen, the Republic of the North could afford to recognize in a more direct manner those of the South,

POLITICAL INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTH AMERICAN REPUBLICS.

It was in 1808 that the interference of Napoleon with the affairs of Spain enabled the South American republics to rejoice in the assurance of their own autonomy. But a long struggle was necessary in order to establish the independence they hoped for. For twenty years they looked vainly for succor or approval from European monarchies. They had been all along looking to the Republic of the North, and copying her splendid example. They now began to look for substantial recognition, and they found in Henry Clay their earliest and ablest champion. In 1818 Mr. Clay made a passionate appeal in the House of Representatives for their recognition, and in the same year the condition of the South American provinces became a subject of consideration at a cabinet meeting, James Monroe being President. Four years afterwards, the recognition they sought from the United States came, and it was soon followed by recognition on the part of Great Britain. In the next year, 1823, President Monroe, in his message to Congress, and in discussing the relation of foreign powers toward those on the American Continent, said :

“In wars of European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defence. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers (of Europe) is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments.

And in the defence of our own which has been achieved by the loss of no small blood and treasure and sustained by the wisdom of our most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled liberty, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to ourselves, and to the amicable relations subsisting between the United States and these powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of our hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing influence or dependence of any European power we have not interfered, and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, in great consideration and as just principles acknowledge, we could not permit any interference, for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other right than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States."

This was the "Monroe Doctrine," was the act of warning to monarchical Europe to keep hands off the political destiny of a Continent. It was of this doctrine that Daniel Webster, in a speech in the House April, 1823, upon the subject of an appropriation to send a mission from the United States to the South American Congress at Panama, said:

"I look on the message of December, 1823, as forming a bright page in our history. I will neither help to erase it or tear it out, nor shall it by any act of mine be blotted or blemished. It did honor to the sagacity of the government, and I will not diminish that honor. It elevated the hopes and gratified the passions of the people. Over those hopes I will not bring a shadow, nor will I put that gratified patriotism to shame."

CONGRESS OF REPUBLICS.

In 1821 the Republic of Colombia suggested the idea of a closer connection between the Spanish colonies in Central and South America. In July, 1822, and before their independence had been recognized by the United States, Colombia and Chili negotiated a treaty looking to a Congress of the new Republics, resembling the one already constructed in Europe (The Holy Alliance, which was an attempt to fetter all Europe with absolute monarchy), and having for its object "The construction of a continental system for America."

The idea ripened slowly, though it was sedulously cherished by Bolivar and other leaders, Bolivar being then at the head of the Republic of Peru. It was not until December 7, 1824, that he issued his invitation to the Republics south of us, to meet in conference at Panama. Most of them accepted, and the "General Assembly of the American Republics" met at Panama, June 22, 1826.

What was singular about this Congress or General Assembly was that it was no part of Bolivar's design to invite the United States to participate. The Republics of South America had abolished African slavery in 1813. Doubtless Bolivar felt that the interest which the United States had at that time in preserving and extending slavery would tend to embarrass her acceptance of an invitation, or make her an unwelcome, if not dangerous, participant. The invitation to the United States came from Colombia and Mexico, after an inquiry through Mr. Clay as to whether it would be acceptable to President Adams. Mr. Adams was so far satisfied as that he appointed two representatives to the Congress or Conference, subject to the "advice and consent of the Senate."

In his message to the Senate, Mr. Adams gave among

other reasons for his action the following, which is valuable in this connection as showing the dawn of the idea that mutual commercial intercourse with the South American States might well become a subject of consideration in such a conference as that proposed. He said:

“But the South American nations, in the infancy of their independence, often find themselves in positions with reference to other countries, with principles applicable to which, derivable from the state of independence itself, they have not been familiarized by experience. The result of this has been that sometimes in their intercourse with the United States they have manifested dispositions to reserve a right of granting special favors and privileges to the Spanish nation as the price of their recognition; at others, they have *actually established duties and impositions operating unfavorably to the United States, to the advantage of European powers*; and sometimes they have appeared to consider that they might interchange among themselves mutual concessions of exclusive favor, to which neither European powers nor the United States should be admitted. In most of these cases their regulations unfavorable to us have yielded to friendly expostulation and remonstrance; but it is believed to be of infinite moment *that the principles of a liberal commercial intercourse should be exhibited to them* and urged with interested and friendly persuasion upon them, when all are assembled for the avowed purpose of consulting together upon the establishment of such principles as may have an important bearing upon their future welfare.”

The debate in the Senate upon the proposed mission was exceedingly acrimonious. Serious charges were brought against President Adams, and the policy and purposes of his administration were denounced as dangerous. It was

declared that the mission would lead to international complications. The slave-holding members affirmed that in reference to the rest of America, as well as to Europe, slavery must be and remain the prime motive of the foreign policy of the United States, and they said that they saw in the conference peril to their "peculiar institutions," for the history of these Southern Republics as to slavery furnished an example "scarcely less fatal than the independence of Hayti to the repose of the slave States of the Union." They had not only copied from the revolutionary records of the United States the words "freedom," "equality" and "universal emancipation," but had actually broken the chains of all slaves.

THE COMMERCIAL THOUGHT UPPERMOST.

The defenders of the proposed mission and of the President's action made many elaborate arguments for their side, all of which embraced in some form the idea of more extended and intimate commercial intercourse, upon the basis of mutual or reciprocal trade. When Mr. Adams was asked by the House for further information respecting his view and his action he responded in a lengthy message, in which he said :—

"The first and paramount principle upon which it was deemed wise and just to lay the corner-stone of all our future relations with them was disinterestedness; the next was cordial good will to them; *the third was a claim of fair and equal reciprocity.*"

Then in further allusion to the commercial idea he said :—

"It will be within the recollection of the House that immediately after our War of Independence a measure closely analogous to this Congress of Panama was adopted by the Congress of our Confederation and for purposes of precisely

the same character. Three commissioners with plenipotentiary powers were appointed to negotiate treaties of amity, navigation and commerce with all the principal powers of Europe. They met and resided at Paris for one year, for that purpose, and the only result of their negotiations was our first treaty between the United States and Prussia, memorable in the diplomatic annals of the world and precious as a monument of principles in relation to commerce and maritime warfare, with which our country entered upon her career as a member of the great family of independent nations."

In the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs reported against the expediency of sending ministers to the Panama Congress, but afterwards, and very grudgingly, approved the President's selection. The House, after long delay, agreed to appropriate the necessary funds. The ministers were sent, but delay had done its designed work. They were too late for the Conference, which had adjourned previous to their arrival. Mr. Clay, then Secretary of State, was much mortified at the failure, and the President, in 1829, in alluding to the failure said to the Senate:—"While there is no probability of the renewal of the negotiations, the purposes for which they were intended are still of the *deepest interest to our country and to the world, and may, hereafter, call again for the active energies of the Government of the United States.*"

It might be interesting in this connection to know that the South and Central American Republics continued to hold conferences for consideration and adjustment of their affairs and the unification of their interests. One was held at Lima in 1847, another in 1864, another was proposed at Panama in 1881, which was prevented by the South American wars, and another was held at Montevideo in 1888-89.

The United States was not represented in any of them. The era of our political influence upon these Republics, whether by example, or by the encouragement extended in the "Monroe Doctrine," or by the comity intended by Mr. Adams, had ended with their freedom from monarchical yoke and the assurance that they were forever committed to the Republican spirit.

COMMERCIAL BONDAGE OF THE REPUBLICS.

But singular as it may seem that political freedom was followed by commercial bondage. Commercial Europe set her head for conquest, and with her immense facilities overran the marts from which the Spanish warships had been driven. This invasion has become well nigh complete.

We now come to the second era above mentioned—the commercial. We have seen how the end of the political era witnessed the dawn of the idea of commercial reciprocity with the Southern Republics. The idea lay dormant, so far as the United States was concerned, through the period devoted to working out its own industrial and commercial independence. The industrial and commercial period from 1824 to 1860 may be likened to the political period prior to the Revolution. The industrial and commercial period from 1861 to the present may be likened to the political period from 1787 to 1824, each of these periods being considered with reference to our relations to the Southern Republics. Strange to say, the above period from 1861 to the present corresponds in length with the period from 1787 to 1824, at whose end we took political cognizance of these Republics and witnessed their freedom from European monarchy.

The settlement of our sectional differences by civil war, the establishment of a system of finance which gives us

rank among the nations, the practice of protection which made us industrially and commercially independent, brings us to a point of time when our example and influence must affect the countries of our continent to the south of us in a commercial sense, just as they were affected in a political sense. If their commercial subjugation by Europe is as complete as was their political subjugation by Spain, and their independence as desirable, they may well look once more to us for something which in commerce shall be the equivalent of the "Monroe Doctrine" in politics. We are in a position to extend it, at least that is the significance of practical reciprocity.

A PEACE CONGRESS.

What President Adams called "the deepest interests of our country," and what he prophesied might "hereafter call again for the active energies of the Government of the United States," began its culmination with the invitation of President Garfield for all the independent governments of North and South America to meet in a Peace Congress at Washington. It has been given out that he aimed at something more than a mere code of arbitration in case of disputes which might lead to war among American states, and that he contemplated making commercial reciprocity a leading feature of his administration. His death frustrated his design.

A MORE COMMERCIAL THOUGHT.

President Garfield's invitation was recalled by President Arthur in order that the Congress might be given opportunity to consider the advisability of the step. Just as soon as the Congress began to deliberate upon the matter, the subject took wider and wider range, and the idea of reciprocal commerce became a conspicuous feature. On Jan-

uary 21, 1880, Senator Davis of Illinois first threw his suggestion of an "International American Conference" into a Senate Bill in which occurred the following words:—

"Whereas from the southern boundary of the United States to the Argentine Republic, and also the Republic of Chile, a distance of about 4,500 miles, including Mexico, Central America, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay, containing a population of, in all, about 40,000,000 industrious and progressive people, with whom the United States hold, and desire to maintain, the most friendly relations, and with whom a closer and reciprocal interest in trade and commerce ought to be encouraged,' etc.

The Davis proposition looked to this "closer and reciprocal interest in trade and commerce" by means of a great southern railroad connecting the three Americas.

On April 24, 1882, Senator Cockrell, of Missouri, introduced into the Senate a bill similar to the above, whose object was the "appointment of a special commissioner for promoting intercourse with such countries of Central and South America as may be found to possess natural facilities for railway communication with each other and with the United States."

On the same date, April 24, 1882, Senator Morgan, of Alabama, introduced a kindred bill, "for the encouragement of closer commercial relations between the United States and the Republic of Mexico, Central America, the Empire of Brazil and the several Republics of South America."

Similar bills were introduced into the House, all looking to "the promotion of commercial intercourse" with the countries to the south of us, all of which were reported adversely by the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

In 1883 Senator Sherman reintroduced into the Senate

the Morgan Bill of 1882. In the first session of the Forty-eighth Congress, Mr. Townsend, of Illinois, introduced a joint resolution, "inviting the co-operation of the Governments of American nations in securing the establishment of free commercial intercourse among those nations and an American Customs' Union."

On March 3, 1884, Senator Cockrell introduced a Senate bill authorizing a commission to Central and South America "for the purpose of collecting information looking to the extension of American trade and commerce," etc. This bill was reported favorably by the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Before taking action on this bill, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Senate requested the views of Mr. Frelinghuysen, Secretary of State, as to the proposed legislation. He reviewed the entire question very fully in his reply of March 26, 1884, and fully set forth the advantages of reciprocity with these countries. His arguments pointed directly to reciprocity as a necessity, in case duties were greatly lowered, or entirely removed, on the products of these countries.

"I am," said he, "thoroughly convinced of the advisability of knitting closely our relations with the States of this Continent, and no effort on my part shall be wanting to accomplish a result so consonant with the constant policy of this country and in the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine, which, in excluding foreign political interference, recognizes the common interest of the States of North and South America. It is the history of all diplomacy that close political relations and friendship spring from unity of commercial interests. The true plan, it seems to me, is to make a series of reciprocity treaties with the States of Central and South

America, taking care that those manufactures, and as far as is practicable those products, which would come into competition with our own manufactures and products should not be admitted to the free list. By these treaties we might secure for valuable consideration so as not to violate the most-favored-nation clause of other treaties, further substantial advantages. Such, for example, as the free navigation of their coasts, rivers and lakes.

“Indiscriminate reduction of duties on materials peculiarly the production of Central and South America would take from us the ability to offer reciprocity, and we would thus lose the opportunity to secure valuable trade. Removal of duties from coffee, without greatly cheapening its price, deprived us of the power to negotiate with the coffee-growing countries of Spanish-America highly advantageous reciprocity treaties, and indiscriminate reduction of duties on sugar would complete our inability to establish favorable commercial relations with those countries which form our natural market, and from which we are now almost entirely excluded. If we confine the reduction of duties on such articles as sugar and coffee to those Spanish-American countries which are willing to negotiate with us treaties of reciprocity, we cheapen these products for our own people and at the same time gain the control of those markets for the products of our fields and factories.”

STARTLING REVELATIONS.

The report of the House Committee, to which two of the above bills had been referred, was most elaborate and contained some startling revelations as to trade with these countries. It showed their total commerce in 1883 to be \$752,918,000, in which the United States participated only to the extent of \$142,282,000. It showed that their imports

to the United States amounted for that year to \$93,319,000, whereas we sent in turn to them only \$48,963,000. It quoted from the work of a recent commercial traveller through those States, to this effect:

“It always grieved me exceedingly, and was particularly offensive to my sense of the fitness of things, to find almost everything in the way of foreign merchandise, throughout the length and breadth of my routes, of European manufacture. At different points along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, in many cities of the plains, in various towns on the mountain slopes, on the apex of Potosi and on the tops of other Andean peaks higher than Mount Hood, I have gone into stores and warehouses and looked in vain—utterly in vain—for one single article of American manufacture. From the little pin with which the lady fastens her beau-catching ribbons to the grand piano with which she enlivens and enchants the hearts of all her household; from the tiniest thread and tack and tool needed in the mechanic arts to the largest plows and harrows and other agricultural implements and machines required for use on the farm—all these and other things, the wares and fabrics and light groceries and delicacies in common demand; the drugs and chemicals sold by the apothecary; the fermented, malt and spirituous liquors in the wine saloon; the stationery and fancy goods in the book-store; the furniture in the parlor and the utensils in the kitchen, are, with rare exceptions, of English, German, Spanish, or Italian manufacture. And what makes the matter still more unsatisfactory and vexatious to the North American and more expensive and otherwise disadvantageous to the South American, is that these articles are, as a general rule, inferior both in material and make to the corresponding article of American manufacture.”

The report favored the appointment of a commission to

these countries. A bill authorizing such commission was passed, and George H. Sharpe, New York, Solon O. Thacher, Kansas, and Thomas C. Reynolds, Missouri, were appointed Commissioners, with Mr. W. E. Curtis as Secretary. They sat in our principal cities, visited the countries of Central and South America, and made valuable reports from time to time.


On December 21, 1885, Mr. Townsend, of Illinois, reintroduced his resolution into the House, looking to an American Customs' Union. It was reported adversely, as was a bill providing for international arbitration. The same fatality befell similar bills in the Senate.

GROWTH OF THE COMMERCIAL THOUGHT.

On February 22, 1886, Senator Frye, of Maine, introduced an elaborate bill into the Senate "to promote the political progress and commercial prosperity of the United States." It provided for an American International Congress at Washington on October 1, 1887, and suggested a list of subjects to be considered, which list embraced:


1. Measures of peace and prosperity.
2. An American Customs' Union.
3. Regular and frequent steamship lines.
4. Uniform system of customs regulations.
5. Uniform weights and measures.
6. A common silver coin.
7. A definite plan of arbitration.

On March 29, 1886, Mr. McCreary, of Kentucky, introduced in the House a bill "authorizing the President to arrange a conference for the purpose of encouraging peaceful and reciprocal commercial relations between the United States and Mexico, the Central American and South Amer-



HON. JOHN M. PALMER.

Born in Scott co., Ky., September 13, 1817; moved to Illinois, 1831; studied at Alton College; admitted to bar, 1839; elected Probate Judge of Macoupin co., 1843; member of Constitutional Convention, 1847; elected County Judge, 1848; elected to State Senate, 1852; elected to State Senate, 1855, as Anti-Nebraska Democrat; Delegate to Republican National Convention, 1856; candidate for Congress, 1859, on Republican ticket and defeated; member of Peace Conference, 1861; entered Union army (1861) as Colonel of 14th Illinois Regiment; promoted to Brigadier General, 1861; promoted to Major General, 1863; commanded 14th Army Corps, 1863; operated on Mississippi, with army of Cumberland and with Sherman to Atlanta; elected Governor of Illinois, 1868; nominated for Governor on Democratic ticket, 1888, and defeated; elected U. S. Senator, as Democrat, 1891.



STEPHEN M. WHITE.

Born in San Francisco, Cal., Jan. 19, 1853; graduated from Santa Clara College, 1871; admitted to practice of law, 1874; practiced and resided in Los Angeles co.; District Atty. of his co., 1882; Chairman of Dem. State Convention, 1884 and 1886; elected to State Senate, 1886; acting Lieut.-Governor, 1888; temporary President of Dem. Nat. Con. at St. Louis, 1888; Del. at Large to Dem. Nat. Con., 1892; elected to U. S. Senate, 1893; member of Committees on Census, Coast Defences, Commerce, Finance, Irrigation and Territories.

ican States." On the same day Mr. McKinley, of Ohio, introduced a bill favoring an Arbitration Conference.

On April 15, 1886, Mr. McCreary, of Kentucky, reported his bill from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, with a complete text and favorable report. It provided for an International Conference at Washington, and for "considering questions relating to the improvement of business intercourse between said countries, and to encourage such reciprocal commercial relations as will be beneficial to all and secure more extensive markets for the products of each of said countries."

NECESSITY FOR RECIPROCAL TRADE.

The report of the majority of the committee accompanying this bill was a very able one, and particularly valuable as a matter of economic and commercial history, and as coming from a committee not regarded as favorable to the reciprocity idea.

The report set forth among other things :

"The subject of establishing closer international relations between all the Republics of the American continent and also the Empire of Brazil, containing in the aggregate one hundred millions of people, for the purpose of improving the business intercourse between those countries and securing more extensive markets for the products of each, is both interesting and important. Sixty years ago this subject was discussed and a conference was suggested between representatives of our Government and the other Governments, and President John Quincy Adams appointed representatives to the Congress held at Panama to consider measures for promoting peace and reciprocal commercial relations between said countries. This Conference was beneficial, but at that time our people were looking more to Europe

for business and commerce than to the countries south of us, and no action was taken by our Congress. Now the United States is at peace with all the world and our population and wealth make this the foremost Republic of the world, and our Government should inaugurate the movement in favor of an American Conference.

"The present depression of business and low price of farm products are caused, to a considerable extent, by a limited market for our surplus products. Some of the best markets we can look to are not far beyond our southern border. They are nearer to us than to any other commercial nation. The people of Mexico and of Central and South America produce much that we need, and our abundant agricultural, manufactured, and mineral productions are greatly needed by them. These countries cover an area of 8,118,844 square miles, and have a population of 42,770,374. Their people recognize the superiority of our products, and desire more intimate business intercourse with our people, but the great bulk of their commerce and trade is with Europe. The Argentine Republic has from forty-five to sixty steamships running regularly between Buenos Ayres and European ports, and no regular line between that country and the United States, and our commercial facilities with the other republics of Central and South America are about the same.

"In 1884 our exports were valued at \$733,768,764.

"Of this amount we exported but \$64,719,000 to Mexico and South and Central America.

"Our annual mechanical and agricultural products are valued at \$15,000,000,000, while we seldom have sold more than \$75,000,000 worth of these products to our nearest neighbors, who buy in Europe at least five times as much as they get here.

"The total commerce of the countries named in 1883 was as follows: Imports, \$331,100,599; exports, \$391,294,781.

"Of the \$331,100,599 of merchandise sold to those countries, the share of the United States was only \$42,598,469; yet we are their closest neighbor.

"The disparity of our trade with Peru, Chili, Argentine Republic and Brazil is both amazing and humiliating.

To	From Great Britain.	From United States.
Peru.....	\$6,235,685	\$743,105
Chili.....	11,060,880	2,211,007
Argentine Republic.....	29,692,295	4,317,293
Brazil.....	33,946,215	7,317,293

"The consumption of cotton goods in Central and South America and in Mexico amounts to nearly \$100,000,000 annually, and although they are so near our cotton-fields, England furnishes about 95 per cent. of these goods.

"Cotton fabrics constitute the wearing apparel of nearly three-fourths of those people, and they have to import all they use.

"England monopolizes this trade because of her cheap transportation facilities, and because her mills furnish goods especially adapted to the wants and tastes of the consumers, which our mills have never attempted to produce.

"It is very important that transportation facilities between the United States and her southern neighbors should be improved; for as long as the freight from Liverpool, Hamburg and Bordeaux is \$15 a ton, they cannot be induced to pay \$40 a ton to bring merchandise from the United States.

"There is not a commercial city in these countries where the manufacturers of the United States cannot compete with

their European rivals in every article we produce for export.

"The report of the South American Commission shows, by the testimony of the importing merchants of those countries, that aside from the difference in cost and convenience in transporting, it is to their advantage to buy in the United States, because the quality of our products is superior, and our prices are usually as low as those of Europe."

AN OPPOSING VIEW.

Mr. Belmont presented a minority, and opposing, report to the above bill. In discussing it from a commercial standpoint, he made quite prominent a fact, if not a principle, though unintended on his part, that was fully recognized when reciprocity was introduced into the Tariff Act of 1890. He said:

"Nothing is now so desirable for our own people as a free and reciprocal interchange of products between ourselves and the people of other nations on this continent. But what now hinders such free interchange so much as our tariff laws? If this Government shall invite Brazil, Mexico and the Republics of Central America and South America to join us in a conference to promote such free and reciprocal interchange of products, what concessions in our tariff schedules is the President to be authorized to instruct our commissioners to propose on our part? The question of our own tariff will naturally and immediately come up for discussion and consideration. Shall, for example, our commissioners be authorized to offer to the Argentine Republic to admit its wool into our ports free of duty?

"No one can be more sensible than I am of the great advantages which in our country flow from that free commercial intercourse, **unvexed** by tariffs or custom-houses, which

the Federal Constitution secures. I wish by some possible and wise contrivance those advantages now enjoyed by and between Maine and California, Florida and Alaska, could be realized by and between every nation and every producer on this hemisphere from Baffin's Bay to Cape Horn. But is this Government now in condition to successfully ask in a diplomatic way the accomplishment of such a result? To use Mr. Gladstone's language, should we not first of all begin to govern ourselves in tariff matters with 'justice and moderation?' And then, too, does opinion in this House tend to tolerate a reform or protective system by treaties?

"One of the difficulties with which we in the United States have now to contend is that, by reason of our present tariff laws, we cannot in our own workshops compete with European manufacturers, notwithstanding the great advantage we have from the efficiency of better paid and better educated labor. So long as such tariff laws shall be maintained it is not believed that any diplomatic negotiations will enable the United States to do in the Dominion of Canada, or in Mexico, or in Central America, or in South America what we cannot do at home—which is to compete with European manufacturers. Freedom to *buy* in these communities we now have, and we can enlarge its use to any degree, but freedom to *sell* to those communities we can only enlarge by producing equally good articles which we will sell at least as cheaply as our European competitors. All schemes whatever for retaining a protective system and gaining foreign markets are impossible of success, no matter how many railways we may build or steamships we may subsidize. It will be seen from the statistics already given that a large part of the products of our neighbors to the south of us are now admitted at our custom-houses free of duty, but the difficulty of increasing the exports of our

manufactured products to those countries remains, because our protective tariff inflicts what, owing to the increased cost of manufacture, is in effect *an export tax* upon our products, which frustrates the efforts of our enterprising and inventive people to have more complete possession of the neighboring markets upon this continent."

ARGUMENTS FOR RECIPROCITY.

It was not until May 6, 1886, that Senator Frye's bill, before alluded to, was reported to the Senate by the Committee on Foreign Relations. Its provisions were very like those of the McCreary bill. It was accompanied by a still more elaborate report than that in the House, which report included the reports made from time to time by the commissioners who had visited the Central and South American countries. This report, or, rather, these reports, left little to be added upon the propriety of an international conference, and the necessity for reciprocity in trade and commerce. We first use the language of Commissioner Thacher:—

"The peculiarities of the Latin race in America lead it away from manufacturing pursuits. Valencia centuries ago imported wool from England and returned it in cloths, but the process is now reversed.

"Great Britain manufactures for the world, and Spain, with all the colonies she planted, contributes to her commercial supremacy.

"In Spain there is cheap fuel and plenty of water-power. In Spanish America, from Mexico to Magellan, there are few coal-fields, but almost everywhere flowing streams, furnishing the cheapest and most abundant power.

"Guatemala, Costa Rica, the western slopes of the Andes, Uruguay, and portions of the Argentine Republic have un-

failing and enormous stores of this easily-used motor. Yet in Costa Rica I saw only two water-driven mills; in Guatemala there were a few more; yet not one-thousandth part of the water-power was utilized. The Rimac for nearly 70 miles is a dashing cascade, with only a tannery, a brewery, and possibly a few other industries at Lima holding in check for a few minutes its rushing flood.

“Chili in the Mopocho and the Maipo has powerful streams, and hundreds of smaller water-courses find their way to the ocean.

“The report from Uruguay calls attention to its internal water-power, and the statements submitted with the report from the Argentine Republic show how immense is the water-power in the Gran Chaco region.

“We must conclude, then, that the want of manufactured products in these countries grows out of either or both of two causes; the one a disinclination to take up the patient, steady routine of daily toil necessary to successful manufacturing, and the other a greater profitableness in other more congenial pursuits.

“Without dwelling on the point, I may say that it is safe to aver that these countries will for years be great consumers of foreign manufactured goods.

“In Chili the war with Peru demoralized the soldiers, many of whom were taken from the ordinary pursuits, and, returning from their conquest, failed to take up the peaceful avocations they left; and yet Chili is beyond doubt in manufacturing the New England of South America. The special report on this country fully covers this question.

“In any trade relations we may establish with those countries we may reasonably count on the permanence of the demand for our goods.

“The larger portion of the commerce we are seeking has

been in the hands of Great Britain, but of recent years another, and what promises to be a more formidable rival, has come to the front.

“The German manufacturers, intrenched behind encouraging and protecting legislative walls, have pushed their products far beyond the home demand. Always sure of their own market without competition, they have turned their unflagging energies to secure centers of trade in the Western Hemisphere. They are clever imitators of every new invention, of every improved machine, and of many of the most useful and popular goods produced in the United States. They send out counterfeits of the famous ‘Collins’ wares, even to the very brand; they make mowers and agricultural implements as nearly like ours as possible. Our sewing-machines are copied by these people, and the imitations are palmed off on the South American trade as coming from the United States. The character and ways of these new rivals for the trade of our neighbors is thus graphically portrayed by our former consul-general in Mexico, Mr. Strother, and I may add that what the German is in Mexico he is in all the other Central and South American nations.

“General Strother says:

“‘For the rest it will still remain with American manufacturers and merchants to solve the question of successful competition with their European rivals, the most formidable of whom at present are the Germans, whose commercial establishments are more substantially planted and more widely extended than those of any other foreign nation. And it may be well here to note their methods and the causes of their success. The German who comes to Mexico to establish himself in business is carefully educated for the purpose, not only in the special branch which he proposes

to follow, but he is also an accomplished linguist, being generally able to converse and correspond in the four great commercial languages—German, English, French, and Spanish. His enterprise is usually backed by large capital in the mother country. He does not come to speculate, or inflated with the hope of acquiring sudden fortune, but expecting to succeed in time by close attention, patient labor and economy, looking forward twenty, thirty, or even forty years for the realization of his hopes. He builds up his business as one builds a house, brick by brick, and with a solid foundation. He can brook delays, give long credits, sustain reverses, and tide over dull times. He never meddles with the politics of the country; keeps on good terms with its governors, whoever they may be. He rarely makes complaints through his minister or consul, but if caught evading the revenue laws, or in other illegal practices, he pays his fine and goes on with his business. With these methods and characteristics, the German merchant generally succeeds in securing wealth and the respect of any community in which he may have established himself.

“In a conversation with the British minister, Sir Spencer St. John, in Mexico, he observed to me that the success of the Germans in dealing with the revenue officials and in pushing their trade had driven out of Mexico every wholesale English house, whereas the foreign commerce was once largely in the hands of his countrymen.

“In passing from this point we must not forget that notwithstanding all this copying of our productions by the German manufacturer, yet the deception deceives few, and that were the markets open to our dealers the superior material, workmanship, and fidelity of our goods would defy all competition.

“The French, equally protected by home legislation and

alive to the wants of the South American markets, are increasing their trade there.

"Indeed we must meet in the ports of our neighbors the wares of many of the European countries, all of which are borne to their destination in vessels flying their own national ensign."

FURTHER ARGUMENTS.

Mr. Reynolds, another of the Commissioners, discussed the reciprocal trade idea still more ably and exhaustively, and in fact left the matter in such shape as that the system of practical reciprocity incorporated into the Act of 1890 was the inevitable outcome of his logic. He says:

"Among the means to secure more intimate commercial relations between the United States and the several countries of Central and South America, suggested in the first report of the Commission to those States (transmitted by the President to Congress on February 13, 1885, and printed as Ex. Doc. No. 226), were the following (p. 4): 'Commercial treaties with actual and equivalent reciprocal concessions in tariff duties.' As the words 'actual and equivalent, were adopted at my suggestion, an explanation of their full force may not be superfluous. A stipulation in a treaty that certain products of one country shall be admitted free, or at a reduced duty, into another country, may, on paper, appear to offer a reciprocal concession for a like admission of certain other products of the latter country into the former. But the seeming effect of it may be neutralized in various ways, so that it will be, to the one country or the other, not an actual concession. Chief among those ways are, the existence of treaties with other nations, placing them on the footing of the 'most favored nation,' export duties, home bounties, drawbacks, monopolies, and muni-

cipal or other local taxation. The skill of the diplomatist, aided by information from consuls, merchants, shippers, and other experts in the question, should be exerted to frame the treaty so as to prevent the defeat of its real object by such collateral disadvantages and burdens. To explain them, or point out modes of removing them, severally, would unduly extend the length of this letter.

“But one of them, the ‘most favored nation clause,’ deserves special consideration. It is understood that Great Britain, Germany, and probably other countries, claim that a reciprocity treaty with the United States by a Spanish American country applies to them, under that clause in their treaties with the last-mentioned country, with the same effect as if their names had been in the treaty instead of or along with that of the United States. For example, should the United States, resuming import duties on coffee, grant to Brazil freedom from them, on the ‘reciprocal concession’ that flour and certain American manufactures should be admitted free into that Empire, Great Britain, which consumes very little coffee of any kind, and probably none from Brazil, would claim the same freedom for her like manufactures. Thus, in return for our being customers of Brazil, in coffee to the amount of about \$50,000,000 annually, Great Britain, offering no ‘equivalent’ concession in fact, would still be able to drive (or rather, keep) us out of the Brazilian market for those manufactures which she can supply more cheaply or with greater facility through her lines of steamers.

“After much thought on the subject, I have found no surer mode of making reciprocity ‘equivalent’ than by expressing in the treaty itself, and as a condition of it, the real object of every reciprocity treaty, the actual and equivalent increase of the commerce between the parties to it. For

illustration, should the United States make a reciprocity treaty with Spain for certain concessions designed to increase our exports to Cuba, in consideration of a reduction of our duties on Cuban sugars, the treaty should provide, that that reduction should exist only as long as Cuba imported from the United States at least a certain fixed amount in value annually, and Spain might justly require a like condition as to the annual amount of our imports of Cuban sugars. The custom-house returns of the two countries would readily fix the respective amounts, and the reciprocity of the treaty, whenever it ceased to be actual and equivalent, could be suspended by a proclamation of the President, on due notice to be provided for in the treaty.

“As it is undeniable, and even generally admitted, that the ‘most favored nation clause’ entitles a country having the privilege of it to be merely ‘on all fours’ with any other nation, and share the advantages of it only on the identical conditions accompanying them, such a proviso as that above mentioned would effectually block the diplomatic game which Germany is understood to have played upon us in Mexico, by claiming for herself the *benéfits* of our recent reciprocity treaty with that Republic. Taking, in fact, no sugar and little tobacco or anything else from Mexico, she sagaciously offers to remit her duties on them, and claims for her exports to that Republic, mainly in manufactures, the same concessions it made to the United States in order to increase the exports of its own products to our country. With such a proviso as that above suggested, Germany would be beaten on her own diplomatic ground. Mexico would be obligated by the ‘most favored nation clause’ only to offer to Germany the same treaty, *mutatis mutandis*, her name taking the place of that of the United States. As her imports from Mexico would not compare with ours, such a

treaty would give her no actual advantage over us. So, also, with Cuba in her commerce with Germany, and probably, also, with Great Britain and France. No one of those countries (France and Germany making their own beet-root sugar, and Great Britain being supplied principally by her own colonies) would be able to take from Cuba the amount of sugars which would be the treaty 'equivalent' for the concessions made to the United States.

"Another important consideration in deciding what kind of a reciprocity treaty to make, or whether to make it at all, is the effect it would have on some equally advantageous indirect trade. By driving out of some South American market some other country which trades with us, we may diminish the purchasing power of that country in our own markets, and increased indirect trade with the former may not compensate us for a loss of trade with the latter. In this connection, the effect of several misused terms is to be deprecated. Generally when our imports from and exports to any particular country do not balance at all, the very bad English is common of speaking of a 'balance of trade' for or against us. It is refreshing to notice that in the reports of our Bureau of Statistics that improper phrase is discarded, and the difference between exports and imports is described as an excess of one over the other. An excess of imports over exports in a particular venture may represent a gain, and not a loss. A familiar illustration is that of a Boston ship which, in former times, would take a cargo belonging to the ship's owner, worth, say, \$100,000, to China, and return with one, also belonging to the same owner, worth twice the amount. The difference, being the returns for the expenses of the voyage, the profit in China on the original venture, and that in Boston on the return cargo, would be all gain. The same may be the case with the entire com-

merce of one country with another, as could be amply shown from the statistics of British trade with Asia, given in Mr. Frelinghuysen's letter on the 'Commerce of the world.' Of course, in some other special case it might be otherwise.

"Another very general error is to treat an excess of imports over exports in our trade with a particular country as a difference which we pay in cash. This is rarely, if ever, the case. It is usually paid in exchange on some other country, obtained by selling to it our own products. Brazil affords a very fair illustration. We take from that Empire directly products many millions in value in excess of what we send directly to it. That excess is paid for by exchange on London, based on our exports of provisions, cotton, etc., and with that exchange the Brazilian pays for English manufactures to be sent to Rio. The indirect trade may be different. The Englishman may sell his manufactures in Brazil, convert the proceeds directly, or indirectly by purchase of exchange, into coffee, with the proceeds of which in New York he purchases provisions to be sent to England. In either case the result is the same. England gains some profit in exchange, as London is the world's money centre, and in freights which her ships carry. But to the extent to which England is crippled in her sales to Brazil, her purchasing power in our provision markets may be diminished.

"Therefore, before making a reciprocity treaty, we should carefully consider, in each particular case, whether, even with the profits in exchange and shipping in a direct trade, we may not be losing a more profitable commerce in a different direction, by diminishing the power of others of our regular customers to purchase products from us."

A STILL FURTHER VIEW.

Mr. Curtis, Secretary of the Commission and afterwards a

Commissioner, added a very interesting report, which still further elaborated the necessity for reciprocal trade. He said :—

“ During the last twenty years the value of the exports from the United States to the Spanish Americans was \$442,048,975, and during that time we purchased of them raw products to the amount of \$1,185,828,579, showing an excess of imports during the twenty years amounting to \$765,992,219, which was paid in cash. It will thus be seen that our commerce with Central and South America has left a very large balance on the wrong side of the ledger, while those countries have all the time been buying in Europe the very merchandise we have for sale. Being the very reverse of the United States in climate and resources, they constitute our natural commercial allies, and the exchange should at least be even ; but they sell their raw products here and buy their manufactured articles in Europe. The principal reason for this is that the carrying trade is in the hands of Englishmen. The statistics show, that, of the total imports into the United States from Spanish America, which, in 1884, amounted to \$159,000,000, three-fourths were carried in foreign vessels. Of our exports to those countries, amounting last year to \$64,000,000, \$46,000,000 were carried in American vessels, while only \$18,000,000 were carried by foreign vessels. It will thus be seen that nearly everything we buy is brought to us from Spanish America by Englishmen, while nearly everything we sell we have to carry there ourselves. The logic of these facts is irresistible.


“ The most absurd spectacle in the commercial world is the trade we carry on with Brazil. We buy nearly all her raw products, while she spends the money we pay for them in England and France.

“ In 1884, of the exports of Brazil \$50,266,000 went to

the United States, \$29,000,000 to England, and \$24,000,000 to France. Of the imports of Brazil in 1884, \$35,000,000 came from England, \$15,000,000 from France, and \$8,000,000 from the United States.

“Another peculiar feature of this commerce was that of the exports of Brazil to the United States \$32,000,000 were carried in English vessels and \$9,000,000 in American vessels, while of her imports from the United States \$6,000,000 were carried in American vessels and only \$2,000,000 in English vessels. The trade is carried on by triangular voyages. Two lines of steamships sailing under the British flag load every week at Rio for New York. Arriving at the latter port they place their cargoes of coffee and hides in the hands of commission merchants, and sail for Europe, where they draw against these consignments, and buy Manchester cotton, Birmingham hardware, and other goods which they carry to Brazil. During the last twenty years this absurd spectacle has cost the United States \$600,000,000, every cent of which has gone into the pockets of English and French manufacturers. We have not only paid for the goods that England has sold Brazil, but as we have had no banking connections with that country and no ships on the sea, nearly every ton of this commerce has paid a tax to English bankers and vessel-owners.

“Several years ago, when we removed the import tax on coffee, Brazil put an export duty on, so that the attempt of Congress to secure a cheap breakfast for the workingman simply resulted in diverting several million dollars from the treasury of the United States into the treasury of Brazil, without changing the price of the article. Mexico and the countries washed by the Caribbean Sea produce a better quality of coffee than is grown in Brazil, and if the United States Government would consent to discriminate against



HON. SHELBY M. CULLOM.

Born in Wayne co., Ky., November 22, 1829; next year parents moved to Tazewell co., Ill.; educated at academy and university; admitted to bar in Springfield and practiced there; elected to State Legislature, 1856, 1860, 1872, 1874; was Speaker in 1861 and 1873; elected a Representative to 39th, 40th and 41st Congresses; elected Governor of Illinois in 1876, and re-elected in 1880; resigned, February 5, 1883, to accept seat in United States Senate, as a Republican, and successor to Hon. David Davis; re-elected in 1888 and again in 1894; father of the Inter-State Commerce Law; Chairman of Committee on Inter-State Commerce, and member of Committees on Census, Foreign Relations, etc.



HON. ISHAM G. HARRIS.

Born in Franklin co., Tenn.; educated at Winchester Academy; admitted to bar at Paris, Tenn., 1841; elected as Democrat to State Legislature, 1847; elected to Congress as Democrat to represent Ninth Congressional District, 1849; re-elected in 1851; moved to Memphis and continued law practice; elected Governor of State in 1857, 1859 and 1861; served during war as Aid to Commanding General of Confederate Army of Tennessee; resumed law practice at Memphis, 1867; elected the United States Senate in 1876; re-elected 1883, 1889, and 1895; an able debater, earnest statesman of the strict-construction school, and popular with his constituents.

Brazilian coffee, raised by slave labor, the nations of Central America and the Spanish Main would reciprocate by admitting free to their ports our flour, lumber, provisions, lard, dairy products, kerosene, and other articles which are now kept from the common people by an almost prohibitory tariff.

“Brazil is in such a critical condition, financially and commercially, that if we did not buy her coffee it would rot on the trees, and the Englishmen who control her foreign commerce would have to close their warehouses and throw all the Brazilian planters into the bankrupt court. These Englishmen have secured mortgages upon the plantations of Brazil by supplying the planters with merchandise on credit and taking the crop at the end of the season in payment; but as the crop seldom pays the advances, the mortgages have been lapping over upon the plantations, until now the Englishmen have the Brazilians by the throat, making their own terms, charging one profit on the merchandise sold, another as interest on the advances, a third on the coffee purchased, and a fourth as interest on payments deferred, while they make three profits out of us: first, on coffee they sell us; second, on transportation charges; third, in discounting our bills on London.

“The greater part of our exports to Spanish America go to Mexico and the West Indies. Deducting these from the total, it will be found that we buy over 30 per cent. of what the South American countries have for sale, and furnish them only 6 per cent. of their imports. The balance of trade goes on piling up at the rate of nearly \$100,000,000 a year. This was not always so. Twenty years ago more than half the commerce of this hemisphere was controlled by the merchants of New York, Boston, and Baltimore, and more than half the ships in its harbors sailed from those

ports. Now only a small percentage of the carrying trade is done in American bottoms, while English ship-owners who control the transportation facilities permit the Spanish-American merchants to buy in this country only such goods as they cannot obtain elsewhere.

"The cause of this astonishing phenomenon is our neglect to furnish the ways and means of commerce. We can no more prevent trade following facilities for communication than we can repeal the law of gravity. While we have been pointing with pride at our internal development, England and France have been stealing our markets away from us. The problem of recovering them is easy of solution. The States of Central and South America will buy what we have to sell if intelligent measures are used to cultivate the markets and means are provided for the delivery of the goods.

"The Spanish-American nations seek political intimacy with the United States, and look to this, the mother of republics, for example and encouragement. They recognize and assert the superiority of our products. They offer and pay subsidies to our ships. Brazil now pays \$100,000 a year as a subsidy to an American steamship line, while the United States Government paid only \$4,000 last year to the same line for carrying our mails. The Argentine Republic had a law upon its statute-books representing a standing offer of a subsidy of 96,000 silver dollars a year to any company that will establish a steamship line between Buenos Ayres and New York, under the American flag, and at the same time has twenty-one lines of steamships, sailing from forty-five to sixty vessels a month, between Buenos Ayres and the ports of Europe, to which it pays nothing. We have no steamship communication with the Argentine Republic whatever. During the last year, out of the millions of tons of shipping represented in the harbor

of that metropolis, there were no steamers from the United States, and our flag was seen upon but 2 per cent. of the sailing vessels. Here is a nation purchasing in Europe \$70,000,000 worth of merchandise every year, and only spending about \$4,000,000 in the United States, and these \$4,000,000 represent articles, such as petroleum, lumber, lard and other pork products, which could not elsewhere be obtained."

THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE.

The Senate passed the Frye bill on June 17, 1886, but it did not become a law until May 24, 1888, when the INTERNATIONAL AMERICAN CONFERENCE became a possibility.

It was for this Conference to give wider, fuller, more learned and disinterested consideration to the question of trade relations and reciprocal commerce between the American nations than ever before. It was called by the President to meet in Washington, October 2, 1889. Invitations were duly issued, and the Conference met with delegates present from Argentine, Bolivia, Brazil, Chili, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Hayti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Salvador, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Hon. James G. Blaine was elected President of the Conference. It remained in session until April, 1890, and discussed and reported upon all the subjects prescribed in the Act authorizing the call, to wit:—

Plan of Arbitration; Reciprocity Treaties; Inter-Continental Railway; Steamship Communication; Sanitary Regulations; Customs Regulations; Common Silver Coin; Patents and Trade Marks; Weights and Measures; Port Dues; International Laws; Extradition Treaties; International Bank.

In the discussions upon "Reciprocity Treaties," all of which were very able and interesting, two lines of thought appeared. That which represented all of the countries except Argentine and Chili, was in the direction of reciprocity, whose advantages were conceded, and whose practical operation needed but the encouragement of some acceptable concession on the part of the United States. The thought of Argentine and Chili seemed to be that reciprocity was impracticable, unless enlarged to suit the world, and that the United States was not yet so commercially strong, or was too hampered with her tariff system to offer the necessary concessions to all the nations. The attitude and the logic of these two States were fully met by the delegates of the United States in the Conference, showing in detail that the first stage of national growth is agricultural, the second is manufacturing, and the third is commercial. The first two stages with us have been reached, and we now enter upon the third. The same restless energy, the same enterprise, and the same inventive genius which gave success to agriculture and manufactures will mark the development of commerce.

"The spirit of enterprise begins to spread like contagion into Central America. Imagination already paints on her canals the commerce of the world. The locomotive is there a messenger of peace, the steel rail a bond of friendship.

"Colombia and Venezuela and Brazil and Ecuador and Peru already feel the irresistible impulse which impels to a closer union. The Argentine and Chili may hesitate for a time, but finally they too will join hands with their sister Republics, and joyfully assist to fulfil the bright destiny that awaits us all."

CONFERENCE REPORT AND BLAINE'S REVIEW.

The Conference adopted a Report which recognized the policy of reciprocity and the "need of closer and more reciprocal commercial relations among American States." Secretary Blaine submitted this Report to the President, June 19, 1890, with an exhaustive review of its contents. This review was so exhaustive, and is, moreover, such an important part of the literature of reciprocity, that inability to publish it here in full, for lack of space, is greatly regretted. But its gist was that out of a total of \$233,000,000 imports furnished to Chili and Argentine alone in 1888, England contributed \$90,000,000, Germany \$43,000,000, France \$34,000,000, the United States only \$13,000,000, and this, notwithstanding the facts that our ports were nearest, and the bulk of those imports were of articles we were actually manufacturing better and as cheaply as foreign nations.

That in 1868 our total exports were \$375,737,000, of which \$53,197,000, or 14 per cent., went to Spanish America, while in 1888 our total exports were \$742,368,000, of which \$69,273,000, or only 9 per cent., went to Spanish America.

That it was the unanimous judgment of the delegates that our exports to these countries and the other Republics could be increased to a great extent by the negotiations of proper reciprocity treaties.

That lack of means for reaching their markets was the chief obstacle in the way of increased exports. The carrying trade has been controlled by European merchants who have forbidden an exchange of commodities. Under liberal encouragement from the government and the establishment of regular steamship lines, France increased her exports to South America from \$8,292,000 in 1880 to \$22,996,000 in 1888. By the same means Germany increased her exports

to South America from \$2,365,000 in 1880 to \$13,310,000 in 1888.

That the Conference believes that while great profit would come to all countries under reciprocity treaties, the United States would be far the greatest gainer, and that especially since 87 per cent. of our imports from those countries came in duty free, while nearly all our exports to them were heavily dutiable at their ports, in some cases to the extent of prohibition.

That increased exports would draw alike from our farms, factories and forests, such being the character of the articles required by those countries. A steamer load from New York to Rio Janeiro, which was traced to its origin, as to the articles which comprised it, showed that thirty-six of our States and Territories had contributed to the cargo.

That, excepting raw cotton, our four largest exports are breadstuffs, provisions, petroleum and lumber. In 1889 our export of these articles was:—Breadstuffs, \$123,876,423, of which only \$5,123,528 went to Latin America; Provisions, \$104,122,328, of which only \$2,507,375 went thither; Petroleum, \$44,830,424, of which \$2,948,149 went thither; Lumber, \$26,907,000, of which \$5,039,886 went thither. Since the United States is almost the only source of supply for these articles, which rank as necessities of life, and there are 50,000,000 of population in Latin America, the advantages of a direct and larger trade are apparent.

That fifteen of the seventeen Republics in the Conference indicated their desire to enter upon reciprocal commercial relations with the United States; the remaining two expressed equal willingness, could they be assured that their advances would be favorably considered.

That to "escape the delay and uncertainty of treaties it

has been suggested that a practicable and prompt mode of testing the question was to submit an amendment to the pending tariff bill, authorizing the President to declare the ports of the United States free to all the products of any nation of the American hemisphere upon which no export duties are imposed, whenever and so long as such nation shall admit to its ports free of all national, provincial (state), municipal, and other taxes, our flour, corn-meal, and other breadstuffs, preserved meats, fish, vegetables and fruits, cotton-seed oil, rice and other provisions, including all articles of food, lumber, furniture and other articles of wood, agricultural implements and machinery, mining and mechanical machinery, structural steel and iron, steel rails, locomotives, railway cars and supplies, street cars, and refined petroleum. These particular articles are mentioned because they have been most frequently referred to as those with which a valuable exchange could be readily effected. The list could no doubt be profitably enlarged by a careful investigation of the needs and advantages of both the home and foreign markets.

“The opinion was general among the foreign delegates that the legislation herein referred to would lead to the opening of new and profitable markets for the products of which we have so large a surplus, and thus invigorate every branch of agricultural and mechanical industry. Of course the exchanges involved in these propositions would be rendered impossible if Congress in its wisdom should repeal the duty on sugar by direct legislation, instead of allowing the same object to be attained by the reciprocal arrangement suggested.”

RECIPROCITY AND THE ACT OF 1890.

We have now reached a period in the history of reciprocity when it was to be given practical application, out-

side of the usual form of prolix and uncertain treaty, and in the form of a specific enactment or declaration. The proposition, just above noted, to incorporate it as a policy in our Tariff laws, was at first received with misgivings by the most ardent friends of protection. They doubted the propriety of introducing it into strictly tariff legislation, lest it might endanger the success of such legislation, or at least subtract from the strength and efficacy of some of the protective doctrines.

But the matter was persistently urged upon the attention of those who had the Tariff Act of 1890 in charge. The more it was studied the more it grew in favor. The literature bearing upon it, the facts it embraced, the theories and promises involved, proved startling and convincing. The administration saw that it could well afford to accept it as a measure and abide by its consequences. Political lines began to harden respecting it, and the one party shrank not from its advocacy nor the other from attack upon it. Thus it ripened, and the Tariff Act of 1890 became its opportunity, not only as to time, but as to the fact that the contemplated enlargement of the free list, by the removal of millions of duties from sugars and other articles, would provide the concessions to other nations necessary for a fair and perhaps successful trial of it, in the proposed way.

At last it found its place in the pending Tariff Act—the Tariff Act of 1890—as Section 3 of the Free List. It reads :—

“That with a view to secure reciprocal trade with countries producing the following articles, and for this purpose, on and after the first day of January, 1892, whenever and so often as the President shall be satisfied that the government of any country producing and exporting sugars, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides raw and uncured, or any of such

articles, imposes duties or other exactions upon the agricultural or other products of the United States, which in view of the free introduction of such sugar, molasses, coffee, tea and hides into the United States he may deem to be reciprocally unequal and unreasonable, he shall have the power, and it shall be his duty to suspend, by proclamation to that effect, the provisions of this Act relating to the free introduction of such sugar, molasses, coffee, tea and hides, the production of such country, for such time as he shall deem just, and in such case and during such suspension duties shall be levied, collected and paid upon sugar, molasses, coffee, tea and hides, the product of or exported from such designated country, as follows:—”

Here follow the rates in detail, the rate on sugar being from 7-10th of a cent per pound to 2 cents per pound according to test; on molasses 4 cents a gallon; on coffee 3 cents per pound; on tea 10 cents per pound; and on hides 1½ cents per pound.

APPLIED RECIPROCITY.

By the middle of March, 1892 (March 15), all the countries of the American Continent south of the United States had either assented to the doctrine of reciprocal trade as incorporated in the McKinley Act of 1890, or had entered into negotiations which looked to a speedy acceptance of the doctrine, with the exceptions of Venezuela, Hayti and Colombia. The refusal of these three to join in reciprocity as offered by the Act of 1890 led to an event which marked the second stage of the reciprocity policy. Their refusal being complete, for the time being at least, President Harrison, under the powers conferred upon him by the Act, issued his proclamation to them, imposing on their sugars, molasses, coffees, teas and raw hides, exported to the United

States and entered at its ports, the duties provided for in the Act, which duties were, as to sugars and molasses, less than under the Act of 1883, or the Mills Bill, and amounted to three cents a pound on coffee, ten cents a pound on tea, and one and one half cents per pound on hides.

These duties, therefore, as to coffee, tea and hides, became really discriminative, for these articles were, and had been for a long time, upon the free list of the United States. They were ratably discriminative as to sugar and molasses, which articles had just gone upon our free list; but then, these three countries did not export sugar to the United States.

In order to meet this stage of the reciprocity policy, those who opposed it with the objection that the Act of 1890 was unconstitutional, as conferring upon the Executive powers which belonged wholly to the Legislative branch of the government, carried a test case into the United States Supreme Court. That tribunal decided that the power conferred upon the President by the Act was not unconstitutional, that the Congress had legislated as clearly respecting the duties to be imposed upon the products of dissenting countries as it had in the regular schedules of the Act, and that the only exceptional feature of the legislation, which was that the President should be left to ascertain the date when a country refused to accept reciprocity, was not fatal to the Act, since it was a fact only which had to be ascertained, and a fact which would have to be ascertained out of the State Department in any event.

At this stage, too, reciprocity met renewed and active opposition in the form of arguments as to its cost to the people of this country. The exports to the United States of the three dissenting countries were, in 1890, as follows:—

	<i>Coffee.</i>	<i>Hides.</i>
Venezuela.....	\$9,662,207	\$812,347
Colombia.....	1,849,441	630,099
Hayti.....	1,270,247	30,391
	\$12,781,895	\$1,472,837

Taking the above item of coffee, which represented an export of about 76,000,000 pounds, these opponents argued that this quantity of coffee, which was about fifteen per cent. of our entire annual supply—500,000,000 pounds—would, at three cents a pound, subject our people to a tax of \$2,280,000 per annum.

To this the friends of reciprocity answered:—that if this duty of three cents a pound were levied upon these coffees it would prove not only discriminating but prohibitory, for these countries could not afford to compete with other coffee-growing countries in a market which was free to them. Therefore, in as much as no coffee could come to us from these dissenting countries, our people would have no duties to pay. But, said the opposition, in that event our annual supply of coffee will be reduced, and we will have to pay more for what does come. To this the answer was, that there is no market for those coffees except in the United States, and that as they would have to come here ultimately, the only condition upon which they could be marketed was by the payment of the duty by the producers; that is to say, they would have to throw off the duty in order to enter the market on the same footing as other countries. And the further answer was given, that even if these coffees never reached our market, the vacuum occasioned thereby would be only temporary, and would be speedily filled by Mexico, Central America and Brazil. As an assurance of this, it was pointed out that all the coffee-

growing countries, notably Brazil, that had accepted reciprocity, were already experiencing improvement in their industrial interests, and feeling the impetus of enlarged trade with the United States.

ACCEPTANCE OF RECIPROCITY.

This stage of the reciprocity policy had been anticipated by all the important sugar-producing countries, or a sufficient number of them to place ninety-five per cent. of our raw sugar supply under the regulation of reciprocity conventions. The Spanish West Indies, whence forty-two per cent. of our supply is derived, Germany, the British West Indies, Hawaii, the Philippines, San Domingo, Brazil, Austria-Hungary, France and colonies, Central America, Mexico, had either accepted reciprocity or called conventions for that purpose. Many of these countries had maintained high rates of duty against exports from the United States, some had imposed prohibitive rates, a few had forbidden altogether the entry of our products, American pork for instance, into their ports.

The concessions granted by these countries in their reciprocity conventions have resulted in opening their ports to a large class of the products of the United States, either by removing duties on them entirely, or by reducing said duties to a minimum. Germany, by her reciprocity agreement, admitted free, or at reduced rates of duty, American meats, fruits, cereals, furniture and farming utensils. France did the same thing, and so of the various countries whose commercial interests were touched by the enlargement of the free list of imports into the United States under the Act of 1890, and the introduction of the reciprocity policy as a provision of said Act.

Of course it would require time to demonstrate by

actual figures the effects of reciprocity on the commerce of the nations interested. Yet very soon figures were obtainable showing an increase of exports to and imports from such countries. Brazil accepted the policy of reciprocity, April 1, 1891. In nine months her imports to the United States showed a total of \$79,183,238, as against a total of \$52,861,398 for the corresponding nine months of 1890. The exports from this country showed \$11,555,447 as against \$10,081,871, in the months above mentioned.

The reciprocity treaty with Spain which took effect September 1, 1891, was followed in four months by an importation of \$14,950,868, as against \$11,782,023, for the corresponding four months of 1890. In the same four months the exports were \$7,063,222, as against \$4,816,029, in the corresponding months of 1890.

These indications continued to be supported by statistics, and in cumulative form, till the principle of reciprocity was swept out of our economic system by the passage of the Wilson Tariff Bill of 1894. That act rendered nugatory all the reciprocity treaties with other nations, and instead of what was known as reciprocal relations, came a system of retaliations, especially on the part of Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, Holland, Denmark and Spain which worked great injury to the agricultural interests of this country. They excluded our flour, meats, live animals and agricultural implements to an extent that amounted almost to prohibition, so that what bade fair under reciprocity, to become an even balance of trade was turned into the old channels against us. Thus in 1895, the Republics to the south of us sold us products, admitted practically free of duty, to the extent of \$246,000,000 while in the same year we only exported to them goods to the value of \$143,000,000, every ounce of which was

taxed from five to one hundred per cent. on its value in their custom houses. The balance of trade against us, \$103,000,000, was paid for in gold.

The gain from the incorporation of reciprocity into our economy under the tariff act of 1890 was sufficiently manifest to furnish the basis of intelligent argument, when it was swept away by the Wilson Tariff Act of 1894. It is sad to contemplate that a doctrine which promised so much should have been so summarily expelled. And the regret over its expulsion is all the deeper from the fact that those who ejected it charged its advocates with taking a step toward free trade, the very doctrine they themselves sought to apply as fully as they could in the Wilson Tariff Bill of 1894.

Aside from partyism and all narrow theory the doctrine of reciprocity is one which deserves the broadest study and, as this country is situated, the fairest of trials. It is a policy really far removed from mere parties and politics, and is a matter of truly national and international import, all of whose features are economic and commercial.

It was thought that its incorporation into our commercial polity was a declaration on the part of the United States that it had reached a place among commercial nations where it was no longer a law into itself, but that in order to compete with the older nations in the markets of the world, it would have to strive as they were doing for legitimate supremacy. Happily for our civilization, the incorporation of reciprocity into our statutes proposed only a peaceful solution of social and economic problems and an amicable assertion of our industrial supremacy and independence.

WHAT EUROPE SAW AND DID.

One must contrast this American purpose with that of the nations of Europe, who would not willingly lose their trade with the Republics to the south of us, but would maintain it with every art known to their diplomacy, all the ingenuity and force born of superiority, all the finesse bred by ages of shrewdness and self-assertion. England, especially seems to have been deeply impressed with the magnitude of the new commercial departure on the part of the United States, and with her usual astuteness earliest foresaw its effects on her markets in Central and South America Countries. Her press became bitter in its denunciations of the new policy, and when the difficulty with Chile arose, the same press made it all too plain that there was concerted effort on the part of English diplomats to crush out intercourse, commercial and social, with our continental neighbor. The United States could not have gone to war with Chile, except by fighting England either openly, or under cover of deeply disguised diplomacy. The English idea of reciprocity being that it involves the principle of *lex talionis*, or law of revenge, "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth," it would have been easy for her to find arguments or excuses for frustrating all our efforts toward more intimate trade relations with all South American Countries. Our imbroglio with Chile made the fact almost patent that foreign nations stood ready to challenge our right to entrench on their commercial domains by means of reciprocity, and their anxiety and attitude showed that they were more fully aware of the effects of reciprocity on their trade in these countries than even our wisest statesmen and shrewdest merchants had been. This attitude of foreign nations

was the greatest compliment that could have been paid to reciprocity as an economic principle and commercial force.

England, France, Germany and Italy had for generations been engaged in a neck and neck race for the markets of Mexico, Central America and South America. They had used every art of diplomacy and all the genius of commerce to head off rivalry and establish supremacy. They manufactured and priced and labelled with specific intent to occupy these markets. They established lines of steamers, whose gauge and velocity were best adapted for intercourse. They subsidized ocean transit to secure dispatch. They loaned credit on most dangerous securities. They sent drummers, agents and other interested parties to prospect, represent and persuade. They formed huge syndicates which took possession of immense inland interests, like the Peruvian nitre beds, and worked them with untold profit. The result was that they came to own and control the markets of South America. The productions of these countries, destined for the United States, came to us in the ships of Europe, and by way of European ports, where they paid the rich bounty of ocean freight and the inevitable commissions for handling, that the European merchant has ever been privileged to suck from the world's goods in transit. Two or three steamers a month sufficed to carry to South American countries all they cared to take from us in the shape of our products. The bulk of what they sold to us—many times over and over again in value what we sold to them—was paid for in gold, through European houses, with another commission for negotiation.

Europe saw that every bill of goods we could place to our credit in a South American port would be deducted from her account. Hence her nervousness, her hostility



HON. JAMES Z. GEORGE.

Born in Monroe co., Ga., October 20, 1826; moved to Mississippi when young; participated in Mexican war; studied law and admitted to practice in Carroll co.; elected Reporter of Appellate Court, 1854 and 1860; reported ten volumes of reports and published a digest of decisions; member of Secession Convention, 1861; Brigadier-General in Confederate army; Chairman of Democratic State Executive Committee, 1875-76; appointed a Judge of State Supreme Court, 1879; elected Chief-Justice; elected to United States Senate, 1881; re-elected 1886 and 1892; member of the Mississippi Constitutional Convention, 1890; member of Committees on Agriculture, Education and Labor, Judiciary, Transportation, etc.



HON. JOSEPH B. FORAKER.

Born near Rainsborough, Ohio, July 5, 1846; enlisted from farm in 89th Ohio Regiment; served in army of Cumberland till close of war; Sergeant in 1862; First Lieutenant in 1864; Captain in 1865; Aide to General Slocum; after war entered Wesleyan University; graduated at Cornell, 1869; studied law and admitted to bar; Judge of Cincinnati Superior Court, 1879-82; nominated as Republican candidate for Governor in 1883, and defeated; re-nominated in 1885 and elected; re-nominated, but defeated by Governor Campbell in 1889; noted for fiery eloquence and devotion to cause of soldiers; elected to U. S. Senate, 1896, to succeed Hon. Calvin S. Brice, whose term expires March 3, 1897.

to American reciprocity. She could not, she would not, sit idly by and witness this threatened inroad into her trade, this disturbance of the commercial nests she had built and snugly feathered in Central and South America. In affairs of this kind, and amid such conditions, affairs and conditions which concern only national pocketbooks and national prestige, there is absolutely no sentiment, nothing to be hoped for from real or imaginary national condescension or sympathy. We must have expected just what came, unless all history belied itself, to wit, the criticism, the antagonism, the counter efforts of the nations whose interests were touched and whose trade was threatened. We must have expected even more, and that was preparation on our part to hold what we could gain, on the principle that our right to obtain was equal with the right of any other nation, and in a geographic sense more natural than with any nation across the sea. What we could not have anticipated was that this country itself should be the first to strike the blow looked for only from other countries, and that at a time when the experiment of reciprocity gave every guarantee of repeating commercially the history which led to the Monroe Doctrine in diplomacy and politics.

When the Monroe Doctrine was announced, and on every occasion that has required its re-assertion, it was notice to Europe that the American republics constituted a political system so continental, unique and independent, that monarchical interference with it would not be tolerated. The introduction of reciprocity into American commerce in 1890, was regarded as a departure of equal moment with that political departure of Monroe in 1823. It was looked upon as the beginning of a continental era looking to commercial freedom and independence, and as

likely to result in the commercial emancipation and solidarity of American countries, as that of Monroe did politically.

REPEAL OF RECIPROCITY.

The life of the reciprocity experiment was unhappily short. What was most unfortunate about it was that it was forced to bow to the behests of party. As has been seen, it was in no sense a party problem, but one of plain business. Its workings were of the purely economic order. To sustain it helped no party. To sacrifice it helped no party. No time had been given to ascertain its real worth, nor to assert as a fact that it had proven harmful. What time was given it, pointed to an outcome highly beneficial to the country, and which should have been the delight of all parties.

The passage of the Wilson Tariff Bill of 1894 left reciprocity without the sanction of law, left it to fall after an experimental life of four years. There had grown up about it, and by means of it, treaties with nearly every country to the south of us, and with many in Europe, establishing commerce on a reciprocal basis. These treaties were in operation when the Reciprocity Act was repealed by the Wilson Tariff Bill. They fell to the ground with that repeal, much to the regret of all the treaty countries, and to the anger and contempt of not a few of them. The milling interests, live stock industries, and manufactures of furniture and farming implements, in this country felt the loss of reciprocity to a lamentable extent. The largely increased export trade, especially to Cuba, Brazil and other important countries, which had come about under reciprocity, fell off and the old trade balance against us was reestablished. How heavy and ruinous

this balance was in 1895, has already been seen in this article.

As has already been intimated, the countries of Europe with whom reciprocity treaties had been made, entered their protests in our State Department against their repeal. These protests passed unheeded. They, therefore, began a system of retaliation by excluding our products from their ports, much to our commercial detriment, and especially to the injury of our agricultural interests. This humiliating and injurious warfare they could not carry on under the reciprocity treaties which pledged mutual consideration of international products entering into commerce.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE, AND VENEZUELA DISPUTE.

HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE.

THE dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela respecting the western boundary of British Guiana began with the cession of the Colony of British Guiana to Great Britain by Holland, under the Netherland treaty of 1814. Venezuela, in all her constitutions, declared her territorial limits to be that of the Captaincy-General of Venezuela, in 1810, but for prudential reasons was content with the general line of the Essequibo river as boundary between herself and British Guiana.

Great Britain never laid claim to a definite western boundary for her possessions till 1840, when she commissioned Sir Robert Schomburgk to lay down boundaries, which he did by means of landmarks and maps. Venezuela protested so vehemently against the Schomburgk boundary, that Great Britain was forced to explain that she regarded the line as only tentative, and as part of her plan to arrive at boundary conclusions between herself and Brazil as well as Venezuela. The monuments of the line were removed by the express orders of Lord Aberdeen, who in 1844, proposed another line, beginning at the river Moroco.

After 1840, Great Britain drew several lines, all more or less imaginary, but each one infringing more and more on Venezuela territory, and correspondingly enlarging

her own. None of these lines were predicated on legal right, and to all the assent of Venezuela was asked and denied. Each new claim to extended boundary brought up the question of arbitration in futile form, and each attracted the attention of the United States, sometimes as an invited arbiter, always as a party jealous of monarchical encroachment on western soil. The Granville line of 1881 started twenty-nine miles west of the Moroco river. The Rosebery line of 1886 increased the area of British Guiana from seventy-six thousand to one hundred thousand square miles. The Salisbury line of 1890, and the second Rosebery line of 1893, showed similar aggressiveness on the part of Great Britain. These later claims were followed by attempts at occupation and the exercise of jurisdiction, despite a solemn agreement made between the two countries, in 1850, that neither country should attempt permanent occupation pending the settlement of the dispute.

Throughout the entire dispute, Venezuela, as her only hope against a powerful adversary, repeatedly sought an understanding through arbitration. Her efforts were baffled, for various reasons, till in 1886 a treaty was drafted between her and Great Britain, which provided for a settlement of all boundary disputes by arbitration. This treaty was not ratified owing to the fall of the Gladstone ministry. Lord Salisbury, Gladstone's successor, refused to accede to the arbitration clause. To every subsequent appeal for arbitration, the answer of Great Britain was that arbitration could be had but only respecting such disputed territory as lay west of a line designated by herself.

Of course such an arbitrary condition was inadmissible by Venezuela, and owing to new appropriations of

territory by Great Britain, Venezuela, in 1887, suspended diplomatic relations, and protested before the British Government and the world "against the acts of spoliation committed to her detriment by the government of Great Britain, which she at no time and on no account will recognize as capable of altering in the least the rights which she has inherited from Spain, and respecting which she will ever be willing to submit to the decision of a third power."

Diplomatic relations were not afterward renewed between the two countries, but owing to further aggressions on the part of Great Britain, Venezuela was forced to resume negotiations respecting the boundary question. But her efforts of 1890 and 1893 failed, for the reason that Great Britain again refused to arbitrate, except as to territory west of an arbitrary line drawn by herself.

In 1893, further negotiations were broken off by another protest, and appeal of Venezuela to the world, in which it was stated that there was seemingly nothing left for her to do but to accept the painful and peremptory duty of providing for her own legitimate defence against the encroachments of Great Britain.

To put the entire British-Venezuela question into a few words, it then appears :

(1) The dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela is as to territory of indefinite but confessedly large extent.

(2) On account of the great strength of Great Britain, Venezuela can only hope to establish her claim through a direct agreement with her adversary, or by means of arbitration.

(3) The controversy has extended over half a century, with constantly varying claims on the part of Great

Britain, and persistent efforts on the part of Venezuela to establish a permanent boundary by agreement.

(4) The futility of seeking direct agreement induced Venezuela to ask and strive for arbitration for at least a quarter of a century.

(5) Great Britain has always and continuously refused to arbitrate except on condition that Venezuela would renounce a large part of her claim, and concede in advance a large share of the territory in controversy.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE DISPUTE.

There has never been a time when the United States, or for that matter, any American republic, could be indifferent to the controversy, in view of their traditional policy as to monarchism on the western continent. But the United States on account of her great strength and prestige, and because she had an earlier and more clearly defined policy than the other Republics, was looked to by Venezuela as the Republic most likely to see that she was not finally wronged by Great Britain, in case of arbitration or warlike clash. In general Venezuela kept the United States informed of her efforts to end the controversy, and very often sought to supplement her efforts by the good offices of this country. Thus in 1876, when Venezuela sought to open negotiations with Great Britain, the fact, and even the note to Great Britain were communicated to this government.

In 1881, when the fact that Great Britain was making a naval demonstration off the mouth of the Orinoco was communicated to this government by the Venezuela minister, Secretary of State, Evarts, replied that "in view of the deep interest which the government of the United States takes in all transactions tending to attempted en-

encroachments of foreign powers upon the territory of any of the Republics of this continent, this government could not look with indifference to the forcible acquisition of such territory by England if the mission of the vessels now at the mouth of the Orinoco should be found to be for that end."

In November, 1882, Venezuela sought the advice and support of the United States respecting another effort at arbitration with Great Britain. In response, Secretary of State, Frelinghuysen, replied in substance that the United States stood willing, at the desire of Venezuela, to propose arbitration to Great Britain as a means of settling the boundary disputes, and that the best tender of the good offices of this country to Venezuela would be in the direction of arbitration. Further, that the United States, while not seeking to become, would not refuse to be, an arbiter between the two countries.

In 1884 the Venezuela minister to England, appointed with a view of negotiating a treaty respecting the boundary dispute, came to Washington first, and after many interviews with our Secretary of State, went to England with commendations to the good offices of Mr. Lowell, the American Minister in London, and with authority to represent to the British Government that this country viewed with concern whatever might affect the interests of a sister republic of the American continent and its position in the family of nations. When, in 1886, it became apparent that this Venezuela Minister was about to fail in his negotiations, and that diplomatic relations were again about to be broken off, our Secretary of State, Mr. Bayard, with a view to preventing such rupture between Venezuela and Great Britain, authorized our Minister to Great Britain to tender the good offices of the

United States to promote an amicable settlement of the boundary differences, and even to extend an offer to the two countries to act as arbiter if agreeable to both. This tender was accompanied by the following clear statement of the relation of the United States to the controversy:

“Her Majesty’s Government will readily understand that this attitude of friendly neutrality and entire impartiality touching the merits of the controversy, consisting wholly in a difference of facts between our friends and neighbors, is entirely consistent and compatible with the sense of responsibility that rests upon the United States in relation to the South American Republics. The doctrines we announced two generations ago, at the instance and with the moral support and approval of the British Government, have lost none of their force or importance in the progress of time, and the Governments of Great Britain and the United States are equally interested in conserving a status, the wisdom of which has been demonstrated by the experience of more than half a century.”

Great Britain declined this offer. Again in 1888, British Guiana widened her boundary pretensions by proposing to build a railroad on soil claimed by Venezuela. This intensification of the dispute attracted the notice of the United States, and once more this country offered to assist in ending the controversy, at the same time calling the attention of Great Britain to the fact that her repeated change of boundaries, her frequent enlargements of them, her refusals to arbitrate with Venezuela, were sources of grave concern to the Government of the United States.

In 1889, word was received that Barima, at the mouth of the Orinoco, had been declared a British port. Mr. Blaine, then Secretary of State, immediately instructed

Mr. Lincoln, our Minister to England, to offer to Great Britain the good offices of the United States with a view to opening diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Venezuela, and as a preliminary step toward ending their controversy by arbitration. A conference between the three powers was proposed, to meet in London, in which the attitude of the United States should be that of impartial friend to the other two. Of this proposal nothing came, but in 1890 and again in 1893, Great Britain refused to hearken to the proposals of Venezuela to reopen diplomatic relations, because a condition of such resumption, steadily adhered to by Venezuela, was the reference of the boundary dispute to arbitration.

After 1893, Venezuela repeatedly brought the controversy to the notice of the United States, and insisted upon its importance to this country and to herself. Her notices came to this country in the form of appeals for service and support. They showed an acute stage of the controversy with Great Britain, which might burst out in war between her and Venezuela at any moment, and with the result that the weaker government must be driven to the wall. These appeals were not received with indifference by this country, indeed they could not be because of the traditional policy of the United States toward the Western Republics, and in every instance an Ambassador to Great Britain was instructed to exert his influence toward the renewal of diplomatic relations between the two estranged countries, and to urge arbitration as a means of settling all boundary differences. Thus much the United States felt free at all times to urge, in its attitude of neutrality and friendship toward both countries.

In the instructions of our Secretary of State to Mr.

Bayard at London, July 13, 1894, the following language occurs :

“ The President (Mr. Cleveland) is inspired by a desire for a peaceable and honorable settlement of the existing difficulties between an American State and a powerful transatlantic nation, and would be glad to see the reëstablishment of such diplomatic relations between them as would promote that end.

“ I can discern but two equitable solutions of the present controversy. One is the arbitral determination of the rights of the disputants as the respective successors of the historical rights of Holland and Spain over the region in question. The other is to create a new boundary line in accordance with the dictates of mutual expediency and consideration. The two governments having so far been unable to agree on a conventional line, the consistent and conspicuous advocacy by the United States and England of the principle of arbitration, and their recourse thereto in settlement of important questions arising between them, makes such mode of adjustment especially appropriate in the present instance, and this Government will gladly do what it can to further a determination in that sense.”

In the above the point is made conspicuous that in her relations with the United States, Great Britain was as much committed to the principle of arbitration as the former country, and hence the United States could not be urging a novel or unacceptable method of settlement as to the Venezuelan boundaries. The implication would be fair that Great Britain's refusal to arbitrate in a matter which came so nearly home to the United States, as one of the western Republics, had behind it a desire to bully a weak government like Venezuela into submission, or to

keep the controversy open till, at some opportune time, a warlike blow forced a settlement.

In his annual message of December 3, 1894, President Cleveland felt warranted in calling the attention of Congress and the country to the condition of the Venezuelan dispute. His language was, "The boundary of British Guiana still remains in dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela. Believing that its early settlement on some just basis, alike honorable to both parties, is in the line of our established policy to remove from this hemisphere all causes of difference with powers beyond the sea, I shall renew the efforts heretofore made to bring about a restoration of diplomatic relations between the disputants, and to induce a reference to arbitration, a resort which Great Britain so conspicuously favors in principle and respects in practice, and which is earnestly sought by her weaker adversary."

On February 25, 1895, Congress took action on the above suggestion of the President, and gave it the moral support of a joint resolution to the effect that Great Britain and Venezuela were recommended to refer their dispute to friendly arbitrament.

It will thus be seen that this acute stage of the controversy between Great Britain and Venezuela was fast becoming a source of irritation to the United States, which saw her offer of good offices repeatedly ignored, her policy of arbitration repudiated by a country which had uniformly accepted it, and the question of monarchical encroachment on the rights of a sister Republic unceremoniously shoved further and further into the background. A full, clear statement of the position of the United States at this time would be that given in the language of Mr. Olney, Secretary of State :

"By the frequent interposition of its good offices at the

instance of Venezuela, by constant urging and promoting the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two contending countries, by pressing for arbitration of the disputed boundary, by offering to act as arbitrator, by expressing its grave concern whenever new alleged instances of British aggression upon Venezuelan territory have been brought to its notice, the Government of the United States has made it clear to Great Britain and the world that the controversy is one in which both its honor and interests are involved, and the continuance of which it cannot regard with indifference."

A SPECK OF WAR.

On July 20, 1895, Secretary of State, Olney, at the instance of President Cleveland, presented to Lord Salisbury, the English premier, a full review of the Venezuelan dispute from the standpoint of the United States, and especially with reference to the attitude of this country toward a question involving the Monroe Doctrine, and likewise the principle of arbitration. The object was to place the United States upon such a plane as that its own people and all the world might see how it stood in relation to the controversy, and might have respect for its efforts at further solution of a now vexatious problem. The time had come for a full and fair expression of a truly American view, and a frank showing of the status of the United States respecting its future interests and course of action.

The situation was such as to compel the United States to ascertain and decide to what extent, if any, it should intervene in a controversy primarily between Great Britain and Venezuela, and how far it should go toward seeing that the integrity of Venezuelan territory was not

impaired by the pretensions of its powerful antagonist. If the United States had no right to intervene, it were best to know it, for then it had done all it could do to bring about a proper understanding between the two disputing countries. If, on the contrary, it had a right to intervene, the quicker it were known the better, for then it became proper and necessary to promptly exercise the right and discharge the duty so as not to fail of the end in view. The question would be easy of solution, so far as it involved a mere matter of principle or related to a settled national policy. It would prove more difficult, when its momentous practical consequences came to be weighed. International law makes it clear that one nation may interpose in a controversy between two others whenever what said nations propose or do becomes a menace to the integrity, peace or welfare of said first nation. Washington in his farewell address had laid down the doctrine that America should exclude herself from European politics, but he was silent as to the part Europe might play in American politics. Inside of twenty years the necessity arose for a full consideration of the momentous problem of how far American exclusion from European politics implied European exclusion from American politics. Discussion of this problem led to the announcement of that American policy which became known as the Monroe Doctrine, and whose history and purport are given in after pages.

Secretary Olney, in his paper, entered into a full discussion of the Monroe Doctrine, and concluded that under all the rules that had hitherto regulated its affirmation and application in America, the Venezuelan controversy was clearly within its scope, at least to the extent of warranting full inquiry into the merits of said


controversy and ascertaining where the right lay. His urgency on Great Britain to submit the matter to arbitration was very powerful, and almost amounted to an arraignment of the British position, for says he, "She (Great Britain) says to Venezuela in substance, 'You can get none of the debatable land by force, because you are not strong enough; you can get none by treaty, because I will not agree, and you can take your chance of getting a portion by arbitration only if you first agree to abandon to me such other portion as I may designate.' It is not perceived how such an attitude can be defended, nor how it is reconcilable with that love of justice and fair play so eminently characteristic of the English race. It in effect deprives Venezuela of her free agency and puts her under virtual duress. Territory acquired by reason of it will be as much wrested from her by the strong hand as if occupied by British troops or covered by British fleets. It seems, therefore, quite impossible that this position of Great Britain should be assented to by the United States, or that if such position be adhered to with the result of enlarging the bounds of British Guiana, it should not be regarded as amounting in substance to an invasion and conquest of Venezuelan territory.

"In these circumstances the duty of the President appears to him unmistakable and imperative. Great Britain's assertion of title to the disputed territory, combined with her refusal to have that title investigated, being a substantial appropriation of the territory to her own use, not to protest and give warning that the transaction will be regarded as injurious to the interests of the people of the United States, as well as oppressive in itself, would be to ignore an established policy with which the honor and welfare of this country are closely identified."

This frank, elaborate and advanced paper concluded with instructions to the American Minister at London to inform Lord Salisbury of its contents, and to urge on him that they called for a definite decision upon the point whether Great Britain would consent or decline to submit the Venezuela boundary question in its entirety, to impartial arbitration. A prompt reply was also requested, in order that the future relations between this country and Great Britain might be understood at the State Department and, if necessary, laid before Congress in the President's annual message.

Lord Salisbury did not reply to this document till November 26, 1865. In his reply he took direct issue with Secretary Olney as to the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine to the Venezuelan controversy, and denied that the dispute was any concern of the United States. As to arbitration, he took the ground that this mode of settling disputes of the kind in question was not free from defects, that impartial arbiters were hard to find, and that the task of insuring compliance with an award was always fraught with difficulty. At any rate, he reasoned further, the question of arbitration was one entirely between the parties directly in contest, and that the claim of any third nation, unaffected by the controversy, to impose arbitration on others had no foundation in the law of nations.

This reply was so defiant in spirit, or so suggestive of a determination on the part of Great Britain to ignore entirely the position of the United States, and to pursue her policy of postponement and embarrassment toward Venezuela, that President Cleveland submitted a special message, bearing on the controversy, to Congress, together with the diplomatic correspondence, on December 17, 1895. This paper, while regarded as timely, was some-



HON. ROBERT E. PATTISON.

Born in Quantico, Somerset co., Md., December 8, 1850; moved to Philadelphia when young and graduated at Central High School; admitted to bar, 1872; elected Comptroller of Philadelphia, 1877 and 1880; elected Governor of Pennsylvania, on Democratic ticket, 1882; appointed member of Pacific R. R. Commission by President Cleveland, 1887; helped to organize and became President of Chestnut Street National Bank; prominent member of *Morning Record* Co., Limited; re-elected Governor of Pennsylvania, on Democratic ticket, 1890; prominently mentioned in connection with Presidential nomination on Democratic ticket in 1896.



HON. RICHARD F. PETTIGREW.

Born at Ludlow, Vermont, July, 1848; moved to Wisconsin, 1854; studied at Beloit College, 1865-66; member of law class of Wisconsin University, 1870; moved to Dakota, 1869, engaged in surveying and real estate at Sioux Falls; practiced law since 1872; elected to Dakota Legislature, 1877 and 1879; elected Territorial delegate to 47th Congress; re-elected to Legislature, 1884-85; member of South Dakota Constitutional Convention, 1883; elected U. S. Senator, as a Republican, from South Dakota, October 16, 1889, chairman of Quadro-Centennial Committee, and member of Committees on Improvement of Mississippi River, Indian Affairs, Public Lands and Railroads; re-elected to Senate in 1895.

what extraordinarily worded, and aside from its merits, excited much discussion as to its manner, and real value as a contribution to the strength of the American position. The President saw no good reason why the Monroe Doctrine did not apply to the Venezuela case, since the taking possession of the territory of a neighboring Republic in derogation of its rights, by a European power, was clearly an attempt on the part of such power to thereby extend its system of government on this continent. As to the Monroe Doctrine not embodying any principle of international law founded on the general consent of nations, the President contended that it finds its recognition in those principles of international law which are based on the theory that every nation shall have its rights protected and its just claims enforced. After stating fully the position of this Government respecting the controversy, the President found the reply of Great Britain very unsatisfactory. "It is," said he, "deeply disappointing that such an appeal as ours, actuated by the most friendly spirit toward both nations directly concerned, addressed to the sense of justice and to the magnanimity of one of the great powers of the world and touching its relations to one comparatively weak and small, should have produced no better results."

He further said, in substance, that the course of this Government, in view of everything that had transpired, admitted of no serious doubt; that Great Britain's final refusal to arbitrate must be accepted and dealt with accordingly; that since it could not be hoped that the attitude of Venezuela would change, it was incumbent on the United States to take measures, for its justification, toward ascertaining for itself what was the true divisional line between British Guiana and Venezuela. To reach

this end, a commission of inquiry was suggested, and an appropriation asked to meet its expenses. Upon its report, further action on the part of the United States was to be based, even to the extent of resisting, by every possible means, the aggressions of Great Britain beyond such boundary as said Commission might decide to be the just one. In conclusion the President said, "In making these recommendations I am fully alive to the responsibility incurred, and keenly realize all the consequences that may follow. I am, nevertheless, firm in my conviction that, while it is a grievous thing to contemplate the two great English speaking peoples of the world as being otherwise than friendly competitors in the onward march of civilization and strenuous and worthy rivals in all the arts of peace, there is no calamity which a great nation can invite which equals that which follows a supine submission to wrong and injustice, and the consequent loss of national self-respect and honor, beneath which are shielded and defended a people's greatness and safety."

The publication of this message led to great excitement in America and England and called forth a great variety of comment. For a time the skies of peace were deeply clouded, and mutterings of war were heard along the murky horizon. In official circles, and in the Congress, the spirit of the message was applauded, not more for its bold affirmation of the Monroe Doctrine and its thorough going Americanism, than for its contrast with other papers of the President, bearing on the foreign policy of his administration.

On the other hand, many newspapers and public writers regarded the message as a blunder, construing it as purely an emanation of jingoism, as written in bad diplomatic taste, in that it contained a threat of war, and

as likely to place the United States in the same bullying category as England. The English sentiment was, of course, firmly and bitterly against the attitude of the President. His message was regarded as a challenge, and calculated to awaken only a bellicose spirit on the part of England.

But however sentiment may have differed among publicists and nations, the Congress was almost unanimous that the nation could well afford to make the position of the President its own. So with remarkable promptitude, it gave the sanction of a law to the appointment of such commission of inquiry as the President had suggested, and authorized a liberal appropriation to pay all expenses. The President speedily announced the commission and set it to work to ascertain a boundary which this nation could afford to accept as righteous, and upon which it could honorably and finally rely in the maintainance of its attitude toward the disputing parties and in the defense of its material and political interests as a distinguished member of the sisterhood of western republics.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE.

We now turn to the Monroe Doctrine, which the Venezuelan dispute brought into such prominence, which, as we have seen, has within it the possibilities of war, and which seemingly needs occasional patriotic spurts to keep it in memory, and enlarge its meaning in proportion to our growing importance as a western republic. Our review of it will be historical rather than critical.

If not in its very inception, at least in the earliest encouragement given to it, the Monroe Doctrine was as much English as American. The restoration of Louis XVIII. to the throne of France, after Napoleon's defeat

at Waterloo, was the signal for a congress of the allied kings of Europe at Paris. The rulers of Russia, Prussia and Austria so met and formed a league called "The Holy Alliance," whose object was to stamp out all constitutional governments, banish liberal ideas, and establish all powers in accordance with the principles of the Christian religion. They thus explained the pledge that passed between them:— "They had no other aim than to manifest to the world their unchangeable determination to adopt no rule of conduct either in the government of their respective countries or in their political relations with other governments than the precepts of that holy religion, the precepts of justice, charity and peace."

This innocent appearing alliance was joined, in two months, by England, and immediately perverted by treaty to the special object of an alliance to exclude Napoleon forever from power, maintain the government they had just set up in France, resist all attacks on the armies then occupying France, and meet in 1818 to consult respecting the condition of Europe.

The four powers met, according to agreement, at Aix-la-Chapelle. They found monarchy so firmly established in France, that the army of occupation was withdrawn, and Louis XVIII. admitted to a vote in the affairs of Europe. But Spain was in dire straits. Her South American colonies were, and had been, in open revolt. She had well-nigh exhausted her resources in attempting to subjugate them, and had appealed to both Russia and England for aid. Russia sold to Spain an unseaworthy fleet. England refused aid, fearing to lose her commerce with the rebellious colonies. The Czar laid the Spanish condition before the powers, in a paper which described the dangers to which European monarchies would be ex-

posed if a federation of republics were allowed to grow up in the western Hemisphere. From this it became apparent what "government in accordance with the principles of the Christian religion," meant, and the direction to be given to the "precepts of justice, charity and peace."

The Czar proposed a conference of European ambassadors at Madrid, over which the Duke of Wellington was to preside, having for its object to decide what terms Spain should offer to her colonies. England refused to join this conference. Spain was left to fight her colonial battles alone. She carried on her American wars in such a way as to breed revolution at home. Liberalism broke forth with such fury as to compel King Ferdinand to adopt a new constitution. The fires of revolution spread to Portugal, and a Cortes was elected to frame a liberal constitution. France would have yielded to the popular furore, but the original members of the Holy Alliance, Russia, Prussia, Austria, with England and France as lookers-on, met at Troppan, in Moravia in 1820, and adjourned to meet the next year at Laybach.

The Congress at Laybach adjourned to meet at Vienna, in 1822, but really met in Verona, where the question of overturning the new liberal constitution in Spain and re-establishing absolute monarchy was long debated, with the result that certain changes in the Spanish constitution should be demanded, and if not granted, that a French army should invade Spain and compel acquiescence. Spain refused the demands, and a French army crossed the line and occupied Madrid and Cadiz.

The object of the Holy Alliance now became plainer than ever. If its accredited army could enter a neighboring domain and force a change of government in accord-

ance with its wishes, it would not hesitate to settle in an equally heroic way the affairs of the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in America, or wherever found. The eyes of American statesmen were fixed intently on this situation, for most of the revolting colonies had become republics and had been recognized by the United States. To admit that absolute monarchism, under the plea of "government in accordance with the Christian Religion," or under the thin disguise of an Holy Alliance, should again become the fate of these young Republics was horrifying to our people, and dangerous to the ascendancy of the Republican idea on the Western Continent.

England became interested also in the pretensions of the allied monarchs, for she had large colonial interests in America which might be seriously affected by the absolute monarchical claims of the Holy Allies. This was in 1823, and Canning was premier of England. The American Ambassador at London was Richard Rush. Canning proposed to Rush that the United States should join England in a declaration to the effect that while neither power desired the colonies of Spain for herself, it was impossible to look with indifference on European intervention in their affairs, or to see them acquired by a third power.

Canning received notice that in the latter part of 1823 a Congress of the allied monarchs would meet to consider the affairs of Spanish America. He urged upon Rush the propriety of a quick answer to his proposition to him. Rush, without waiting for home instructions, ventured to pen the following in reply, promising to join the United States with England in making it a formal declaration, on condition that England would first acknowledge the independence of the western republics:—"We

should regard as highly unjust and as fruitful of disastrous consequences any attempt on the part of any European power to take possession of them by conquest, by cession, or on any ground or pretext whatsoever."

Here were the gems of the Monroe Doctrine. Rush's bold, sagacious but unauthorized announcement was made at the instance of the English premier, and as part of a plan by which both the United States and England might head off the proposed scheme of the allied monarchs of Europe to interfere with the young American republics and reintroduce governments of monarchical form. But while Rush's announcement was such as England had proposed, Rush coupled its public promulgation and the final joining of his name and country in it with England with the condition that England should first recognize the independence of the young American republics. This England refused to do, and the joint declaration was never made.

That the policy thus far was original with England, and was really more English than American, is plain from the reasons urged upon Mr. Rush by Mr. Canning. Further, Mr. Canning had evidently conceived of the policy, not as a temporary expedient but as one of perpetual application, for he thus said to Rush:—"The United States were the first power established on the continent, and now confessedly the leading power. They are connected with South America by their position and with Europe by their relations. Was it possible they could see with indifference their fate decided upon by Europe? Had not a new epoch arrived in the relative position of the United States toward Europe which Europe must acknowledge? Were the great political and commercial interests which hung upon the destiny of the new continent to be canvassed

and adjusted on this hemisphere without the coöperation or even knowledge of the United States?"

The above was embodied in Rush's letter upon the subject addressed to Monroe's Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams. The importance of the matter, the strength and urgency of Rush's reasons, the singularity of the proposition as emanating from England, seem to have disconcerted President Monroe. He found himself confronted with the solemn, and then popular, advice of Washington in his Farewell Address, an advice which had become almost a policy in itself, and which ran:

"Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course."

Jefferson's warning against entangling foreign alliances, in his first inaugural, had been equally strong. Monroe, himself, had in two inaugurals and an half a dozen other messages, seriously advised against violation of the policy of non-intervention in the affairs of the colonies. No wonder he was in a quandary over Rush's letters and the proposition of a new and widely variant policy. He had not the courage to venture on a departure so radical as the one proposed, till he thoroughly weighed the situation. In his doubt he sent the Rush correspondence to Thomas Jefferson, then in retiracy at Monticello, for review and the expression of an opinion. Jefferson's reply came with no uncertain sound, and it will

be seen from it that he hesitated not to run counter, in great part, to the policy he had hitherto accepted and promulgated. He said:

“The question presented by the letters you have sent me is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of Independence. That made us a nation; this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. And never could we embark upon it under circumstances more auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cisatlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should, therefore, have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While the last is laboring to become the domicil of despotism, our endeavor should be to make our hemisphere that of freedom.”

Thus encouraged by one in whom he had so great confidence, Monroe made the subject one of special study, seeking the advice and coöperation of his cabinet, and of others, with a view to all the practical consequences of a formal declaration of the new doctrine. It was seen that while the policy enumerated by Washington and pursued by his successors took America out of the domain of Europe politics, it was silent as to the part Europe might be permitted to play in America. Doubtless it was thought the latest addition to the family of nations should not make haste to prescribe rules for the guidance of its older members, and the expediency and propriety of serving the powers of Europe with notice of a complete and distinctive American policy excluding them from interference

with American political affairs, might well seem dubious to a generation to whom the French alliance, with its manifold advantages to the cause of American independence, was fresh in mind.

Twenty years later, however, the situation had changed. The lately born nation had greatly increased in power and resources, had demonstrated its strength on land and sea, and as well in the conflicts of arms as in the pursuits of peace, and had begun to realize the commanding position on this continent, which the character of its people, their free institutions, and their remoteness from the chief scene of European contentions combined to give to it. The Monroe administration therefore did not hesitate to accept and apply the logic of the farewell address by declaring, in effect, that American non-intervention in European affairs necessarily implied and meant European non-intervention in American affairs. Conceiving unquestionably that complete European non-interference in American concerns would be cheaply purchased by complete American non-interference in European concerns, President Monroe, in the celebrated message of December 2, 1823, thus formulated the doctrine which afterwards took his name :

“In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparations for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are, of necessity, more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Govern-

ments. And to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of our most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.

“With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. * * *

Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the Government *de facto* as the legitimate Government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting, in all instances, the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to these continents, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace

and happiness; nor can any one believe that our Southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form with indifference."

The Monroe administration, however, did not content itself with formulating a correct rule for the regulation of the relations between Europe and America. It aimed at also securing the practical benefits to result from the application of the rule. Hence the message just quoted declared that the American continents were fully occupied and were not the subjects for future colonization by European powers. To this spirit and this purpose also are to be attributed the passages of the same message which treat any infringement of the rule against interference in American affairs on the part of the powers of Europe as an act of unfriendliness to the United States. It was realized that it was futile to lay down such a rule unless its observance could be enforced. It was manifest that the United States was the only power in this hemisphere capable of enforcing it. It was therefore courageously declared not merely that Europe ought not to interfere in American affairs, but that any European power doing so would be regarded as antagonizing the interests and inviting the opposition of the United States.

The announcement of the Monroe Doctrine to the world brought speedy opportunity for its explanation, development and application. Gallatin applied it in his French diplomacy. Clay, as Secretary of State, thus instructed our Minister to Mexico respecting it in 1825: "The other principle asserted in the message is that while we do not desire to interfere in Europe with the political system of the allied powers, we should regard as dangerous to our

peace and safety any attempt on their part to extend their system to any part of this hemisphere. The political systems of the two continents are essentially different. Each has an exclusive right to judge for itself what is best suited to its own condition and most likely to promote its happiness, but neither has a right to enforce upon the other the establishment of its peculiar system. This principle was declared in the face of the world at a moment when there was reason to apprehend that the allied powers were entertaining designs inimical to the freedom if not to the independence of the new Governments. There is a ground for believing that the declaration of it had considerable effect in preventing, if not in producing the abandonment of all such designs. Both principles were laid down after much and anxious deliberation on the part of the late administration. The President, who then formed a part of it, continues entirely to coincide in both. And you will urge upon the Government of Mexico the utility and expediency of asserting the same principles on all occasions."

The new doctrine passed through the fierce fires of partisan debate, when what was called the Panama Mission was up for discussion in the Congress in 1826. Columbia and Mexico had invited the United States to be represented at a Congress of Republics at Panama. One of the aims of this Congress, as stated in the invitation, was to consider "the means of making effectual the declarations of the President of the United States respecting any ulterior design of foreign power to colonize any portion of this continent, and also the means of resisting all interference from abroad with the domestic concerns of American Governments."

President Adams, Clay, Webster, and a host of power-

ful statesmen approved of sending commissioners. They were opposed by many able men, in a purely partisan spirit, among whom were Polk and Buchanan, both of whom lived to reverse their arguments and positions. The result of the debate was a resolution of the House practically affirming the Monroe Doctrine in two essentials, (1) that the United States should form no alliance with any foreign nation, nor join it in any declaration concerning the interference of any European power in its affairs, and (2) that we act toward them in any crisis as our honor and policy may at the time dictate.

In the debates of 1826, Polk took the ground that Monroe's declaration was a "mere expression of executive opinion, designed to produce an effect on the Holy Alliance in relation to their supposed intention to interfere in the war between Spain and her former colonies. It had probably produced the designed effect, and therefore, performed its office. President Monroe had no power to bind the nation by his pledges." In 1845, when Mr. Polk was President and confronted with such momentous questions as the Mexican war and trouble with England over the Oregon boundary, he said in his message to Congress :-- "In the existing circumstances of the world, the present is deemed a proper occasion to reiterate and reaffirm the principle avowed by Mr. Monroe, and to state my cordial concurrence in its wisdom and sound policy. The reassertion of this principle, especially in reference to North America, is, at this day, but the promulgation of a policy which no European power should cherish the disposition to resist. Existing rights of every European nation should be respected, but it is due alike to our safety and our interests that the efficient protection of our laws,

should be extended over our whole territorial limits, and that it should be distinctly announced to the world as our settled policy, that no future European colony or dominion, with our consent, be planted or established on any part of the North American Continent."

Again in 1848, when war was being waged in Yucatan, between the Indians and whites, and when the former had appealed to England and Spain for aid, President Polk sounded the following note of warning:—"While it is not our purpose to recommend the adoption of any measure with a view to the acquisition of dominion and sovereignty over Yucatan, yet according to our established policy we could not consent to a transfer of this dominion and sovereignty to either Spain, Great Britain or any other European power. In the language of President Monroe, in his message of December, 1823, we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere, as dangerous to our peace and safety."

And so Buchanan, during his presidential term, reversed his position in the debates of 1826, and stoutly adhered to the Monroe Doctrine. It was in 1859-60, when England, France and Spain had decided on armed intervention in the then distracted affairs of Mexico. In his message of 1859, President Buchanan advised the employment of a sufficient military force to penetrate into the interior of Mexico, if necessary. In his message of 1860, he deprecates the failure to thus employ force, by saying:

"European Governments would have been deprived of all pretext to interfere in the territorial and domestic concerns of Mexico. We should thus have been relieved


from the obligation of resisting, even by force should this become necessary, any attempt by these Governments to deprive our neighboring republic of portions of her territory—a duty from which we could not shrink without abandoning the traditional and established policy of the American people.”

In the debates of 1826, Mr. Webster thus replied to those who were contending that the Monroe Doctrine was a mere executive opinion, of transitory moment :

“Sir, I agree with those who maintain the proposition, and I contend against those who deny it, that the message did mean something; that it meant much; and I maintain against both that the declaration effected much good, answered the end designed by it, did great honor to the foresight and the spirit of the Government, and that it cannot now be taken back, retracted, or annulled without disgrace. It met, Sir, with the entire concurrence and the hearty approbation of the country. The tone which it uttered found a corresponding response in the breasts of the free people of the United States. That people saw, and they rejoiced to see, that on a fit occasion our weight had been thrown into the right scale, and that, without departing from our duty, we had done something useful and something effectual for the cause of civil liberty. One general glow of exultation, one universal feeling of the gratified love of liberty, one conscious and proud perfection of the considerations which the country possessed, and of the respect and honor which belonged to it, pervaded all bosoms.”

Mr. Seward thus affirmed the doctrine in 1861 :

“The Government of the United States would regard with grave concern and dissatisfaction movements in



HON. JAMES L. PUGH.

Born in Burke co., Ga., December 12, 1820; moved early to Alabama, and received academic education; admitted to bar in 1841, and acquired a lucrative practice; elected to 36th Congress, but withdrew when State seceded; served in Confederate army; elected to Confederate Congress, 1861-63; resumed law practice at Eufaula; member of Convention that framed State Constitution in 1875; elected to U. S. Senate in 1880; re-elected 1884 and 1890; member of Committees on Education and Judiciary, Privileges and Elections, Revolutionary Claims and Extension of Congressional Library.



HON. REDFIELD PROCTOR.

Born at Proctorsville, Vermont, June 1, 1831; graduated from Dartmouth, 1851, and from Albany Law School in 1859; practiced law in Boston; served in Army 1861-63; rose to be Colonel of Fifteenth Vermont Volunteers; returned to practice of law; elected to Assembly, 1867-68; again, 1888; served in State Senate, 1874-76; elected Lieutenant-Governor, 1876; advanced to Governor, 1878; delegate-at-large to Republican National Conventions, 1884, 1888; appointed Secretary of War by President Harrison, 1889; resigned November 1, 1891, to take place of Senator Edmunds in United States Senate; and October 18, 1892, was elected to fill both the unexpired and the full terms. His term expires in 1899.

Cuba to introduce Spanish authority within the territory of Dominica."

President Grant's position in 1870, was this:

"The allied and other Republics of Spanish origin on this continent may see in this fact a new proof of our sincere interest in their welfare; of our desire to see them blessed with good Government, capable of maintaining order and of preserving their respective territorial integrity, and of our sincere wish to extend our own commercial and social relations with them. The time is not probably far distant when, in the natural course of events, the European political connection with this continent will cease. Our politics will be shaped in view of this probability, so as to ally the commercial interests of the Spanish-American States more closely to our own, and thus give the United States all the preëminence and all the advantages which Mr. Monroe, Mr. Adams, and Mr. Clay contemplated when they proposed to join in the Congress of Panama."

President Cleveland, in his special message of December 17, 1895, upon the boundary controversy between Great Britain and Venezuela, thus applied the doctrine:

"Without attempting extended argument in reply to these positions, it may not be amiss to suggest that the doctrine upon which we stand is strong and sound because its enforcement is important to our peace and safety as a nation, and is essential to the integrity of our free institutions and the tranquil maintenance of our distinctive form of Government. It was intended to apply to every stage of our National life, and cannot become obsolete while our Republic endures. If the balance of power is justly a cause for jealous anxiety among the Governments

of the Old World and a subject for our absolute non-interference, none the less is an observance of the Monroe Doctrine of vital concern to our people and their Government.

“Assuming, therefore, that we may properly insist upon this doctrine without regard to ‘the state of things in which we live,’ or any changed conditions here or elsewhere, it is not apparent why its application may not be invoked in the present controversy.

“If a European power, by an extension of its boundaries, takes possession of the territory of one of our neighboring Republics against its will and in derogation of its rights, it is difficult to see why, to that extent, such European power does not thereby attempt to extend its system of Government to that portion of this continent which is thus taken. This is the precise action which President Monroe declared to be ‘dangerous to our peace and safety,’ and it can make no difference whether the European system is extended by an advance of frontier or otherwise.”

Thus the Monroe Doctrine has been accepted as a public law of the country ever since its announcement. It was the controlling factor in the emancipation of South America, and to it the independent states which now divide that region between them are largely indebted for their very existence. Since then the most striking single achievement to be credited to the rule is the evacuation of Mexico by the French upon the termination of the Civil war. But we are also indebted to it for the provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which both neutralized any interoceanic canal across Central America and expressly excluded Great Britain from occupying or exercising any dominion over any part of Central America.

It has been used in the case of Cuba as if justifying the position that, while the sovereignty of Spain will be respected, the island will not be permitted to become the possession of any other European power. It has been influential in bringing about the definite relinquishment of any supposed protectorate by Great Britain over the Mosquito coast.

OUR CUBAN RELATIONS.

FIRST POINT OF VIEW.

EVERY effort of Cuba to liberate herself from the galling yoke of Spain has met with large sympathy in the United States. The more modern the efforts, the larger the sympathy. The revolution in the island, on in its fury in 1896, so impressed our people that the Congress felt warranted by resolution in expressing its horror of Spain's conduct toward this, its richest colony, and, by implication, the hope of that colony's success in its effort for independence. The passage of the resolution through both houses brought forth in each a depth of sentiment which did not hesitate to hold Spain up to the civilized world as a rapacious and tyrannical monster, unworthy of respect as mistress of a fruitful island, and a veritable stumbling-block in the march of a people inspired with free notions. Doubtless, much of the boldness and bitterness of speech was intended as a prick for a seemingly slothful and indifferent President, and it was only the intent to give the Executive a little time to study the direction of the wind of popular sentiment that prevented the Congress from making its resolution a joint one, and to include a grant of full belligerent rights to the struggling Cubans.

This question of our encouragement in the shape of an
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offer of belligerent rights opened up the whole subject of Spanish and Cuban relations, and imposed on our government a task as delicate as it was exacting. Historically considered, the task was an old one, and had been variously viewed and weighed. We find that with wrestling with it, such a grave statesman as John Quincy Adams had thrown himself open to the charge of jingoism by the announcement that,

“These islands [Cuba and Porto Rico] from their local position are natural appendages to the North American continent, and one of them, Cuba, almost in sight of our shores, has, from a multitude of considerations, become an object of transcendent importance to the commercial and political interest of our Union. . . . Such, indeed, are the relations between that island and this country, the geographical, commercial, moral, and political relations formed by nature, gathering in the process of time, and even now verging to maturity, that in looking forward to the probable course of events for the short period of half a century, it is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our Federal republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself. . . . Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only toward the North American Union, which by the same law of nature cannot cast her off from its bosom.”

Nor was Clay less pronounced in his opinion of a situation hardly differing from that of 1896, when he said,

“If the war should continue between Spain and the new republics, and those islands [Cuba and Porto Rico] should become the object and theatre of it, their fortunes have such a connection with the prosperity of the United States

that they could not be indifferent spectators, and the possible contingencies of such a protracted war might bring upon the government of the United States duties and obligations, the performance of which, however painful it should be, they might not be at liberty to decline."

These expressions of public opinion, uttered by the wisest statesmen of their day, show that the Cuban question is by no means a new one, but that it dates back in all its solemn depth and multiform ramifications to quite an early period in our history. Late attempts at its solution are not novel. The boldness and violence of speech in the 54th Congress respecting it have been heard before, the patriotic outbursts have been witnessed, the threats of war encountered.

But these facts intensify, rather than chill, interest in the question, for it is conceded that almost enough of years have elapsed to bring about a consummation such as every Cuban patriot has devoutly wished and strenuously striven for. Therefore, in making up the history of the Cuban problem it will appear strange that administrations prior to that of Mr. Cleveland, have uniformly declared to Spain and the world that the condition of Cuba was a matter in which the United States had a vital interest and which could never be disregarded. To put it in the bold language of Edward Everett, "the Cuban question is purely an American one."

Especially is this true of that phase of the question which contemplated the transfer of the island to some more powerful and, perhaps, congenial European power than Spain, even if the object in view were the payment of debts which Spain could not otherwise hope to liquidate. It has been repeated by our Secretaries of State, and by Senators and members of Congress that the United

States could never suffer Cuba to pass into the hands of another European power. It has been often announced by our representatives abroad that any attempt on the part of Spain to transfer Cuba to another European power would be regarded by the United States as an act of war. And this could hardly be otherwise, for the situation of the island is such as to make its possession by other than Spain a double menace to our commerce and to our coasts. Such has been the interest of the United States in the island that during the war of 1868, an offer of a large sum of money, or a guarantee of the Cuban debt, was made if Spain would declare the independence of the island. Later on, and during the same uprising, a threat of intervention was made by the United States.

Thus our policy as to Cuba and our foreign relations have taken shape. Whether they shall be modified, or what further shape they shall take, depends on a full understanding of the history of Cuba and of the attitude of the United States toward her, not in the line of selfishness, but in the interest of humanity and civilization.

Cuba remained faithful to Spain amid all those revolutions which swept away her South American possessions and made them Republics. True there were juntas there which had aided the Republics, and, as a compensation, Bolivar offered to pay off the debt by helping the island to obtain independence of Spain. He was persuaded to desist by this country for certain diplomatic reasons. Spain suspected the whole island of insincerity in her allegiance, and in 1825 transferred to the captain-general all the authority of the local governors. This was as much as to proclaim the island under martial law, and with the event began the history of Cuba's resistance to the sweeping and needless tyranny of Spain. Since then,

each revolutionary outbreak has become more desperate and formidable than the preceding one.

The march of these revolutions have been, in brief, the insurrection of 1826, resulting in the execution of the two leaders; the "Conspiracy of the bald Eagles," quickly repressed, and the leaders, imprisoned, banished or executed; the exclusion of the Cuban and Porto-Ricom representatives from the Cortes in 1837, on the ground that special laws were applicable to the islands; the expeditions under Quitman and others in 1855, where many leaders were executed and others banished.

Now many years elapsed during which the Cubans endeavored by peaceful means to secure from Spain relief from their oppression and wrongs. Every change that Spain could be induced to make was made for the worse. With the decadence of Spanish power the island became a more imposing part of empire. With the increase of Spanish debt, the island became a more necessary source of revenue. The tyranny that was at first natural on the part of Spain, became imperative as a means of squeezing every available dollar from patient and opulent subjects.

The revolution of 1868, under Cespedes, was inevitable. Years of oppression had pointed to it. Though it was limited to the eastern portion of the island, it lasted for ten years and was only brought to an end by a treaty in which Spain promised to the revolutionists the reforms for which they had taken up arms. Thus the revolutionists gained a moral victory, and one which crippled the already broken power of Spain. They laid down their arms, and kept their compact. But not so with Spain. The treaty with her was a mere pretext. She disregarded her pledges of amnesty in great part, and imprisoned or executed many who had been engaged in

the insurgent cause. Her promised reforms were either withheld, or proposed and carried out in a spirit of mockery. They were of no value to the island in either political or commercial sense. If any result followed, it was to aggravate a strained situation by supplementing tyranny with treachery and bloodshed. In the Spanish attitude were all the seeds of further revolt, and the period from 1878 to 1895 was one of civic protest and warlike preparation.

The flames of revolution broke out anew in 1895, and under auspices far different from those of former outbursts. The feeling back of it was one of intense animosity toward Spain on account of her broken pledges, manifest double dealing and bloody cruelty. It was a wider-spread and more unanimous feeling than ever before. The quiet warlike preparations had brought to the front men of executive force and considerable military experience. There was abroad a local spirit of *amor patriæ*, and a supreme confidence inspired by leadership and organization. There was little money, few arms and supplies, but it was felt these would come after a few successes along lines of matured military plan, and especially through the agency of that sympathy which was sure to be evoked in the bosoms of Cuban residents in the United States, and perhaps among all lovers of liberty and independence.

The first sound of arms was in 1895 when General Gomez landed 500 men on the extreme end of Cuba, near Santiago de Cuba. Around this nucleus gathered other forces under the lead of such men as Maceo. By rapid accretions the number swelled to 30,000, all fairly armed. The number could have readily been made 60,000 had arms been obtainable. The leaders wished to avoid the troubles and excesses incident to an untrained, unarmed rabble,

hence they wisely organized and mobilized only those they could arm and render effective in the field.

The ten year rebellion of 1868-78 had been confined to the eastern part of the island. This localization, desirable in every sense on the part of Spain, was a serious drawback to the insurgents. It dwarfed operations and sentiment respecting them. It prevented the spread of enthusiasm, and interfered with those coöperative uprisings the earlier insurgents had a right to expect. This uprising would avoid many of the errors of former ones. In a single year the Cuban army was marched from the east to the west of the island, through fruitful provinces, sources of the great wealth which Spain extracted from the island, and past the lines of Spanish soldiers thrown across the island to break the force of insurrection. Havana was encircled and repeatedly threatened. Her inland communications were often cut, and the sugar and tobacco plantations largely devastated. Spain augmented her armies in Cuba till a force of over 100,000 men was on the scene, yet the operations of the insurgents received no serious check. They passed and re-passed the celebrated *trocha*, or armed trench across the island, with ease and without loss, always, of course, avoiding decisive battles for want of heavy artillery. In strategy they were more than a match for the Spaniards, and in their tactical delays, forays and surprises they proved more formidable than if they had sought successes through direct blows. They saw their foes harried and weakened at every point, exhausted by exertion here, mutinous for lack of food there, decimated by disease everywhere. Spain's best military talent was disconcerted, and could neither prepare nor deliver an effective blow. Time, which was everything to Spain in her impoverished condition, was in complete control of the in-

surrgents, who lengthened it to suit themselves, and spread it out so as to mature their own plans, or till they witnessed the dissipation of offensive projects on the part of their foes. Spain held nothing securely by means of her armies, except her armed camps near seaports, and these latter were held by means of warships. In any liberal military sense the insurgents were possessors of the island, and could not be ousted. They had enjoyed a military success far beyond their most sanguine expectations.

Meanwhile, they had held two elections of national import to them, had set up a provisional government at a stated capital, and had drafted and adopted a constitution. Civic officers had been inaugurated and civic officers duly installed. Generals and minor army officers held their commissions by virtue of regular constituted civic authority. Official life represented the two races on the island, white and black, the burden of civic affairs falling to the whites, the blacks being represented in the field by the two able Maceos and others. The seat of government was not stable. It could not be by virtue of circumstances, for it had to keep pace with the swift moving camps. Yet it was none the less a seat of government, always a desirable object of attack by the Spaniards, yet never captured.

What the insurgents lacked most, at the end of a year's fighting, was a seaport. This fact was urged against them by Spain and her friends in America in the arguments against a state of actual war on the island and the propriety of granting belligerent rights to the struggling patriots. But they more than once proved their ability to capture seaports, as at Batabano. There was hardly a time when they were not confident of being able to capture any of the Spanish seaports. Their inability to hold them, however, through lack of heavy guns and

battle ships, made their possession undesirable. In reality there was no need for them. The minor ports were open, and but little difficulty was experienced in obtaining food and munitions of war from friends in other countries.

It is, of course, difficult to verify absolutely all the foregoing history. But it is such as is furnished to the world by the best authorities at command, to wit, disinterested travelers and correspondents, American consuls, and others. Spanish officials, by means of an imperious censorship, and even by resort to imprisonment of news gatherers, permitted no report to go out from the island except those colored to suit their interests. Yet it was submitted by the friends of Cuba in America that enough was surely known to make out a case on which the United States could securely stand, should it choose to grant belligerent rights to the Cubans.

As put by one publicist of note, the case historically resolved itself into this:

“The island of Cuba, which lies but a short distance from our coast, is now again, after recurring revolutions and disorders extending over seventy years, the scene of a revolution more formidable and successful than any which has preceded it. American property in the island is being destroyed, and our commerce with Cuba is being ruined. The ablest and most humane general in Spain, who brought the previous insurrection to a close by judicious concessions, has been recalled,—which is in itself a confession of failure,—and has been replaced by a man notorious for his ferocity and brutality. This new general, Weyler, has reverted to the methods of warfare employed by the Duke of Alva in the Netherlands three hundred years’ ago, when the ruin of the Spanish Empire began; which is very characteristic, for the Spaniards,

although they learn nothing, have, unlike the Bourbons, forgotten many things. For many years it has been clear that Spain could not hold the island. If this war fails, it will be followed by another a few years hence. But it seems tolerably clear that Spain is unable to suppress this insurrection. She may complete the ruin of Cuba, but she cannot conquer the Cubans. The present war therefore is as useless as it is bloody and savage."

It is reasonably clear, therefore, that our relationship of indifference toward the struggling Cubans, or which is the same thing, of favoritism toward Spain, must sooner or later give way to something more pronounced. Should that something be recognition of belligerent rights? It might well be such, argue those who are satisfied with the facts heretofore stated. Cuban belligerency was withheld during the ten years' struggle from 1868 to 1878. In this respect the United States did not copy Spain's haste to recognize the belligerency of the rebellious States of the Union, at a time within sixty days of the firing on Fort Sumter, and before word of any other combat of arms had reached her. The Cuban insurrection of 1895 went on a year, with the establishment of a government, with battles fought and victories won, with the island conquered except as to its port towns. Here then was a condition far more fully justifying a recognition of belligerency by the United States, than what Spain found in this country when she recognized the war status of the South in 1861.

Belligerency is at most a question of fact. It is not, and has never been, regarded by nations as an occasion for war. As a fact it is one wholly within the breasts of the nations asking and granting it. If the fact is clearly established, the granting nation may proclaim its determination, without right of question by any third nation.

A different policy was adopted by the United States during the Cuban insurrection of 1868-78. It was the policy of good offices toward the contending parties, looking toward Cuban independence, and even going so far as an offer to purchase of Spain the independence of the island. Many of our leading statesmen favored it among them, even such as were coldly disposed toward Cuba on account of the existence of the negro slavery on her soil. This policy became that of the Grant administration, but it was so distasteful to Spain as to seemingly aggravate her cruel dealings with the insurgents, and to require something stronger on the part of President Grant, for, in 1876, his Secretary of State was forced to write that unless the insurrection in Cuba was speedily suppressed the United States would be compelled to intervene.

The overwhelming vote of sympathy, in both houses of the Fifty-fourth Congress, in favor of the Cuban patriots, brought about a strong contrast with the course of President Cleveland. It was alleged that his attitude was not one of indifference toward the contestants but of actual favoritism toward Spain, in that he had gone beyond his duty of preserving neutrality. Though it had been decided in our highest judicial tribunals, that vessels carrying war munitions and unarmed men were not illegitimately engaged, the President ordered the seizure of several such, only to find that they were released by the courts. His undertaking to police the seas beyond the three mile limit and to arrest vessels suspected of violating the neutrality laws, was equally repudiated by the judicial tribunals. Only in a single instance was his course sustained, and that was where the arms and soldiers were found aboard together, the former actually

in the latter's hands, and where the evidence was that such union had been planned on the soil of the United States.

Among the pecuniary or material reasons for change in our Cuban relations, may well be mentioned the ruin of American property of immense value in Cuba, the destruction of a large commerce with the island, the shutting out of American enterprise from a wide and desirable field. Add to these the importance of removing a continuous threat upon our commercial and political well being contained in the possession of an island lying so near our coasts by a foreign and monarchical government, and one may find good reason for the opinion of Charles Sumner in 1869 :

“For myself I cannot doubt that in the interest of both parties, Cuba and Spain, and in the interest of humanity also, the contest should be closed. This is my judgment on the facts, so far as known to me. Cuba must be saved from its bloody delirium, or little will be left for the final conquerer. Nor can the enlightened mind fail to see that the Spanish power on this island is an anachronism. The day of European colonies has passed—at least in this hemisphere, where the rights of man were first proclaimed and self-government first established.”

But what really makes a change in our Cuban relations necessarily rests on that high ground taken by Mr. Lodge in the *Forum* :

“Such a war as is now being waged in Cuba—unrestrained by any of the laws of civilized warfare and marked by massacre and ferocious reprisals at every step—is a disgrace to civilization. It is as useless as it is brutal. Spain is in truth “an anachronism ” in the Western Hemisphere. It is impossible that she should long retain even this last foothold. Spanish-American Governments have

no doubt fallen far short of the standards of the English speaking race, but they have been an immense improvement in the stupid and cruel misgovernment of Spain. It is no argument to say that, the Spanish-American Governments are not up to our standard, the Cubans should be compelled to remain crushed beneath the misgovernment of Spain,—especially when we remember that, although there are many negroes and mulattoes in Cuba, the whites are whites of pure race and not mixed with Indian blood as on the continent

“This is a world of comparative progress, and freedom from Spain would be to Cuba a long step in advance on the highroad of advancing civilization. The interests of humanity are the controlling reasons which demand the beneficent interposition of the United States to bring to an end this savage war and give to the island peace and independence. No great nation can escape its responsibilities. We freely charge England with responsibility for the hideous atrocities in Armenia. But it is the merest cant to do this if we shirk our own duty. We have a responsibility with regard to Cuba. We cannot evade it and, if we seek to do so, sooner or later we shall pay the penalty. But the American people, whose sympathies are strongly with the Cubans fighting for their liberties, will no longer suffer this indifference toward them to continue. If one administration declines to meet our national responsibilities as they should be met, there will be put in power another administration which will neither neglect nor shun its plain duty to the United States and to the cause of freedom and humanity.”

A SECOND VIEW.

It must not be supposed that those who favor strict



JOHN W. DANIEL.

Born at Lynchburg, Sept. 5, 1842; educated at Lynchburg College and Harrison University; served in Confederate Army; Adjutant of Early's Staff; studied law at University of Va.; member of House of Delegates, 1869-70, 1871-72; member of Senate, 1875-81; Tilden Elector, 1876; member of Dem. Nat. Con., 1880, 1888; defeated for Governor in 1881; member of 49th Congress; elected to U. S. Senate and took seat March 4, 1887; re-elected Dec., 1891; member of Committees on Foreign Relations, Appropriations, Judiciary, Public Buildings and Grounds, and Revision of Laws.



HON. DAVID B. CULBERSON.

Born in Troup co., Ga., September 29, 1830; educated at Brownwood; studied law and moved to Texas, 1856; elected to State Legislature, 1859; served in Confederate army throughout war; elected to State Legislature, 1864; elected, as a Democrat, to 44th, 45th, 46th, 47th, 48th, 49th, 50th, 51st and 52d Congresses, to represent Fourth Texas District, composed of eleven counties; an earnest and popular member, admired by a large constituency; active on the floor as debater and parliamentarian; Chairman of the Judiciary Committee.

neutrality as to Spain and indifference on the part of the United States, are any the less impressed with the importance of the situation, whether regarded in a political or commercial light. They do not necessarily lack sympathy with the efforts of the patriots to secure the blessing of free institutions for themselves, nor do they close their eyes to the righteousness of a struggle occasioned by long years of harsh taxation, treacherous dealings and cruel oppression.

They see with all others the three great causes that have contributed to make the Cuban question one of peculiar interest to the United States, to wit: Sympathy with the idea of Cuban independence, the tyranny of Spanish rule, desire of annexation to the United States. But they see also, and make it conspicuous, the supreme duty of the United States to sedulously maintain its neutrality laws, and to take no risks by a change of its relations with a friendly government. These have studied faithfully the histories of Cuban struggles, and their judgments cannot be ignored in making up the national verdict respecting the attitude to be assumed by the United States.

They sustain the President in his proclamation of June 12, 1895, calling attention to the prohibition of our neutrality laws, and warning all persons against breaking them. They find support for their views in the statement in the President's annual message of December 2, 1895, to the effect that:

“The traditional sympathy of our countrymen as individuals with a people who seem to be struggling for a larger autonomy and greater freedom, deepened as such sympathy naturally must be in behalf of our neighbors, yet the plain duty of their Government is to observe in

good faith the recognized obligations of international relationship."

When the Congress passed its resolution expressing the opinion that the Cubans should be granted belligerent rights, with such great unanimity, it was seen that such action, if not directly, at least by implication, was equivalent to saying to the public that the judgment of the President was erroneous and should be reversed. This opened inquiry as to the power of the President in the premises. It was conceded, after but little discussion, that the question of belligerency was one wholly in the hands of the President, as the person charged by the Constitution with the conduct of our foreign relations. It was equally agreed that belligerency, like independence, was one of fact, in the determination of which neutral governments do not necessarily consider the question of right between the contending parties. This rule was announced to the Texas envoy in 1837, and was found to have been repeated before and since. The actual state of hostilities and not the merits of a controversy is the guide for neutrals in entering on the path of intervention.

Assuming that the President and the Congress had access to the same sources of information respecting hostilities in Cuba, or had equally reliable information, the whole question became one of relying upon or construing such information. And here what may be called an historic view of the Cuban cause assumed shades to suit the friends and opponents of belligerency. We have, in former pages, traced this history from the standpoint of those who found in it sufficient to warrant a change in our Cuban relations. We must also trace it from the standpoint of those who opposed a change of such relations.

According to these latter, the Cuban uprising, beginning in February, 1895, in the provinces of Santiago de Cuba and Matanzas, embraced only the banditti element of the mountains, and included none of the political parties which represented the planting, industrial, commercial and professional interests of the island. It was an uprising of the laboring classes, chiefly plantation negroes, who had been goaded to desperation by low and uncertain wages, due to depression in the prices of sugar and tobacco, to excessive cost of provisions and clothing, and to the grinding modes of Spanish taxation. The hope was that, like other and similar uprisings, this one would soon exhaust itself, and that peace would be restored.

But it was found that there was more back of it than was at first suspected. Gomez proved abler than former leaders, and he found valuable assistants in the two Maceos, Antonio and José, who, being mulattoes, easily persuaded the negroes to leave the cane fields and tobacco plantations and swell the ranks of the insurgents. The spirit of revolt soon spread among the whites, who were encouraged by the show of systematic effort on the part of leaders. Organizations ripened, and a plan of campaign was agreed upon admirably calculated to inflame insurrection and augment the insurgent forces. Battles with Spanish forces were avoided, but a series of brilliant marches was entered upon, where the track was marked by the destruction of plantations, crops, railroads, and all resources vital to the existing government. Thus, by sweeping from east to west, throughout the length of the island, the insurrection was given geographic extent, and became an object which attracted thousands to it. Contributions were levied on planters, and towns, fields, build-

ings and machinery were destroyed ; laborers were enlisted or, upon refusal, shot. Said Mr. Williams, our Consul-General at Havana :

" Besides the burning of cane fields, the newspapers report cases of damage to railroads by displacing rails, the blowing up of culverts, burning of bridges and stations ; also, the pillaging of country stores, the carrying off of horses, saddles, and bridles from farms on their line of march for the mounting of men, and the slaughter of cattle for food. . . . The insurgents appear, while carrying on their work of destruction of private property, to have been able, thus far, to elude all encounter with the government troops."

From this state of affairs, it was argued that even if there was a Cuban war in progress, as the friends of Cuban freedom claimed, it could not be dignified by the name of regular warfare, but possessed only the characteristics of guerrilla warfare, and therefore presented none of the conditions which would warrant a grant of belligerent rights by a nation which professed to follow strictly neutral lines. Wars vary in kind and degree, and do not become public wars merely by the exclusion of right authority from a portion of its domain, nor by the setting up of a rebellious government inside of said domain. A fine line was drawn between a "public war" and "civil war," and before the latter could become the former, the insurgents must have risen to the dignity of a political power, with cohering principles, a certain degree of independence, definite geographic limits, and some community of population, interest and destiny. Till the latter became the former there could be no proper grant of belligerent rights, for only a "public war" warranted such a grant.

This principle of law, the resolution passed by the Congress seemingly conceded, for the language of the resolution was, "in the opinion of Congress, a *public war* exists between the Government of Spain and the Government proclaimed and for some time maintained by force of arms by the people of Cuba." But there was a stout denial by opponents of belligerency that, as facts stood, the insurgents were in any sense "the people of Cuba," or that they were "maintaining a Government."

Again it was argued that there was no emergency, either actual or imminent, in connection with the Cuban question which made it incumbent on neutral powers to define their relation to the conflict. As to the necessity of such emergency in such cases the principle of international law was invoked, that "so long as a Government is struggling with insurgents isolated in the midst of loyal provinces and consequently removed from contact with foreign States, the interests of the latter are rarely touched, and probably are never touched in such a way that they can be served by recognition. In case of maritime war the assumption of propriety lies in the opposite direction. To the legal concession of belligerency two conditions are essential; first, the struggle shall have attained the dimensions of war in the international sense; second, there must be a necessity for the recognition. A recognition by a foreign State of full belligerent rights, if not justified by necessity, is a gratuitous demonstration of moral support to the rebellion, and of censure upon the parent Government."

The Government of the United States had adhered to these principles during the insurrections in the Spanish-American colonies in 1810-15, and only departed from them in the latter year, by a grant of belligerent rights,

after the appearance of vessels bearing the flags of the insurrectionary governments appeared in our ports. During the Cuban insurrection of 1868-78, President Grant, in his message of June 13, 1870, gave the following reason for his refusal to recognize the Cuban insurgents as belligerents, and these reasons were the more quoted and urged by opponents of belligerency in 1896, because, in 1869, Cespedes, the then President of the Cuban Republic, had declared in an address to President Grant, that he had an army of 10,000 men, which occupied three-fourths of the island and that a navy was in process of construction. It would seem also as if the new government were actually further on in 1869 than in 1896, for it had been recognized as independent by Peru, and as a belligerent by Chile, Bolivia and Mexico. It had also sent a duly accredited minister to the United States, and had organized a government at a stated capital, had passed laws, issued money, and done what regular governments are authorized to do.

President Grant evidently regarded the above statements respecting the Cuban situation as exaggerated, for in his message he said:

“The question of belligerency is one of fact, not to be decided by sympathies with or prejudices against either party. The relations between the parent state and the insurgents must amount, in fact, to war in the sense of international law. Fighting, though fierce and protracted, does not alone constitute war; there must be military forces acting in accordance with the rules and customs of war—flags of truce, cartels, exchange of prisoners, etc.,—and to justify a recognition of belligerency there must be, above all, a *de facto* political organization of the insurgents sufficient in character and resources to constitute it, if left to itself, a State among nations capable of discharging the

duties of a State, and of meeting the just responsibilities it may incur as such toward other powers in the discharge of its national duties.

“Applying the best information which I have been enabled to gather, whether from official or unofficial sources, including the very exaggerated statements which each party gives of all that may prejudice the opposite or give credit to its own side of the question, I am unable to see, in the present condition of the contest in Cuba, those elements which are requisite to constitute war in the sense of international law.

“The insurgents hold no town or city; have no established seat of government; they have no prize courts; no organization for the receiving and collecting of revenue; no seaport to which a prize may be carried, or through which access can be had by a foreign power to the limited interior territory and mountain fastnesses which they occupy. The existence of a legislature representing any popular constituency is more than doubtful.

“In the uncertainty that hangs around the entire insurrection there is no palpable evidence of an election, of any delegated authority, or of any government outside the limits of the camps occupied from day to day by the roving companies of insurgent troops. There is no commerce; no trade, either internal or foreign; no manufactures.”

Again in his message of December 7, 1875, he declared that the United States should carefully avoid the “false lights which might lead it into mazes of doubtful law and of questionable propriety, and adhere rigidly and sternly to the rule which has been its guide of doing only that which is right and honest and of good report”; and, adverting to the fact that the conflict still continued to be on land, and that the insurrection had no seaport whence

it might send forth its flag, "nor any means of communication with foreign powers except through the military lines of its adversaries," he pointed out that no apprehension of any of the sudden and difficult complications which a war upon the ocean was apt to precipitate called for a definition by foreign powers of their relation to the conflict.

As is well known, there was much excitement in this country over the attitude assumed by President Grant, and in a sudden outburst of sympathy for the Cuban patriots Mr. Sherman introduced a resolution in the Senate in favor of recognizing the belligerency of Cuba, sustaining it with an able speech. The excitement gradually died out, and the President's course was seen to be right, in view of the fact that an old treaty of 1795 between this country and Spain was found to be in existence, which in case of belligerency would have given Spain an undoubted right to search suspected American vessels, a measure sure to provoke international complications and lead to war.

The argument drawn from the fact that Spain had recognized the belligerency of the Confederate States within sixty days from the firing on Fort Sumter, and without other knowledge of the real status of the rebellion, was met by the statement that long preceding that event, South Carolina had adopted an ordinance of secession, that by May, 1861, ten other States had followed, the Constitution for the Confederate States was formed in February 1861, officers elected, and steps taken toward forming an army, that custom houses, forts, arsenals, and ports had been seized, that Sumter had been fired upon April 12, 1861; that President Lincoln had issued a proclamation for troops, that in April a blockade of the ports of the seceded States had been declared. The reasoning

from this state of facts was, that a large portion of the people of the United States were actually maintaining a government, collecting customs at seaports, and exercising dominion over a vast extent of territory. That the Federal Government in calling out troops and declaring the blockade recognized the condition to be one of "public war." That this condition was so accepted by the nations which granted belligerent rights to the Confederates. In this connection they quoted the opinion of Judge Grier, of the United States Supreme Court, in the Prize Cases:

"This greatest of civil wars was not gradually developed by popular commotion, tumultuous assembles, or local unorganized insurrections. However long may have been its previous conception, it nevertheless sprang forth suddenly from the parent brain, a Minerva in the full panoply of war. . . . The proclamation of blockade is itself official and conclusive evidence that a state of war existed which demanded and authorized a recourse to such a measure, under the circumstances peculiar to the case In organizing this rebellion, they have *acted as States* claiming to be sovereign over all persons and property within their respective limits, and asserting a right to absolve their citizens from their allegiance to the Federal Government. . . . Their right to do so is now being decided by wager of battle. The ports and territory of each of these States are held in hostility to the General Government. It is no loose, unorganized insurrection, having no defined boundary or possession. It has a boundary marked by lines of bayonets, and which can be crossed only by force,—south of this line is enemies' territory, because it is claimed and held in possession by an organized, hostile and belligerent power."

The final argument of the opponents of Cuban belliger-

ency was that it could be no possible benefit to the struggling patriots. It could in no wise alter their relations to Spain, who could still regard them as rebels worthy of death or banishment if she saw fit. On the contrary it might prove of great detriment to the Cuban cause, for if Spain chose to exercise her rights of search under the treaty of 1795, that would put an end to the transportation of munitions of war for the insurgents.

In the discussion in Congress upon the passage of the resolution advising the grant of belligerency, quite a sentiment cropped out in favor of direct intervention by the United States under certain conditions. One of the strongest exponents of this sentiment was Senator Mills, who proposed in his speech that if the Government of Spain should deny a request of the United States upon her to grant to Cubans the power of local self-government, then the United States should take possession of the island and hold it until its inhabitants can institute such government as they may wish, and organize and arm such forces as may be necessary to support it.

As to the other means of dealing with the Cuban question—the purchase of the island outright by the United States, and its annexation as a State of the Union, it had never entered so fully into public discussion nor taken so serious a hold on public sentiment as in 1854, during a period of violent agitation in favor of annexation. During that exciting period Mr. Buchanan, our Minister at London, Mr. Mason, Minister at Paris, and Mr. Soulé, Minister at Madrid, met at Ostend to consider the question of Cuban annexation. The result was a report to Wm. L. Marcy, then Secretary of State, which became known as the “Ostend Manifesto.” It contained this extraordinarily bold and defiant language :

“If Spain, deaf to the voice of her own interests, and actuated by stubborn pride and a false sense of honor, should refuse to sell Cuba to the United States,” the time would then have come for the United States to consider whether Cuba in the possession of Spain seriously endangered ‘our internal peace and the existence of our cherished Union’; that, if this question should be answered in the affirmative, ‘then, by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain, if we possess the power’; and that we should be ‘recreant to our duty—be unworthy of our gallant forefathers, and commit base treason against our posterity, should we permit Cuba to be Africanized and to become a second St. Domingo.’”

This doctrine was as boldly repudiated, in the following year, by Secretary Marcy. He said in reply to the report:

“I am entirely opposed to getting up a war for the purpose of seizing Cuba; but if the conduct of Spain should be such as to justify a war, I should not hesitate to meet that state of things. The authorities of Cuba act unwisely, but not so much so as is represented. They are more alarmed than they need to be in regard to dangers from this country, though it cannot be said that the filibuster spirit and movements do not furnish just grounds of apprehension. They have a clear right to take measures for defence, but what those measures may be, it is not easy to define. In exercising their own rights they are bound to respect the rights of other nations. This they have not done in all cases. That they have deliberately intended to commit wrong against the United States I do not believe; but that they have done so I do not deny. The conduct of Spain and the Cuban authorities has been exaggerated and even misrepresented in some of our leading

journals. I am not much surprised at the opinion for war, right or wrong: but I venture to assure you that such is not the policy of the Administration. It does not want war, would avoid it, but would not shrink from it, if it becomes necessary in the defence of our just rights.

"The robber doctrine, I abhor. If carried out it would degrade us in our own estimation and disgrace us in the eyes of the civilized world. Should the Administration commit the fatal folly of acting upon it, it could not hope to be sustained by the country, and would leave a tarnished name to all future times.

"Cuba would be a very desirable possession, if it came to us in the right way, but we cannot afford to get it by robbery or theft. I am for getting the island, if it can be acquired fairly and honestly, not otherwise. I do not believe the robber doctrine when calmly considered will be popular or that a party can sustain itself upon it."

GERMS OF WAR.

Looking at the Cuban question from the standpoint of popular sentiment in Spain, it is an incendiary question which, without the greatest caution on the part of Spanish rulers, is liable to break out into consuming flame. When word reached Spain of the action of the American Congress, that country manifested the most violent indignation. The masses in populous towns rallied to war cries against the United States, and necessitated the use of armed troops to protect the person and property of American representatives and citizens. All orders of citizens, outside of those directly responsible for peace, threw themselves into a war frenzy, and ridiculous threats were made of an immediate invasion and conquest of the United States.

While this blood thirsty indignation was slowly spending itself, the action of the Spanish authorities in Cuba served to kindle indignant fires in the United States. A vessel, called the *Competitor*, was siezed while engaged in trying to land war munitions for the insurgents. Her crew were summarily tried by court-martial and sentenced to pay the death penalty. The trial was a sheer mockery, in that the accused were denied time for preparation and counsel of their own choosing. Among them was an American-citizen, who was not a part of the crew, but who was seeking to enter the island as a newspaper correspondent. This action of the authorites was so hasty and in such accord with the charges of cruelty to which they had already thrown themselves open, that word of it incensed our people and spurred our Government to the point of intervention.

Fortunately the finding of the court-martial had to be certified to the home government for approval before it could be executed. It was met there by an American protest, whose form was not made public. That one made twenty-three years before in the celebrated *Virginius* affair, by Secretary Fish, at the instance of President Grant, read thus:

“In case of refusal of satisfactory reparation within twelve days from this date, you will, at the expiration of that time close your legation, and will, together with your secretary, leave madrid, bringing with you the archives of the legation. You may leave the printed documents constituting the library in charge of the legation of some friendly power which you may select, who will take charge of them.”

At any rate it served to call Spain to her senses, and to postpone the approval of what would have been the mur-

der of an American citizen. It transpired, amid discussion of the merits of the case, that condemnation of the men on the charge of piracy and treason, and by so savage a court as a court-martial, was clearly illegal. None of the elements of piracy were found in the case of the *Competitor*. She was engaged in filibustering, or in a military expedition, which is not piracy. Piracy is a crime committed on the high seas. Its object is plunder by attack upon vessels that come in its way. A pirate is an enemy of the human race. International law so adjudges her. But not so an insurgent vessel, carrying arms to friends, with no intent to depredate in the open seas, and without power to do so.

Nor was the crime treason, for that is the crime of a subject against his sovereign. The crew of the *Competitor* were not Spanish subjects. One was an American.

In the case of Aaron Burr, charged with treason, against our Government, Justice Marshall held that treason was not proven, although Burr had planned a rebellion, organized men, or was about to, and had actually purchased arms and ammunition as well as a ship for his enterprise. Nor did he sink his ship and destroy the arms until he learned that he was to be arrested on the charge of treason. Of course it would be impossible for an American to commit an act of treason against Spain or any other foreign power.

It further transpired that the American on board the *Competitor* was wrongly tried by court-martial, it being stipulated by the Cushing Treaty of 1821 between Spain and the United States that "No citizen of the United States in Spain, her adjacent islands, or her ultramarine possessions, charged with acts of sedition, treason or conspiracy against the institutions, the public security, the integrity of the


territory, or against the Supreme Government, or any other crime whatsoever, shall be subject to trial by exceptional tribunal, but exclusively by the ordinary jurisdiction, except in the case of being captured with arms in hand."

Now, the purpose of treaties is to define clearly and definitely matters between certain nations. Treaties outrank international law. The latter is strictly a general agreement on general matters between the principal nations of the world. A treaty, however, is made that the understanding between the parties to it may be explicit. Therefore, in the case of the Cushing Treaty there is but one construction to be placed upon the phrase, "captured with arms in hand." The prisoners must have been in actual possession of arms—have had arms in their hands—to come under the provision of the treaty, which permits them to be tried by court-martial.

The third section of the treaty says that "those who may be taken with arms in hand," and who are therefore comprehended in the exception of the first article, shall be tried by ordinary council of war in conformity with the second article of the hereinbefore mentioned law; but even in this case the accused should enjoy for their defense the guarantees in the aforesaid law of April 17, 1821.


Pending the solution of this delicate case of the Competitor, a solution which involved the higher question of peace or war between the two anxious and excited countries, the Cuban problem worked its way largely into the politics of the national campaign of 1896. It brought the Congress nearly to the verge of passing a joint resolution in favor of belligerency, in order to compel President Cleveland to show where he stood by signing or vetoing it. Many State Conventions of both parties passed resolutions of sympathy with the struggling Cubans, and as

time progressed it became almost certain that neither the Republican nor Democratic parties could refuse to insert a plank in their national platforms in favor of Cuban belligerency. The time seemed to be already at hand, or within near arrival, when tension grew full of threatening if not lamentable incidents; when it would be necessary to inform Spain that indefinite riot and rapine could not be permitted to continue in Cuba, and that if she could not restore peace in the fertile island this country must. Should she resent this attitude, there would be no distinction of political party in this country, and no difference of opinion in the universal determination to meet all the responsibilities of such a situation, created not by the United States but by Spain.



HON. JOHN SHERMAN.

Born at Lancaster, Ohio, May 10, 1823; academically educated; studied law and admitted to bar, May 11, 1844; delegate to Whig National Conventions, 1848 and 1852; President of first Republican in Ohio, 1855; elected to 34th, 35th, 36th and 37th Congresses; elected, as Republican, to United States Senate, March, 1861; re-elected to same, 1866 and 1872; appointed Secretary of Treasury, by President Hayes, March, 1877, and served till March 3, 1881; distinguished for advocacy of resumption and success in refunding United States debt; re-elected to Senate for term beginning March 4, 1881, and again in 1886 and 1892; Chairman of Committee on Foreign Relations and member of Committees on Finance, etc.



WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

LIFE OF WILLIAM M^cKINLEY.

BIRTH AND EDUCATION.

THE McKinley family, to which our illustrious subject belongs, was originally from the west of Scotland, but eventually found its way to the north of Ireland, as part of that important migration which afterwards became so conspicuously known both in Europe and this country as Scotch-Irish.

Two branches of the McKinley family migrated to America about the beginning of the last century. One branch settled in the South, and became founder of a long line of prominent and influential citizens. The other branch settled in the North, and presumably in York county, Pa.; at least one James McKinley, who was but twelve years old when his father came to this country, was a resident of York in 1755, where a son was born to him, whom he named David McKinley.

This David McKinley served as a private in the Revolutionary war, and was engaged in several important battles. After the war he moved to Westmoreland county, Pa., then to Mercer county, Pa., then to Columbiana county, Ohio, and finally to Crawford county, where he died. . He married twice, the first time in 1780 to Sarah Gray, and the second to Eleanor McClean. He had no children by his second wife, but by his first he had

four sons and several daughters, all of whom were born in Pennsylvania, in Westmoreland or Mercer counties. He died, August 8, 1840, in Crawford county, Ohio.

His second son, James McKinley, and great-grandfather of our subject, was born September 19, 1783, and resided in Mercer county, Pa., where he married Mary Rose, who was of English extraction. Her father was an iron founder, and he, too, was a soldier in the Revolutionary war. James McKinley moved to New Lisbon, Ohio, in 1800, taking along with him his son, William McKinley, then but a year and a-half old, and born November 15, 1807. There were born to James McKinley, thirteen children, eleven of whom were born in New Lisbon. The oldest son was the above mentioned William McKinley, father of our subject.

He early became associated with the iron business, and erected, both for himself and in association with others, several foundries and furnaces in Ohio, moving in pursuit of his business from New Lisbon to Niles, thence to Poland, and thence to Canton, where he died in 1892. He married Nancy Campbell Allison, in 1827. She was a descendant of an English family, that had first settled in Virginia, then moved to Greene county, Pa., and finally to New Lisbon.

From this union sprang William McKinley, the subject of our biography, distinguished alike for his high place in American political history, and as the recipient of an homage accorded to but few statesmen. He was born at Niles, Trumbull county, Ohio, January 29, 1843. His father was then a resident of Niles, and manager of an iron furnace there. While the younger William and his sisters were mere children, the father and mother moved to Poland, in Mahoning county, a village in the centre of

a flourishing agricultural and mining section. This move was made both for business and educational reasons, the place being somewhat noted for its academy.

In this busy but unostentatious village, the younger McKinley began his school career. It was at first the usual tame submission to the routine of the public schools, and then a loftier and pleasanter walk in the portals of the academy. The pupil was ever obedient and progressive. He labored hard during the school sessions to improve his opportunities, and during vacations he did not hesitate to follow the custom of the times by earning pocket and book money on his own account. As he progressed with his studies, he filled in his leisure with odd clerical jobs, and taught a term of public school in a district contiguous to Poland, thus contributing materially to the expense of his academic education, as well as to the development of his intellectual organization and powers of self-control.

As a boy and pupil, young McKinley gave evidence of many of those qualities which in their maturity characterized his public life. His industry and perseverance were earnest of that assiduity and persistency which afterwards enabled him to meet and conquer the hard problems of legislation and statescraft. His youthful love of fun, exercise and athletics gave assurance of sturdy physical power, equal to the hardest strains of the battlefield or the severest exactions of the political campaign or committee room. In his youthful candor and generosity of spirit, were the germs of that social elegance and pleasing political address admired as much by those who opposed as those who favored his views. In his boyish democracy were the seeds of that philanthropy which would bring the beneficences of economic legislation down to

the looms and the furnace hearths, and into the domestic lives of the toiling masses. In the brightness and acquisitiveness of his youthful intellect, we see that future mastery of our industrial status, and that successful application of remedial laws which have borne such relishable fruits and have left him without a peer in popular affection. In that young faithfulness to family, in obedience, in all that reflected a noble mother's assiduous training, have been found that exalted moral life, noble integrity of purpose, severe adherence to the codes of honor that regulate our business and political estates. In short, the boyish and educational estate of William McKinley presaged the coming man with far greater accuracy than is common, even with those who have the greatest reason to appreciate the stern lessons of early years.

He left the Academy at Poland when seventeen years of age, and entered Allegheny College. But his career here was brief, owing to sickness. On his return to Poland he again taught public school for a time, and also Bible class in his Sunday school, he being then a member of the Methodist Episcopal church.

ARMY CAREER.

A youth of McKinley's patriotism could not, of course, resist the high call to duty which came with the breaking out of the Civil war. Burning with desire to aid the cause of the Union, forgetting his unripe years and the sacrifices that one so young would have to make, he joined the band of companions that went out from Poland early in the war—June 11, 1861—and that afterwards became Company E, of the 23d Ohio Volunteers. He bore no commission, was honored by no title, but

marched as private in the ranks, impelled only by the sacredness of his cause and that inward devotion to principle which actuated his entire military career.

He was but a stripling of eighteen years, but as undaunted as the volunteer of stronger mould and more mature years, in whose hands the musket was less unwieldy, on whose back the knapsack was less a burden, whose limbs were stronger for fatiguing march, whose vitality was hardier against camp exposure. Hardly had he found his way to headquarters before he attracted the attention of his superiors, as one possessed of more than the usual qualities of a private soldier. He was ever attentive to duty, promptly in his place at every command, fearless of danger and exposure, an inspiration to his fellow soldiers, and withal, gave evidence of an ability to originate and execute which bade fair to be of inestimable value to those over him.

His Colonel was W. S. Rosecrans who, being a West Pointer, proved to be a severe disciplinarian. If McKinley and his comrades found their school of the regiment at first a hard one, it was none the less useful, and the time would prove to be near when the advantages of discipline would become apparent. Stanley Matthews was the first Lieutenant Colonel of the regiment, and Rutherford B. Hayes, afterward, President Hayes, was its first major. Here was certainly distinguished company, and to win the favor of such men by rigid adherence to duty, and by show of superior ability was a matter of more than ordinary moment.

The rendezvous of the regiment was Camp Chase, Columbus, Ohio. It had enlisted for the three months' service. On its arrival at camp, the State quota for three months' men was found to be full. But orders for three

years' men had already been issued from Washington, and the 23d Ohio was asked to change the term of its enlistment. A great majority of them, including McKinley did so, and thus the regiment which had been third to enlist of the three months' men, became the first to enlist of the three years' men.

The regiment continued to drill at Camp Chase during July, 1861. Owing to the promotion of General Rosecrans, E. P. Scammon became its Colonel. It was now ripe for the field, and was waiting at Clarksburg, W. Va., a mountainous, remote, difficult section infested by guerrillas. Here the regiment was not likely to meet an enemy in pitched battle, but a secret foe, who kept it on almost a continuous march by night and day, over steep mountains, through dangerous defiles, drenched with rain to-day, shelterless and foodless to-morrow, routing, chasing and scattering an adroit, swift and heartless enemy. The mountain incursion may not have called forth the highest fighting qualities of the regiment, but it was certainly a severe test of its powers of endurance, and an excellent foretaste of the real hardships of campaigning. The only engagement fought by the regiment that reached the magnitude of battle was that at Carnifex Ferry on September 10, 1861. This was a series of active skirmishes throughout the day, followed by the stealing away of the enemy at night.

These operations ended by a difficult march of the regiment to Camp Ewing on New river, which proved to be a very unhealthy spot, and where the ranks were greatly decimated by an outbreak of disease, owing to exposure and lack of proper food. In May, 1862, the regiment, now fully recruited and in good condition, left its camp, under the lead of Lieutenant-Colonel Hayes, and

marched upon Princeton, W. Va. The enemy first evacuated the town, but afterwards returned. A sharp engagement followed, May 15, 1862, resulting in the defeat of the Union forces. They retreated, however, in good order, but were afterward subjected to great hardship by the cutting off of their supplies.

While in camp at Flat Rock, orders were received to march to Green Meadows and thence to Camp Piatt on the Great Kanawha, on the way eastward to reinforce McClellan's army, then about to confront the forces of Lee in Maryland. In three days, the regiment covered the very difficult distance of one hundred and four miles from Green Meadows to Camp Piatt. The embarkation for Washington was speedy, and the arrival in Washington timely, for after a rest of a day or two, the regiment was on the march with McClellan toward Frederick City, Md., to head off Lee's threat upon Washington and Baltimore.

But now McKinley was no longer a private in the ranks. In recognition of those very executive qualities Colonel Hayes had discovered in him while at Camp Chase, he had secured his promotion to the important post of commissary sergeant, April 15, 1862, ere they left the wilderness of West Virginia. This brought him into a staff relation with his colonel, and they not only became friends, but their intimacy proved to be deep and lasting. The preliminary battle of dreadful Antietam had now to be fought, September 14, 1862. McKinley's regiment, still commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Hayes, was attached to Cox's division, which was the division in the advance of McClellan's army. The battle opened by an attack of this advance upon the enemy, strongly entrenched up the mountain side. A murderous fire at short range

was opened on the leading Federal brigade, and in a few moments one-third of their number was stretched upon the field, Lieutenant-Colonel Hayes receiving a bad wound in the arm. On the arrival of reinforcements, the brigade charged up the hill and drove the enemy from his strong entrenchments at the point of the bayonet. During the balance of the day the regiment fought with its division, under the immediate command of General Cox, and in all made three severe bayonet charges with success. The regimental losses for the day were nearly two hundred, one-fourth of whom were killed outright.

Severe as this battle of South Mountain was, it was but a prelude to that of Antietam, for which both sides were now making the utmost preparation. This great battle was fought, September 17, 1862. It has passed into history as the bloodiest single day of war during the rebellion. McKinley's regiment fought at the right of the First Brigade of the Kanawha Division. It was called into battle before daylight and without breakfast. The entire division soon found its left and rear exposed to a terrific attack of the enemy from a corn field. Its colors of the 23d went down, to be hoisted again by Major Comly, on a new line facing the enemy, to which the entire regiment quickly conformed, and by a decisive fire forced the enemy to retire. The regiment, not receiving the orders of the division to withdraw, held its position till the arrival of a special order for it to fall to the rear. Notwithstanding the arduous and bloody duties of the day, the regiment spent the night in support of a battery, and found final relief only on the next afternoon. All through the angry fight of the 17th, Sergeant McKinley spared no exertion to relieve the men of his regiment of the pangs of hunger and thirst. He was in the midst

of the fires of conflict from morning to night, serving with his own hands the food and drink which the men had been deprived of by the early morning outburst of battle. It was this occasion of bravery and self-sacrifice under fire, and this incident of devotion and administrative ability, that earned for him the applause of his officers and companions. Word of it reached the Governor of his State, and recognition came back in the shape of a promotion to the Second Lieutenancy of Company D, September 23, 1862.

The relief which came to a dangerous military situation through the battle of Antietam, enabled McClellan to send McKinley's regiment once more to West Virginia, where its presence was much needed. It made a hasty journey westward and went into winter quarters on the Great Kanawha, after a march of six hundred miles during the year, a campaign of severe mountain service, and participation in two of the bloodiest episodes of the war. McKinley was promoted to be First Lieutenant of Company E February 7th, 1863.

During 1863, the regiment was engaged in the scouting duty incident to the occupation of West Virginia, but once it was called upon to participate in the movement which brought Morgan's raid to termination by the engagement at Buffington's island, Ohio. During the winter of 1863-64, it was in winter quarters at Charleston, West Virginia.

In the spring of 1864, it marched to Brownstown on the Kanawha, where it became a part of the force of General Crook, who was then preparing for his celebrated raid on the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. This expedition differed but little in its dangers and hardships from the everyday West Virginia experience. It embraced

toilful mountain marches, the threading of deep and dangerous ravines, exposure to frequent rainfalls, precarious supplies of food, repeated encounters with guerrillas, till on May 9, 1864, patience and effort culminated in the spirited battle of Cloyd's mountain.

In this engagement the 23d Ohio occupied the right of the First Brigade which was face to face with an enemy strongly posted on the wooded steeps of the mountain, with an open meadow in front. A charge was ordered on the enemy's lines, amid a terrific fire of musketry and artillery. It was bravely made across the open space and up over the first line of entrenchments, the enemy retreating to a second fortified line further up the mountain. A second charge up the steeps dislodged him from this line. Reinforced, a third stand was made, but nothing could now check the ardor of the Union troops. They rushed in hand to hand encounter upon the enemy's guns, and after an heroic struggle succeeded in capturing them, and thus accomplishing an important aim of the raid. This victory was followed by a series of active operations, involving the artillery duel at New Bridge, and the destruction of the bridge; the continuous battle march to Blackburnburg, and the embarrassing crossing of Salt Pond mountains, owing to incessant rains, the wretched condition of the roads, and the flocking of "contrabands," whom pity could not leave to starvation, or perhaps a worse death.

Crook's force was now within reach of that of Hunter, who had been ordered on a similar raid up the James river. It was therefore ordered to join with Hunter, which it did at Lexington, Virginia. March was taken for Lynchburg, with the intent of attacking. Lee had sent heavy reinforcements from Richmond, and when the encounter came, the Union forces met with severe repulse,

At the time of the junction of Crook's forces with Hunter, they were in no condition for battle. They had been on almost incessant night and day marches for a long time, had scaled mountains and forded streams, had passed through repeated encounters, some of which rose to the dignity of battles, and had never had a sure supply of food.

The fortunes of the 23d Ohio now for a time became those of Hunter to the north of Richmond and in the Shenandoah Valley. Or to speak more accurately, its fortune remained that of General Crook, for all of Hunter's infantry command had not yet arrived from the Kanawha valley. And this fortune was by no means a happy one, for the enemy followed up his advantage at Lynchburg, and attacked the Union forces at Liberty, where a brisk battle occurred, resulting in a further Union retreat.

On June 20, 1864, the rear of the Union forces, consisting of Hayes' brigade, with Crook present, held Buford Gap against the enemy's advance, and then made a hasty night retreat for the van, supposed to be at Salem. But Hunter was not found at Salem. The enemy had attacked and cut off his trains, and had forced him beyond the place. Crook's rear guard was in a manner surrounded, and it was only by rare strategy and brave fighting that he extricated his command from this dilemma.

This retreat before a superior force was kept up without opportunity for rest and with an insufficient supply of food and ammunition till June 27th, when a safe spot was reached on Big Sewell Mountain. It had been a continuous fight and march for nearly 180 miles. It need not be recited here how General Early's successes in the Shenandoah Valley at this time emboldened him to carry his invasion to the very front of Washington, and to

challenge a fight for the National Capital. It was all too plain that the Union forces under command of Hunter in the valley were unable to cope with the augmented forces of Early. So Grant sent two corps from Richmond for the rescue of the Capital.

Before these Early beat a retreat southward, carrying along a rich supply of stores and booty gleaned from the valley. He was pursued for a time by Hunter's command, and had gotten as far as Strasburg in his retreat. Here he halted, and learning that he was no longer pursued, resolved to return and fall upon Hunter's in detail.

It had become the opinion of all that Lee had recalled to Richmond the reinforcements previously sent to Early. Hence Hunter felt comparatively secure, after seeing his enemy so far south as Strasburg. He had not only called off pursuit, but had posted his all too meagre forces at various strategic points in the valley. These were driven, somewhat in surprise, from their positions, by Early's returning forces, and forced northward, in a line through Winchester, which General Crook held, with his rearguard of Hunter's army. Crook's command contained Hayes' brigade, in which was the Ohio, 23d Regiment.

On July 24, 1864, Crook's command heard firing to the south of Winchester. He promptly marched his forces, numbering some 6,000 men, out some four miles in the direction of the firing, and to the village of Kernstown. Here he formed a line of battle with Hayes' brigade, numbering 1,700 men, on his left. Here it soon became manifest that Early was present in force, and that a severe struggle impended.

Early pushed the attack with his greatly superior force. It was an attack by centre and both flanks, and was successful on the centre. But Hayes' brigade kept the left

steady, and only retreated to Winchester, after the rest of the lines had been driven back in confusion. In the fierce contention for his position throughout the day, he had lost nearly a fourth of his command, a proportionate share of which fell to the Ohio Twenty-third. In the annals of this fierce encounter of Hunter's rear guard, an encounter which, though it brought not victory, yet answered the purpose of checking for the time the career of an invading foe of superior numbers, occurred one of the many episodes in young McKinley's army the career, which served to show his heroism amid danger. At Winchester, General Hayes learned that one of his regiments had not been informed of the retreat of the brigade, and had been left in a position where it could hardly escape capture, being already nearly surrounded by the enemy. He ordered McKinley, then acting as his aide, to ride out and bring it in. It was seemingly a ride to the death, but, nothing daunted, the brave young officer executed the order, brought the regiment safely in, and received the congratulations of all for his perilous feat.

After this battle of Kernstown, or as is more frequently written in the war histories, of Winchester, there was a confused period of evacuation by Crook's command and a hasty following up, as rear guard, of Hunter's forces toward Martinsburg. Many incidents of this retreat reflected great credit on young McKinley's military career. He was brave, sagacious, thoughtful, spirited, when all was perilous, confused and despondent, and more than once the saving of men and guns from capture was due to his advice and personal heroism.

Lieutenant McKinley was commissioned Captain of Company G. of his regiment, on July 25, 1864, the day after the Kernstown battle. Sheridan now came to the com-

mand in the Shenandoah Valley. His forces embraced the two corps Grant had sent from Richmond, the two infantry divisions of Crook, and Averill's cavalry. These had been concentrated at Halltown in the valley. Early was forced to call together his scattered columns. Sheridan moved against him on August 10th, and pursued him to Strasburg, where he found him so strongly entrenched and greatly reinforced that he dare not attack. On the contrary, Early now began an offensive movement, determined to crush Sheridan at Cedar Creek. But the latter was on the alert and retired to Berryville, leaving Early to concentrate at Winchester, now no longer the centre of a land of plenty.

Now occurred a period of manœuvring for position. At length Sheridan determined to attack Early in his position on the Opequan, covering Winchester. He formed his line of battle with the Sixth and Nineteenth army corps in front, and Crook's divisions in reserve. The attack began on September 19, 1864. Sheridan's onset was fierce but was rolled back. It was followed by a countercharge which broke Sheridan's centre. The broken lines were quickly reestablished. As the battle progressed it was found that the enemy's left was strongest. Crook was ordered to find the extreme of this left, strike its flank and rear and break it up, while Sheridan swung his own left in a half wheel to support him. Crook made his advance with great spirit, and the enemy was forced step by step from his position. Torbert's cavalry came to the aid of Crook and his gallant men, and soon Early's stubborn and strong left was in confusion. Sheridan was driving the centre hard with the Sixth and Nineteenth corps. Wilson was ordered to push his cavalry to the left and gain the roads leading south from Winchester. He dashed to the

right where Crook and Torbert were making such telling inroads on the enemy's ranks, and ordered a charge with all the troops that could be brought into position. Infantry and cavalry now bore irresistibly on the enemy's wavering columns. Early trembled for the fate of his army, pressed as it was in front and by flank. His forces could stand the strain no longer. They broke and fled over the spaces between the Opequan and Winchester and through the latter place. Night alone saved his forces from complete destruction. He lost 4,500 men, of whom 2,500 were prisoners, and several guns. Sheridan lost 4,500 men; 500 killed, 3,500 wounded and 500 missing. Never was battle more decisive. It had been fought with the precision of clockwork, and was the first in which infantry, artillery and cavalry had been used concurrently. The victory brought great honor to every participant, and electrified the country.

Sheridan pushed his beaten foe vigorously, first to Newtown, then to Fisher's Hill, then to Strasburg. Here Sheridan sent Crook's command to work its way secretly, under cover of the night, to Early's left. Torbert was sent on a similar mission to the left. On September 22, Sheridan attacked with his Sixth and Nineteenth corps. Suddenly Crook debouched from his hiding place on the enemy's flank and rear, and doubled up his lines within his breastworks. Sheridan charged in front. The enemy fled in panic, leaving sixteen guns and 1,100 prisoners in Sheridan's hands. Again Sheridan pursued the routed enemy and drove him out of the valley.

But the valley forces had not long to rest. Early was strongly reinforced from Richmond, by October 5th, and on the 6th, attacked Sheridan's advance at Harrisonburg, driving it back. Sheridan called together his forces at

Cedar Creek, for he had learned that Longstreet had been sent from Richmond to Early's aid. At Cedar Creek Sheridan left his forces in apparent safety to go to Washington at the command of the President. Crook's command here occupied a position to the left of the cavalry, which formed the extreme right. While Sheridan was absent Early attacked in a roundabout and highly strategic way on October 19th. That portion of his attack, headed by Kershaw, fell on the Union left, where Crook was situated. The battle raged furiously here, but the force of the enemy's blow could not be resisted. Crook's lines were driven in, after a contest in which many on both sides lost their lives. General Hayes had his horse shot under him and narrowly escaped with his life.

Cedar Creek was thus far a surprise for the Union forces. Except upon the left, it hardly reached the importance of a battle, for the right, finding its position untenable, and snuffing disaster if a general engagement ensued, found its highest mission in securing lines for a safe retreat. Yet the result was disastrous enough in loss of life, guns and munitions, to render the enemy jubilant and encourage him to fresh attack.

On the night of the 18th Sheridan slept at Winchester, on his return from Washington. On the morning of the 19th the firing of heavy guns twenty miles away told him of battle at Cedar Creek. Then began his famous twenty miles ride with all its exciting incidents—its repeated shouts to "Face the other way boys!" "We are going back!" "We'll lick them yet!" "Back to duty boys!" as he met his retreating soldiers. Soon he is with his generals—Crook and all the rest—now in momentary conference, now issuing hasty orders, inspiring all by his presence, bringing order out of dire confusion.

Sheridan found that Getty's division of the 6th corps,



HON. MATTHEW S. QUAY.

Born at Dillsburg, York co., Pa., September 30, 1833; graduated at Jefferson College, 1850; admitted to bar, 1854; elected Prothonotary of Beaver co., 1856 and 1859; served in Union army as Colonel of 134th Pennsylvania Volunteers, and as Military State Agent at Washington, Assistant Commissary-General and Chief of Transportation; Military Secretary to Governor of Pennsylvania, 1861-65; member of Legislature, 1865-67; Secretary of Commonwealth, 1872-78; Chairman of Republican State Committee, 1878-79; Secretary of Commonwealth, 1879-82; elected State Treasurer, 1885; elected United States Senator, as Republican, 1886, and again in 1893; Chairman of Republican National Committee during campaign of 1888; Chairman of Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds, and member of Committees on Appropriations, Commerce and Epidemic Diseases; prominent candidate for Presidential nominee in 1896.



HON. HENRY CABOT LODGE.

Born in Boston, Mass., May 12, 1850; graduated at Harvard, 1871; graduated from Harvard Law School, 1875; admitted to Suffolk bar, 1876, but preferred literary pursuits; served two terms in State Legislature; elected, as a Republican, to 50th, 51st, 52d and 53d Congresses, to represent Sixth Massachusetts District; elected to U. S. Senate, January 17, 1893, to succeed Hon. Henry L. Dawes; resigned his seat in House and took that in Senate, March 4, 1893; chairman of Committee on Immigration, and member of other important Committees.

supported by Custer's and Merritt's Cavalry, occupied a position between the rapidly advancing enemy and his other corps. His quick topographic eye selected this line as his line of battle, for he saw that battle must be joined at once in order to retrieve the disaster of the morning. He quietly closed his corps on that line, and not a moment too soon, for already the attack was on, upon the 19th corps. It was bravely resisted, and Early thought to fortify and merely hold his own lines. At three P. M. Sheridan took the offensive, and attacked with his entire line, by a left flank movement, his cavalry ably supported him. For a time the battle went stubborn and bloody. Early was trying Sheridan's manœuvre with his own left. It was charged upon by a force led by Sheridan in person, and partly detached from the main column. The charge grew more persistent and bloody. The Confederate left wavered and gave way. Early acknowledged the day lost by ordering a retreat. Then the confusion of the morning was transferred to the enemy's ranks. They were rolled backward to the position of the morning on Cedar Creek. At this point, Early lost control of his men, and retreat became a rout. Prisoners, guns, ammunition fell readily into the victor's hands. Roads were blocked with discarded booty and army paraphernalia. At Fisher's Hill, Early hoped to make a stand, but he found nothing there except the Union prisoners of the morning. Night alone saved his fleeing remnants from annihilation, and darkness found Early at New Market twenty miles away from Cedar Creek. Sheridan had not only brilliantly re-won the battle of Cedar Creek, but had recaptured all the guns taken in the morning and had added to them twenty-four of the enemy's pieces, 1,600 prisoners and three hundred wagons.

The momentous battle of Cedar Creek ended the campaign in the Shenandoah Valley. Early was recalled to Richmond. The President honored Sheridan with a Major-General's commission, "For the personal gallantry, military skill and just confidence in the courage and gallantry of your troops." The Congress complimented him and his soldiers for their "series of victories in the Shenandoah Valley, and especially for their services at Cedar Creek".

In Sheridan's disposition of the forces left in the Valley, on his return to Richmond, the command to which the Twenty-third Ohio was attached was ordered to Martinsburg. Their march thither was enlivened by casting the army vote for President in 1864. The McKinley "boy soldier" had earned his manhood in the field along with other honors, and cast his first vote in that election, along with the older veterans.

The battle of Cedar Creek therefore virtually ended the active military career of Captain McKinley, though he found much future service on staffs of both Generals Crook and Carroll. On March 13, 1865, he was brevetted major. In the spring of 1865 the Twenty-third Ohio was ordered to Camp Cumberland, where it was mustered out of service, July 26, 1865, closing a four year career of war with honor, leaving a host of brave comrades beneath the turf of the battlefields, returning home to receive the congratulations of loyal friends and to enter once more the occupations of peace. The soldier boy of eighteen years was now a man of twenty-two. The private of 1861 was now a major. The education and aspirations of youth, had been supplemented by such an experience in the cause of country as few could claim at his age, and such as would meet the most exalted purposes of after life.

IN PRIVATE LIFE.

On his return from the army in July, 1865, and at the age of twenty-two years, Major McKinley settled at Poland. The problem before him was the choice of a civic career. Both qualification and inclination pointed to a course of law. He accordingly entered the law office of Judge Glidden of Mahoning County, Ohio, where he grounded himself in the principles of law, and afterwards completed his course at the Albany Law School, in New York.

He proved to be an apt and diligent student. Though hampered at times by paucity of means, he courageously fought his way toward the bar, and was admitted to that of Canton County in the early part of 1867. At this date he left his Poland home, and entered on his professional career at Canton, the county seat, then a town of some 6,000 inhabitants, mostly sturdy migrants from Pennsylvania, or their descendants.

He began his career auspiciously, in that his industry and energy happily seconded an excellent preparation and a naturally forceful and persuasive style of speech. He was painstaking in preparing a cause and eloquent in presenting it. To these necessary attributes of the successful practitioner, he added a charming personal address. With this equipment and these qualities his success at the bar was marked. He not only won speedy recognition among his fellow members but among the people. Before two years had transpired he was honored with the Republican nomination for District Attorney of his county. Though the county was largely Democratic, he at once took the stump and conducted so vigorous a campaign that, to the surprise of friend and foe, he was elected.

He was renominated for the same office, but his political enemies were on the alert, and he was defeated, not, however, without putting up a battle that proved him to be one of the ablest and most indefatigable of campaigners. In these, his preliminary contests, he laid the ground work of that fame which has ever since been his portion as one of the most captivating and convincing public speakers in the land.

On January 25, 1871, he married Miss Ida Saxton, the accomplished daughter of James A. Saxton, a banker of Canton, and began housekeeping in the neat and comfortable home that has since become historic. They had two daughters, both of whom died young. The blow greatly affected Mr. McKinley's general health for a time, and they went to live with Mr. McKinley's mother, till the time came for him to move to Washington as a member of Congress.

IN CONGRESS.

In 1876, Major McKinley entered the race for Congress in the Eighteenth Ohio District. There were several distinguished competitors for the nomination in his party, some of whom were distinguished politicians and veteran campaigners. But the young man of thirty-three years carried off the honors of the nominating convention, and, after one of his characteristic campaigns, he was elected to the Forty-fifth Congress by a handsome majority. He continued to be reelected to each succeeding Congress up to 1890. Though the Democrats, in 1878, tried to defeat him by a gerrymander of his district, making it Democratic by 1,800 majority, he carried it by 1,300 majority. In 1884, a similar gerrymander was tried, but McKinley still held his district by some 1,500 majority. It was only after

a third and more desperate attempt, in 1890, to gerrymander him out of his district, that his political enemies succeeded in their nefarious object. His home county, Stark, was thrown in with three overwhelmingly Democratic counties, so as to make a sure Democratic majority of 3,000 in the district. Yet such was McKinley's hold on the affections of the people, and such the strength of his campaign, that he was beaten only by the beggarly majority of 363 votes, having polled 2,500 more votes in his district than had been cast for Harrison in 1888.

In Congress, Major McKinley was to do far more than repeat his brilliant success at the bar. He was in a field more to his liking and one fuller of opportunity for the development and application of endowments leading to the highest plains of statesmanship. He entered public life with the ardor of a youthful, ambitious nature, with a large fund of information, especially upon economic problems, with painstaking industry, with unswerving fidelity to political conviction, with commanding address, with far more than usual parliamentary and diplomatic tact, with a demeanor and philosophy that attracted instant notice and rendered his counsels pleasing and desirable.

It was but natural that one thus equipped for public life should soon begin to make his mark. He grew daily in popularity among the members, and in respect and strength among his party associates. His assignment to various important committees, all of which were of the working kind, tested thoroughly the appreciation of his ability and supplied opportunities for the exercise of that usefulness he exemplified from the very beginning of his public career. At first his growth in favor was rather through the channels of committee work, with its arduous details, than through those of open debate. But this was all the better

as a ground work for solid reputation, and as a preparation for that higher statesmanship in whose midst he was soon to stand so conspicuously forth.

It must not be thought, however, that he neglected forensic opportunity. Indeed his reputation as a keen, clear and powerful debater preceded his entry to Congress, and the distinction that awaited him, in this respect, came naturally and expectedly. His interest in public questions, his wonderful power in the marshalling of facts, his forceful, impressive logic, his fascinating rhetoric, his fairness to opponents, his freedom from excitement and bitterness, his readiness and keenness in repartee, very soon, and of their own momentum, carried him to a front place in the rank of skilled debaters. He never rose to speak without an occasion, nor did he ever speak idly nor without full knowledge of his subject. What he touched upon he both ornamented and exhausted. His earnestness bespoke depth and honesty of conviction. His warmth inspired enthusiasm. He charmed by lucidity of thought and clear cut expression. His political foes heard with the same interest and delight as his friends.

McKinley found a place on the Committee of Ways and Means, on entering Congress. This was to be the avenue to that high pedestal of protection he would soon occupy. "Pig Iron" Kelly was his sponsor in these early days of his career. Afterwards Garfield was chairman, an economic tutor as brilliant, if less sturdy, than his predecessor. McKinley came to the exalted honors and grave responsibilities of the chairmanship under a tutelage whose ability was everywhere recognized, and by virtue of deserved promotion. He had served thirteen years upon the committee, had passed through all its labors and throes, and was at length crowned with its leadership, to crown, in

turn, his party and country with its greatest and best protective safeguard.

In his early Congressional career, the questions of greatest moment related to the currency and to the resumption of specie payments in 1879. In these he took a keen interest, and stood shoulder to shoulder with the Republican leaders who had resolved that the country's promises to pay should be redeemed in gold, and that the national credit should be at par in all the world.

Time and again the subject of pension for Union soldiers come up, and each time it found in Major McKinley one of its most resolute and effective champions. No subject touched him more nearly, and over none did he ever grow more fervent and forceful.

What may be called his maiden speech upon the doctrine of protection was made in 1878 when the Wood tariff bill was under discussion. This speech ranked as one of the ablest delivered during those debates, and in it McKinley took the high and noble stand he was to occupy in all subsequent discussions of the same momentous subject. It stamped him more as leader, than follower, of the economic thoughts which were to dominate future tariff legislation. It prepared the way for his powerful advocacy of that measure which came up in 1882, and which looked to the appointment of a Tariff Commission, duly authorized by Congress, whose duty should be a friendly revision of the tariff.

This commission prepared and presented the tariff bill of 1883. In advocacy of its passage Major McKinley stood shoulder to shoulder with such veteran protectionists as Kelley and others and evenly divided with them the honors of debate. It was at this juncture that Judge Kelley said of him, "he has distanced all his colleagues in

mastering the details of the tariff." And this was the occasion when McKinley made the protective idea a paramount doctrine of the Republican party by carrying it farther down to the masses and into the workshops and homes, than any previous exponent had done. He proved to be the greatest orator of this memorable occasion, and a prophet as well, for the revelations of 1894 repeated in disaster and want and tears and groans his visions of 1883.

By 1884 McKinley had deservedly and honorably won the title of "Champion of American Protection." Or, if not yet, the title could no longer be withheld, for he was about to add another imposing chapter to his career in the celebrated debates on the Morrison horizontal tariff bill. In his opposition to this bill he was learned, exhaustive, merciless, and such a master of the situation as to make those who favored the bill appear ridiculous, and the bill itself an economic farce.

In 1888, Mr. Mills sprung his remarkable attack on American industries upon the Congress, by a bill which became known as the "Mills Tariff Bill." This bill was an insult to the minority of the Ways and Means Committee, for it had been prepared and presented without consulting with them. The insult was resented and the bill opposed by the minority, headed by Mr. McKinley, in a report, which for minute detail, exhaustive presentation of facts, and invincible argument, must ever stand as a monument to his patient industry and perfect mastery of his subject. It was regarded as one of the ablest papers on the subject of tariff ever presented to Congress, and when it was followed in a short time by the speech of its author in the House, he clinched the impression already existing as to the report, that none could approach him in fearless, logical and convincing championship of the doctrine of protec-

tion. This report and this speech went to the country in the campaign of 1888, and served as potent agencies in the election of President Harrison, with a Republican House of Representatives.

Major McKinley now reached the grandest opportunity of his brilliant career, thus far. By virtue of his position as chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means in the Fifty-first Congress he was to incorporate the policy of party and the verdict of the country into its commercial economy, to put into the form of statute the doctrine of protection that been so ably and fully presented in the preceding campaign, and so emphatically passed upon. He entered upon this work fully equipped by experience, and with all the enthusiasm of his ardent nature. Determined to avoid the errors into which the Democrats had previously fallen, he invited all the interests concerned in tariff revision to a hearing, and a bill was framed which was to constitute the Tariff Act of 1890, and be popularly known as the "McKinley Bill." It involved the experience of all former tariff legislation and the best features of all former acts. It imposed protective rates in the interest of American labor, on home manufactures whose existence was threatened by foreign competition. It imposed higher rates on manufactures which we ought to produce but did not. It largely reduced the duties on necessities of life, or made them (such as sugar) free. It greatly enlarged the free list by placing on it all raw materials whose importation did not compete with the home growth of the same. It introduced the policy of reciprocity.

No previous tariff bill had ever been so fully matured, or had so satisfied in advance the various interests consulted in its preparation. Certainly none ever passed that

was more ably championed or persistently opposed. Its passage occupied the entire time of the first session of the Fifty-first Congress, and during all that time Mr. McKinley stood at the head of his party, directing the fortunes of his bill, and vigilant day and night over its fate. Its passage was a signal triumph of his patience, endurance and legislative ability. His name went forth with the tide of prosperity that followed the bill, and was heard amid the rejoicings in every hamlet, workshop and home of the land. He came to stand for the beneficence of his measure in the eyes and hearts of the toiling millions.

At a later date, 1894, when the McKinley Act was about to be repealed by the Wilson Act which President Cleveland designated as a product of "perfidy and dishonor" and permitted to become a law without his signature, Mr. McKinley spoke thus of the operation of the act which bore his name:

"The law of 1890 was enacted for the American people and the American home. Whatever mistakes were made in it were all made in favor of the occupations and the firesides of the American people. It didn't take away a single day's work from a solitary American workingman. It gave work and wages to all, such as they had never had before. It did it by establishing new and great industries in this country, which increased the demand for the skill and handiwork of our laborers everywhere. It had no friends in Europe. It gave their industries no stimulus. It gave no employment to their labor at the expense of our own.

"During more than two years of the administration of President Harrison, and down to its end, it raised all the revenue necessary to pay the vast expenditures of the Government, including the interest on the public debt and

the pensions. It never encroached upon the gold reserve, which in the past had always been sacredly preserved for the redemption of outstanding paper obligations of the Government.

“During all its operations, down to the change and reversal of its policy by the election of 1892, no man can assert that in the industries affected by it wages were too high, although they were higher than ever before in this or any other country. If any such can be found, I beg that they be named. I challenge the enemies of the law of 1890 to name a single industry of that kind. Further, I assert that in the industries affected by that law, which that law fostered no American consumer suffered by the increased cost of any home products that he bought. He never bought them so low before, nor did he ever enjoy the benefit of so much open, free home competition. Neither producer nor consumer, employer or employee, suffered by that law.

AS GOVERNOR.

The attack made on the McKinley Act by its free trade enemies, fall of 1890, and before any of its beneficent results could be tabulated and officially shown, was the most ferocious illogical and deceptive attack in the annals of campaigning. It passions and falsehoods carried down many of the active advocates of the bill. McKinley's defeat for the Fifty-second Congress was brought about by a Democratic gerrymander of his district, which was now made hopelessly Democratic. Yet he lost it by only a paltry majority, though the Democrats centred in its speakers and resources from various States. But what was an irreparable loss to the party and the country proved to be a gain to his State and himself. Sentiment

in his State began immediately to settle on him as a candidate for Governor. He would not enter a contest for the honor, but would accept if it came spontaneously.

The State Convention was held in June, 1891. There was really but one candidate put in nomination, and that was McKinley. His nomination was unanimously made. It was received with applause throughout the State, and the campaign was active and aggressive from the first, on the lines of protection and reciprocity. Mr. McKinley made it a typical "campaign of education," visiting in person eighty-six out of eighty-eight counties in the State, and speaking one hundred and thirty times.

The Democrats contested every inch of the ground stubbornly, but the people turned to McKinley as to the apostle of the true dispensation, and women and children said he had made protection and tariff plain to them. In that campaign, the first general campaign Mr. McKinley had ever made, he was pronounced the best vote-getter ever seen on the stump in Ohio. He won the admiration of Democrats, as he won the devotion of Republicans, and his election by a handsome majority was gratifying to one party, without being a source of bitterness to the rank and file of the other party. As his first term in the Governor's chair drew toward its close he was renominated by acclamation, and after another spirited campaign he was reelected by a majority of more than 80,000, at that time the largest but one in the history of the State.

As Governor, Mr. McKinley never forgot that he was the Chief Magistrate, not merely of the party which had elected him, but of the whole State, and he was untiring in his efforts to secure for the whole State a wise, economical and honorable administration. He took great interest in the management of the public institutions of the State,

making a special study of means for their betterment, and securing many important and much-needed reforms. He urged the preserving and improving of the canal system, and was an earnest promoter of the movement for good roads. To the question of tax reform he paid much attention, and repeatedly urged its importance upon the Legislature. Many questions relating to the welfare of workmen became acute during his administration, and were dealt with by him in a spirit of intelligent sympathy. He had already long been known as an advocate of the eight-hour system, and of arbitration as a means of settling disputes between employers and employees. It was due to his initiative that the State Board of Arbitration was established in Ohio, and to its successful operation he gave for nearly four years his close personal attention. He made various wise recommendations for legislation for the better protection of life and limb in industrial pursuits, and as a result several salutary laws to such effect were put upon the statute book. When destitution and distress prevailed among the miners of the Hocking Valley, he acted with characteristic promptness and decision. News that many families were in danger of starving reached him at midnight. Before sunrise he had a carload of provisions on the way to their relief.

Many times during his administration the peace of the State was disturbed by unseemly outbreaks requiring the application of the restraining power of the Government. This power Mr. McKinley exercised with signal firmness and discretion. Fifteen times it was necessary to call out the State troops for the maintenance or restoration of order, but on no occasion was the use of them in any respect oppressive. During the summer of 1894 strikes and other disturbances prevailed, especially on the chief

railroad lines, and for three weeks the regiments were on duty, acquitting themselves most creditably for the protection of property and enforcement of the law, without any unnecessary harshness toward either party to the disputes. On two noteworthy occasions desperate efforts were made by ill-advised mobs to commit the crime of lynching. Governor McKinley promptly used the military forces of the State to prevent such violence of law and dishonor to the Commonwealth, and showed himself a thorough master of the trying situation.

A distinctive feature of the McKinley administration was the absence of red tape and needless formality. In his method of transacting business the Governor was concise and direct, and in his intercourse with the people, though dignified, he was always approachable and genial. Access was readily had to him at all reasonable times, and no matter of actual interest ever failed to receive his courteous, prompt and painstaking attention.

PERSONAL APPEARANCE AND HOME LIFE.

Mr. McKinley is five feet, seven inches in height, straight as an arrow, and of full, rotund figure. His mouth is grave and dignified, his lower jaw heavy and firm, his forehead high, broad and full. His eyes are dark and look out keenly from under ample brows. The general cast of his face is pleasant, and it lights up into animated expressiveness when he smiles, or under the glow of excitement. His favorite suit for dress purposes is a double-breasted frock coat and a tall silk hat.

His tastes are modest and habits quiet. He enjoys a cigar, but rarely touches strong drinks. He loves the country, and enjoys the sight of fine cattle and horses. Before his financial reverses he owned a farm in Colum-

biana County on which he spent part of his leisure time. He is a charming man to meet at home, on the street, and in a business or political way. His presence is prepossessing, though his conversation is not striking nor scintillating. He talks to the point both in home and public speech. Not caring for interviews, he is yet affable with newspaper men, who as a rule are attracted by him, except when he wears them out with his indomitable energy in campaign work, as was the case in his celebrated campaigns of 1890, 1891 and 1893.

In the speeches he makes one notable characteristic is always prominent. He does not make enemies. No man ever heard McKinley abuse a political opponent from the stump. Few men have ever heard him speak with disrespect or malignity of one in private life. Only among his close confidants, and they are carefully chosen and not numerous, does he allow himself to speak his mind fully.

In 1893 Mr. McKinley suffered severe financial reverses through the failure of a friend for whom he had endorsed heavily. His own savings of a lifetime, amounting to \$20,000 were entirely swept away. His wife came nobly to his rescue with her inherited property, but this too was absorbed by the losses, and the two found themselves penniless. At this juncture, friends of Mr. McKinley, without his knowledge or consent, began a quiet subscription, which in a short while resulted in a sum sufficient to release himself and wife from the terms of the assignment they had made.

Mr. and Mrs. McKinley have been inseparable companions, except when he was engaged in campaign work, and their domestic life has been one of mutual trust and happiness. During his service in Washington she was

always with him, embroidering the slippers which has constituted her principal employment in his absence, until the number which have solaced the sufferers in hospitals is said to amount to nearly four thousand. From Congressional duty to his wife and back to duty was the round of his Washington life. While Governor of Ohio four rooms in the Chittenden House in Columbus was their home. An early breakfast and he was off to his executive duties. It was remarked that he always left his hotel by a side entrance, and when well across the street he turned and lifted his hat, while a handkerchief fluttered for an instant from the window of his home. Then the Governor with a pleased smile walked jauntily off toward the State House. This was repeated every evening, showing that loving watch was kept at that window. Occasionally, weather and health permitting, Mrs. McKinley indulged in a carriage ride, her husband always accompanying her. Always on Sunday the Governor took an early train for Canton, and going to his mother's house accompanied her to the First M. E. Church, of which he has been a member for thirty-five years. He was superintendent of its Sunday-school until public duty took him to Washington.

After their devotions he escorted his proud mother to her home again and then took the first train for Columbus, where he spent the remainder of the day with his wife. After he resumed his home life in Canton his days were not so full of incident. His office is across the hall from the family apartments on the ground floor. There in an ample and well-stocked library he receives his numerous callers and gives as much time to his secretary and correspondence as he can afford. Then he seeks the solace of companionship with the wife whose gentle spirit has



MARK A. HANNA,
Chairman Republican National Committee.



HON. CHAUNCEY M. DEPEW.

Born in Peekskill, N. Y., April 23, 1834; graduated at Yale, 1856; studied law and admitted to bar; elected to New York Assembly, 1861-62; elected Speaker; elected Secretary of New York State, 1863; Tax Commissioner of N. Y. city; nominated Minister to Japan; General Counsel for Hudson R. & N. Y. Central R. R's, 1866 and 1869; candidate for Lieut.-Governor, 1872, but defeated; Regent of State University, 1874; President of N. Y. Central R. R., 1885; President of Union League and Yale Alumni Association; prominent candidate for President of U. S. before conventions of 1884, 1888; manager of Harrison forces in convention of 1892; celebrated as orator and lecturer; spoken of as Secretary of State to succeed Blaine; delegate to National Republican Convention of 1896.

mellowed his nature and brought to its highest development his own dominant kindness and gentle spirit toward friend and foe.

PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE.

It was in the natural order of things that a man so forceful and efficient in every tried capacity should presently be regarded as a possible future President of the United States. As early as 1880 he was spoken of as a coming candidate. In 1884 his name was brought before the Republican National Convention, though not with his authority or desire. Four years later, in 1888, the Presidency lay within his reach, but he declined it on a point of honor. He was a delegate to the Chicago Convention from Ohio, pledged to support the candidacy of his friend, Senator Sherman. After several ballots had been taken, however, it became evident that the veteran statesman of Ohio was not to be the Convention's choice. His friends supported him loyally, but were in a hopeless minority, and were unable to rally others to their standard. So some of them began to cast about for another candidate to whom they could transfer their votes with better prospect of success. Their choice quickly fell upon McKinley. From the first, two delegates had been voting persistently for him, although he had not, of course been formally placed in nomination. Now the number of the supporters rose to fourteen. All the Republican Congressmen at Washington telegraphed to the Convention, urging his nomination. The air became electric with premonitions of a stampede. He had listened to the announcement of the two votes for him on each ballot with mingled annoyance and amusement. But now the case was growing serious. The next ballot might give him a majority of the

whole convention. He had only to sit still and the ripe fruit would drop into his hands. He had only to utter an equivocal protest and the result would be the same. But there was nothing equivocal about William McKinley. On one side was his personal honor; on the other side the Presidency of the United States. In choosing between the two, hesitation was impossible. He sprang to his feet with an expression upon his face and an accent in his voice that thrilled the vast assembly, but hushed it mute and silent as the grave while he spoke:

"I am here as one of the chosen representatives of my State. I am here by resolution of the Republican State Convention, passed without a single dissenting vote, commanding me to cast my vote for John Sherman for President and to use every worthy endeavor for his nomination. I excepted the trust because my heart and my judgment were in accord with the letter and spirit and purpose of that resolution. It has pleased certain delegates to cast their vote for me for President. I am not insensible to the honor they would do me, but in the presence of the duty resting upon me, I cannot remain silent with honor.

"I cannot, consistently with the wish of the State whose credentials I bear and which has trusted me; I cannot with honorable fidelity to John Sherman; I cannot, consistently with my own views of personal integrity, consent, or seem to consent, to permit my name to be used as a candidate before this convention. I would not respect myself if I should find it in my heart to do so, or permit to be done that which would ever be ground for any one to suspect that I wavered in my loyalty to Ohio or my devotion to the chief of her choice and the chief of mine. I do not request, I demand that no delegate who would not cast a reflection upon me shall cast a ballot for me."

That ended it. There was no stampede. McKinley was

the hero of the hour, and his heroism prevailed. The nomination was not forced upon him, neither could he secure it for Mr. Sherman, though he loyally strove to do so to the end. But no man was ever walked out of a National Convention with higher honors upon him than those he bore that day.

Another similar incident occurred in 1892. Mr. McKinley was the presiding officer. He was pledged in honor to the support of President Harrison for renomination. But the party bosses sought to defeat such renomination, and sought to do so by stampeding the Convention for McKinley himself. No less than 182 votes were cast for him, against his earnest protest. When the vote of Ohio was announced, "44 for McKinley," he himself from the chair challenged its correctness. The reply was made that he was not then a member of the delegation, his alternate taking his place when he was elected to the chair. Thereupon Mr. McKinley called another man to the chair and took his place upon the floor, checked the incipient stampede, and moved that the renomination of Harrison be made unanimous. "Your turn will come in 1896!" shouted his supporters.

That prophecy was to be fulfilled. There was hardly a time between 1892 and 1896 when the finger of party sentiment did not point unerringly to Major McKinley as a Presidential possibility. There were other aspirants for the high honor, each well equipped for the place, and all enjoying the respect and confidence of the Republican organization, but no name inspired the general masses with such hope and enthusiasm as did that of McKinley. As the State Conventions met in their order to choose delegates to the National Convention at St. Louis, it became manifest that the popular tide was running

stronger and stronger in favor of McKinley, and was soon to become irresistible. Politicians who favored other candidates, party bosses who sought opportunities for trades and manipulations, every time-serving element in the party, pulled their little barks in vain against the strong McKinley current. No such uprising of the people in behalf of a candidate had been witnessed since the time Lincoln had been named for a second term. Ere the day of the National Convention dawned, it was definitely known that his nomination could not be defeated. His popularity proved to be a talisman in the strongholds of other aspirants, and their strength dwindled away to the despair of their friends. The mighty uprising sprang from the eager, passionate determination of the people to retrieve the stupendous mistake of 1892, with its blight of panic and depression, and to restore the principles and policies of which they regarded McKinley as the foremost representative and exponent. To the masses of his party, he personified protection, and typified the reaction from the catastrophe of 1892. His whole congressional career had been a series of courageous battles for protection. In 1888 he had led the opposition to the Mills bill. After the reverses of 1890 and 1892, he upheld the banner of protection on a thousand platforms all over the land, and McKinley and protection were everywhere associated in the public mind. His eloquent voice, plain practical arguments, pleasing, persuasive address and indefatigable effort, had easily made him the preeminent representative of the cause which appealed so loudly to the industrial and business elements of the country.

On June 10, 1896, the Executive Committee of the National Republican Committee met at St. Louis for the purpose of hearing contests and settling the preliminaries

of the National Convention. Its members were anxious for a test of the strength of their favorites for the Presidential nomination. The contests over disputed seats soon presented the desired test. A single aye and no vote over the contest in Alabama settled the complexion of the Committee. The anti-McKinley strength in the Committee amounted to no more than seven votes, while the McKinley strength amounted to thirty-eight votes. It was conceded by the leaders of the anti-McKinley forces that his strength was overwhelming in the Committee, and that it would be reflected in the convention in the most direct and powerful way.

The National Republican Convention, the eleventh in the history of the party, met Tuesday, June 16, 1896, at St. Louis, and was organized under the leadership of Mr. McKinley's friend, Mr. Hanna, of Cleveland, by the election of Hon. C. W. Fairbanks of Indiana, as temporary chairman. On the 17th a permanent organization was effected by the election of Senator John M. Thurston of Nebraska as chairman. The first momentous question before the Convention was that of the platform. It was known that a few delegates from the mining States would insist upon a free silver coinage plank, and there was anxiety to find out their strength. When the platform was reported, it possessed the true Republican ring, and was emphatic on those cardinal principles of the party, a tariff levied so as to protect American industry, and a national currency redeemable in gold or its equivalent. The platform, fixing the policy of the party for the campaign and for the next four years, was voted upon with the result, that 812½ votes were cast in favor of its financial plank, and 110½ against, the latter representing the free silver coinage strength. After this result a portion of the

free silver men withdrew from the Convention, and the rest of the platform was unanimously adopted.

The time now came for nominations for President. The candidates placed in nomination were Senator W. B. Allison, of Iowa; Hon. Thomas B. Reed, of Maine; Governor Levi P. Morton, of New York; Senator M. S. Quay, of Pennsylvania; Hon. William McKinley, of Ohio. In his speech placing Mr. McKinley in nomination, Senator Foraker, of Ohio, said :

“It remains for us now, as the last crowning act of our work, to meet again that same expectation in the nomination of our candidates. What is that expectation? What is it that the people want? They want as their candidate something more than ‘a good business man’ (an allusion to Mr. Depew’s characterization of Governor Morton). They want something more than a popular leader. They want something more than a wise and patriotic statesman. They want a man who embodies in himself not only all these essential qualifications, but those, in addition, which, in the highest possible degree, typify in name, in character, in record, in ambition, in purpose, the exact opposite of all that is signified and represented by that free trade, deficit-making, bond-issuing, labor-assassinating, Democratic administration. (Cheers.) I stand here to present to this Convention such a man. His name is William McKinley.”

At this point the Convention broke into tumultuous cheers, which could not be restrained till a quarter of an hour had elapsed. When Mr. Foraker was permitted to continue, he eulogized the great Republican leaders, and further said :

“But, greatest of all, measured by present requirements, is the leader of the House of Representatives, the

author of the McKinley Bill, which gave to labor its richest rewards. No other name so completely meets the requirements of the occasion, and no other name so absolutely commands all hearts. The shafts of envy and malice and slander and libel and detraction that have been aimed at him lie broken and harmless at his feet. The quiver is empty, and he is untouched. That is because the people know him, trust him, believe in him, love him, and will not permit any human power to disparage him unjustly in their estimation.

“They know that he is an American of Americans. They know that he is just and able and brave, and they want him for President of the United States. (Applause.) They have already shown it—not in this or that State, nor in this or that section, but in all the States and in all the sections from ocean to ocean, and from the Gulf to the Lakes. They expect of you to give them a chance to vote for him. It is our duty to do it. If we discharge that duty we will give joy to their hearts, enthusiasm to their souls and triumphant victory to our cause. (Applause.) And he, in turn, will give us an administration under which the country will enter on a new era of prosperity at home and of glory and honor abroad, by all these tokens of the present and all these promises of the future. In the name of the forty-six delegates of Ohio, I submit his claim to your consideration. (More applause.)”

Mr. Foraker's motion was eloquently seconded by the chairman, Senator Thurston.

The Convention was now ready for a ballot. It was evident that a single one would bring the desired result. It was taken by a call of States, with the following result.

McKinley	.	.	.	.	.	.	661 $\frac{1}{2}$
Reed	.	.	.	.	.	.	84 $\frac{1}{2}$
Quay	.	.	.	.	.	.	61 $\frac{1}{2}$
Morton	.	.	.	.	.	.	58
Allison	.	.	.	.	.	.	36 $\frac{1}{2}$
Cameron	.	.	.	.	.	.	1
Absent or not voting	.	.	.	.	.	.	22
Total	.	.	.	.	.	.	924

The Convention broke into a delirium of joy over this result, and united spontaneously in the request to make McKinley's nomination unanimous. Never was a nomination received with greater satisfaction or more unanimous expressions of joy by party or country than this one. Even political opponents could not withhold their congratulations over a triumph so deserved by the man and over a situation that promised so much for the honor and success of the party. All the land seemed to be united in one voice, and that was that William McKinley and what he stood for in the platform of principles, were what a long suffering country demanded to redeem it, and restore it to the prosperous era prior to 1892.

The life of Mr. McKinley at Canton, for a time after his nomination, was filled with congratulatory episodes—letters, telegrams, visitors, singly and by delegations, speeches—to which welcomes and replies had to be extended. But the liveliest of all these episodes, and the one that made an imposing chapter in his own and his party's history, was the occasion of June 29, when he was officially notified of his nomination, by the Convention's Committee, composed of a representative from each State and Territory. Such occasions had hitherto been formal and stilted, but Mr. McKinley threw into it the

grace of a new departure, by turning it to the account of his party and country. In his own eloquent, logical and convincing way he let it be known precisely how he stood toward the party and its platform of principles, how the party was expected to stand toward the country, and what were the solemn duties of an hour in which redemption from existing ills was expected. It was as though he had already written and published his formal letter of acceptance, and his sturdy stand and emphatic words were applauded in every business centre and Republican home. This sketch could be no more fittingly concluded than by quoting some of the masterly allusions, in his speech of acceptance, to the leading issues of the hour :

“Great are the issues involved in the coming election, and eager and earnest the people for their right determination. Our domestic trade must be won back and our idle working people employed in gainful occupations at American wages. Our home market must be restored to its proud rank of first in the world, and our foreign trade, so precipitately cut off by adverse national legislation, reopened on fair and equitable terms for our surplus agricultural and manufacturing products. Protection and reciprocity, twin measures of a true American policy, should again command the earnest encouragement of the Government at Washington.

“Public confidence must be resumed, and the skill, the energy, and the capital of our country find ample employment at home, sustained, encouraged and defended against the unequal competition and serious disadvantages with which they are now contending.

“It must be apparent to all, regardless of past party ties or affiliations, that it is our paramount duty to provide adequate revenue for the expenditures of the Govern-

ment economically and prudently administered. This the Republican party has heretofore done, and this I confidently believe it will do in the future, when the party is again entrusted with power in the executive and legislative branches of our Government.

"The national credit, which has thus far fortunately resisted every assault upon it, must and will be upheld and strengthened. If sufficient revenues are provided for the support of the Government, there will be no necessity for borrowing money and increasing the public debt. The complaint of the people is not against the administration for borrowing money and issuing bonds to preserve the credit of the country, but against the ruinous policy which has made this necessary, owing to the policy which has been inaugurated.

"The inevitable effect of such a policy is seen in the deficiency in the United States Treasury, except as it is replenished by loans, and in the distress of the people who are suffering because of the scant demand for their labor and the products of their labor. Here is the fundamental trouble, the remedy for which is the Republican opportunity and duty. During all the years of Republican control following resumption there was a steady reduction of the public debt, while the gold reserve was sacredly maintained, and our currency and credit preserved without depreciation, taint, or suspicion.

"If we would restore this policy that brought us unexampled prosperity for more than thirty years under the most trying conditions ever known in this country, the policy by which we made and bought more goods at home and sold more abroad, the trade balance would be quickly turned in our favor, and gold would come to us and not

go from us in the settlement of all such balances in the future.

“The party that supplied, by legislation, the vast revenues for the conduct of our greatest war, that promptly restored the credit of the country at its close, that from its abundant revenues paid off a large share of the debt incurred in this war, and that resumed specie payments, and placed our paper currency upon a sound and enduring basis, can be safely trusted to preserve both our credit and currency with honor, stability and inviolability.

“The American people hold the financial honor of our Government as sacred as our flag, and can be relied upon to guard it with the same sleepless vigilance. They hold its preservation above party fealty, and have often demonstrated that party ties avail nothing when the spotless credit of our country is threatened.

“The money of the United States, and every kind or form of it, whether of paper, silver or gold, must be as good as the best in the world. It must not only be current at its full face value at home, but it must be counted at par in any and every commercial centre of the globe. The sagacious and far-seeing policy of the great men who founded our Government, the teachings and acts of the wisest financiers at every stage in our history, the steadfast faith and splendid achievements of the great party to which we belong, and the genius and integrity of our people, have always demanded this, and will ever maintain it. The dollar paid to the farmer, the wage-earner and the pensioner must continue forever equal in purchasing and debt-paying power to the dollar paid to any Government creditor.

“The contest this year will not be waged upon lines of

theory and speculation, but in the light of severe practical experience and new and dearly acquired knowledge. The great body of our citizens know what they want, and that they intend to have. They know for what the Republican party stands, and what its return to power means to them. They realize that the Republican party believes that our work should be done at home and not abroad, and everywhere proclaim their devotion to the principles of a protective tariff which, while supplying adequate revenues for the Government, will restore American production and serve the best interests of American labor and development.

“Our appeal, therefore, is not to a false philosophy or vain theorists, but to the masses of the American people, the plain, practical people whom Lincoln loved and trusted, and whom the Republican party has always faithfully striven to serve.

“The platform adopted by the Republican National Convention has received my careful consideration and has my unqualified approval. It is a matter of gratification to me, as I am sure it must be to you and Republicans everywhere, and to all our people, that the expressions of its declaration of principles are so direct, clear and emphatic. They are too plain and positive to leave any chance for doubt or question as to their purport and meaning.”

LIFE OF GARRET A. HOBART.

GARRET A. HOBART, nominee of the Republican party for Vice President, in 1896, was born at Long Branch, N. J., in the year 1844. His youth was spent in that vicinity, where the opportunity for education was good. He entered Rutgers' College at the age of fifteen years, and graduated therefrom at the age of nineteen.

After graduation he entered upon the study of law in the office of Socrates Tuttle, of Paterson, who ranked as one of the leading attorneys of the State. Mr. Hobart was admitted to the bar in 1866, and three years after was enrolled as a counsellor of law. He entered upon practice in Paterson, and his success was rapid and brilliant. In 1871 he was elected Counsel of the City of Paterson, which office he filled with great force and ability. The next year he was chosen Counsel of the Board of Freeholders of Passaic County, another office of great legal responsibility, and also acceptably filled.

Mr. Hobart's political career began with his election to the House of Assembly of the State of New Jersey. Here he displayed such energy and parliamentary knowledge, such tact and rare executive force, that in his second year of service, he was elected Speaker of the House. In this responsible capacity he served so ably as to win the regard of all members without distinction of party, and the favorable impression he made was not lost on the people of Passaic County.

In 1875 he was urged to accept a renomination, but was forced to decline the honor owing to a pressure of legal business. When the honor of a nomination for the State Senate was extended in 1877, he was induced to accept, and at once entered upon an active campaign. He was elected by a large majority. So satisfactory had his service proved, that his constituents renominated him for the Senate in 1879, giving him a majority far larger than before, and the largest ever given to a candidate for the same office in Passaic County.

During the years 1881 and 1882 he was President of the Senate, and when he closed his career in the Legislature, it was with the thanks not only of his county but of the entire State for the ability and care with which he had served the best interests of the people at large. It was while he was a member of the Senate that he was chosen a member of the State Republican Committee, of which body he was elected Chairman in 1880. This brought him into more direct contact with his party in general, and just such high character of service as he was qualified to give was much needed in the State, for the Republican party had long been confronted by a horde of Democrats who defied honest party methods, and had so fattened on the spoils of office as to regard all efforts of opponents to dislodge them with scorn.

No set of men in political life ever had a harder task before them, than Mr. Hobart and his associates of the State Republican Committee. They worked persistently and heroically for years to rout the enemy from his entrenchments and restore the lost honor of their State. Inch by inch they gained ground, and after three years of incessant warfare they succeeded in capturing the enemy's salient points, and in wresting the Legislature from his

iron grasp. Much of the honor of this signal victory belonged to Mr. Hobart.

He was not content, however, with victory, nor with anything short of the utter rout and demoralization of the corrupting forces within the State. Still a member of the State Committee, and one of its hardest workers and most trusted advisers, he was found in every fray that punished the retreating enemy, and in every council that helped to strengthen his party and promote its growing welfare. Under his able organizing direction, with his swift and keen executive ability, by reason of the invincible blows he prepared and struck, the enemy was forced from cover to cover, and, at length, out of the prolonged and herculean strife came the great Republican victory of 1895, which seated Governor Griggs in the executive chair, and redeemed the State from Democratic misrule.

But Mr. Hobart's splendid political achievements have not by any means been limited to his State. As early as 1884, he became a figure in national politics as the choice of his State delegation for member of the national committee. Into this wider sphere of political influence he carried the same sagacity, industry and influence that had made him so conspicuous and useful a force in local affairs. This honor of membership in the national committee was continued in 1888, 1892 and again in 1896. In 1892 he served as vice chairman of the committee.

Mr. Hobart's business career has covered a wide field and been a series of proud successes. The energy and ability that heralded the great advocate, the courage, sagacity and persistency that crowned the political leader, were largely supplemented in his nature with the qualities and inclinations that demanded the activities of business.


His skill, diplomacy and acumen came into request in connection with industrial enterprises, and his genius found agreeable vent at the head of various important institutions.

Among his first business connections was his receivership of the New Jersey Midland Railway. He found the affairs of this corporation in a most demoralized condition, but by the application of his extraordinary business tact and energy he was enabled to rescue the company from its perilous position, and to turn it over to the stockholders in a state of solvency.

Subsequently he was appointed to the receivership of the Montclair Railroad, and of the Jersey City and Albany line. In 1880, when the First National Bank of Newark failed, Mr. Hobart was appointed its receiver. He took hold of the delicate and intricate task with his usual vigor and acumen, and managed it so successfully that in six months he closed up its affairs, with the payment of all the depositors in full.

He filled the responsible position of general manager of the East Jersey Water Company and its allied interests, and is president of the Passaic Water Company, the Acquackanonck Water Company, the consolidated lines of the Paterson Railway Company, the Morris County Railway, and the People's Gas Company.

To these important trusts he adds the duties of director in several National Banks and of legal adviser in numerous industrial and improvement companies. Thus Mr. Hobart is one of the busiest as well as most successful of men. Personally he is endowed with nearly all the graces that go to make a man popular with his fellows and useful to the State. His temperament is unruffled by any of the petty annoyances of everyday life, and it is said of him



GARRET A. HOBART.



HON. THOMAS C. PLATT.

Born in Owego, N. Y., July 15, 1833; studied at Yale College; became President of Tioga, N. Y., National Bank, and engaged in lumber business in Michigan; elected to Congress, as a Republican, 1872-74; elected to U. S. Senate, January 18, 1881; resigned with Roscoe Conkling, May, 1881; defeated for re-election; Secretary and Director of U. S. Express Co., 1879; President of same since 1880; Commissioner of Quarantine, N. Y., 1889-1888; member of Republican National Conventions, 1876 80-84-88-92; President of Southern Central R. R. since 1888; conspicuous in Republican National Convention of 1892 as leader of Blaine forces; an acute and natural party leader in New York.

that "a frown on his face is as unusual an occurrence as a snow storm in July." No man, no matter what his condition in life, is more easily approached, and the millionaire and the laboring man receive the same courteous hearing when they call at his office on public or private business. Added to this he has a certain dignity of countenance and bearing which adds to rather than detracts from the charm of his good-natured smile. His social life in Paterson is quiet and without pomp, though both he and his charming wife are leaders among the social set.

By reason of his successes in behalf of his party in the State of New Jersey, and at the bar and in business fields, and by virtue of his high standing and large acquaintance with national leaders, it could hardly be otherwise than that his name should, at an early day, become conspicuous in connection with the Vice Presidency. Wherever it was broached in this connection it was received with favor, and without question as to availability, should the nomination fall to the East. No man had accomplished more for the party, and on the very field where achievement counted for most. No man could bring to the high position a longer and stronger list of personal, mental, moral and political essentials. He stood forth as the unanimous choice of his state delegation, and that was a pleasing augury of his success, considering other political circumstances.

In the national convention at St. Louis, his name, high character, preëminent ability, political devotion, and locality, all pointed to him as a logical running mate with the Ohio statesman who was to become the head of the Republican ticket. Sentiment in his favor crystallized with every hour of the Convention, and when the time came for nominations for Vice President, he was an easy leader of the field.

His name was placed in nomination by his friend, Judge J. Franklin Fort, whose language must be here reproduced in order to complete a chapter in the life of our subject.

"Mr. President and gentleman of the convention : I rise to present to this convention the claims of New Jersey to the Vice Presidency.

"We come because we feel that we can for the first time in our history bring to you a promise that our electoral vote will be cast for your nominees. If you comply with our request this promise will surely be redeemed.

"For forty years, through the blackness of darkness of a universally triumphant Democracy, the Republicans of New Jersey have maintained their organization and fought as valiantly as if the outcome were to be assured victory. Only twice through all this long period has the sun shone in upon us. Yet, through all these weary years, we have, like "Goldsmith's Captive," felt that

"Hope like the gleaming tapers' light,
Adorns and cheers our way ;
And still as darker grows the night,
Emits a brighter ray."

"The fulfillment of this hope came in 1894. In that year, for the first time since the Republican party came into existence, we sent to Congress a solid delegation of eight Republicans, and elected a Republican to the United States Senate. We followed this in 1895 by electing a Republican Governor by a majority of 28,000. And in this year of grace we expect to give the Republican electors a majority of not less than 20,000.

"I come to you, then, to-day, in behalf of a new New Jersey, a politically redeemed and regenerated State. Old things have passed away, and behold ; all things have become new. It is many long years since New Jersey has received recognition by a national convention.

“When Henry Clay stood for protection in 1844, New Jersey furnished Theodore Frelinghuysen as his associate. The issue then was the restoration of the tariff, and was more nearly like that of to-day than at any other period which I can recall in the nation’s political history. In 1856, when the freedom of man brought the Republican party into existence and the great “Pathfinder” was called to lead, New Jersey furnished for that unequal contest William L. Dayton as the Vice Presidential candidate. Since then counting for nothing, we have asked for nothing. During this period Maine has had a candidate for President and a Vice President; Massachusetts a Vice President; New York, four Vice Presidents, one of whom became President for almost a full term; Indiana, a President, a candidate for President and a Vice President, Illinois a President twice and a Vice Presidential candidate; Ohio two Presidents, and now a candidate for the third time; Tennessee a Vice President, who became President for almost a full term.

“We believe that the Vice Presidency of 1896 should be given to New Jersey. We have reasons for our opinion. We have ten electoral votes. We have carried the State in the elections of 1893, ’94 and ’95. We hope and believe we can keep the State in the Republican column, for all time. By your action to-day you can greatly aid us. Do you believe you could accord the Vice Presidency to a state more justly entitled to a recognition or one which it would be of more public advantage to hold in the Republican ranks?

“If the party in any State is deserving of approval for the sacrifice of its members to maintain its organization, then the Republicans of New Jersey, in this, the hour of their ascendancy, after long years of bitter defeat, feel that they cannot come to this convention in vain.

"We appeal to our brethren in the South, who know, with us, what it is to be overridden by fraud on the ballot box, to be counted out by corrupt election officers, to be dominated by an arrogant, unrelenting Democracy.

"We should have carried our State at every election for the past ten years if the count had been an honest one. We succeeded in throttling the ballot-box stuffers and imprisoning the corrupt election officers, only to have the whole raft of them pardoned in a day to work again their nefarious practices upon the honest people. But to-day under ballot reform laws, with an honest count, we know we can win. It has been a long, terrible strife to the goal, but we have reached it unaided and unassisted from without, and we come to-day promising to the ticket here selected the vote of New Jersey whether you give us the Vice Presidential candidate or not. We make it no test of our Republicanism that we have a candidate. We have been too long used to fighting for principle for that, but we do say that you can by granting our request lighten our burden and make us a confident party with victory in sight even before the contest begins.

"Will we carry Colorado, Montana and Nevada this year if the Democracy declare for silver at 16 to 1? Let us hope we may. New Jersey has as many electoral votes as these three States together.

"Will you make New Jersey sure to take their place in case of need? We have in all these years of Republicanism been the "lone star," Democratic star in the North. Our forty years of wandering in the wilderness of Democracy are ended. Our Egyptian darkness disappears. We are on the hilltop looking into the promised land. Encourage us as we march over into the political Canaan of Republicanism, there to remain, by giving us a leader on the national ticket to go with us.

“We are proud of our public men. Their Republicanism and love of country have been welded in the furnace of political adversity. That man is a Republican who adheres to the party in a state where there is no hope for the gratification of personal ambitions. There are no camp followers in the minority party of any State. They are all true soldiers in the militant army, doing valiant service without reward, gain or the hope thereof, from principle only.

“A true representative of this class of Republicans, New Jersey will offer you to-day. He is in the prime of life, a never-faltering friend, with qualities of leadership unsurpassed, of sterling honor, of broad mind, of liberal views, of wide public information, of great business capacity, and withal he is a parliamentarian who would grace the Presidency of the Senate of the United States. A native of our State, the son of an humble farmer, he was reared to love of country in sight of the historic field of Monmouth, on which the blood of our ancestors was shed, that the republic might exist. From a poor boy, unaided and alone he has risen to his renown among us.

“In our State we have done for him all that the political condition would permit. He has been Speaker of our Assembly and President of our Senate. He has been the choice for the United States Senator of the Republican minority in the Legislature, and had it been in our power to place him in the Senate of the United States he would ere this have been there.

• His capabilities are such as would grace any position of honor in the nation. Not for himself, but for our State; not for his ambition, but to give to the nation the highest type of public official, do we come to this convention by the command of our State, and, in the name of the Republican

party of New Jersey—unconquered and unconquerable, undivided and indivisible—with our united voice speaking for all that counts for good citizenship in our State nominate to you for the office of Vice President of the Republic, Garret A. Hobart, of New Jersey.” (Prolonged applause.)

The speech was loudly cheered, the New Yorker’s joining with the New Jersey men in the nomination. J. Otis Humphrey, of Illinois, seconded Hobart.

A single ballot was all that was required to secure Mr Hobart’s nomination. It was taken with the following result, after which the nomination was made unanimous:

Hobart,	.	.	.	.	.	533½
Evans,	.	.	.	.	.	277½
Bulkley,	.	.	.	.	.	39
Walker,	.	.	.	.	.	24
Lippitt,	.	.	.	.	.	8
Reed,	.	.	.	.	.	3
Fred Grant,	.	.	.	.	.	2
Thurston,	.	.	.	.	.	2
Depew,	.	.	.	.	.	3
Brown,	.	.	.	.	.	2
Morton,	.	.	.	.	.	1
Absent or not voting,	.	.	.	.	.	29
Total,	.	.	.	.	.	924

The nomination met with the approbation of the entire Republican press of the country, and with that of the party in general. Said Mr. Hanna, Chairman of the National Committee, speaking for that body and the country:

“Mr. Hobart’s nomination must be gratifying to the great body of Republicans throughout the country. In personal character and qualifications for the office he is a fit associate for Major McKinley and will bring great

strength to the ticket. In addition, he is wholly free from all factional complications, a leader within his own State and liked best where he is best known. I do not see how, under the circumstances, a wiser or better choice could have been made."

One sentiment from the public press will answer for all:

"Mr. Hobart has been a leading force for many years in the Legislature and politics of New Jersey. Though a lawyer by profession his activities have been largely in executive duties and his reputation was gained through success in business lines. His winning manners will make him friends in the Senate and his experience as Speaker of the New Jersey Assembly will stand him in good stead when in the chair of the Vice President. Should Providence see fit to call him to the position of Chief Magistrate he has shown that he possesses the qualifications which should carry him through the trying duties of that exalted station with credit and success. It is a good nomination and gives the Republican party a well-balanced, harmonious and entirely acceptable ticket."

On July 7, Mr. Hobart was officially notified of his nomination as Vice President by the Republican National Convention. The ceremony took place at his home in the presence of an assembly of 3,000 people. The Chairman of the Notification Committee, ex-Judge Charles W Fairbanks, said:

"Mr. Hobart:—The Republican National Convention recently assembled at St. Louis commissioned us to formally notify you of your nomination for the office of Vice President of the United States. We are met pursuant to the direction of the Convention to perform the agreeable duty assigned us.

"In all the splendid history of the great party which

holds our allegiance, the necessity was never more urgent for steadfast adherence to those wholesome principles which have been the sure foundation rock of our national prosperity. The demand was never greater for men who hold principle above all else and who are unmoved either by the clamor of the hour or the promise of false teachers.

"The Convention at St. Louis, in full measure met the high demands of the times in its declaration for party principles and in the nomination of candidates for President and Vice President. Yes, the office for which you were nominated is of rare dignity, honor and power. It has been graced by the most eminent statesmen who have contributed to the upbuilding of the strength and glory of the Republic.

"Because of your exalted personal character and of your intelligent and patriotic devotion to the enduring principles of a protective tariff, which wisely discriminates in favor of American interests, and to a currency whose integrity none can challenge, and because of your conspicuous fitness for the exacting and important duties of this high office, the Republican National Convention, with a unanimity and enthusiasm rarely witnessed, chose you as our candidate for Vice President of these United States.

"We know it to be gratifying to you personally to be the associate of William McKinley in the pending contest. For you and your distinguished associate we bespeak the enthusiastic and intelligent support of all our countrymen, who desire that prosperity shall again rule throughout the Republic."

Mr. Hobart responded as follows:

"I beg to extend to you my grateful acknowledgments

for the very kind and flattering terms in which you convey the formal announcement of my nomination for Vice President of the United States by the Republican National Convention at St. Louis. I am profoundly sensible of the honor which has been done me, and through me to the State in which all my life has been spent, in my selection as a candidate for this high office. I appreciate it the more because it associates me, in a contest which involves the very gravest issues, with one who represents in his private character and public career the highest intelligence and best spirit of his party, and with whom my personal relations are such as to afford a guarantee of perfect accord in the work of the campaign which lies before me.

“It is sufficient for me to say at this time that, concurring without reserve in all the declarations of principle and policy embodied in the St. Louis platform, I accept the nomination tendered to me with a full appreciation of its responsibilities, and with an honest purpose, in the event that the people shall ratify the choices made by the National Convention, to discharge any duties which may devolve upon me, with best reference to the public good.

“Let me add that it will be my earnest effort in the coming campaign to contribute in every way possible to the success of the party which we represent, and which as to the important issues of the time stands for the best interests of the people.

“Uncertainty or instability as to the money question involves most serious consequences to every interest and to every citizen of the country.

“The gravity of this question cannot be overestimated. There can be no financial security; no business stability;

no real prosperity where the policy of the Government as to that question is at all a matter of doubt.

“Gold is the one standard of value among all enlightened commercial nations. All financial transactions of whatever character, all business enterprises, all individual or corporate investments are adjusted to it. An honest dollar worth 100 cents everywhere cannot be coined out of 53 cents’ worth of silver, plus a legislative fiat.

“Such a debasement of our currency would inevitably produce incalculable loss, appalling disaster and national dishonor. It is a fundamental principle in coinage recognized and followed by all the statesmen of America in the past and never yet safely departed from, that there can be only one basis upon which gold and silver may be concurrently coined as money, and that basis is equality, not in weight, but in the commercial value of the metal contained in the respective coins. This commercial value is fixed by the markets of the world with which the great interests of our country are necessarily connected by innumerable business ties, which cannot be severed or ignored. Great and self-reliant as our country is, it is great not alone within its own borders and upon its own resources, but because it also reaches out to the ends of the earth in all the manifold departments of business, exchange and commerce, and must maintain with honor the standing and credit among the nations of the earth.

“The question admits of no compromise. It is a vital principle at stake, but it is in no sense partisan or sectional. It concerns all the people. Ours, as one of the foremost nations, must have a monetary standard equal to the best.

“It is of vital consequence that this question should be

settled now in such a way as to restore public confidence here and everywhere in the integrity of our purpose. A doubt of that integrity among the other great commercial countries of the world will not only cost us millions of money, but that which, as patriots, we should treasure still more highly—our industrial and commercial supremacy.

“My estimate of the value of a protective policy has been formed by the study of the object lessons of a great industrial State, extending over a period of thirty years. It is that protection not only builds up important industries from small beginnings, but that these and all other industries flourish or languish in proportion as protection is maintained or withdrawn. I have seen it indisputably proved that the prosperity of farmer, merchant and all other classes of citizens goes hand in hand with that of the manufacturer and mechanic.

“I am firmly persuaded that what we need most of all to remove the business paralysis that afflicts this country, is the restoration of a policy which, while affording ample revenue to meet the expenses of the Government, will reopen American workshops on full time and full handed, with their operatives paid good wages in honest dollars. And this can only come under a tariff which will hold the interests of our own people paramount in our political and commercial systems.

“The opposite policy which discourages American enterprise reduces American labor to idleness, diminishes the earnings of American workingmen, opens our markets to commodities from abroad which we should produce at home, while closing foreign markets against our products and which, at the same time, steadily augments the public debt, increasing the public burdens, while diminishing the

ability of the people to meet them, is a policy which must find its chief popularity elsewhere than among American citizens.

“I shall take an early opportunity, gentlemen of the committee, through you to communicate to my fellow-citizens with somewhat more of detail my views concerning the dominant questions of the hour and the crisis which confronts us as a nation.

“With this brief expression of my appreciation of the distinguished honor that has been bestowed upon me, and this signification of my acceptance of the trust to which I have been summoned, I place myself at the service of the Republican party and of the country.”

THE REPUBLICAN PLATFORM OF 1896.

The Republicans of the United States, assembled by their representatives in national convention, appealing for the popular and historical jurisdiction of their claims to the matchless achievements of thirty years of Republican rule, earnestly and confidently address themselves to the awakened intelligence, experience and conscience of their countrymen in the following declaration of facts and principles:

For the first time since the Civil War the American people have witnessed the calamitous consequences of full and unrestricted Democratic control of the Government. It has been a record of unparalleled incapacity, dishonor and disaster. In administrative management it has ruthlessly sacrificed indispensable revenue, entailed an unceasing deficit, eked out ordinary current expenses with borrowed money, piled up the public debt by \$262,000,000 in time of peace, forced an adverse balance of trade, kept a perpetual menace hanging over the redemption fund, pawned American credit to alien syndicates and reversed all the measures and results of successful Republican rule. In the broad effort of its policy it has precipitated panic, blighted industry and trade with prolonged depression, closed factories, reduced work and wages, halted enterprise and crippled American production, while stimulating foreign production for the American market. Every consideration of public safety and individual interest demands that the Government shall be rescued from the hands of those who have shown them-

selves incapable to conduct it without disaster at home and dishonor abroad, and shall be restored to the party which for thirty years administered it with unequalled success and prosperity; and in this connection we heartily indorse the wisdom, patriotism and the success of the Administration of President Harrison.

THE TARIFF PLANK.

We renew and emphasize our allegiance to the policy protection as the bulwark of American industrial independence and the foundation of American development and prosperity. This true American policy taxes foreign products and encourages home industry; it puts the burden of revenue on foreign goods; it secures the American market for the American producer; it upholds the American standard of wages for the American workingman; it puts the factory by the side of the farm and makes the American farmer less dependent on foreign demand and price; it diffuses general thrift, and founds the strength of all on the strength of each. In its reasonable application it is just, fair and impartial, equally opposed to foreign control and domestic monopoly, to sectional discrimination and individual favoritism.

We denounce the present Democratic tariff as sectional, injurious to the public credit and destructive to business enterprise. We demand such an equitable tariff on foreign imports which come into competition with American products as will not only furnish adequate revenue for the necessary expenses of the Government, but will protect American labor from degradation to the wage level of other lands. We are not pledged to any particular schedules. The question of rates is a practical question, to be governed by the conditions of the time and of production; the ruling and uncompromising principle is the protection and development of American labor and industry. The country demands a right settlement and then it wants rest.

RECIPROCITY INDORSED.

We believe the repeal of the reciprocity arrangements negotiated by the last Republican Administration as a national calamity, and we demand the renewal and extension on such terms as will equalize our trade with other nations, remove the restrictions which now obstruct the sale of American products in the ports of other countries, and secure enlarged markets for the products of our farms, forests and factories.

Protection and reciprocity are twin measures of Republican policy and go hand in hand. Democratic rule has recklessly struck down both, and both must be reestablished.

Protection for what we produce ; free admission for the necessities of life which we do not produce ; reciprocal agreements of mutual interests, which gain open markets for us in return for our open market to others. Protection builds up domestic industry and trade and secures our own market for ourselves ; reciprocity builds up foreign trade and finds an outlet for our surplus.

We condemn the present administration for not keeping faith with the sugar producers of this country. The Republican party favors such protection as will lead to the production on American soil of all the sugar which the American people use, and for which they pay other countries more than \$100,000,000 annually.

To all our products—to those of the mine and the field, as well as to those of the shop and the factory—to hemp, to wool, the product of the great industry of sheep husbandry, as well as to the finished woollens of the mill—we promise the most ample protection.

We favor restoring the early American policy of discriminating duties for the upbuilding of our merchant marine and the protection of our shipping in the foreign carrying trade, so that American ships—the product of American labor, employed in American ship yards, sailing under the Stars and Stripes, and manned, officered and owned by Americans—may regain the carrying of our foreign commerce.

FOR GOLD STANDARD.

The Republican party is unreservedly for sound money. It caused the enactment of the law providing for the resumption of specie payments in 1879. Since then every dollar has been as good as gold.


We are unalterably opposed to every measure calculated to debase our currency or impair the credit of our country. We are, therefore, opposed to the free coinage of silver except by international agreement with the leading commercial nations of the world, which we pledge ourselves to promote, and until such agreement can be obtained the existing gold standard must be preserved. All our silver and paper currency must be maintained at parity with gold, and we favor all measures designed to maintain inviolable the obligations of all our money, whether coin or paper, at the present standard—the standard of the most enlightened nations of the earth.

THE PENSION QUESTION.

The veterans of the Union Army deserve and should receive fair treatment and generous recognition. Wherever practicable they should be given the preference in the matter of employment, and they are entitled to the enactment of such laws as are best calculated to secure the fulfillment of the pledges made to them in the dark days of the country's peril. We denounce the practice in the Pension Bureau, so recklessly and unjustly carried on by the present Administration, of reducing pensions and arbitrarily dropping names from the rolls, as deserving the severest condemnation of the American people.

OUR FOREIGN POLICY.

Our foreign policy should be at all times firm, vigorous and dignified, and all our interests in the Western Hemisphere carefully watched and guarded. The Hawaiian Islands should be controlled by the United States, and no foreign power should be permitted to interfere with them. The Nicaraguan Canal should be built, owned and operated



HON. JAMES K. JONES.

Born in Marshall co., Miss., Sept. 29, 1839; educated in classics and law; served in Confederate army; a planter till 1873; began law practice at Washington, Arkansas, and elected to State Senate in 1873; re-elected in 1877, and became President of the body; elected, as Democrat, to 47th, 48th and 49th Congresses, elected to U. S. Senate in 1884; re-elected in 1890; term expires March 3, 1897; member of Committees on Senate Expenses, Finance, Indian Affairs, Irrigation, etc.



HON. STEPHEN B. ELKINS.

Born in Perry co., Ohio, September 26, 1841; graduated from University of Missouri, 1860; admitted to bar, 1863; practiced in New Mexico for several years; elected to Territorial Legislature in 1866, and soon after made Attorney General of Territory; appointed U. S. District Attorney in 1868; elected Delegate to Congress, 1873; re-elected in 1875; Delegate to Republican National Conventions, 1884, 1888; large business and banking interests in Santa Fé, also large land owner; moved to West Virginia, and extensively engaged in mining, timber, railroad and banking interests; appointed, by President Harrison Secretary of War, December 17, 1891; elected to U. S. Senate as a Republican, 1894, Chairman of Select Committee on Geological Survey, and member of Committees on Civil Service, Commerce, Military Affairs, Railroads and Territories.

by the United States, and by the purchase of the Danish Islands we should secure a proper and much-needed naval station in the West Indies.

The massacres in Armenia have aroused the deep sympathy and just indignation of the American people, and we believe that the United States should exercise all the influence it can properly exert to bring these atrocities to an end. In Turkey American residents have been exposed to the gravest dangers, and American property destroyed. There and everywhere American citizens and American property must be absolutely protected at all hazards and at any cost.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE.

We reassert the Monroe Doctrine in its full extent, and we reaffirm the right of the United States to give the doctrine effect by responding to the appeals of any American State for intervention in case of European encroachment. We have not interfered and shall not interfere with the existing possessions of any European power in this hemisphere, but those possessions must not, on any pretext, be extended. We hopefully look forward to the eventual withdrawal of the European powers from this hemisphere, and to the ultimate union of all English-speaking parts of the continent by the free consent of its inhabitants.

SYMPATHY FOR CUBA.

From the hour of achieving their own independence the people of the United States have regarded with sympathy the struggle of other American peoples to free themselves from European domination. We watch with deep and abiding interest the heroic battle of the Cuban patriots against cruelty and oppression, and our best hopes go out for the full success of their determined contest for liberty.

The Government of Spain, having lost control of Cuba, and being unable to protect the property or lives of resident American citizens, or to comply with its treaty obligations, we believe that the Government of the United

States should actually use its influence and good offices to restore peace and give independence to the island.

The peace and security of the Republic and the maintenance of its rightful influence among the nations of the earth demand a naval power commensurate with its position and responsibility. We, therefore, favor the continued enlargement of the navy and a complete system of harbor and sea cost defenses.

EDUCATIONAL TEST OF IMMIGRANTS.

For the protection of the quality of our American citizenship and of the wages of our workmen against the fatal competition of low-priced labor, we demand that the immigration laws be thoroughly enforced, and so extended as to exclude from entrance to the United States those who can neither read nor write.

The civil service law was placed on the statute book by the Republican party, which has always sustained it, and we renew our repeated declarations that it shall be thoroughly and honestly enforced and extended wherever practicable.

We demand that every citizen of the United States shall be allowed to cast one free and unrestricted ballot, and, that such ballot shall be counted and returned as cast.

We proclaim our unqualified condemnation of the uncivilized and barbarous practice well known as lynching or killing of human beings suspected or charged with crime without process of law.

NATIONAL ARBITRATION BOARD.

We favor the creation of a national board of arbitration to settle and adjust differences which may arise between employers and employees engaged in interstate commerce.

We believe in an immediate return to the free homestead policy of the Republican party; and urge the passage by Congress of the satisfactory free homestead measure which has already passed the House and is now pending in the Senate.

We favor the admission of the remaining Territories at the earliest practical date, having due regard to the interests of the people of the Territories and of the United States. All the Federal officers appointed for the Territories should be elected from bona-fide residents thereof, and the right of self-government should be accorded as far as practicable.

We believe the citizens of Alaska should have representation in the Congress of the United States, to the end that needful legislation may be intelligently enacted.

We sympathize with all wise and legitimate efforts to lessen and prevent the evils of intemperance and promote morality.

RIGHTS OF WOMEN.

The Republican party is mindful of the rights and interests of women. Protection of American industries includes equal opportunities, equal pay for equal work, and protection to the home. We favor the admission of women to wider spheres of usefulness, and we welcome their cooperation in rescuing the country from Democratic and Populist mismanagement and misrule.

Such are the principles and policies of the Republican party. By these principles we will abide and these policies we will put into execution. We ask for them the considerate judgment of the American people. Confident alike in the history of our great party and in the justice of our cause, we present our platform and our candidates in the full assurance that the election will bring victory to the Republican party and prosperity to the people of the United States.

LIFE OF WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN.

BIRTH AND EDUCATION.

WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN, popularly known as the "Boy Orator of the Platte," was born in the town of Salem, Marion County, Illinois, March 19, 1860. His lineage is thoroughly Democratic. His father was Silas L. Bryan, who was born in Culpepper County, Va., at the foot of the Blue Ridge Mountains. He came to Illinois when eighteen years of age, and settled finally at Salem. He was a graduate at McKendrie College, Lebanon, Ill., and began the practice of law. In 1852 he was elected State Senator, and served eight years. He was elected, in 1860, Circuit Judge, and served until 1872. He was a member of the Constitutional Convention in 1870, and there introduced a resolution that all officers created by the constitution, should be elected by the people. In 1870 he was Democratic candidate for Congress, and was defeated by 240 votes, by James S. Martin. He was a strong man intellectually, and was a good public speaker. He died in 1880. He was married to Maria Elizabeth Jennings, at Salem, in 1852. They had nine children, of whom five are living. W. J. is the fourth. Mrs. Bryan died in Salem, in 1896.

The family residence was on a farm just outside of the town limits, and it was there that the son William passed his early youth, amid rural scenes and the arts of husbandry. His education began in the common schools of

the town, and to facilitate this, he came to spend much of his time within the reach of the schools, the rest being spent on the farm.

By the time he reached the age of fifteen years, he had completed his common school education, and, in the fall of 1875, he entered Whipple Academy, at Jacksonville, Illinois. After an academic course, extending over two years, he was prepared to enter Illinois College, at Jacksonville, which he did in 1877, matriculating in the Freshman Class. As a collegian, he proved to be an apt and earnest and assiduous student, and, early in his course, gave promise of those forensic powers which were to bring him speedy National distinction. In 1880, while a Senior, he won second prize as the representative of his college in the State collegiate oratorical contest at Galesburg.

He graduated from his college in 1881, with the highest honors of his class, and, by virtue of this rank, he became the class valedictorian. After leaving college, young Bryan went to Chicago, where he entered the Union Law College of that city. At the same time he entered the law office of Senator Lyman Trumbull, for the double purpose of assisting in his own education, and acquiring a knowledge of the practice of law along with its theories.

This course imposed upon him a double duty, but he had physical strength, mental ability and energy of purpose equal to even a harder task, and he ended his two years of law study with honors. He was now thoroughly equipped for his profession, and he entered upon it at Jacksonville, Ill., soon after his admission to the bar, in 1883.

IN PUBLIC LIFE.

The young attorney prospered in his profession from the start, for he added to careful preparation all the energies and ambitions of youth, a cordial disposition, pleasing manners, and a most persuasive eloquence. He found at Jacksonville an attraction in the person of Miss Mary E. Baird, a young lady who had been a student in the seminary there while he was attending college. He made her his wife, and the two lived happily at Jacksonville till the year 1887. Even before this date, Mr. Bryan had begun to indulge his rhetorical powers in the political discussions of his vicinity, and every one recognized in him a disputant of pre-eminent ability, considering his youth.

In the autumn of 1887, he went on a business trip to the State of Nebraska, and, while there, he became impressed with the greater opportunities, the newer and more rapidly developing West offered to a young man of his aspirations and qualifications. So, in the same year, he moved to the State, and settled at Lincoln, the Capital, where he opened a law office with Mr. Talbot, the firm name being Talbot & Bryan.

This move proved to be auspicious. It brought him a profitable clientage, and, at the same time, opened for him, almost as if by magic, a political career which, for speed and splendor, stands without parallel. In less than half a year after his advent in Lincoln, he entered on his first political effort as delegate to the Democratic State Convention, which met at Omaha, in May, 1888, to choose delegates to the National Convention at St. Louis. During an interlude in the proceedings, when something was needed to break monotony, some of his friends called on

him for a speech, by way of divertisement. The call was sudden, and the opportunity was by no means a favorable one for forensic display, but the young orator made the most of the occasion. He soon awakened the tired and sleepy audience to a realizing sense of his magnetic powers, and, ere long, had it completely in his grasp. Devoting himself exclusively to the tariff, then, an all-absorbing issue with the Nebraska people, he brought the vast audience to its feet with responsive cheer after cheer. The strength of his logic and arguments, combined with his brilliancy and eloquence, was irresistible, and he, there and then, laid a firm foundation for a State reputation.

So commanding, indeed, were the talents of this remarkable young man, that the very next year he was offered the Democratic nomination for Lieutenant-Governor. This he declined, but he took an active part in the campaign, making in all more than fifty speeches.

Meantime J. Sterling Morton, at the election of 1888, had been defeated for Congress by his Republican opponent, W. J. Connell, by more than 3,000 majority, although the district, two years before, had given a Democratic majority of nearly 7,000. There was need of a new Moses, and the younger Democrats of the district decided that Bryan was the man to lead them.

When he was offered the Congressional nomination, in 1890, Connell being a candidate for re-election, Bryan said :

“Of course there is no show for an election, but I will make the race and do my best.”

Only thirty years old at the time, he put all his might into the fight.

"I will advocate the Democratic principle of tariff reform on every stump in the district," he said, and he carried out his words. It was a herculean labor, for the district was made up of nine counties, and polled a total vote of more than 72,000.

The old-time politicians took no interest in the battle, as they looked upon it as lost at the outset, and they were more than niggardly in furnishing the sinews of war. But the younger Democrats were more than zealous, and by their vigorous efforts fully made up for the lack of campaign funds.

Mr. Bryan was then, as now, a comparatively poor man, and his campaign expenses were limited to less than \$400. But the greatest interest was aroused, and Mr. Bryan's tour became one long ovation. The Republicans had submitted a prohibition amendment to the State constitution, and the Democrats, in their platform, had declared against prohibition. Lincoln and Omaha, the largest cities in the State, were in the district, and, in them, the Republicans lost heavily on the temperance issue.

A striking feature of the campaign was the challenge issued by the Democratic Committee to Cornell to discuss the issues of the day in joint debate with Mr. Bryan. They did not really expect that Connell would be rash enough to accept, but hoped to make political capital out of his refusal. Connell, however, flattered by former successes in haranguing helpless juries, accepted the challenge.

Mr. Bryan then showed that he was not only his adversary's superior in oratory, but also his master in matters of fact. Thoroughly familiar with the subjects to be

discussed, he was equipped with statistical and historical information, and was ever ready to meet the points of his opponent on economic as well as political grounds.

From the outset, his advantage was so marked that Connell's friends recommended him to find some excuse to draw out of the contest, but with more persistence than discretion, he refused to hearken to their advice, and when the votes were counted, it was found that he had been snowed under by a majority of nearly 7,000.

A winning so large as this, and accomplished so distinctly upon the issue of tariff-reform, made Mr. Bryan, when the House was organized, an eminently worthy man for recognition in the making up of the Ways and Means Committee, as a representative of the West. Although a new-comer in Congress, he was appointed without protest on the part of any one. The wisdom of Speaker Crisp's judgment was shown when Mr. Bryan made his first speech. It was a brilliant plea for tariff-reform, and made the biggest hit of the debate.

The House was in confusion when he began speaking, but, in five minutes, every Democratic leader sat about him, listening intently. The Republicans soon paid the young orator the same compliment, the galleries began to fill up, and the crowd remained until he had finished.

Some of the Republicans sought to take advantage of his inexperience by interrupting him with questions that might have puzzled much older heads. But Mr. Bryan brightened under this friction, and forced one Republican after another into his seat, all of them finding the young Nebraskan more than their match. He argued his case with a dramatic directness that aroused not only the enthusiasm of the Democrats, but won the applause of the galleries.

He won his first cheers by a characteristic piece of wit.

"There was once a time in the history of Nebraska," he said, "when there was a sheep there for every person in the State. But now, if every woman in Nebraska named Mary wanted a pet lamb, she would have to go out of the State to get it."

The peroration of that speech is worth quoting, for it shows tersely the stand Mr. Bryan has taken on the tariff question all through his public career. It is as follows:

"The country has nothing to fear from the Democratic policy upon the tariff question. It means a more equal distribution of the great advantages of this country. It means that the men who produce the wealth shall retain a larger share of it. It means that enterprise shall be employed in natural and profitable industries, not in unnatural and unsuitable industries. It means more constant employment for labor and better pay. It means the 'maximum of product for the minimum of toil.' It means commerce with other countries and ships to carry on that commerce. It means prosperity everywhere and not by piecemeal.

"It is for this reason that young men of this country are coming to the Democratic party, as Mr. Clarkson, that high Republican authority, declared. It is because we are right, and right will triumph. The day will come, and that soon, I trust, when wiser economic policies will prevail than those to which the Republican party is wedded; when the laws in this country will be made for all and not for a few; when those who annually congregate about this capital, seeking to use the taxing power

for purposes of private gain, will have lost their occupation; when the burdens of government will be equally distributed and its blessings likewise.

“Hail that day! When it comes, to use the language of another, ‘Democracy will be King. Long live the King!’”

At the end of that speech the members of the House no longer questioned the ability of the young man just come among them. Natures that had been prone to discount the youthful interloper from Nebraska recovered from their error with no further delay.

Of the hundred and more young members who then appeared in the Fifty-second Congress, he was the youngest. Only a few months previous he had celebrated his thirty-first birthday. Bryan attracted little or no attention. To the men even from the West his ability was unknown. He was looked upon as one of the accidents of politics.

He was guilty of the crime of being a young man. He could not deny it. It was indelibly written all over his smooth, clear-cut face; was revealed in the sparkle of his dark brown eyes, and was undeniably betrayed in his first speech, which was side-tracked to the *Congressional Record* without being delivered. Put aside by the leaders, who deny any latitude to inexperience, he sat day after day in his seat, watching parliamentary tricks and subtleties and mentally collecting knowledge of men and affairs, which he used with surprising tact and force when his opportunity came.

His years were betrayed only in his face and his suppressed speech. He looked the statesman and dressed with fitting dignity. In season and out, defying even the tropical sun of the long August days in the capital, he

appeared in a long black Prince Albert, black cravat and black trousers, which showed no signs of tailor's attention.

He was punctual in his attendance, sat throughout the long sessions and then went home. A dress suit he did not own; nor had he any ambition to possess one. The allurements of society, the official functions, the Senatorial teas and the Congressional junkets he put aside as pitfalls to be avoided by a man who came from a district normally Republican, with probably only two years to serve, and with every incentive for a prudent man, suddenly raised from a yearly income of next to nothing, to \$5,000 to save enough so that when he got back to his dusty lawyer's desk, empty of briefs, he could provide for his family until his profession brought him substantial returns.

Bryan made friends even with his great handicap of youth and inexperience. He had a charm of manner that won him recognition and invited confidence. Judge Crisp was impressed with the promise in the young, smooth-shaven member from the Valley of the Platte. He had helped Crisp in his canvass for the Speakership, and Crisp put him on the important Ways and Means Committee—an exceptional honor, which, while it gave him a standing, exposed the Speaker to much criticism.

But Bryan justified the judgment of the brilliant Georgian, although not until late in the session. He was heard at last and the speech he delivered—on the tariff—will be remembered and compared with the brilliant oratory of Bourke Cockran, against whom he was pitted in defence of silver at a later date. The debate on one of Springer's popgun bills had run on for weeks. It had ceased to attract the public or to interest the House. Along toward the close of an April afternoon, when the

galleries were clear, the doorkeepers dozing in their chairs and the members present were exchanging stories between cigar puffs, Bryan arose. He pulled from his inside pocket a few slips of paper on which were scribbled notes. He had scarcely spoken twenty words before the members began to lean over the rail to listen, and the doorkeepers roused from their slumbers.

Bryan was pale and cool; there was a slight tremor in his voice. He began to speak over the heads of the members. A pretty young woman in a neat brown dress had entered the gallery as he began. The young woman was his wife. He was speaking to her, looking to her, no doubt for confidence.

Bryan's rich strong voice, melodious in tone, filled the chamber. The members who had first leaned over the rail to listen, had taken seats, and for an hour Bryan spoke, introducing metaphors and stories which were singularly apt and convincing. Reed and several other Republicans regarded him with curiosity. They could scarcely realize that the young man possessed such powers of oratory. For months he had sat silent in his seat. To test him, Reed interrupted with questions, but Bryan was not to be confused or rattled or led away from the thread of his speech.

When he had concluded and the cheering had subsided, Reed was the first to cross the aisle and grasp his hand. Reed's example was followed. Every member, Democrat and Republican, moved up in procession to Bryan's seat and shook his hand. From that moment Bryan had a standing, commanded notice and exerted a strong influence.

No one sneered at Bryan after that, and there were few who dared to risk the discomfort of tackling the lithe

Westerner who was so quick and nimble on his mental feet.

All through that Congress—the Fifty-second—Bryan was one of the most prominent figures in the House, although he was its youngest member. He devoted limitless time to tariff reform, and when he went back to Nebraska it was with the knowledge that he had fought a good fight.

When he stood for reelection to the Fifty-third Congress his opponent was Allen W. Field. Conditions had changed greatly in the district, and after a desperate contest Bryan won by a scant plurality of 140 in a total vote of 30,000.

He reentered Congress to fight a new battle, for he at once joined the free silver forces, led by Mr. Bland, whose first lieutenant he became. He had sided with Mr. Bland in the previous Congress, but it was not until now that he became an out-and-out silver leader. Before that it had been thought he favored free coinage because of a supposed strong sentiment among his constituents favorable to this legislation. But now he showed that his heart and soul were in the cause.

His speech against the repeal of the Sherman Silver Coinage Act was one of the most remarkable ever heard in the House. For three hours he held the close attention of the largest audience, both on the floor and in the galleries, drawn to the Capitol during that session. The oldest members of the House followed the speech with even more respectful interest than had been accorded to Mr. Bland's speech a few days before, and Mr. Bryan's more attractive personality and his captivating eloquence fixed the attention of hundreds present who were less interested in the issue discussed.

After this speech a prominent Democratic member, an administration man, pulled Bryan into a chair in the House lobby and said :

“Bryan, it is a pity that a man of your great ability should sacrifice himself to the silver cause, which offers no future. Whatever there is of credit to any one in advocating it, Bland has. Come East and we will make a President of you.”

But Bryan laughed and replied: “No matter about the credit, I believe in free silver. I would rather go back to Nebraska if it fails than to come East and put aside my principles, no matter what the inducement.”

When the end of his second term in Congress approached Bryan declined a renomination, saying he proposed to return to Nebraska to practice law. It was not long, however, before he was announced as the editor-in-chief of the *World Herald* of Omaha, in which he was to advocate the free and unlimited coinage of silver, and incidentally, it was said, to promote his candidacy for the United States Senate. Another feature of his management was to be a hostility to the administration and all that partook of Clevelandism.

Mr. Bryan took hold September 1, 1894, and all went well until the Nebraska Republican State Central Committee made a contract by which it should control two columns in the editorial pages. Mr. Bryan found that the Republicans were using their space to publish matter detrimental to his Senatorial project and he made a fight in the court, which was decided in favor of his enemies.

Bryan's aspirations were blasted by the election of John M. Thurston to the Senate, and the silver-tongued young orator retired to private life as an “ex-Congressman.”

He still continued, however, to advocate in every way

the free coinage of silver, and made frequent trips through the West and South advocating it. In 1895, he spoke in Birmingham, Ala. As he closed Prof. H. P. Burris, the local leader of the Populists, asked him if he would support a Democrat who held the views of Cleveland and Carlisle, if nominated on a gold platform by the Democrats this year. With great emphasis he replied :

“Nothing in heaven above, on the earth below or in hell beneath, could make me support a gold standard candidate on a gold standard platform.”

Just before the Chicago Convention, when asked if he would accept a compromise on the silver question by the Chicago Convention, he said :

“No compromise on the silver question is either to be desired or tolerated. Every State which has declared for silver has adopted a platform which declares for free and unlimited coinage of both gold and silver at the present legal ratio of 16 to 1 without waiting for the aid or consent of any other nation on earth, and this will be the substance of the Chicago declaration.

“The silver Democrats have fought against great odds ; they have had to contend against the world, the flesh and the devil, but they have won the fight.

“The success of our cause is due to the support it has found among the common people, and any attempt to modify or weaken the position already taken in the silver States would rob the campaign of its enthusiasm and subject the delegates to the charge of having betrayed their constituents.”

PERSONALISM AND HOME LIFE..

A friend who called on Mr. and Mrs. Bryan at the



WILLIAM J. BRYAN,



ARTHUR SEWALL.

Clifton hotel, just after he had received the nomination, thus sketched the pair :

“Mr. Bryan’s handsome head was bent over a writing desk his dark hair fell back from a broad, white brow, his veiled eyes followed the lightninglike movements of his pencil, and he looked like the embodiment of strength, courage, decision and noble manhood. Mrs. Bryan stood beside him, a fit companion for the man. She is tall, dark-haired, with a clear complexion and a fine figure. In relation to her early life Mrs. Bryan said :

“‘I was Mary Elizabeth Baird and I was born in Pike County, Ill., and in 1881 was graduated with the highest honors of my class from the Young Ladies’ School, at Jacksonville, Ill.

“‘In 1884 I was married to Mr. Bryan and during the twelve years of our married life three children have joined our family circle. Our home is just the ideal spot on earth. My eldest daughter, Ruth, is eleven years of age. My boy, William J. Bryan, Jr., is seven, and my baby girl is five, and we are, indeed, a happy family.

“‘I am hardly what one would call a society woman,’ said Mrs. Bryan. ‘I am president of the Lincoln Sorosis Club and take a keen interest in everything that pertains to the advancement of woman. I am not an avowed woman suffragist.

“‘I want everything that will broaden, elevate and uplift women and make them better wives, mothers, sisters and companions. If, after careful investigation, I find that the ballot is necessary to bring about this development, I shall be in favor of woman suffrage.

“‘I play the piano only for the amusement of my little family. I can swim, and I am just taking my first lessons on a wheel. I love good literature and endeavor to keep

myself posted on the principal topics of the day. In 1887 I took a course of law at Union College, Chicago, and was admitted to the bar. I did not do this with a view to going into the general practice of law, but to bring myself in touch with my husband's work.

“‘I do not read much law at present, for since Mr. Bryan became so deeply interested in politics I have given most of my attention to educating myself in this direction. I have been in attendance at the convention every day and have enjoyed every moment of it. It has been glorious, hasn't it? The enthusiasm is so delightfully inspiring. Of course, I am more pleased than I can express at the honor which has been bestowed upon my husband, and I feel unbounded confidence in his ability to win a great victory.’”

As to Mrs. Bryan's appearance the visitor continued :

“She must be seen, and when she is seen she must smile in order to bring out the perfect sweetness of her face. She is a woman of medium height. Her complexion is fair, her hair is a light brown and her eyes, the chief charm of her face, are dark bluish gray, outlined with heavy dark lashes. She was dressed in a becoming costume of dark blue cashmere, trimmed with delicate touches of white honiton braid. A small dark turban completed a neat street costume and made her appear just what the great American people will find her to be, a thoroughly womanly woman, gracious, kind, companionable, and a woman capable of presiding with dignity over the great mansion that shelters the master of the White House.”

With full faith in his own ability, he naturally looks hopefully toward a favorable destiny. Two months before his nomination, he said to an intimate friend :

“I think I shall be the next President of the United

States. I am confident that I shall be nominated in Chicago, and if nominated, I am sure I shall be elected. I think McKinley will be the Republican nominee, and he can be beaten. It is a matter I have never said much about, but I believe in destiny, and ever since I was fourteen years of age I have felt that I was destined to rise to a position of prominence and importance."

An admirer thus describes Mr. Bryan's graces as an orator:

"Bryan neglects none of the accessories of oratory. Nature richly dowered him with rare grace. He is happy in attitude and pose. His gestures are on Hogarth's line of beauty. Mellifluous is the word that most aptly describes his voice. It is strong enough to be heard by thousands; it is sweet enough to charm those least inclined to music. It is so modulated as not to vex the ear with monotony, and can be stern or pathetic, fierce or gentle, serious or humorous with the varying emotions of its master. In his youth Bryan must have had a skilful teacher in elocution, and must have been a docile pupil. He enriches his speeches with illustrations from the classics or from the common occurrences of every-day life with equal felicity. But his crowning gift as an orator is his evident sincerity. He is candor incarnate, and thoroughly believes what he says himself."

Mr. Bryan is a man of considerable personal magnetism and fine presence. The resemblance between him and the late Samuel J. Randall has been remarked by many. He is about five feet ten inches in height, weighs 180 pounds, and has dark hair and dark eyes. His jaw is heavy and square, and he is smooth shaven. His cheek bones are prominent and his forehead square.

He is an exceedingly pleasant talker, and is fond of

dealing in well-rounded phrases. His speeches abound with poetry. He is of Irish extraction, but his people have lived in this country for more than a hundred years. In religion he is a Presbyterian, but believes in the entire separation of Church and State. He steadfastly opposes bringing religion into politics or politics into religion.

Mr. Bryan lives well in a commodious dwelling in the fashionable part of Lincoln. The study in which both Mr. and Mrs. Bryan have desks is a very attractive room. It is filled with books, statuary and mementos of campaigns. There are busts or portraits of noted men, and there are two butcher knives which Mr. Bryan used in the campaign with Judge Field, to refute the latter's boasts of the effects of high protection.

Mr. Bryan has many admirers among the Republicans. He has cultivated the enemy. He knows, personally, nearly every young man of any prominence in southeastern Nebraska, and he has a way of making friends feel that he takes a personal interest in their welfare. When he was in Congress he maintained a very large correspondence with men of all parties at home.

When he heard that any acquaintance of his had been promoted or married, or had won distinction of any sort, he immediately wrote a friendly letter of congratulation. In case of affliction he wrote consolingly.

Then when he came home and met the people on the street he never failed to grasp their hands warmly and make personal inquiry as to their welfare. Bryan never passes a friend without suitable recognition. This has been very effective in giving him a hold on the people.

Another thing that has contributed to his popularity is his good nature. He has come in for a good deal of criticism, but he has never lost his temper. He has met abuse

with smiles. He has sought to placate, to conciliate. He gets close to people. He is gifted with the politician's highest art.

NOMINATION FOR PRESIDENT.

The National Convention of the Democratic party met at Chicago on July 7th, 1896. The gathering was looked to with profound interest by the entire country, for it was well known that a factional fight would be precipitated between the "free silver coinage" and "sound money" wings of the party, upon whose results might depend the further existence of the party.

The contentious wings were divided sectionally, the "sound money" men representing the Eastern States, with one or two exceptions, and the "free silver coinage" men representing the Western and Southern States. The exponents of the former were such leaders as Whitney, Flowers, and Hill, of New York, Russell, of Massachusetts, and others, who had been trusted Democratic counsellors in the past, and who stood for the financial views of the Cleveland administration. The exponents of the latter wing were such men as Bland of Missouri, Jones of Arkansas, McLean of Ohio, Boies of Iowa, Bryan of Nebraska, Gov. Altgeld of Illinois, Senator Tillman of South Carolina, and others, all more or less distinguished for their adherence to the doctrine of free silver coinage, to the principle of free trade, and to such other theories of government as had been agitating the South and West for a decade.

Long before the convention met, and during almost the entire period of creating delegates to it, it was confidently asserted by the free silver coinage wing that it would prevail in the councils of the party, and would no longer per-

mit a minority to dictate a policy. They, therefore, came into the convention with resolute purpose, and when they found that their predictions as to strength and numbers had been fulfilled, their determination became all the more pronounced. The convention was to become a battle royal between contending forces, and a policy was to be launched which would shape the party's destiny for the future.

The silver men had not only the advantage of numbers, but they had the moral advantage that accrued to them from the attitude of the gold men in 1892, when, in order to secure the election of Mr. Cleveland, they went into the silver states and effected unions of Democrats and Populists in order to achieve their purpose. They were, therefore, now in no position to antagonize effectually the very sentiments they had once encouraged for ulterior purposes. They were surrounded by fires of their own kindling. The legitimate consequences of their own political methods had come home to torment and frustrate them. They were face to face with a catastrophe of their own shaping.

From the very start of the Convention, the silver men took high and bold ground. They organized it by electing Senator Daniel, of Virginia, as temporary chairman, over Senator Hill, of New York, though it had been customary to concede to the minority the compliment of this office. The vote on this innovation showed a strength of 556 silver men to 349 gold men, though the real strength of the former was larger, owing to the fact that many of them doubted the propriety of breaking away from a time honored procedure. This test of strength was made amid great excitement and much acrimonious speech-making, and the result was received with an outburst of cheers by the silver men, while

the gold men sat in silent stupefaction, or made known their protest by threats of a bolt.

Mr. Daniel accepted the honor conferred in a brilliant speech, whose key was the free and unlimited coinage of silver as a measure of declaring the financial independence of the United States of all other nations, and of restoring lost prosperity. The test vote would also decide the complexion of the platform, but it would not decide the candidature, for as yet the two-third rule for a nomination existed.

A permanent organization was effected on July 8, by the selection of Senator Stephen B. White, of California, as permanent chairman. In the case of contested seats from Michigan, enough silver men were seated to throw the vote of that state into the silver column. There were two contesting delegations from Nebraska, Mr. Bryan's own State.

The National committee reported in favor of the gold men, but when the matter was referred to the Credentials Committee the latter at once reported in favor of the delegates led by Mr. Bryan. The motion to adopt the report in the Convention was declared carried by a viva voce vote, a demand for a roll-call, which was at first made by ex-Governor Russell, being withdrawn on the statement of the chairman of the Credentials Committee that the report was unanimous. The gold delegation then retired to a march tune by the band, and the silver delegation under Bryan's lead was admitted to the Convention.

These radical changes were brought about by a vote of 558 to 368, and they served to show the earnestness of the silver majority, as well as the fact that it was now sufficiently organized to remain coherent amid all the exciting turns of the Convention.

Meanwhile a terrific battle was going on in the Committee on Resolutions. The silver men were determined that the platform should be a plain and unequivocal statement of their principles, while the gold representatives sought such modifications as would serve to stave off a party breach, and reconcile the country to the platform declarations. The result of this struggle was a majority and minority report on the platform, with an appeal to the Convention for final settlement.

When these reports were made, it meant a day of angry struggle in the Convention. The silver men grew firmer in their attitude and more pronounced in their views. The gold men tried all the expedients of oratory and delay to accomplish something favorable to themselves but they were opposed on every hand by buttresses upon which they could make no impression. Signal and stinging as their repeated defeats had been, they were, henceforth, to be still more crushing and humiliating. The silver men meant to be complete masters of the Democratic party and its future destiny. They grew defiant in debate, and many of them assumed attitudes which called for rebuke from their own side.

This third day's session of the Convention (July 9) was pivotal and crucial. It witnessed the sullen departure from the deliberations of many of the gold delegates. It felt the distracting influence of presidential booms, the most imposing of which was in favor of Richard P. Bland, of Missouri, who had been for years the recognized champion of the free silver cause, and whose nomination was regarded as deserved and logical, if not inevitable. It heard the echoes of a battle more desperate than any ever before waged in a Democratic Convention, the memorable

Convention of 1860, which sundered the party on the slavery issue, alone excepted.

Senator Jones, of Arkansas, read the majority report of the Committee on Platform. J. H. Wade, of Ohio, followed by reading the minority report. Both these reports will be found in place at the end of this article. The issue was thus drawn in Convention. Senator Tillman, of South Carolina, sprang to the rescue of the majority platform in a speech filled with fiery invective, and most ultra denunciation of the Cleveland administration. It was so partisan and sectional, that Senator Jones, of Arkansas, rose and gave a non-sectional turn to the discussion, by declaring that free silver coinage was national, and as a cause had adherents in every State.

Now came the turn of Senator Hill, of New York. By reason of his ability and prominence, he was accorded an anxious hearing, and it was known that his effort was to crown the action of the gold men. It was to be their final protest and expiring cry in the Convention, and it was to remain practically unanswered till Mr. Bryan found in it a theme for that great forensic effort which carried the Convention by storm and made him its nominee for President.

Mr. Hill was followed in equally eloquent and pathetic strains by Senator Vilas, of Wisconsin, and ex-Governor Russell, of Massachusetts. The climax of excitement was supposed to have been reached. But not so. The storm of demonstration that greeted Russell's peroration was quickly submerged by that which welcomed the appearance of William J. Bryan on the stage. He had been spoken of in a general way as a presidential possibility, but as yet no concerted movement had been made in his behalf. He had been frequently called for by the Con-

vention, but had preferred reserve to publicity. His time had now come. As he appeared more than half the Convention was standing and the air was full of newspapers and hats. Four times the cheering seemed to have spent itself and each time it rose again with a roll of an advancing wave. Bryan stood with a smile playing on his face and an uplifted arm waiting for silence. While he stood there waiting, hundreds had their first view of a man whose political life in Congress and afterward had been identified with the movement for free silver.

He was in face and figure a Roman on the stage—the likeness of one stepped from the tragic stage. He had a clean-cut, firm mouth, a strong Roman nose and black hair brushed back from his forehead and falling over his collar in short curls. His appearance was that of a plain Westerner.

Even the attention given to Tillman and Hill did not equal the breathless eagerness with which the thousands peered forward to catch the first sentence of this young man whom many Westerners appraise as their foremost orator. They were not disappointed. He spoke as follows, nearly every sentence being received with ringing applause, and at times the approval being so boisterous and continuous as to interrupt his torrent of eloquence for several minutes:

“Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the Convention:—I would be presumptuous indeed to present myself against the distinguished gentleman to whom you have listened, if this were but a measuring of ability, but this is not a contest among persons. The humblest citizen in all the land when called to arms in a righteous cause is stronger than all the whole hosts of error that they can bring. I

come to speak to you in defence of a cause as holy as the cause of liberty, the cause of humanity.

“When this debate is concluded a motion will be made to lay upon the table the resolution offered in commendation of the Administration and also the resolution in condemnation of the Administration. I shall object to bringing this question to a level of persons. The individual is but an atom; he is born, he acts, he dies; but principles are eternal and this has been a contest of principle.

“Never before in the history of this country has there been witnessed such a contest as that through which we have passed. Never before in the history of American politics has a great issue been fought out as this issue has been by the voters themselves.

“On the 4th of March, 1895, a few Democrats, mostly members of Congress, issued an address to the Democrats of the nation asserting that the money question was the paramount issue of the hour; asserting also the right of allowing the Democratic party to control the position of the party on this issue; concluding with the request that all believers in free coinage of silver in the Democratic party should take charge of and control the policy of the Democratic party.

“Three months later, at Memphis, an organization was formed and the silver Democrats went forth openly and boldly and courageously proclaiming their belief and declaring that if successful they would crystallize in the platform the declaration which they had made; and then began the conflict with a zeal approaching the zeal which inspired the crusaders who followed Peter the Hermit. Our silver Democrats went forth from victory unto victory, until they are assembled now, not to discuss, not

to debate, but to enter up the judgment rendered by them to the people of this country.

"In this contest brother has been arrayed against brother, and father against son. The warmest ties of love and acquaintance and association have been disregarded. Old leaders have been cast aside when they refused to give expression to the sentiments of those whom they would lead, and new leaders have sprung up to give direction to this cause of truth.

"Thus has the contest been waged, and we have assembled here under as binding and solemn instructions as were ever fastened upon the representatives of a people. We do not come as individuals. Why, as individuals we might have been glad to compliment the gentleman from New York, but we know that the people for whom we speak would never be willing to put him in a position where he could thwart the will of the Democratic party. (Cheers.) I say it was not a question of persons, it was a question of principles, and it is not with gladness, my friends, that we find ourselves brought into conflict with those who are now arrayed on the other side. The gentleman who just preceded me (Governor Russell) spoke of the old State of Massachusetts. Let me assure him that not one person in all this Convention entertains the least hostility to the people of the State of Massachusetts.

"But we stand here representing people who are the equals before the law of the largest citizens in the State of Massachusetts. (Applause.) When you come before us and tell us that we shall disturb your business interests, we reply that you have disturbed our business interests by your course. (Great applause and cheering.) We say to you that you have made too limited in its application the definition of business men. The man who

is employed for wages is as much a business man as his employer.

“The attorney in a country town is as much a business man as the lawyer in the great metropolis. The merchant at a crossroads is as much a business man as the merchant of New York. The farmer who goes forth in the morning and toils all day, begins in the Spring and toils all Summer, and by the application of brain and muscle to the natural resources of this country creates wealth, is as much a business man as the man who goes upon the Board of Trade and bets upon the price of grain.

“The miners who go a thousand feet into the earth or climb 2,000 feet upon the cliffs and bring forth from their hiding places the precious metals to be poured into the channels of trade, are as much business men as the few financial magnates who in a back room corner the money of the world.

“We come to speak for this broader class of business men. Ah! My friends, we say not one word against those who live upon the Atlantic coast; but those hardy pioneers who braved all dangers of the wilderness, who have made the desert to blossom as the rose—those pioneers away out there, rearing their children near nature’s heart where they can mingle their voices with the voices of the birds—out there where they have erected schoolhouses for the education of their young, and churches where they praise their Creator, and cemeteries where sleep the ashes of their dead—are as deserving of the consideration of this party as any people in this country.

“We have petitioned, and our petitions have been scorned. We have entreated, and our entreaties have been disregarded, and they have mocked and our calamity came.

"We beg no longer ; we entreat no more ; we petition no more. We defy them.

"The gentleman of Wisconsin has said that he feared a Robespierre. My friends, in this land of the free, we need fear no tyrant who will spring up from among the people. What we need is an Andrew Jackson to stand as Jackson stood the encroachments of aggrandizement of wealth. They tell us that this platform was made to catch votes. We reply to them that changing conditions make no issues ; that the principles upon which rest Democracy are as everlasting as the hills, but that they must be applied to new conditions as they arise.

"Conditions have arisen and we are attempting to meet those conditions. They tell us that the income tax ought not to be brought in here ; that it is a new idea. They criticise us for our criticisms of the Supreme Court of the United States. My friends, we have not criticised. We have simply called attention to what you know. If you want criticisms, read the dissenting opinion of the court. That will give you criticisms.

"They say we passed an unconstitutional bill. I deny it. The income tax was not unconstitutional when it was passed. It was not unconstitutional when it went before the Supreme Court for the first time. It did not become unconstitutional until one Judge changed his mind, and we cannot be expected to know when a Judge will change his mind.

"The income tax is a just law. It simply intends to put the burden of Government justly upon the backs of the people. I am in favor of an income tax.

"When I find a man who is not willing to pay his share of the burden of the Government which protects him, I find a man who is unworthy to enjoy the blessings of a

Government like ours. He says that we are opposing the national bank currency. It is true. If you will read what Thomas Benton said you will find that he said that in searching history he could find but one parallel to Andrew Jackson. That was Cicero, who destroyed the conspiracy of Cataline and saved Rome. He did for Rome what Jackson did when he destroyed the bank conspiracy and saved America.

"We say that in our platform that we believe that the right to coin money and issue money is a function of the Government. We believe it. We believe it is a part of sovereignty and can no more with safety be delegated to private individuals than we could afford to delegate to private individuals the power to make penal statutes or levy laws for taxation. Mr. Jefferson, who was once regarded as good Democratic authority, seems to have a different opinion from the gentlemen who have addressed us on the part of the minority. Those who are opposed to the proposition tell us that the issue of paper money is a function of the bank and that the Government ought to go out of the banking business.

"I stand with Jefferson rather than with them and tell them, as he did, that the issue of money is a function of the Government and that the banks ought to go out of the Government business. They complain about that plank which declares against the life tenure in office. They have tried to strain it to mean that which it does not mean. What we oppose in that plank is the life tenure that is being built up at Washington, which excludes from party representation in the benefits the humbler members of our society.

"Let me call the attention to two or three great things. The gentleman from New York says that he will propose

an amendment providing that this change in these laws shall not affect contracts already made. Let me remind him that there is no intention of affecting those contracts which according to the present laws are made payable in gold.

“But if he means to say that we cannot change our monetary system without protecting those who have loaned money before the change was made, I want to ask him where, in law or in morals, he can find authority for not protecting the debtors when the act of 1873 was passed, but not insist that we must protect the creditors.

“He says he also wants to amend this law and provide that if we fail to maintain a parity within a year that we will then suspend the coinage of silver. We reply that when we advocate a thing which we believe will be successful we are not compelled to raise a doubt as to our own sincerity by trying to show what we will do if we can.

“I ask him if he will apply his logic to us, why he does not apply it to himself. He says that he wants this country to try to secure an international agreement. Why doesn't he tell us what he is going to do if they fail to secure an international agreement?

“There is more reason for him to do that than for us to fail to maintain the parity. They have tried for thirty years to secure an international agreement, and those who are waiting for it most impatiently don't want it at all.

“Now, my friends, let me come to the great paramount issue. If they ask here why is it we say more on the money question than we say upon the tariff question, I reply that if protection has slain its thousands the gold standard has slain its tens of thousands. If they ask us

why we didn't embody all these things in our platform which we believe, we reply to them that when we have restored the money of the Constitution, all other necessary reforms will be possible, and that until that is done there is no reform that can be accomplished.

"Why is it that within three months such a change has come over the sentiments of this country. Three months ago, when it was confidently asserted that those who believed in the gold standard would frame our platform and nominate our candidate, even the advocates of the gold standard did not think that we could elect a President; but they had good reason for the suspicion because there is scarcely a State here to-day asking for the gold standard that is not within the absolute control of the Republican party.

"But note the change. Mr. McKinley was nominated at St. Louis upon a platform that declared for the maintenance of the gold standard until it should be changed into bimetallism by an international agreement. Mr. McKinley was the most popular man among the Republican party, and everybody three months ago in the Republican party prophesied his election. How is it to-day? Why that man who used to boast that he looked like Napoleon (laughter and cheers)—that man shudders to-day when he thinks that he was nominated on the anniversary of the battle of Waterloo.

"Not only that, but as he listens, he can hear with ever increasing distinctness the sound of the waves as they beat upon the lonely shores of St. Helena. Why this change? Ah! my friends, it is evident to every one who will look at the matter. It is no private character, however pure; personal popularity, however great, that can protect from the avenging wrath of an indignant people the man who

will neither declare that he is in favor of foisting the gold standard upon the people or who is willing to surrender the right of self-government and place legislative control in the hands of foreign potentates and powers.

"We go forth confident that we shall win. Why? Because upon the paramount issue in this campaign there is not a spot of ground upon which the enemy will dare to challenge battle. Why, if they tell us that the gold standard is a good thing, we point to their platform and tell them that their platform pledges the party to get rid of a gold standard and substitute bimetallism.

"If the gold standard is a good thing why try to get rid of it? If the gold standard, and I might call your attention to the fact that some of the very people who are in this convention to-day and who tell you that we ought to declare in favor of the international bimetallism, and thereby declare that the gold standard is wrong, and that the principle of bimetallism is better, these very people four months ago were open and avowed advocates of the gold standard and telling us that we could not legislate two metals together even with all the world.

"I want to suggest this truth, that if the gold standard is a good thing we ought to declare in favor of its retention and not in favor of abandoning it; and if the gold standard is a bad thing, why should we wait until some other nations are willing to help us to let go?

"Here is the line of battle. We care not upon which issue they force the fight. We are prepared to meet them on either issue or on both. If they tell us that the gold standard is the standard of civilization, we reply to them that this, the most enlightened of all the nations of the earth, has never declared for a gold standard, and both the parties this year are declaring against it.

“If the gold standard is the standard of civilization, why, my friends, should we not have it? So if they come to meet us on that, we can present the history of our nation. More than that, we can tell them this, that they will search the pages of history in vain to find a single instance in which the common people of any land have ever declared themselves in favor of a gold standard.

“They can find where the holders of fixed investments have. Mr. Carlisle said in 1878 that this was a struggle between the idle holders of idle capital and the struggling masses who produce the wealth and pay the taxes of the country, and, my friends, it is simply a question that we shall decide upon which side shall the Democratic party fight? Upon the side of the idle holders of idle capital, or upon the side of the struggling masses?

“That is the question that the party must answer first, and then it must be answered by each individual hereafter. The sympathies of the Democratic party as described by the platform are on the side of the struggling masses who have ever been the foundation of the Democratic party.

“There are two ideas of Government. There are those who believe that if you just legislate to make the well-to-do prosperous that their prosperity will leak through on those below. The Democratic idea has been that if you legislate to make the masses prosperous their prosperity will find its way up through every class and rest upon it.

“If you come to us and tell us that the great cities are in favor of the gold standard, I tell you that the great cities rest upon these broad and fertile prairies. Burn down your cities and leave our farms, and your cities will spring up again as if by magic. But destroy our farms

and the grass will grow in the streets of every city in this country.

“My friends, we shall declare that this nation is able to legislate for its own people on every question without waiting for the aid or consent of any other nation on earth (applause), and upon that issue we expect to carry every single State in the Union.

“I shall not slander the fair State of Massachusetts nor the State of New York by saying that when its citizens are confronted with the proposition, Is this nation able to attend to its own business?—I will not slander either one by saying that the people of those States will declare our helpless impotency as a nation to attend to our own business.

“It is the issue of 1776 over again. Our ancestors, then but 3,000,000, had the courage to declare their political independence of every other nation upon earth. Shall we, their descendants, when we have grown to 70,000,000, declare that we are less independent than our forefathers?

“No, my friends, it will never be the judgment of the people. Therefore, we care not upon what lines the battle is fought. If they say bimetallism is good, but we cannot have it till some nation helps us, we reply that instead of having a gold standard because England has, we shall restore bimetallism and then let England have bimetallism because the United States has.

“If they dare to come out and in the open defend the gold standard as a good thing, we shall fight them to the uttermost, having behind us the producing masses of this nation and the world. Having behind us the commercial interests and the laboring interests and all the toiling masses, we shall answer their demands for a gold standard by saying to them **you shall not** press down upon the brow

of labor this crown of thorns. You shall not crucify man on a cross of gold."

The conclusion of Mr. Bryan's speech was marked by the most enthusiastic demonstration of the Convention up to that time. The whole Convention sprang to its feet and 20,000 throats roared, while twice 20,000 arms waved frantically. Handkerchiefs and flags flew wildly. Hats were hurled aloft. Umbrellas were waved. Men shouted like maniacs. From every quarter of the hall came the hoarse roar.

Suddenly a member of the Texas delegation uprooted the banner of the Lone Star State, and carried it to where stood the standard of Nebraska. Above the roar rose piercing shrieks, which sounded like a volley of siege guns above the continuous rattle of 10,000 small arms. Other delegates grasped the staffs of their delegations and pushed their way to the Nebraska delegation.

Soon the staffs of two-thirds of the States were grouped about the purple standard of Bryan's State. Only the standards of Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Maine, Minnesota, New York, New Jersey, New Hampshire, Vermont, South Dakota, Rhode Island and Pennsylvania were left standing when the demonstration was at its height.

Meantime the awful roar from the galleries continued. The band played, but the music could not be heard above the Niagara-like tumult of sound. Like an angry ocean it swept on, breaking at last, receding, falling back, only to rise again. Delegates fairly jumped for joy. Some of them took possession of the aisles and marched. Suddenly the State standards clustered at Nebraska were borne away in single file through the aisles of the pit.

After five minutes of this turbulence, the crowd sank

back exhausted. When all were seated, Delegate Saulsbury, of Delaware, climbed on to his chair. He and his three silver colleagues in that State gave three cheers for Bryan, which was answered with a shout from the gallery of "What's the matter with Bryan for President?"

The transaction of business was started again by Senator Hill of New York, but not without considerable difficulty.

The "ayes" on the question were not loud, but the "noes" gave a great shout. Whereupon, Senator Hill, with uplifted hand demanded the call of States.

The announcement of the vote, "ayes" 626, "noes" 303, gave the silver men grounds for applause, because it was the first test vote directly on the financial question, and showed six more than the necessary two-thirds to nominate.

Senator Hill offered other amendments to the platform which were voted down by the same majority. A vote was then taken on the platform submitted by a majority of the Committee on Resolutions, and it was adopted by 628 for and 301 against.

The great battle was over, the party commitment decisively made. The laurels of the day rested on the head of the "Boy Orator of the Platte," and henceforth he was to rank with the most formidable of the aspirants for Presidential honors. There was destiny in his superb oratorical effort.

The evening session of July 9, was devoted to placing candidates in nomination. Mr. Bland was eloquently nominated by Senator Vest, Mr. Matthews by Senator Turpie, Mr. Boies by Senator White. Then Georgia was called, Colonel H. T. Lewis rose, and, after a few eloquent enconiums submitted the name of William J. Bryan, of

Nebraska, as the one for whom the State would vote. "He needs no speech to recommend him," said Colonel Lewis.

The words exploded another mine of the same fiery sort which the Nebraskan had enflamed with his own oratory a few hours before. Three or four State delegations were on their chairs leading the cheer with the lungs of scattering delegates from other States abetting them. Nebraska seemed to furnish the galleries with a hero, for they were making the great chorus of the noise. The blue banner with the placard, "William J. Bryan Club, of Nebraska; 16 to 1," emblazoned in silver letters was lifted above Nebraska's seats.

The standards of Georgia, North Carolina, Louisiana, Michigan and South Dakota rallied around the blue and silver emblem, and then the standard-bearers started a march around the pit.

When order was partially restored, T. F. Klutz, of North Carolina, seconded the nomination of William J. Bryan, and in this he was followed by G. F. Williams of Massachusetts, and Thos. Kernan of Louisiana.

The work of balloting for a nominee was postponed till Friday, July 10th. The indications now all pointed to Bryan though several other candidates were to be placed in the field. It was to be as exciting a day as the previous one, though without its acerbities. A melancholy and painful part of the proceedings was the declination of so many delegates to join in them, through disgust at the platform and their treatment by the majority. New York and New Jersey delegates remained passive in their seats, and Connecticut, Wisconsin, Delaware, Michigan, and Rhode Island cast only partial or scattering votes.

The first ballot showed that the heroes in the contest were Bland and Bryan, and that a clarification of the situa-

tion could hardly be other than in favor of Bryan, for the Bland strength must have its limit, while that of Bryan could have none short of a nomination. The ballots were taken in quick order and with the following results:

FIRST BALLOT.

Bland	-	-	-	-	-	-	237
Bryan	-	-	-	-	-	-	137
Boies	-	-	-	-	-	-	67
Blackburn	-	-	-	-	-	-	83
McLean	-	-	-	-	-	-	54
Matthews	-	-	-	-	-	-	37
Stevenson	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
Teller	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Pattison	-	-	-	-	-	-	94
Russell	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Pennoyer	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Tillman	-	-	-	-	-	-	17
Hill	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Campbell	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Not voting	-	-	-	-	-	-	179
Total voting	-	-	-	-	-	-	751

SECOND BALLOT.

Bland	-	-	-	-	-	-	281
Bryan	-	-	-	-	-	-	197
Boies	-	-	-	-	-	-	37
Blackburn	-	-	-	-	-	-	41
McLean	-	-	-	-	-	-	53
Matthews	-	-	-	-	-	-	34
Stevenson	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
Teller	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Pattison	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Pennoyer	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Hill	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Not voting	-	-	-	-	-	-	160
Total voting	-	-	-	-	-	-	770

THIRD BALLOT.

Bland	.	.	.	.	.	.	291
Bryan	-	.	.	.	.	.	219
Boies	-	.	.	.	.	.	36
Blackburn	-	.	.	.	.	.	27
McLean	-	.	.	.	.	.	54
Matthews	-	.	.	.	.	.	34
Stevenson	-	.	.	.	.	.	9
Pattison	-	.	.	.	.	.	97
Hill	-	.	.	.	.	.	1
Not voting	-	.	.	.	.	.	162
Total voting	-	.	.	.	.	.	768

FOURTH BALLOT.

Bland	.	.	.	.	.	.	241
Bryan	.	.	.	.	.	.	280
Boies	-	.	.	.	.	.	33
Blackburn	-	.	.	.	.	.	27
McLean	-	.	.	.	.	.	46
Matthews	-	.	.	.	.	.	36
Stevenson	-	.	.	.	.	.	6
Pattison	-	.	.	.	.	.	96
Hill	-	.	.	.	.	.	1
Not voting	-	.	.	.	.	.	162
Total voting	.	.	.	.	.	.	766

THE FIFTH AND DECISIVE BALLOT.

Bryan	.	.	.	.	.	.	528
Bland	.	.	.	.	.	.	77
Boies	.	.	.	.	.	.	36
Matthews	.	.	.	.	.	.	30
Scattering	.	.	.	.	.	.	5
Not voting	-	.	.	.	.	.	254
Total voting	.	.	.	.	.	.	676

Mr. Bryan received the announcement of his nomination with all the composure and calmness of a man who had been used to such things during a longer life than his. His handsome black eyes were perhaps slightly more dilated than ordinarily when the bulletin carrying the nomination message was handed to him, but otherwise he manifested no change of countenance or manner. He was at the time sitting chatting with two newspaper friends in his parlor at the Clifton House.

"If," said he, "this is true, I want to do that which I have for some time had in contemplation in this emergency." He then turned to the parlor table, and with a lead pencil wrote on a scrap of soft paper supplied by one of his newspaper visitors the following:

To the American People:—In order that I may have no ambition but to discharge faithfully the duties of the office, I desire to announce that, if elected President, I shall under no circumstances be a candidate for re-election.

W. J. BRYAN.

During the evening a public reception was arranged for him at his hotel, at which he sounded the keynote of his campaign in the following vigorous language:

"There shall be no signs of 'Keep off the grass' when you come around, boys," he began good-naturedly to the jostling thousands on the street. Then he asked: "Is this the Bland Club?" A yell in the affirmative answered his inquiry.

"Then I want to say to the friends of Bland that if the Convention had chosen as their nominee the man whose name is inscribed on your banners he would have no more loyal supporter than I. The fact that he was

not chosen cannot be taken as the slightest reflection upon his great ability. No man more deserves of the Convention its love, its honor and its confidence than Richard P. Bland."

Another great shout went up from the crowd and for several minutes the speaker could not proceed. When quiet was again restored he went on. "But circumstances contributed much in shaping the results of this Convention. When the campaign is over I think it can be said that no mistake has been made.

"But it depends upon you, upon the plain people. Abraham Lincoln once said that the Lord must love the plain people because he made so many of them. If we win in this great fight it will be because the plain people believe that we will bring to them exact and equal justice.

"We raise no plea against the power and the just due accorded to intelligence and to education, but we insist that when the Government comes in contact with the people there must be equal aid, exact justice to all alike, rich and poor, great and humble.

"The issue of this campaign is the money question (long continued applause), and we cannot be driven from our faith by the charge that we advocate dishonest money. The free and unlimited coinage of silver at the ratio of 16 to 1, independent of any nation on the face of the earth, will not give us dishonest money.

"It will not give us a dollar's worth of value to one and another to another man. It will give to the man who toils, the same as to the man who holds the mortgage. It will give us a coin that sails upon prosperity. This is to be a fight of the campaign, and you, my friends, are to do the fighting.

"I once heard a story of a man at a hotel who could not sleep because the man in the room above walked the floor all night. At last the man below, in despair, asked his friend above why he continued to walk the floor throughout the night. The friend replied: 'I owe \$10,000, and it is due next week. I think it is about time to walk the room all night.' 'But my friend, why don't you go to sleep and let the other man do the walking?'"

"Now, a great many people seem to think that the candidate must do all the walking of the floor and all the fighting. But this is your fight. It is more important to the people that they should select their officers than it is to the candidate that they should elect themselves. It is for you to say who your hired man will be. The officers of the people are their servants.

"Why should you not be careful in selecting the man who serves you in a public capacity, when you give great care in selecting those who serve you in a private capacity? I want you to go home and feel that this cause is your cause. It is the cause of the people, the plain people. If we fight as we should, we shall deserve to win. I thank you my friends."

Mr. Bryan's nomination drew a variety of comment from his party. The silver men regarded it as eminently fitting, and as calculated to lead to certain victory. The gold men did not withhold their admiration for his private worth and great forensic ability, but they bitterly denounced the platform which had been adopted, and expressed in unmeasured terms their hostility to the principles therein incorporated. They regarded them as un-Democratic and revolutionary, and as impossible for support. This, however, had evidently been anticipated and

discounted, for Mr. Bryan took the optimist view that as soon as the passions of the hour had cooled the full party strength would rally to his support. In this he was encouraged by the number and character of the congratulations that poured in upon him by telegraph and letter from men of all factions and parties, without regard to geographic limits.

Space does not permit the printing of these congratulations, nor a setting forth of the character of the criticisms mentioned in connection with the platform. One characteristic of the latter, however, is consonant with impartial history, and that was the confession that Democratic leaders were not blameless for the situation with which they found themselves confronted. For the three Cleveland campaigns they had sowed dragon's teeth, in sending speakers to the country to tell the people that they were being ground down by oppressive laws which protected monopolies and which made the rich richer and the poor poorer. Cleveland himself it was said made this mistake, never losing an opportunity to say to the masses that they were being frightfully burdened by unjust taxation. These campaign arguments and plausible and ponderous pleas of Cleveland created much discontent, and added to that which already existed, but the great mistake, as admitted by some of those who were in part responsible for it, was that which was made in 1892.

After Mr. Bryan's departure from Chicago, and on his way home to Lincoln, he visited Salem, his birthplace. The journey was a continuous series of ovations, hardly less enthusiastic than those that awaited him at Salem, and again on his arrival at Lincoln, where the populous turned out irrespective of party to proclaim their satisfaction over his nomination. These occasions gave him

opportunity for eloquent and stirring speeches, in which he fully sustained the reputation for oratory he had so splendidly confirmed in the Convention and before the party that had honored him with the nomination for President.

LIFE OF ARTHUR SEWALL.

ARTHUR SEWALL, nominee of the Democratic Party for Vice-President, sprang from an old and distinguished family on both sides of the Atlantic. His ancestors came to this country in 1654, and his grandfather, Dummer Sewall, was a soldier in the Revolutionary War. He was settled at York, Maine, and moved thence to Bath, Maine, in 1762, where he purchased the tract of land on which to this day is located the Sewall mansions and shipyards.

William D. Sewall, the father of Arthur, entered upon the business of ship-building at Bath, in 1835, and his shipyards soon became famous the world over for the staunch, fleet and beautifully modeled vessels it turned out. From its first product, the pretty little sail-ship, *Diana*, launched in 1825, to the exquisitely lined monster, the steel steamer, *Dirigo*, launched in 1894, the Sewall shipyards have easily led the country in designs for merchantmen, and, at this writing, the Sewall ship-building firm can boast that it owns the largest sailor merchantman afloat.

Arthur Sewall was born in Bath, Me., Nov. 25, 1835. He was liberally educated, and at once entered the ship-building business with his father, in the early fifties. This step meant that his future destiny was to be inseparable from the creation and sailing of American ships, for the Sewalls made ships not only for others

but for themselves, and out of the great number they have built since the establishment of their plant, they have owned and sailed ninety-five.

Arthur Sewall succeeded to his father's business in conjunction with his brother, under the firm name of E. and A. Sewall. Since then the firm has been changed and expanded by the introduction of his son, William D. Sewall, and his nephew, Samuel S. Sewall, the firm name being A. Sewall & Co.

Through natural taste for his business, aided by full acquaintance with its details and an interest in maritime affairs, Arthur Sewall has made a conspicuous success in his calling. But the prominence it has given him in a business way, not only in the merchant marine but among home associates, measures but little in comparison with the high place he has attained in the world of affairs outside of his shipbuilding occupation.

No single occupation, however, intricate and taxing, could limit energy and ability such as his. He extended his business prowess to various other enterprises and became successful in all, adding greatly to his civic and political influence as well as to his material means. In time he came to rank among Maine's most substantial capitalists and his advice and managerial powers were in request by nearly every important corporation in his county and vicinity. He was for nine years president of the Maine Central Railroad, and resigned in 1893, but only to give place to a successor who fully represented his business policy respecting the management of the road, and who shared his tact in carrying it out.

He is a director in many railroads of his own, and adjoining states, and was at one time prominent in the management of the Mexican Central and Sonora Railway. He

is also president of the Fourth National Bank of Maine, and a director and trusted advisor of the leading manufacturing concerns of Sagadahock County. In all his numerous business ventures he has shown himself to be a keen, progressive man of affairs. Under his management he changed the Main Central from a third rate to a first-class railroad, with steel rails and all modern equipments.

Though a lifelong Democrat, he has never felt bound to follow blindly the tenets of his party, but has always had an opinion of his own, especially respecting matters relating to finance, the tariff and merchant marine. Thus, when the question of admitting the steamships City of New York and City of Paris to American registry was up in Congress, and was exciting shippers and shipbuilders all over the country, he stepped forward as one of the largest builders of sailing ships in the country and showed so conclusively that the measure under discussion would prove a step toward a revival of our merchant marine, as to convince such Republicans as Senator Fry and Congressman Dingley, and secure their indorsement.

When a few years ago he completed that magnificent fleet of ships, of which the Roanoke is a type, he decided, and he was the first New England shipbuilder to do so that the time of wood in the ocean marine was past; that the age of steel had come. After a prolonged visit to the great yards in England and Ireland he returned to Bath and put up a complete modern steel plant.

The part of his whole life, and that in which he takes the greatest interest, is his career as a shipbuilder and ship owner. His belief in the future of American shipping has never flagged, even when he saw so many of the associates of his youth go out of the business.

For the past eight years Mr. Sewall has been Maine's

representative on the Democratic National Committee until a short time ago, when Dr. S. H. C. Gordon succeeded him. He was an original Cleveland man and followed the career of the Buffalo statesman up until a couple of years ago notwithstanding the fact that he shared something of the protection views of the late Samuel J. Randall. Ever since the greenback victory which swept over Maine, Mr. Sewall has been a close student of financial question, and this has crystallized in him to a thorough belief in bimetallism and the free coinage of both silver and gold. Mr. Sewall was a candidate for United States Senator against Senator Eugene Hale in 1892.

In 1859 Mr. Sewall married Emily Duncan Crooker, daughter of a prominent citizen of Bath. Three children were born to them. Harold Sewall, former Consul-General to Samoa, William Sewall, a junior member of the shipbuilding firm, and Demmer Sewall who died in infancy. Harold Sewall was sent to Samoa at the time of the Samoan outbreak, by President Cleveland. Later he became a Republican and at the recent Convention in St. Louis he headed a Reed Republican Club from Bath.

Though Mr. Sewall, born in 1835, is over sixty years of age, he does not look to be over forty-five. He is a splendid example of physical manhood, carries himself with a soldierly bearing and is what might be termed a fine looking man. His hair and mustache are slightly tinged with gray, but the wrinkles of age have scarcely made their appearance on his face.

All who know him accord to him the highest business ability, honesty, persistency and foresight. His manners are straight forward even to brusqueness, and in the expression of his thoughts for the public ear, he makes no

pretensions to oratory or magnetism. Though not a society man, in the ordinary acceptation of that term, he is lovable and loyal when once his acquaintance is made. Always a large employer of labor, he has ever treated it justly, and thereby escaped the trouble of protest by strikes and other violent means. He is a practical workman himself, and when occasion required could pick up tools and show a man how his work should be done.

In religion, Mr. Sewall is a member of the Swedenborgian Church, and a liberal contributor to the church in his parish. He finds his social outlet in occasional visits to the Sagadahock Club of Bath, of which he is a member. He is also a member of the Dunlap Commandery, Knight Templars, but is not active in its councils. He is distinctively a home man, and in this shares the tastes of his wife, who is in many ways a remarkable woman. Bright, well educated, with a peculiar grace and charm of manner when she wants to show it, her reticence deprives her of what the world calls popularity. Mrs. Sewall, after attending several New England schools, was sent to the famous Ipswich Institution, where she finished her education. She traveled in Europe for several years after that and returned to America an unusually accomplished girl. Mrs. Sewall has an artistic temperament, to which a large collection of water colors, landscape photographs and sketches made by her on two continents bear witness. Gifted with the power of observation and with the ability to recognize the interesting, her reminiscences of European life are charming whenever they are called up in the companionship of her intimate friends. Mrs. Sewall's health has not been good for several years, though she is in no sense an invalid, and she is compelled to exercise care and

has not been so prominent in society as might otherwise have been the case.

She has been a student and a wide reader, and is proficient in French, which has always been a favorite language with her. She is thoroughly acquainted with this country, having visited every part of it. She has crossed the Pacific on every transcontinental line, and her camera has caught for her bits of scenery in almost every corner of the land. She is an expert amateur photographer, and has received diplomas for her work in Paris, New York and Boston.

The visitor to the Sewall mansion ascends a smooth walk across a sloping lane, and on the wide porch overlooks the Kennebec and the yards where the Sewalls, father and son, have turned out a hundred ships, and he sees every evidence of good trade in the grounds that surround the mansion.

The house is one that evidently cost its owner much money and thought, still it is not what the world calls a handsome one. There is an air of comfort and refinement, and little show about it. Mrs. Sewall's taste is seen everywhere about the house—in the books in the library, in the pictures on the wall, and in the curtains and rugs. Outside in the grounds and the stable it is Mr. Sewall's idea that is dominant everywhere. They have divided the task of home making, and apparently it is a success. Mr. Sewall is very fond of his ground and garden, and none handsomer is to be seen in Maine. He is also fond of good horses, and his stable is well stocked with blooded animals. He is often seen behind a pair of handsome blacks in the streets or on the country roads near the city, in fact, his time is divided between his office, his home and the road when he is in Bath.

When Mr. Sewall went as a delegate to the Chicago Convention of 1896, he carried along with him pronounced convictions as to free silver coinage, but no thought of becoming a candidate for the Vice Presidency. Always willing to serve his party, he had no ambitions to fill public office. But circumstances were such that the trend of sentiment toward his candidacy became inevitable. His conspicuous position in the councils of his party, the fact that Mr. Bryan, of Nebraska, had been placed at the head of the ticket, thus rendering the choice of an Eastern running-mate desirable, and the additional fact that there were many aspirants for the honor of second place in Western sections, whose differences could not be reconciled, all pointed to Mr. Sewall as the candidate in whom centred the best elements of availability and the soundest reasons for choice.

His name was presented to the Convention by his friend, William R. Burk, of California, in the following brief and pointed speech :

“Mr. Chairman and members of the Convention:—What I shall say to you at this juncture I know in one respect will commend itself to you. Taking into account the great mission which has called us into convention, it seems to me that we should consider matters far beyond the reach of this great body. We should consider that there are people whom we represent, who have to vote on this great question. Therefore, geographical considerations should prompt us, as well as the question of ability. It would not become me to say aught of any gentleman whose name has been brought before you in this connection.

“But it seems to me that when we come to make up the remaining portion of this ticket, we should consider those

States beyond the Blue Ridge Mountains. And in that connection I present a candidate who represents every element which is presented to you in your platform and in your distinguished candidate for the Presidency, Mr. William J. Bryan. I take pleasure in presenting for your careful consideration the name of Arthur Sewall, of Maine. And, Mr. President, it may be well said of him in connection with the great questions involved in this matter and the interests which are before you, that he will fulfill the pledges which have been made by your platform. You will make no mistake in nominating him." (Applause.)

Among the other candidates whose names had been placed in nomination, were those of Sibley, Penna.; McLean, Ohio; Williams, Mass.; Boies, Iowa; Bland, Mo.; Blackburn, Ky.; Daniel, Va. The ballots cast resulted as follows:

FIRST BALLOT.

Sibley,	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	163
Sewall,	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	100
McLean,	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	111
Williams, (Mass.,)	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	76
Boies,	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	20
Bland,	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	62
Clark,	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	50
Lewis,	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	11
Williams, (Ill.),	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	22
Blackburn,	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	20
Daniel,	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	11
Scattering,	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	24
Absent or not voting,	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	260

SECOND BALLOT.

Sibley,	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	113
Sewall,	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	37

McLean,	.	.	.	.	.	.	164
Williams, (Mass.),	.	.	.	.	.	.	16
Bland,	.	.	.	.	.	.	288
Clark,	.	.	.	.	.	.	22
Williams, (Ill.),	.	.	.	.	.	.	13
Scattering,	.	.	.	.	.	.	22
Absent or not voting,	.	.	.	.	.	.	255

THIRD BALLOT.

Sibley,	.	.	.	.	.	.	50
Sewall,	.	.	.	.	.	.	97
McLean,	.	.	.	.	.	.	210
Williams, (Mass.),	.	.	.	.	.	.	19
Bland,	.	.	.	.	.	.	255
Clark,	.	.	.	.	.	.	22
Scattering,	.	.	.	.	.	.	25
Absent or not voting,	.	.	.	.	.	.	255

FOURTH BALLOT.

Sewall,	.	.	.	.	.	.	261
McLean,	.	.	.	.	.	.	298
Clark,	.	.	.	.	.	.	46
Daniel,	.	.	.	.	.	.	54
Scattering,	.	.	.	.	.	.	21
Absent or not voting,	.	.	.	.	.	.	250

On the fifth ballot the name of Mr. McLean, who had reached the limit of his strength, was withdrawn and the ballot was practically unanimous for Mr. Sewall. He was warmly congratulated over his nomination by his friends at Chicago, and at once became the recipient of hundreds of congratulatory telegrams from all parts of the country. On his return home he was received with an ovation by the people of Bath, without distinction of party, who were delighted over the fact that so distinguished an honor had been conferred on their fellow townsman.

THE DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM OF 1896.

WE, the Democrats of the United States, in National convention assembled, do reaffirm our allegiance to those great essential principles of justice and liberty upon which our institutions are founded, and which the Democratic party has advocated from Jefferson's time to our own—freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of conscience, the preservation of personal right, the equality of all citizens before the law, and the faithful observance of constitutional limitations.

During all these years, the Democratic party has resisted the tendency of selfish interests to the centralization of governmental power, and steadfastly maintained the integrity of the dual scheme of government established by the founders of this republic of republics. Under its guidance and teachings, the great principle of local self-government has found its best expression in the maintenance of the rights of the States, and in its assertion of the necessity of confining the general government to the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution of the United States.

Recognizing that the money system is paramount to all others at this time, we invite attention to the fact that the Federal Constitution names silver and gold together as the money-metals of the United States, and that the first coinage law passed by Congress, under the Constitution, made the silver dollar the monetary unit

and admitted gold to free coinage at a ratio based upon the silver dollar unit.

We declare that the act of 1873 demonetizing silver without the knowledge or approval of the American people has resulted in the appreciation of gold and a corresponding fall in the price of commodities produced by the people; a heavy increase in the burden of taxation, and of all debts, public and private; the enrichment of the money-lending class at home and abroad; prostration of industry and impoverishment of the people.

We are unalterably opposed to monometallism, which has locked fast the prosperity of an industrial people in the paralysis of hard times. Gold monometallism is a British policy, and its adoption has brought other nations into financial servitude to London. It is not only un-American, but anti-American, and it can be fastened on the United States only by the stifling of that spirit and love of liberty which proclaimed our political independence in 1776 and won it in the War of the Revolution.

We demand the free and unlimited coinage of both gold and silver at the present legal ratio of 16 to 1 without waiting for the aid or consent of any other nation. We demand that the standard silver dollar shall be a full legal tender equally with gold for all debts, public and private, and we favor such legislation as will prevent for the future the demonetization of any kind of legal tender money by private contract.

We are opposed to the policy and practice of surrendering to the holders of obligations of the United States the option reserved by law to the Government of redeeming such obligations in either silver coin or gold coin.

We are opposed to the issuing of interest-bearing bonds of the United States in time of peace, and condemn the

trafficking with banking syndicates, which, in exchange for bonds and at an enormous profit to themselves, supply the Federal Treasury with gold to maintain the policy of gold monometallism.

Congress alone has the power to coin and issue money, and President Jackson declared that this power could not be delegated to corporations or individuals. We therefore demand that the power to issue notes to circulate money be taken from the National Banks and that all paper money shall be issued directly by the Treasury Department and be redeemable in coin and receivable for all debts, public and private.

We hold that tariff duties should be levied for purposes of revenue, such duties to be so adjusted as to operate equally throughout the country, and not discriminate between class or section, and that taxation should be limited by the needs of the Government honestly and economically administered. We denounce as disturbing to business the Republican threat to restore the McKinley law, which has been twice condemned by the people in national elections, and which, enacted under the false plea of protection to home industry, proved a prolific breeder of trusts and monopolies, enriched the few at the expense of the many, restricted trade, and deprived the producers of the great American staples of access to their natural markets. Until the money question is settled we are opposed to any agitation for further changes in our tariff laws, except such as are necessary to make up the deficit in revenue caused by the adverse decision of the Supreme Court on the income tax.

There would be no deficit in the revenue but for the annulment by the Supreme Court of a law passed by a Democratic Congress in strict pursuance of the uniform

decisions of that court for nearly one hundred years, that court having under that decision sustained constitutional objections to its enactment which have been overruled by the ablest Judges who had ever sat on that bench.

We declare that it is the duty of Congress to use all the constitutional power which remains after that decision, or which may come from its reversal by the court as it may hereafter be constituted, so that the burdens of taxation may be equally and impartially laid to the end that wealth may bear its proportion of the expenses of the Government.

We hold that the most efficient way of protecting American labor is to prevent the importation of foreign pauper labor to compete in the home market, and that the value of the home market to our American farmers and artisans is greatly reduced by a vicious monetary system which depresses the prices of their products below the cost of production and thus deprives them of the means of purchasing the products of our home manufactures.

The absorption of wealth by the few, the consolidation of our leading railroad systems, and the formation of trusts and pools require a stricter control by the Federal Government of those arteries of commerce. We demand the enlargement of the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission and such restrictions and guarantees in the control of railroads as will protect the people from robbery and oppression.

We denounce the profligate waste of the money wrung from the people by oppressive taxation and the lavish appropriations of recent Republican Congresses, which have kept taxes high, while the labor that pays them is unemployed and the products of the people's toil are depressed

in prices till they no longer repay the cost of production. We demand a return to that simplicity and economy which befit a Democratic Government and a reduction in the number of useless offices, the salaries of which drain the substance of the people.

We denounce the arbitrary interference by Federal authorities in local affairs as a violation of the Constitution of the United States and a crime against free institutions, and we especially object to Government by injunction as a new and highly dangerous form of oppression, by which the Federal Judges, in contempt of the laws of the States and rights of citizens, become at once legislators, Judges and executioners, and we approve the bill passed at the last session of the United States Senate, and now pending in the House, relative to contempts in Federal courts and providing for trials by jury in certain cases of contempt.

No discrimination should be indulged in by the Government of the United States in favor of any of its debtors. We approve of the refusal of the Fifty-third Congress to pass the Pacific railroads funding bill, and denounce the effort of the present Republican Congress to enact a similar measure.

Recognizing the just claims of deserving Union soldiers, we heartily indorse the rule of the present Commissioner of Pensions that no names shall be arbitrarily dropped from the pension roll, and the fact of enlistment and service should be deemed conclusive evidence against disease and disability before the enlistment.

We favor the admission of the Territories of New Mexico and Arizona into the Union as States, and we favor the early admission of all the Territories having the necessary population and resources to entitle them to State-

hood, and while they remain Territories we hold that the officials appointed to administer the government of any Territory, together with the District of Columbia and Alaska, should be bona-fide residents of the Territory or district in which their duties are to be performed. The Democratic party believes in home rule, and that all public lands of the United States should be appropriated to the establishment of free homes for American citizens.

We recommend that the Territory of Alaska be granted a delegate in Congress, and that the general land and timber laws of the United States be extended to said Territory.

We extend our sympathy to the people of Cuba in their heroic struggle for liberty and independence.

We are opposed to life tenure in the public service. We favor appointments based upon merit, fixed terms of office, and such an administration of the civil service laws as will afford equal opportunities to all citizens of ascertained fitness.

We declare it to be the unwritten law of this Republic, established by custom and usage of one hundred years, and sanctioned by the examples of the greatest and wisest of those who founded and have maintained our Government, that no man should be eligible for a third term of the Presidential office.

The Federal Government should care for and improve the Mississippi River and other great waterways of the Republic, so as to secure for the interior States easy and cheap transportation to tide water. When any waterway of the Republic is of sufficient importance to demand aid of the Government, such aid should be extended upon a definite plan of continuous work until permanent improvement is secured.

Confiding in the justice of our cause and the necessity of its success at the polls, we submit the foregoing declaration of principles and purposes to the considerate judgment of the American people. We invite the support of all citizens who approve them and who desire to have them made effective through legislation for the relief of the people and the restoration of the country's prosperity.

The following paragraph was added to the preamble :

"The Constitution of the United States guarantees to every citizen the rights of civil and religious liberty. The Democratic party has always been the exponent of political liberty and religious freedom, and it renews its obligations and reaffirms its devotion to these fundamental principles of the Constitution."

And this plank was inserted :

"We are in favor of the arbitration of differences between employers engaged in interstate commerce and their employees, and recommend such legislation as is necessary to carry out this principle."

LIFE OF JOSHUA LEVERING.

PROHIBITION CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT, WITH PLATFORM AND CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS.

JOSHUA LEVERING, the nominee of the Prohibition Party for the Presidency of the United States in 1896, was born in Baltimore, Md., on September 12, 1845. His present residence in the city was the spot of his birth. He has always resided in Baltimore, and his fortunes have always been closely linked with the city's growth and welfare.

His father was Eugene Levering, one of Baltimore's oldest and most extensive merchants, who was for years engaged in the business of exporting flour, provisions and other American products to the different ports of Brazil, and importing coffee from the same.

Joshua Levering was acquiring his education in the private schools of his native city when the Civil War broke out. Its exigencies compelled him to close his school career and turn his attention to gainful pursuits. He entered upon a clerical life, which he continued till 1866, when he and his two brothers entered business with their father, under the firm name of E. Levering & Co. The father died in 1870, since which time the business has been carried on jointly by the three brothers, in a much enlarged form, the firm having several branch houses in Brazil.

Mr. Levering married Martha W. Keyser, daughter of

Charles Maris Keyser, of Baltimore, in 1870. The issue of this marriage was three sons and four daughters. Mrs. Levering died in May, 1888. In March, 1892, Mr. Levering married his first wife's sister, Margaret I. Keyser, who died in August, 1895.

Though actively and arduously engaged in a large and responsible business, few citizens of Baltimore hold more conspicuous place in the work that counts for a great city's social estate, philanthropy, moral and mental status, and general enterprise. Of excellent judgment, boundless energy, unswerving probity, and pleasing demeanor, his life has been a series of rapid, complimentary steps to the highest esteem of his fellow men, the implicit confidence of the public, and the most responsible civic and political trusts.

In 1857, at the early age of twelve years, he united with the Baptist Church, under the preaching of Rev. Jacob Knapp, and in 1871, became a constituent member of the Eutaw Place Baptist Church of Baltimore, which connection he has since retained. He has been Superintendent of the Sunday school of this church since 1881.

He easily ranks as one of the most energetic, liberal and prominent members of his denomination, and in 1888 was a prime mover and helper in the organization of the American Baptist Educational Society, whose treasurer he became, and which responsible post he has held ever since. In 1885 he was elected President of the Young Men's Christian Association of Baltimore, and has been unanimously reelected ever since.

He was once elected as Vice President of the Southern Baptist Convention. In 1886, he was chosen President of the House of Refuge of Maryland, and in appreciation of his useful and satisfactory services in this charitable

field he has been reelected to the same responsible position annually ever since.

He also holds the honorable position of President of the Board of Trustees of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, at Louisville, Ky., is Vice President of the American Baptist Publication Society, and is one of the directors of the Maryland Trust Company and of the Provident Savings' Bank of Baltimore.

In 1884 he connected himself with the Prohibition cause and has ever since been one of its ablest, most earnest and consistent exponents. The same qualities of head and heart, the same energy and devotion to purpose, that have endeared him to his fellow men and imposed on him so many business trusts and civic honors, soon opened for him wide avenues to political distinction. He became a trusted counsellor and favorite leader in his party, and, in 1887, presided as chairman of the Prohibition Convention of his State. He occupied the same post of honor and responsibility in the State Convention of 1893. In 1888, he was a delegate of his party to the National Prohibition Convention at Indianapolis, and in 1892 he was a delegate to the National Convention at Cincinnati. On the latter occasion he declined the honor of a nomination for the Vice Presidency of the United States in favor of Dr. E. B. Cranfill.

In 1891, Mr. Levering received the nomination of his party for State Controller, and in 1895 he was nominated by his party for Governor of the State of Maryland. After an energetic campaign he increased the Prohibition vote of his State to 8,000, a gain of fifty per cent. over any previous vote cast for a Prohibition nominee in the State.

After so rapid a rise in the councils and esteem of his

party, it was but natural that his name should be conspicuous in the National Convention of 1896, in connection with the highest honors at its disposal. This Convention met in Pittsburg, on May 27 and 28, 1896. It was the seventh National Convention in the history of the party, and one of the largest and most broadly representative. It was also to be one of greater excitement and intensity of feeling than any other.

Long before it assembled there was manifest a factious disposition in the party respecting the dominant questions of free coinage of silver and woman's suffrage. The advocates of the first of these two principles, became known as "broad-gagers." They insisted that what they advocated should be incorporated in the National platform. Their opponents, that is, those who insisted that the platform should not be weighted with embarrassing questions, became known as "narrow-gagers," or "straight Prohibitionists."

The battle royal for the control of the party management and for the shaping of its future policy upon the above lines, began in the Committee on Platform. In that tribunal every inch of ground was hotly contested, but without evidence of other than some satisfactory agreement in the end, until a vote was reached on the plank favoring the free coinage of silver. This test showed the free silverites, or "broad-gagers" to be in a minority in the Committee, and led to a presentation to the Convention of a majority and minority report.

The scene of battle thus shifted, its bitterness was speedily renewed by the introduction of the majority and minority reports of the Committee on Resolutions.

THE MAJORITY REPORT.

The Prohibition party, in National Convention assembled, at Pittsburg, Pa., May 27, 1896, acknowledging Almighty God as the source of all power in Government, do hereby declare:

“First—We hold, with the United States Supreme Court, that the statistics of every State show a greater amount of crime and misery attributed to the use of ardent spirits obtained at retail liquor-saloons than to any other source. We maintain that the liquor dealers corrupt legislation, debauch voters, bribe officials, intimidate public men, control political parties, and make good government in the centres of population impossible.

“Second—We are unalterably opposed to the alcoholic drink traffic, and declare for the suppression of the manufacture, sale, importation, exportation, and transportation of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes. We utterly reject all plans for regulating or compromising with this traffic, whether such plan be Local Option, taxation, license, or public control.

“Third—We call the attention of wage-earners to the fact that the enormous waste caused by the liquor traffic is inevitably at the cost of production, and we maintain that success for the Prohibition party will remove this great burden from industry.

“Fourth—We stand unequivocally for good government honestly and economically administered in every detail. We stand for fullest protection of the elective franchise, which is the basis of our civil liberties. With the destruction of the liquor power, the greatest corrupter and debaucher of votes and voters will have disappeared, and the people and their representatives will be free to promote the best interest of all.

“Fifth—There is no greater peril to the nation than the competition of political parties for the liquor vote, and any party not openly opposed to the saloon will engage in such competition, court the favor of the criminal classes,

and barter away public morals and the purity of the ballot.

“Sixth—We call upon voters to enforce the declarations of the churches against the liquor traffic by supporting the Prohibition party, which aims to settle the only political question upon which the churches make deliverances; and we maintain that a new era of political righteousness will come when the voting members of the churches stand at the ballot-box in State and National elections for principles and candidates of the Prohibition party.”

Those opposed to divisive issues wanted to stop right here, but the “broad-gage” folks wanted to say more and presented the following as a minority report:

THE PLATFORM WHICH THE MINORITY WANTED.

“First—That all money be issued by the Government only and without the intervention of any private citizen, corporation or banking institution. It should be based upon the wealth, stability, and integrity of the nation, and be a full legal tender for all debts, public and private, and should be of sufficient volume to meet the demand of the legitimate business interests of the country, and for the purpose of honestly liquidating all our outstanding coin obligations. We demand the free and unlimited coinage of silver and gold at a ratio of 16 to 1, without consulting any other nation.

“Second—Land is the common heritage of the people, and should be preserved from monopoly and speculation. All unearned grants of land subject to forfeiture should be reclaimed by the Government, and no portion of the public domain should hereafter be granted except to actual settlers. Continuous use being essential to tenure.

“Third—Railroads, telegraph, and other monopolies should be owned and operated by the Government, giving to the people the benefit of service and product therefrom at cost.

“Fourth—The national constitution should be so amended as to allow the national revenues to be raised by equitable adjustment of taxation on the properties and incomes of the people, and import duties should be levied only as a means of securing equitable commercial relations with other nations.

“Fifth—The contract convict labor system, through which speculators are enriched at the expense of the state, should be abolished.

“Sixth—Believing that the free expression of the popular will is essential in representative Government, we favor the adoption of the initiative and referendum.

“Seventh—No citizen should be denied the right to vote on account of sex.

“Eighth—All citizens should be protected in their right to one day’s rest without opposing any one who conscientiously observes any other than the first day of the week.

“Ninth—American public schools taught in the English language should be maintained, and no public funds should be applied to sectarian institutions.

“Tenth—The President, Vice President, and Senators of the United States should be elected by the vote of the people.

“Eleventh—Ex-soldiers and sailors should be granted pensions graded upon disability and time of services, not merely as a debt of gratitude, but for services rendered in the preservation of the Union.

“Twelfth—Our immigration laws should be so secure as to exclude paupers and criminals; immigrants wishing to become citizens should be required to register in a court, and the right of franchise should not be granted until five years thereafter.

“Thirteenth—None but citizens should be allowed to vote in any state, and naturalized citizens should not be allowed to vote for one year after naturalization papers are issued.”

The fourteenth plank referred to international arbitration, and the fifteenth plank asked for the coöperation, of all citizens in support of the platform.

The conflict opened over a motion to make the minority report a part of the majority report. The "broad-gagers," or free silverites, carried this by a vote of 492 to 310. The platform was then taken up and considered section by section. When the free silver plank was reached it gave rise to a prolonged and heated debate, which engaged the best minds in the convention and proved an opportunity for such an exhibition of eloquence as is seldom witnessed. The result was the defeat of the free silver plank by a vote of 387 to 427.

Now came the most interesting episodes of the Convention, and of a kind which must prove far reaching in their effects on the future of the Prohibition party. One was the leap of the Convention from a compound to a simple platform.

This leap was taken on motion of R. H. Patton, of Springfield, Ill., a free silver advocate, who moved as a substitute for all planks adopted or proposed a single issue platform. This was the occasion for another interesting debate, free, however, from the acrimonies of the former one. The majority drifted strongly to the single issue idea, which was given the following form, and made the sentiment of the Convention by a decisive vote :

THE PROHIBITION PLATFORM.

"We, the members of the Prohibition party, in national convention assembled, renewing our declaration of allegiance to Almighty God as the rightful ruler of the universe, lay down the following as our declaration of political purpose.

"The Prohibition party, in national convention assembled, declares its firm conviction that the manufacture, exportation, importation, and sale of alcoholic beverages has produced such social, commercial, industrial, and polit-

ical wrongs and is now so threatening to the perpetuity of all our social and political institutions, that the suppression of the same by a national party organized therefor, is the greatest object to be accomplished by the voters of our country, and is of such importance that it, of right, ought to control the political actions of all our patriotic citizens until such suppression is accomplished.

“The urgency of this course demands the union without further delay of all citizens who desire the prohibition of the liquor traffic; therefore be it

“Resolved, That we favor the legal prohibition by state and national legislation of the manufacture, importation, and sale of alcoholic beverages. That we declare our purpose to organize and unite all the friends of Prohibition into one party, and in order to accomplish this end we deem it of right to leave every Prohibitionist the freedom of his own convictions upon all other political questions, and trust our representatives to take such action upon other political questions as the changes occasioned by Prohibition and the welfare of the whole people shall demand.”

The convention did not feel like leaving out the usual suffrage plank, which had for so many years held an honored place in the platform, so, upon motion of Mrs. Ella A. Boole, of New York, it passed the following resolution, the vote being almost unanimous:

Resolved, “The right of suffrage ought not to be abridged on account of sex.”

Another episode was the withdrawal of the “broad-gagers” from further participation in the Convention, and the setting up of a new Prohibition party with candidates representing its principles.

The regular Convention was now free to complete its work, which it proceeded to do with harmonious earnestness. The trend of sentiment had all along pointed to Mr. Levering as the one to be honored with the nomina-

tion for the Presidency. His name was presented to the Convention by his friend Mr. W. F. Tucker, of Baltimore, who in part said :

“Maryland has the honor of presenting a man as standard-bearer of the Prohibition party who, back in 1884, did not hesitate to go out and work for that matchless man, John P. St. John, and since that time he has been working and voting the Prohibition ticket. Until a few moments ago he refused to allow his name to be used. He will not sit at home expecting the people to do his work, nor confine his work to the state of Maryland or the South, but he will devote his time to work, so the people of the United States will know he is the standard-bearer of the Prohibition party. I hereby present the name of Joshua Levering, as candidate for the nomination of this convention.”

Perhaps no nomination in any national convention was ever seconded so numerously or eloquently. The following eulogium by Mr. Hipp, of Arizona, will serve as a sample of all :

“The candidate whom I favor is worthy to lead us in so great a cause. A prince among men, he stands one of the leaders of the great church to which he belongs. In education, in home and foreign missionary enterprises, in every kind of philanthropic work, he stands without a peer.

“His high character and standing as a Christian man will add strength to our cause, and thousands upon thousands of votes to our party.

“I therefore heartily second the nomination of that spotless son of the Southland, Joshua Levering, of Maryland.”

The name of the Ex-Governor L. C. Hughes, of Arizona, was also presented to the Convention, but it did not serve

to deflect the strong current of sentiment in favor of Mr. Levering, whose nomination was made unanimous, amid the wildest enthusiasm. On being introduced to the Convention by the chairman, Mr. Stewart, Mr. Levering accepted the trust imposed and the honor conferred, in the following language :

“I would be less than human if my heart did not beat quick, and every nerve pulsate with deep emotion as I stand before you as the candidate against the legalized liquor traffic of this country. When an honor comes as a sacrifice for humanity such as this is, it is an honor worth wearing. I feel my own unfitness for it, and would shrink from its acceptance but for one reason, and that is that the secular press have come to realize that we are earnest in our purpose and do us justice in saying that we are honest. Therefore I feel that I would waive my private interest and yield to your wishes. I am tempted to cry out, as did the servant of the Almighty, when he was called to lead the children of Israel out of Egypt—‘Who am I that I should be called to lead the children out of the wilderness?’

“Friends, trusting in the God of battles, and trusting in you and those you represent, I am prepared to stand here and accept this sacred trust, and to the extent of my ability I assure you that wherever the fight is thickest, the white flag of Prohibition will be planted. We may not succeed in planting our flag in the White House, but I think we will come near it ; but if we do the Government shall not be run in the interest of any trust or individual. I want to remind you that this great responsibility is yours, and the success of the campaign is not on the standard-bearers so much as on the rank and file. Let us have the faith to believe that right is might. God and humanity expect every Prohibitionist to do his duty.”

LIFE OF HON. HALE JOHNSON.

PROHIBITION CANDIDATE FOR VICE PRESIDENT.

THE subject of this biographic sketch was born in Montgomery County, Indiana, August 21, 1847. He resided there, receiving such education as the schools of the place afforded, till the breaking out of the War of the Rebellion, when, though quite a youth, he enlisted in the 135th Indiana Volunteers, and served in the cause of the Union till the end of the war.

In 1865 he moved to Illinois, and took up the study of law. On his admission to the bar he made Newton, Ill., his permanent residence. He soon acquired a lucrative practice there, which he still enjoys. Commensurate with his rise at the bar was his growth in the confidence and esteem of his community. He became an active member of the Republican party, and was promised the honor of an election to the State Legislature, but on his failure to secure the adoption of a Prohibition plank in the platform of that party, in 1884, he left it for the Prohibition party, with which he has coöperated ever since.

In 1884, he attended the National Prohibition Convention at Pittsburg, where he favored the nomination of John P. St. John as a candidate for the Presidency. He has always been regarded by his party as one of its ablest exponents and most earnest workers. Nor is he less a worker in other directions. He is a devout and highly esteemed member of the Christian Church, a past-com-

mander of the Grand Army of the Republic, and a colonel in the Veteran Commandery.

He was a delegate to the Prohibition National Convention of 1896, at Pittsburg, May 27th and 28th, where, during the heated controversy between the "broad-gage" and "narrow-gage" factions, he distinguished himself by a masterly effort to harmonize the antagonistic forces. The impression he made on the Convention proved to be so deep that he was singled out as the one most fitting to bear the honors of a nomination for the Vice Presidency of the United States.

His name was presented to the Convention in an eloquent speech by Chairman Dickie. His running opponent was ex-Governor L. C. Hughes, of Arizona, whose name had been before the Convention as a candidate for the Presidency. The ballot resulted in 309 votes for Johnson and 132 for Hughes. The motion to make the nomination unanimous was carried without dissent. The final result was the signal for an ovation such as had crowned the nomination of Joshua Levering as candidate for President. Mr. Johnson was escorted to the platform and introduced to the Convention, when he accepted the responsible trust and acknowledged the high honors in one of his characteristically, eloquent and inspiring speeches.

THE NATIONAL PARTY AND PLATFORM OF 1896.

THE NATIONAL PARTY was formed of those who bolted the Prohibition Convention at Pittsburg, in May, 1896. The bolting body was known in Convention as "Broad Gagers." They nominated the following ticket at Pittsburg:

For President, CHARLES E. BENTLEY, of Nebraska. For Vice President, JAMES H. SOUTHGATE, of North Carolina.

Their Platform and appeal to the people of the United States, are as follows:

LIBERTY, JUSTICE, EQUALITY.

To the People of the United States:

The inalienable right of each citizen to affiliate with that political party which he regards as the best exponent of his own views, will hardly be questioned in a free country.

Neither will it be disputed that this right involves the right of any body of citizens to organize a new party, whenever they are unable to find among existing parties one which they regard as a satisfactory exponent of their views.

But when a new party is organized and other citizens

are invited to sunder former party ties in order to give it support, it is but just and proper that those concerned in the organization of such new party should present to the people a fair statement of the reasons for its organization and of the grounds on which support for its ticket is claimed.

The National Party was organized at Pittsburg, Pa., on May 29, 1896. There were present participating in the organization of this party over three hundred men and women, representing twenty-seven States. The purpose of this party is to secure control of the government in State and Nation, and so administer it that "Liberty, Justice and Equality" may prevail.

The principles and purposes of this party are set forth in the following platform:

The National party, recognizing God as the author of all just power in government, presents the following declaration of principles, which it pledges itself to enact into effective legislation when given the power to do so.

1. The suppression of the manufacture and sale, importation, exportation and transportation of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes. We utterly reject all plans for regulating or compromising with this traffic, whether such plans be called local option, taxation, license or public control. The sale of liquors for medicinal and other legitimate uses should be conducted by the State, without profit, and with such regulations as will prevent fraud or evasion.

2. No citizen should be denied the right to vote on account of sex.

3. All money should be issued by the general Government only, and without the intervention of any private citizen, corporation or banking institution. It should be

based upon the wealth, stability and integrity of the Nation. It should be a full legal tender for all debts, public and private, and should be of sufficient volume to meet the demands of the legitimate business interests of the country. For the purpose of honestly liquidating our outstanding coin obligations, we favor the free and unlimited coinage of both silver and gold, at the ratio of 16 to 1, without consulting any other nation.

4. Land is the common heritage of the people and should be preserved from monopoly and speculation. All unearned grants of land, subject to forfeiture, should be reclaimed by the Government, and no portion of the public domain should hereafter be granted except to actual settlers, continuous use being essential to tenure.

5. Railroads, telegraphs and other natural monopolies should be owned and operated by the Government, giving to the people the benefit of service at actual cost.

6. The national constitution should be so amended as to allow the national revenues to be raised by equitable adjustment of taxation on the properties and incomes of the people, and important duties should be levied as a means of securing equitable commercial relations with other nations.

7. The contract convict labor system, through which speculators are enriched at the expense of the State, should be abolished.

8. All citizens should be protected by law in their right to one day of rest in seven, without oppressing any who conscientiously observe any other than the first day of the week.

9. The American public schools, taught in the English language, should be maintained, and no public funds should be appropriated for sectarian institutions.

10. The President, Vice President and United States Senators should be elected by direct vote of the people.

11. Ex-soldiers and sailors of the United States army and navy, their widows and minor children, should receive liberal pensions, graded on disability and term of service, not merely as a debt of gratitude, but for service rendered in the preservation of the Union.

12. Our immigration laws should be so revised as to exclude paupers and criminals. None but citizens of the United States should be allowed to vote in any State, and naturalized citizens should not vote until one year after naturalization papers have been issued.

13. The initiative and referendum, and proportional representation, should be adopted.

14. Having herein presented our principles and purposes, we invite the coöperation and support of all citizens, who are with us substantially agreed.

Very largely the men and women who organized the National party had previously acted with the Prohibition party, and had been in attendance upon the National Convention of that party in session in Pittsburg during the two days preceding. They withdrew from the party and that convention because it had refused to take a stand in defence of the principles of "Liberty, Justice and Equality," and had adopted a platform which utterly ignored every reform issue of the day except the prohibition of the liquor traffic.

Those who organized the National party were fully aware of the magnitude of the liquor evil and were of one accord in the belief that it must be destroyed. But they also recognized the fact that there are other great evils afflicting this nation, and that silence by a political party in reference to wrongs resulting from political

action is sanction, and that sanction of the oppression and degradation of the people by the powers of injustice and wrong is a crime.

The women of America, recognized as citizens by the Constitution and laws, are yet denied that right which inheres in citizenship, "the freeman's ballot," and are refused all voice in the Government which they are taxed to support and compelled to obey.

Silence in reference to such a violation of the principles of civil liberty is a crime.

The Government of the country has been for years completely dominated by the money power of America and Europe. This money power has controlled Congresses, Legislatures and Presidents, and secured legislation which enables a pampered few to live in luxury on the labor of the many. It has put poverty, wretchedness and vagrancy where there should be peace, prosperity and plenty. It has crippled our industries, fostered monopolies, organized trusts, increased the burdens of public and private debts, robbed every man and woman engaged in any legitimate occupation, reduced millions to pauperism and suffering, and created a spirit of unrest and discontent which threatens our existence as a nation.

Silence in regard to such a perversion of the province of Government is a crime.

And as the Prohibition Party was silent in regard to all these political crimes except the liquor traffic, it was impossible to remain in the party without giving silent sanction to these crimes.

But to what party could those who recognized this fact turn?

Under the alternate dominance of the Republican and Democratic parties have these evils grown to their present

magnitude. It were folly to look for relief to the parties which had created and nurtured the evils from which relief was sought.

The People's party is making a brave stand against the aggressions of monopoly, but is as silent on the liquor question as the Prohibition party is on the monopoly question.

And in all four of these parties there was not to be found one to champion the civil rights of womanhood.

Under these circumstances, to support either the Republican or Democratic parties was to assist in perpetuating all the legislation which has brought the country to its present condition.

To support the People's party was to consent to the continuance of the liquor traffic, and the disfranchisement of woman, in order to strike a blow at our financial and industrial system.

To support the Prohibition party was to consent to the disfranchisement of women and the continuance of our present financial and industrial system, in order to strike a blow at the liquor traffic.

What could those persons do who were unwilling to compromise with two great public wrongs in order to strike a third one?

They were compelled to either disfranchise themselves and neglect their duties as citizens, or organize a party which should be true to the right on all the great political questions of the day, and which should uphold the banner "Liberty, Justice and Equality," for all people, of all sexes and all classes.

That party has been organized. It is called the National party. Its platform of principles is before you. It invites all citizens who desire the good of the whole people

and the overthrow of all political wrongs, to unite at the ballot box next November and elect Charles E. Bentley and James H. Southgate, President and Vice President of this Republic.

L. B. LOGAN, Chairman.

JOHN P. ST. JOHN, Vice Chairman.

D. J. THOMAS, Secretary.

A. M. TODD, Treasurer.

HELEN M. GUGAR.

JOHN LLOYD THOMAS.

R. S. THOMPSON.

National Executive Committee.

July 4, 1896.


LIFE OF CHARLES E. BENTLEY.

Charles E. Bentley, of Nebraska, nominee of the National party for President in 1896, was born in the town of Warner's, Onondaga County, New York, April 30, 1841. His forefathers were of sturdy New England stock, and his grandparents migrated to Warner's in 1809, carving out of the forest the farm of 100 acres which has been ever since a Bentley possession.

Mr. Bentley is the eldest and only survivor of a family of six children. His parents were of decided literary tastes, and the father was of an active political turn, being a pronounced Whig and Republican. The son received his education in the common schools of his vicinage and in seminary courses at Elbridge and Cazenovia, New York.



JOSHUA LEVERING.



HALE JOHNSON.

In 1863 he married Miss Persis Freeman, of Baldwinsville, N. Y., and in 1866 moved to Clinton, Iowa, where, for twelve years, he was nearly all the time engaged in public service, being City Clerk and Treasurer, and Secretary of the Board of Education. In 1878, he moved to Nebraska and settled on a farm at Surprise, in Butler County. Here his family grew up about him, and received their education, judiciously tempered with farm work. The farm became a model one, and the family grew into importance as leaders of organizers and workers in the cause of education, temperance, Christianity and good morals.

In 1890, Mr. Bentley moved his family to Lincoln, Neb., the better to carry on his own philanthropic work and round out the education of his children. As early as 1884, Mr. Bentley ceased to cooperate with the Republican party, and joined the Prohibition party. He was chairman of the first Prohibition Convention ever held in Nebraska, and has often been similarly honored since. He was often a candidate of his party—twice for the legislature, once for governor, once for congress, and once for the United States Senate—and in every instance led his ticket in the number of votes received or strength accorded.

Such was his courage, executive ability and popularity, that in 1892 he was chosen a member of the National Prohibition Committee. At the State Convention of 1895 and at that of 1896 the delegates to the National Convention were instructed to vote for him for President. With some reluctance he assented to the use of his name at Pittsburgh, where he conspicuously represented the "broad gauge" principles of his party.

Mr. Bentley is and has been a sturdy and determined

advocate of woman suffrage. No party can hold him in political leading that in open opposition or silent, cowardly, evasion, denies to women the right of the ballot. Mr. Bentley retains at Surprise the pastoral charge of the Baptist Church, over which he has presided since he personally led in its organization in 1880. He also preaches as supply for the church at Friend, Neb. The doors of his church have always been opened for every righteous reform. His plain uncompromising declarations of truth as he preaches political righteousness and denounces parties that have made a "Covenant with Death," are in refreshing contrast to the timid time-serving utterances of the average license party preacher.

In personal appearance Mr. Bentley is a man of more than average attractions, gifted with splendid physique, a genial manner, forcefulness of expression and those rare gifts of oratory which come from a direct statement of the truth. He is a leader by virtue of his natural endowments, coupled with the experience which he has had all these years.

LIFE OF JAMES H. SOUTHGATE.

James H. Southgate, nominee of the National party for Vice President, was born in Norfolk, Va., the 12th of July, 1859, moved to North Carolina in 1861, and has lived in Franklin, Iredell, Orange and Durham counties in said State, the last mentioned for 20 years. Was prepared for College by Maj. D. H. Hamilton, of Hillsboro, and the Horner and Graves Military Academy of

the same place. Was a student at the University of N. C. during the years 1876-79 inclusive, and on leaving College studied the banking business and opened the first set of banking books ever opened in Durham. Went in partnership with his father, J. Southgate, in the general insurance business, in 1882. Was married in that year to Kate Shephard, oldest daughter of B. and M. H. Fuller. Mrs. Southgate died in February, 1893. Two children survive her, Mena, aged 11, and Tom, aged 5.

Is an ex-president of the Y. M. C. A. Convention of N. C., and is now a member of its State Executive Committee, and has been for a number of years. Was Secretary of the first State Convention ever held in the interest of that order in N. C. in the year 1877. Has been a member of the Executive Committee of the State Sunday School Association for nearly 10 years, and is now the Treasurer of that body and a Trustee and member of the Executive Board of Trinity College, Durham, N. C., and President of the Educator Publishing Co., and Director in the Morehead Banking Co. Has been a member of the State Executive Committee of the Prohibition party for nearly a decade, and was elected Chairman of the State Executive Committee of that party of 1892.

THE PEOPLE'S PARTY.

CANDIDATES AND PLATFORM OF 1896.

The second National Convention of the Peoples' or Populist party met at St. Louis on July 22, 1896. This new party met in first National Convention at Omaha, July 4, 1892, and nominated General Weaver for President, who received over 1,000,000 votes.

The first platform of the People's party was adopted at Cincinnati May 20, 1891, and was based on the Ocala platform, adopted in Florida the year previous.

The St. Louis Convention was composed of 1,322 delegates, divided among the respective States somewhat in proportion to the strength of the vote cast in 1892. It organized temporarily by the election of Senator Butler, of N. Carolina, as chairman, and permanently by the election of Senator William V. Allen, of Nebraska.

Early in the session it was manifest that a powerful sentiment existed in favor of ratifying the Democratic nomination of Bryan and Sewall. This sentiment was greatly encouraged by the presence at the convention of Mr. Bryan's managers, such as Senator Jones, of Arkansas, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, and others. It found equal, if not more direct and stronger, encouragement in the members of the Free Silver party, who were also sitting in National Convention, in St. Louis, simultaneously with the Populists, and whose mission there had been foreshadowed as one of alliance with the Democratic party, with the hope

that it could be instrumental in inducing the Populists to join in such alliance. Moreover, it was felt that it would be good practical politics to unite all the Populistic and Free Silver party strength under the Bryan Democratic banner, since all agreed that the question of free silver coinage at the ratio of 16 to 1 was a paramount issue, and since the doctrine had found unequivocal sanction in the Democratic platform at Chicago.

Opposed to this sentiment was another, whose strength could not be ascertained till a test was made in Convention, which opposed the endorsement of Bryan and favored the nomination of straightout Populistic candidates. This sentiment found its strongest supporters in the Southern States, where the Populists had in many places fought their way to victory over the heads of the old Democratic party. They claimed that an alliance with the Democrats, and a contribution of direct support to Bryan, would eliminate the Populist party in the South by subordinating it wholly to that tyrannical dominion whence it had escaped only after superhuman exertion. As "middle-of-the-road" men they claimed the right to perpetuate their organization in spite of all questions of expediency.

A test of strength came on the second day of the Convention over the question of electing a permanent chairman. The Bryan supporters nominated Senator William V. Allen, of Nebraska, for the place, and the "middle-of-the-road" men nominated Mr. Champion, of Maine. A test of strength on this crucial question showed 758 votes for Allen and 564 for Champion, thus placing the convention at the disposal of a Bryanite majority, and committing it to an alliance with the Democracy, at least so far as the head of the ticket and the cardinal plank in the platform went.

Committees were now raised in both the sitting conventions to confer with one another over the special terms of alliance. It does not appear that these committees proved useful for the purposes intended, at least the Silver party went ahead and placed the Chicago nominees upon their ticket and then adjourned, leaving the Poupulists to take their own course.

The convention was thrown into confused and acrimonious debate over the question of indorsing Bryan and Sewall, the Democratic nominees at Chicago. As the dispute lengthened it became evident that the disposition was to throw Sewall off the ticket, and the order of business was changed so as to nominate the Vice President first.

Several names were placed in nomination for Vice President, the most conspicuous of which were Mr. Sewall and Hon. Thos. E. Watson, of Georgia. Notwithstanding the manifestation of Bryan strength on former tests, which strength, it was supposed, could be transferred to Sewall, a vote disclosed the fact that Mr. Watson had secured the nomination for Vice President by a fair majority.

By this heroic action the convention had rendered a cloudy situation more obscure, for it became doubtful whether Mr. Bryan would accept either a nomination or indorsement after the defeat of his Chicago running mate. This, however, did not defer earnest work in his behalf, and when nominations for President were reached his name was eloquently placed before the convention by General Weaver. The name of Col. S. F. Norton, of Illinois, was also placed in nomination. A ballot disclosed the fact that the Bryan sentiment was overwhelming, and his nomination was secured by a vote of

1,042 to 321 for Norton. As the platform had already been adopted, the convention adjourned on July 25.

PEOPLE'S PARTY PLATFORM FOR 1896

"The People's Party," assembled in National convention, reaffirms its allegiance to the principles declared by the founders of the Republic, and also to the fundamental principles of just government as enunciated in the platform of the party in 1892.

"We recognize that through the connivance of the present and preceding administrations, the country has reached a crisis in its National life as predicted in our declaration four years ago, and that prompt and politic action is the supreme duty of the hour.

"We realize that while we have political independence, our financial and industrial independence is yet to be attained by restoring to our country the Constitutional control and exercise of the functions necessary to a people's government, which functions have been basely surrendered by our public servants to corporate monopolies. The influence of European money-changers has been more potent in shaping legislation than the voice of the American people. Executive power and patronage have been used to corrupt our Legislatures and defeat the will of the people, and plutocracy has been enthroned upon the ruins of Democracy.

"To restore the government intended by the fathers, and for the welfare and prosperity of this and future generations, we demand the establishment of an economic and financial system which shall make us masters of our

own affairs, and independent of European control by the adoption of the following Declaration of Principles:—

FINANCE.

“First.—We demand a National money, safe and sound, issued by the general Government only, without the intervention of banks of issue, to be a full legal tender for all debts, public and private; also, a just, equitable and efficient means of distribution direct to the people, and through the lawful disbursements of the Government.

“Second.—We demand the free and unrestricted coinage of silver and gold at the present legal ratio of 16 to 1, without waiting for the consent of foreign nations.

“Third.—We demand the volume of circulating medium be speedily increased to an amount sufficient to meet the demands of the business population of this country, and to restore the just level of prices of labor and production.

“Fourth.—We denounce the sale of bonds and the increase of the public interest-bearing bond-debt made by the present Administration as unnecessary and without authority of law, and that no more bonds be issued except by specific act of Congress.

“Fifth.—We demand such legal legislation as will prevent the demonetization of the lawful money of the United States by private contract.

“Sixth.—We demand that the Government, in payment of its obligations, shall use its option as to the kind of lawful money in which they are to be paid; and we denounce the present and preceding Administrations for surrendering this option to the holders of Government obligations.

"Seventh.—We demand a graduated income tax, to the end that aggregated wealth shall bear its just proportion of taxation; and we denounce the Supreme Court, relative to the income tax law, as a misinterpretation of the Constitution, and an invasion of the rightful powers of Congress over the subject of taxation.

"Eighth.—We demand that postal saving banks be established by the Government for the safe deposit of the savings of the people, and to facilitate exchange.

TRANSPORTATION.

"Transportation being a means of exchange and public necessity, the Government should own and operate the railroads in the interest of the people, and on non-partisan basis, to the end that all may be accorded the same treatment in transportation, and that the tyranny and political power now exercised by the great railroad corporations, which result in the impairment, if not the destruction of the political rights and personal liberties of the citizen, may be destroyed. Such ownership is to be accomplished gradually, in a manner consistent with sound public policy.

"Second.—The interest of the United States in the public highways built with public moneys and the proceeds of extensive grants of land to the Pacific railroads should never be alienated, mortgaged or sold, but guarded and protected for the general welfare, as provided by the laws organizing such railroads. The foreclosure of existing liens of the United States on these roads should at once follow default in the payment thereof of the debt of companies, and at the foreclosure sales of said roads the Government shall purchase the same if it becomes necessary to protect the interests

therein, or if they can be purchased at a reasonable price ; and the Government shall operate such railroads as public highways for the benefit of the whole, and not in the interest of the few, under suitable provisions for the protection of life and property, giving to all transportation interests and privileges, and equal rates for fares and freight.

“Third.—We denounce the present infamous schemes for refunding these debts, and demand that the laws now applicable thereto be executed and administered according to their true intent and spirit.

“Fourth.—The telegraph, like the postoffice system, being a necessity for the transmission of news, should be owned and operated by the Government in the interest of the people.

LAND MONOPOLIES.

“First.—The true policy demands that the National and State legislation shall be such as will ultimately enable every prudent and industrious citizen to secure a home, and, therefore, the land should not be monopolized for speculative purposes.

“All lands now held by railroads and other corporations in excess of their actual needs should, by lawful means, be reclaimed by the Government and held for actual settlers only; and private land monopoly, as well as alien ownership, should be prohibited.

“Second.—We condemn the frauds by which the land grant to the Pacific railroad companies have, through the connivance of the Interior Department, robbed multitudes of equal bonafide settlers of their homes, and miners of their claims, and we demand legislation by Congress which will enforce the exemption of mineral

land from such grants after as well as before patent.

“Third.—We demand that bonafide settlers on all public lands be granted free homes, as provided in the National Homestead Law, and that no exception be made in the case of Indian reservations when opened for settlement, and that all lands not now patented come under this demand.

“We favor a system of direct legislation through the initiative and referendum, under proper Constitutional safeguards.

GENERAL PROPOSITIONS.

“First.—We demand the election of President, Vice-President and United States Senators by a direct vote of the people.

“Second.—We tender to the patriotic people of Cuba our deepest sympathy in their heroic struggle for political freedom and independence, and we believe the time has come when the United States, the great republic of the world, should recognize that Cuba is and of right ought to be a free and independent State.

“Third.—We favor home rule in the Territories and the District of Columbia, and the early admission of the Territories as States.

“Fourth.—All public salaries should be made to correspond to the price of labor and its products.


“Fifth.—In times of great industrial depression, idle labor should be employed on public works as far as practicable.

“Sixth.—The arbitrary course of the courts in assuming to imprison citizens for indirect contempt, and ruling that by injunction should be prevented by proper legislation.

“Seventh.—We favor just pensions for our disabled Union soldiers.

“Eighth.—Believing that the election franchise and untrammelled ballot are essential to a Government of, for and by the people, the People's Party condemn the wholesale system of disfranchisement adopted in some States as unrepugnant and undemocratic, and we declare it to be the duty of the several State Legislatures to take such action as will secure a full, free and fair ballot, and an honest count.

“Ninth.—While the foregoing propositions constitute the platform upon which our party stands, and for the vindication of which its organization will be maintained, we recognize that the great and pressing issue of the pending campaign upon which the present Presidential election will turn, is the financial question, and, upon this great and specific issue between the parties, we cordially invite the aid and co-operation of all organizations and citizens agreeing with us upon this vital question.”



MARION BUTLER.

Born in Sampson co., N. C., May 20, 1863; graduated at University of N. C., 1885; relinquished study of law for farming; joined Farmers' Alliance and edited *Clinton Caucasian*; elected to State Senate, 1890; elected president of Farmers' Alliance, 1891-92; V.-P. of Nat. Farmers' Alliance, 1893; President of same, 1894; severed connection with Dem. party in 1892, and built up People's party in 1893-94; Chairman of Populist Committee; member of Board of State University; elected as Populist to U. S. Senate, 1895; Chairman of Com. on Executive Expenditures, and member of Committees on Agriculture, Coast Defences, Epidemic Diseases, Fisheries, and Post Offices and Roads.



THOMAS E. WATSON

LIFE OF THOMAS E. WATSON.

Thomas Edward Watson, nominee of the People's party for Vice-President, was born in Columbia County, Georgia, on September 5, 1856. After passing through the public schools, he entered Mercer University, at Macon, Ga., in 1872, but did not complete a full course for lack of means. He taught school for a time and then entered the law office of Judge W. R. McLaws, of Augusta, Ga. On his admission to the bar, he began practice at Thomson, in 1876.

In 1880, at the age of twenty-four, he entered the political arena as a delegate to the Democratic State Convention, and at once leaped into fame by one of the most eloquent speeches delivered before that body. In 1882 he was elected to the lower house of the State Legislature, and, in 1888, was a Democratic Presidential elector-at-large.

In 1890 he was elected to Congress from the Augusta District as a Democrat, receiving 5,456 votes, against 597 for Anthony E. Williams, his Republican candidate. In this campaign he exhibited much force and ability as a speaker, and was a stern champion of the principles inculcated by the Farmers' Alliance.

In the House, he distinguished himself as a fiery debater, and took a leading part in several parliamentary battles. His unique personality and sanguine temperament attracted the attention of the country at large. He took strong ground against the principles and methods of both political parties, and thus in turn won the applause of both.

In 1892, he became the nominee of the People's party

for Congress in his district. He began his campaign by the publication of a book which contained charges against the morality of members of the House. An investigation followed, pending which Watson defended the truth of his charges with great ability, but a majority of the investigating committee found them without warrant.

Throughout his second campaign, he championed the cause of the farmer, poor man, and negro, as against the rich, and held a series of exciting debates with his opponent, which resulted in much ill-feeling at the time. Able as he was upon the stump, he could not stem the tide which set in against him, because of his liberal notions, and he was defeated at the election by a vote of 17,772 to 12,333.

In 1894, he again tried conclusions with his old opponent, Mr. Black, and this time as a straighter than ever Populist. Though he made a splendid campaign, he was again doomed to defeat by 20,942 to 13,498 votes. There were charges and counter-charges of fraud, and Mr. Black, declining to enter on a term about which there was a dispute, resigned his seat. This enabled the two competitors to make another appeal to the people. It was made at a special election held October 2d, 1895, and resulted in another defeat for Watson by a vote of 10,193 to 8,637.

In 1878, Mr. Watson was married to Miss Georgia Durham, and has two children. In appearance he is slender, angular and youthful looking. His head is crowned with a luxuriant crop of auburn hair. His physical appearance by no means denotes the fiery zeal, persistent energy, great mental activity, and wonderful oratorical powers of the man who even excels his running mate on the Populist ticket in his speedy march to fame and in superb rhetorical force.

NATIONAL SILVER PARTY.

CANDIDATES AND PLATFORM FOR 1896.

The National Silver Party met in its first National Convention at St. Louis on July 22, 1896, simultaneously with the meeting of the People's party, with which it was in close political affiliation. This new party owed its existence to the American Bimetallic League, which on February 22, 1895, at Chicago, appointed a committee of congressmen, with Hon. William M. Stewart, of Nevada, at their head, to promote "the equal use of gold and silver." There was established at Washington an executive committee of the league, or party, whose head and active spirit was ex-Congressman A. Judson Warner, of Marietta, Ohio, afterwards of Washington. Minor leagues were formed throughout the country, all with a common view, and these became consolidated under the name of the American Bimetallic Union.

This union, league or party was encouraged and grew on the hypothesis that neither of the leading political parties would favor its principles in their conventions; but after the adoption of a free silver coinage platform by the Democratic party at Chicago, and the nomination of Bryan and Sewall, it found in both platform and in those candidates what it wanted, and forthwith issued the following proclamation and indorsement through its Executive Committee ;

CHICAGO, ILL., July 12.

“To the members of the American Bimetallic Union and of all affiliated unions and leagues throughout the United States, and all other friends of bimetallism :

“Whereas, The American Bimetallic Union, being a consolidation of the American Bimetallic League, the National Bimetallic Union, the National Silver Committee, and other bimetallic organizations, called a conference at Washington, D. C., on the 22d day of January last, at which conference it was determined that the people in the approaching election should have the opportunity to vote for candidates for President and Vice-President, and for members of Congress, committed unequivocally to the restoration of the unrestricted coinage of both gold and silver on the terms of equality existing prior to 1873, and to make this determination sure, a convention was called by said conference to meet at St. Louis on the 22d day of July, there to place in nomination candidates for President and Vice-President, in case, meantime, neither of the two great parties—as then appeared doubtful—offered acceptable candidates on a platform committing the candidates and the party to the restoration of the unrestricted coinage of both gold and silver ; and,

“Whereas, The Democratic convention just ended at Chicago has adopted a platform containing all that bimetallics have demanded, fully and unequivocally expressed, and has nominated candidates of distinguished ability, and long known as sincere adherents of our cause ; therefore be it

“Resolved, That in the opinion of this committee but one duty remains for the friends of this great cause to perform, and that is to unite as one man in support

of the platform adopted at Chicago and the candidates nominated thereon, and to work with might and main until the election in November to secure the success of this ticket. If this is done we sincerely believe that our cause will be won and prosperity be restored to our people.

“The only danger to be feared is in a division of our own forces, which we pray will not be allowed to take place. To divide our forces on the eve of the great contest before us would be unnatural and suicidal ; and for one to lead a revolt in such a cause and at such a time, would come little short of being a public crime. We therefore appeal to all members of the bimetallic union and of affiliated silver leagues and all others opposed to the continuance of the single gold standard, regardless of party affiliations, to come to the support of the platform and the splendid ticket given us at the people’s great convention just held at Chicago. We further urge upon all who agree with us upon this vital issue, to join us at St. Louis on July 22d, there to in-dorse and ratify the work so nobly begun.

“A. J. Warner, President.

“R. C. Chambers, First Vice-President.

“Henry G. Miller, Second Vice-President.

“Thomas G. Merrill, Treasurer.

“J. B. Grant, of Executive Committee.

“H. F. Bartine, of Executive Committee.

“George E. Bowen, Secretary.”

This proclamation was of course a commitment, in advance of the forthcoming convention of the party to the Democratic nominees and platform, at least so far as the latter represented free silver coinage, and when the

convention actually assembled at St. Louis, it soon made known its preference for Bryan and Sewall. It also raised a committee to confer with a similar committee on the part of the Populists, then also in National Convention at St. Louis, over the details of an out and out alliance of all the free silver coinage elements of the country with the Democratic party.

These committees did not prove very effective for their purpose, and the convention made haste to adopt its platform and to nominate by acclamation the nominees of the Chicago convention, Bryan and Sewall, for President and Vice President.

THE NATIONAL SILVER PARTY PLATFORM OF 1896.

First—The paramount issue at this time in the United States is indisputably the money question. It is between the gold standard, gold bonds and bank currency on the one side and the bimetallic standard, no bonds and government currency on the other.

On this issue we declare ourselves to be in favor of a distinctively American financial system. We are unalterably opposed to the single gold standard, and demand the immediate return to the constitutional standard of gold and silver by the restoration by this government, independently of any foreign power, of the unrestricted coinage of both gold and silver into standard money at the ratio of 16 to 1 and upon terms of exact equality, as they existed prior to 1873; the silver coin to be a full legal tender, equally with gold, for all debts and dues, private and public, and we favor such legislation as will

prevent for the future the demonetization of any kind of legal tender money by private contract.

We hold that the power to control, and regulate a paper currency is inseparable from the power to coin money, and hence that all currency intended to circulate as money should be issued, and its volume controlled, by the general government only and should be legal tender.

We are unalterably opposed to the issue by the United States of interest-bearing bonds in time of peace, and we denounce as a blunder worse than a crime the present treasury policy, concurred in by a Republican House, of plunging the country in debt by hundreds of millions in the vain attempt to maintain the gold standard by borrowing gold ; and we demand the payment of all coin obligations of the United States, as provided by existing laws, in either gold or silver coin at the option of the government—not the option of the creditor.

The demonetization of silver in 1873 enormously increased the demand for gold, enhancing its purchasing power and lowering all prices measured by that standard ; and since that unjust and indefensible act the prices of American products have fallen upon an average nearly 50 per cent., carrying down with them proportionally the money value of all other forms of property. Such fall of prices has destroyed the profits of legitimate industry, injuring the producer for the benefit of the non-producer, increasing the burden of the debtor, swelling the gains of the creditor, paralyzing the productive energies of the American people, relegating to idleness vast numbers of willing workers, sending the shadows of despair into the home of the honest toiler, filling the land with tramps and paupers and building up colossal fortunes at the money centres.

In the effort to maintain the gold standard the country has within the last two years in a time of profound peace and plenty, been loaded down with \$262,000,000 of additional interest-bearing debt, under such circumstances as to allow a syndicate of native and foreign bankers to realize a new profit of millions on a single deal.

It stands confessed that the gold standard can only be upheld by so depleting our paper currency as to force the prices of our products below the European and even below the Asiatic level, to enable us to sell in foreign markets, thus aggravating the very evils of which our people so bitterly complain, degrading American labor and striking at the foundation of our civilization itself.

The advocates of the gold standard persistently claim that the cause of our distress is overproduction; that we have produced so much that it has made us poor, which implies that the true remedy is to close the factory, abandon the farm and throw a multitude of people out of employment, a doctrine that leaves us unnerved and disheartened and absolutely without hope for the future.

We affirm it to be unquestioned that there can be no such economic paradox as over-production and at the same time tens of thousands of our fellow-citizens remaining half clothed and half fed and who are piteously clamoring for the common necessities of life.

Second—That over and above all other questions of policy, we are in favor of restoring to the people of the United States the time-honored money of the Constitution—gold and silver, not one, but both—the money of Washington and Hamilton, and Jefferson and Monroe,

and Jackson and Lincoln, to the end that the American people may receive honest pay for an honest product; that the American debtor may pay his just obligations in an honest standard and not in a standard that has appreciated one hundred per cent. above all the great staples of our country, and to the end further that silver standard countries may be deprived of the unjust advantage they now enjoy in the difference in exchange between gold and silver—an advantage which tariff legislation alone cannot overcome.

We therefore confidently appeal to the people of the United States to leave in abeyance for the moment all other questions, however important and even momentous they may appear, to sunder, if need be, all former party ties and affiliate and unite in one supreme effort to free themselves and their children from the domination of the money power—a power more destructive than any which has ever been fastened upon the civilized men of any race or in any age. And upon the consummation of our desire and efforts we invoke the gracious favor of Divine Providence.







